lar to those governing conventional bombing. That the new weapon might be special was understood, but its revolutionary nature was not their central concern. As Michael D. Gordin demonstrates in detail, their task was to get it ready for use and delivery. That involved transporting, transferring, and assembling the various elements needed for the bombing and making sure all was in order before the *Enola Gay* took off on its mission.

A report on this level of activity helps round out our understanding and is a genuine contribution. The author also adds to our knowledge about the attitudes of several high-level military leaders in the period between the August 6 Hiroshima bombing and the August 14 Japanese surrender. He shows—again, this is not surprising and has been previously documented—many were hard at work preparing a third bomb because they could not assume the first bombs would bring surrender. New details on how they understood the weapon are also useful, but in this area the author is working through materials that have been reported on to a substantial degree by other scholars.

The main problem with the book is its attempt to document a much more far-reaching claim largely with narrowly focused research on those two groups. What Gordin tries to argue is that before Japan surrendered, the atomic bomb was *generally* not recognized to be a weapon with revolutionary implications—and that only the suddenness of Japan's surrender created that understanding. However, we have a great deal of evidence demonstrating that American leaders knew full well they were dealing with something extraordinary. As Gordin notes, Interim Committee minutes show that Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Gen. George C. Marshall both viewed the atomic bomb not simply as a new weapon, "but as a new relationship of man to the universe" (p. 56). The first atomic test made Gen. Thomas F. Farrell feel that "we puny things were blasphemous to dare tamper with the forces heretofore reserved to The Almighty" (Gar Alperovitz, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,* 1995, p. 251). And well before its use President Harry S. Truman described it as "the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark" (*ibid.*, p. 250).

Gar Alperovitz
University of Maryland
College Park, Maryland

Caliban and the Yankees: Trinidad and the United States Occupation. By Harvey R. Neptune. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. xiv, 274 pp. Cloth, $59.95, ISBN 978-0-8078-3080-2. Paper, $21.95, ISBN 978-0-8078-5788-5.)

Even before Pearl Harbor, Franklin D. Roosevelt got Winston Churchill to allow U.S. fortifications in the British Caribbean. On Trinidad, an island of half a million souls, the U.S. Navy and Army built two bases, stationed twenty-five thousand troops, and gave jobs to tens of thousands. In this engaging study, Harvey R. Neptune explores the social impact of such sudden militarization.

The story of the occupation presents "no clear-cut narratives" but plenty of "quotidian social conflict" (p. 1). It is this story that Neptune unwraps in two main themes. The first is the surprisingly positive—or at least ambivalent—reception given to U.S. forces. To be sure, as in other U.S. base communities, locals were embarrassed by their own poverty and dependency and repulsed by U.S. racism and unruliness. But working-class Trinidadians generally welcomed the Yankee dollar. Americans came with jobs, bought local goods, and spent lavishly on local entertainment (and women). Trinidadians saw in the occupiers bringers not only of work but also of movies, zoot suits, and informality—in short, of modernity.

The second dominant theme is internal conflict, especially between the two groups who claimed to voice public opinion. One of those was the elites, who worried about losing their maids to higher-paying Americans and their position as arbiters of fashion. The wealthy feared the "abnormal purchasing power" of the working classes under occupation and attempted to limit the "prevailing wage" (p. 97). The second group was made up of intellectuals such as Albert Gomes and Jean De Boissiere, nationalists who opposed the occupation on principle yet sympathized with working-class needs.

These "patriot dissidents" were determined to leverage the troop presence to accelerate the decline of British influence, even though some of them clung to British tastes (p. 115).

The majority of the struggles occurred on the terrain of culture. The calypso, for instance, and its working-class performers owed their wartime popularity largely to U.S. patrons, and their songs even spoke of the emasculating—and, to the upper classes, threatening—spectacle of nonwhite Trinidadian women frequenting white occupation forces. The book explores the debates and puns revolving around terms such as "saga boys," "mopsies," and "Pam Palaam."

The author repeatedly makes clear that the voices of the poor and of women long remained largely silent, which allowed nationalist historians such as Eric Williams to craft a one-sided narrative of united struggle against U.S. occupation, paving the way for independence in 1962. To defy that teleology and amplify those muffled voices, the author delves into U.S. and British archives and offers creative readings of Trinidadian newspapers, songs, and novels.

Neptune has so fully researched and so carefully explained the ramifications of the occupation that what may have been of interest only to historians of Trinidad should now be relevant to all the literature on U.S. foreign relations. *Caliban and the Yankees* should be read by a wide audience for its erudition, lively prose, and deft unearthing of the cultural complexities that can develop when U.S. foreign troops step on friendly foreign ground.

Alan McPherson
Howard University
Washington, D.C.

Radical Pacifism in Modern America: Egalitarianism and Protest. By Marian Mollin. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006. x, 255 pp. $49.95, ISBN 978-0-8122-3952-2.)

This book is essentially a detailed examination and critique of the protest actions of the radical pacifist movement in the United States from 1940 to 1970. Marian Mollin critiques the largely white-male-led movement for its failure, despite its rhetoric and intentions, to act consistently either for racial or gender equality and for not including women or African Americans in its leadership and the planning of protests. She charges that neither gender nor race relations improved over the three decades her book covers. This, despite the fact that the leaders of the movement who served jail sentences for their refusal to serve in World War II acted militantly and heroically resisting the pervasive Jim Crow in the prison system. Black conscientious objectors refused to sit at segregated tables and white conscientious objectors supported those actions by refusing to work or eat until equal treatment was established. For that they suffered harsh physical repression but won support from hardened prisoners, forced concessions from the authorities, and brought the issue to public attention. That victory led the radical pacifists to favor a masculinist image, which they believed would lessen the "sissy" and "coward" appellations attached to those who refused to fight in the war.

During World War II female radical pacifists could not engage in such heroics. All they could do was provide moral and material support for male objectors who were confined to special camps for those who chose alternate service over military duty. Later, during the antinuclear protests in the early 1960s and the antidraft actions in the Vietnam War years, women were expected to resist and face imprisonment by holding the cups in which the male draft refusers deposited the ashes of their burned draft cards. Apparently, no matter how militant the women were, they discovered that their male cohorts did not recognize them as equals in leadership, this despite strong feminist criticism.

Racial misunderstanding arose in the Quebec-Washington-Guantanamo Walk for Peace of 1963, which was made up of an interracial team of a dozen women and men. When the walk reached the South and began to interact with the civil rights movement, tensions and conflicts arose. There were differences in history, culture, political goals, and priorities that separated the white and black peace walkers. The radical pacifists were not interested in gaining political power. Their main aim was to demonstrate the power of civil disobedience, whereas the civil rights movement desperately

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