Financial Intermediary Capital*

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Abstract

We propose a dynamic theory of financial intermediaries as collateralization specialists that are better able to collateralize claims than households. Intermediaries require capital as they can borrow against their loans only to the extent that households themselves can collateralize the assets backing the loans. The net worth of financial intermediaries and the corporate sector are both state variables affecting the spread between intermediated and direct finance and the dynamics of real economic activity, such as investment, and financing. The accumulation of net worth of intermediaries is slow relative to that of the corporate sector. A credit crunch has persistent real effects and can result in a delayed or stalled recovery. We provide sufficient conditions for the comovement of the marginal value of firm and intermediary capital.

Keywords: Collateral; Financial intermediation; Financial constraints; Investment

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1 Introduction

The capitalization of financial intermediaries is arguably critical for economic fluctuations and growth. We provide a dynamic model in which financial intermediaries are collateralization specialists and firms need to collateralize promises to pay with tangible assets. Financial intermediaries are modeled as lenders that are able to collateralize a larger fraction of tangible assets than households who lend to firms directly, that is, are better able to enforce their claims. Financial intermediaries require net worth as their ability to refinance their collateralized loans from households is limited, as they, too, need to collateralize their promises. The net worth of financial intermediaries is hence a state variable and affects the dynamics of the economy. Importantly, both firm and intermediary net worth play a role in our model and jointly affect the dynamics of firm investment, financing, and loan spreads. Spreads on intermediated finance are high when both firms and financial intermediaries are poorly capitalized and in particular when intermediaries are moreover poorly capitalized relative to firms. One of our main results is that intermediaries accumulate net worth more slowly than the corporate sector. This has important implications for economic dynamics. For example, a credit crunch, that is, a drop in intermediary net worth, has persistent real effects and can result in a delayed or stalled recovery.

In our model, firms can raise financing either from households or from financial intermediaries. Firms have to collateralize their promises to pay due to limited enforcement. Both households and intermediaries extend collateralized loans, but financial intermediaries are better able to collateralize promises and hence are able to extend more financing per unit of tangible assets collateralizing their loans. Financial intermediaries in turn are able to borrow against their loans, but only to the extent that other lenders themselves can collateralize the assets backing the loans. Intermediaries thus need to finance the additional amount that they are able to lend out of their own net worth. Since intermediary net worth is limited, intermediated finance commands a positive spread.

The determinants of the capital structure for firms and intermediaries differ. Firms' capital structure is determined by the extent to which the tangible assets required for production can be collateralized. Intermediaries' capital structure is determined by the extent to which their collateralized loans can be collateralized themselves. In other words, firms issue promises against tangible assets whereas intermediaries issue promises against collateralized claims, which are in turn backed by tangible assets.

Intermediaries are essential in our economy in the sense that allocations can be

\footnote{Rampini and Viswanathan (2010, 2013) provide a dynamic model with collateral constraints which are explicitly derived in an environment with limited enforcement.}
achieved with financial intermediaries, which cannot be achieve otherwise. Financial intermediaries have constant returns in our model and hence there is a representative financial intermediary. We first consider the equilibrium spread on intermediated finance in a static environment with a representative firm. Importantly, the spread on intermediated finance critically depends on both firm and intermediary net worth. Given the (representative) firm's net worth, spreads are higher when the intermediary is less well capitalized. However, spreads are particularly high when firms are poorly capitalized, and intermediaries are poorly capitalized relative to firms at the same time. Poor capitalization of the corporate sector per se does not imply high spreads, as low firm net worth reduces the demand for loans from intermediaries. Given the net worth of the intermediary sector, a reduction in the net worth of the corporate sector may reduce spreads as the intermediaries can more easily accommodate the reduced loan demand.

Our model allows the analysis of the dynamics of intermediary capital. A main result is that the accumulation of net worth of intermediaries is slow relative to that of the corporate sector. We first consider the deterministic dynamics of intermediary net worth and the spread on intermediated finance. In a deterministic steady state, intermediaries are essential, have positive net worth, and the spread on intermediated finance is positive. Dynamically, if firms and intermediaries are initially poorly capitalized, both firms and intermediaries accumulate net worth over time. Importantly, firms in our model accumulate net worth faster than financial intermediaries, because the marginal and in particular the average return on net worth for financially constrained firms is relatively high due to the high marginal product of capital. Financial intermediaries accumulate net worth at the interest rate earned on intermediated finance, which is at most the marginal return on net worth of the corporate sector and may be below when the collateral constraint for intermediated finance binds. Thus, intermediaries, with constant returns to scale, earn at most the marginal return on all their net worth, whereas firms, with decreasing returns to scale, earn the average return on their net worth.

