Abstracts and Online Papers
Published
(and forthcoming) Papers:
In this paper I defend the theory that knowledge
is credit-worthy true belief against a family of objections, one of which was
leveled against it
in a recent paper by Jennifer Lackey. In that paper, Lackey argues that testimonial
knowledge is problematic for the credit-worthiness theory because when person
A comes to know that p by way of the testimony of person B, it would appear
that any credit due to A for coming to believe truly that p belongs to the
testifier, B, rather than the hearer, A. If so, then knowledge would appear
not to be a matter of credit for true belief. I think that the problem this
raises actually has little to do with the fact that the knowledge comes by
way of testimony, and that similar objections can be formulated in terms of
perceptual and memorial knowledge. I will attempt to neutralize these objections
by drawing a distinction between credit as praiseworthiness and credit as attributability.
“Luck, Knowledge, and Control,” forthcoming in Epistemic Value, A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. H. Pritchard, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
“Understanding, Knowledge, and the Meno Requirement,” forthcoming in Epistemic Value, A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. H. Pritchard, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Twentieth Century Anglo-American philosophy famously
took a "linguistic turn", wherein philosophers sought to gain purchase
on traditional problems in metaphysics, epistemology, and to some extent
ethics, by first settling some fundamental questions in the philosophy of
language. While this movement has largely run its course, it did provide
us with lasting insights into some of these problems. In an analogous fashion,
I think that philosophers can gain insight into the traditional problems
of epistemology (at least) by attending first to questions of (epistemic)
value. In this paper, I describe in general terms both the motivations for
and the method of what I call "value-driven" epistemology. This is an approach
to epistmeology that, while it is not exclusive of other approaches that
are discussed, promises certain advantages that other approaches cannot offer.
It is nearly universally acknowledged among epistemologists that a belief, even if true, cannot count as knowledge if it is somehow largely a matter of luck that the person so arrived at the truth. A striking feature of this literature, however, is that while many epistemologists are busy arguing about which particular technical condition most effectively rules out the offensive presence of luck in true believing, almost no one is asking why it matters so much that knowledge be immune from luck in the first place. I argue that the best explanation for the consensus that luck undermines knowledge is that knowledge is, complications aside, credit-worthy true believing. To make this case, I develop both the notions of luck and credit, and sketch a theory of knowledge in those terms.
It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to
believe anything upon insufficient evidence. –W. K. Clifford
We must know the truth; and we must avoid error—these are our first and great commandments as
would-be knowers; but they are not two ways of stating an identical
commandment, they are two separable laws…. –William James
This famous philosophical exchange contains a profound lesson for contemporary epistemology that seems to have gone unlearned. The crucial point made by James is the distinction between and the equal importance of the two goals of pursuing true beliefs and avoiding false ones. Though seemingly banal, this distinction, if taken seriously, would change the epistemological landscape in interesting and surprising ways. I argue that contemporary epistemological dogma about knowledge and its relation to these two cognitive goals is confused, and clarification of these matters will perhaps be a step in the direction of a fruitful realignment in epistemology. In particular, it shows that “knowledge,” though still an important epistemological concept, need not (and should not) dominate epistemological discussion and debate as it currently does.
"Beyond Truth & Falsehood: The Real Value of Knowing that p," (Philosophical Studies 107, 2002)
Three common assumptions in epistemology are that (1) knowledge derives all of its value from the ends or goods of cognition, (2) there are only two of these goods: having true beliefs and avoiding falsehoods, and (3) knowledge is always more valuable than mere true belief. In this paper I argue that the first two assumptions entail the denial of the third. Rather than give up assumption (3), I argue that the best alternative is to abandon (2) instead. If we accept a third value as an additional cognitive good, we can retain our commitment to (3). I conclude by recommending and briefly defending the value of "epistemic credit" as this third value.
"Understanding 'Virtue'
and the Virtue of Understanding," in Intellectual
Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology,
Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003).
Virtue theories are very popular in epistemology these days,
but they are a motley bunch. But despite the diversity among these competing
theories, there are two common features. First, virtues are defined as being
either teleologically or causally related to the cognitive end of having true
beliefs. Second, most epistemologists take the primary epistemological task of
"virtue theory" to be to help us account for knowledge and
justification. I think virtue theorists are wrong on both points. Virtues
should be defined in terms of the goal of "understanding," not merely
in terms of true belief. And the promise of virtue theory lies in its ability
to illuminate and explain the values inherent in our cognitive lives. One
cannot account for the wide array of epistemically valuable (and disvaluable)
states, processes, things, etc. with only the concepts of knowledge and
justification. Thus, epistemological virtue theory should be pursued on its own
terms, not yoked to the project of analyzing "knowledge."
"Reliability
and the Value of
Knowledge," (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64, January
2002)
Reliabilism has come under recent attack for its alleged inability to account for the value we typically ascribe to knowledge. It is charged that a reliably-produced true belief has no more value than does the true belief alone. I reply to these charges on behalf of reliabilism; not because I think reliabilism is the correct theory of knowledge, but rather because being reliably-produced does add value of a sort to true beliefs. The added value stems from the fact that a reliably-held belief is non-accidental in a particular way. While it is widely acknowledged that accidentally true beliefs cannot count as knowledge, it is rarely questioned why this should be so. An answer to this question emerges from the discussion of the value of reliability, an answer that holds interesting implications for the value and nature of knowledge.
"What Are the 'Chances' of Being Justified?" The Monist 81 (3), 1998.The purposes of this essay are two-fold. First, it adds to the growing number of arguments that the responsibilist and truth-conducivist conceptions of epistemic justification are distinct notions, and should be pursued separately rather than treated as mutually exclusive. Second, it attempts to explain the sense in which the two notions are, in fact, related. The connection is genetic, or historical. Each conception arises from an identical epistemological concern--the desire to disallow mere "accidents" from counting as instances of knowledge. One interesting consequence of this is that neither notion can claim epistemological precedence over the other.
"The Weakness of Strong Justification," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2), 1997.Alvin Goldman's reliabilist theory of epistemic justification is a paradigm example of a truth-conducive conception of justification. Other philosophers (e.g., Stewart Cohen and Laurence BonJour, among others) have criticized his view for not satisfying the requirements of an alternative conception of justification often called "responsibilism." Goldman responds to these objections by trying to show that his view incorporates essential features of "responsibilism." This essay argues that Goldman fails in this attempt. Furthermore, the reasons for this failure highlight the tensions between the two conceptions of justification. It is precisely because his theory is truth-conducive that it cannot also be responsibilist.
It is a commonplace in epistemology that normative terms
like “knowledge” and “justified” get their normative content by virtue of their
connection to the epistemic goal of having true beliefs. In this paper, I argue that, given the
nature of the connection between truth and justification, the value of having
true beliefs is not sufficient to account for the value generally attributed to
having justified beliefs. To make this
case, I discuss the value theories that implicitly underlie reliabilism and
what I call “responsibilism,” which I take to be the other dominant conception
of epistemic justification.
“Can A Coherence Theory Appeal to Appearance States?” Philosophical
Studies 67 (3), 1992 (co-author: Jonathan Kvanvig).
Two of the most important types of theories of justification
are foundationalism and coherentism. While some foundationalist theories define justification as a relation
on both belief states and appearance states, coherence theorists have
universally defined justification as a relation only among (the contents of)
belief states. We argue that this
restriction on coherentism is merely a regrettable artifact of its
history. By abandoning this artifact,
coherentists can provide responses to some of the more common problems facing
their theory—responses which are not available without abandoning this
artificial restriction.
"Insight, Open-Mindedness and Understanding"
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