Suppose that firms are initially poorly capitalized also relative to financial intermediaries. Then the dynamics of the spread on intermediated finance are as follows. Because the firms are poorly capitalized, the current demand for intermediated finance is low and the spread on intermediated finance is zero. Intermediaries save net worth by lending to households to meet higher future corporate loan demand. As the firms accumulate more net worth, their demand for intermediated finance increases, and intermediary finance

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2In Appendix A, we analyze the choice between intermediated and direct finance in the cross section of firms in a static environment. More constrained firms borrow more from intermediaries, which is empirically plausible and similar to the results in Holmström and Tirole (1997).
becomes scarce and the spread rises. The spread continues to rise as long as the firm’s collateral constraint for intermediated finance binds. Once the spread gets so high that the collateral constraint is slack, the spread declines again as both firms and intermediaries accumulate net worth. Since intermediary net worth accumulates more slowly, firms may temporarily accumulate more net worth and then later on re-lever as they switch to more intermediated finance when intermediaries become better capitalized. Eventually, the spread on intermediated finance declines to the steady state spread as intermediaries accumulate their steady state level of net worth.

A credit crunch, modeled as a drop in intermediary net worth, has persistent real effects in our model. While small drops to intermediary net worth can be absorbed by a cut in dividends, larger shocks reduce intermediary lending and raise the spread on intermediated finance. Real investment drops, and indeed drops even if the corporate sector is well capitalized, as the rise in the cost of intermediated finance raises firms’ cost of capital. Remarkably, the recovery of investment after a credit crunch can be delayed, or stall, as the cost of intermediated finance only starts to fall once intermediaries have again accumulated sufficient net worth.

In a stochastic economy, we provide sufficient conditions for the marginal value of intermediary and firm net worth to comove. For example, if intermediary net worth is sufficiently low, these values comove and indeed move proportionally. Thus, the marginal value of intermediary net worth may be high exactly when the marginal value of firm net worth is high, too.

Few extant theories of financial intermediaries provide a role for intermediary capital. Notable is in particular Holmström and Tirole (1997) who model intermediaries as monitors that cannot commit to monitoring and hence need to have their own capital at stake to have incentives to monitor. In their analysis, firm and intermediary capital are exogenous and the comparative statics with respect to these are analyzed. Holmström and Tirole conclude that “[a] proper investigation ... must take into account the feedback from interest rates to capital values. This will require an explicitly dynamic model, for instance, along the lines of Kiyotaki and Moore [1997a].” We provide a dynamic model in which the joint evolution of firm and intermediary net worth and the interest rate on intermediated finance are endogenously determined. Diamond and Rajan (2001) and Diamond (2007) model intermediaries as lenders which are better able to enforce their claims due to their specific liquidation or monitoring ability in a similar spirit to our model, but do not consider equilibrium dynamics. In contrast, the capitalization of financial intermediaries plays essentially no role in liquidity provision theories of financial intermediation (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)), in theories of financial intermediaries
as delegated, diversified monitors (Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), and Williamson (1986)) or in coalition based theories (Townsend (1978) and Boyd and Prescott (1986)).

Dynamic models in which net worth plays a role, such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997a), typically consider the role of firm net worth only, although dynamic models in which intermediary net worth matters have recently been considered (see, for example, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), who also summarize the recent literature, and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2010)). However, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider a dynamic model in which both firm and intermediary net worth are critical and jointly affect the dynamics of financing, spreads, and economic activity.

In Section 2 we describe the model. Section 3 studies how the spread on intermediated finance varies with firm and intermediary net worth in a simplified static version of the model. The dynamics of intermediary capital are analyzed in Section 4. We first consider the deterministic steady state and dynamics of firm and intermediary capital, and the dynamic effects of a credit crunch. We then provide sufficient conditions for the comovement of the marginal value of intermediary and firm net worth in a stochastic economy. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix B.

2 Model

We consider a model in which promises to pay need to be collateralized due to limited enforcement. There are three types of agents: households, financial intermediaries, and agents that run firms; we discuss these in turn. We consider an environment with a representative firm. Time is discrete and the horizon infinite. There is an exogenous state \(s \in S\), which determines the firm’s productivity, that follows a Markov chain with transition probability \(\Pi(s, s')\), where \(S\) is a finite state space.\(^3\)

2.1 Households

There is a continuum of households (of measure 1) in the economy which are risk neutral and discount future payoffs at a rate \(R > 1\) where \(R^{-1} > \beta\) and \(\beta \in (0, 1)\) is the discount rate of agents who run firms, that is, households are more patient than the agents who run firms. These lenders are assumed to have a large endowment of funds in all dates and states, and have a large amount of collateral and hence are not subject to enforcement

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\(^3\)In a slight abuse of notation, we denote the cardinality of \(S\) by \(S\) as well.
problems but rather are able to commit to deliver on their promises. They are willing to provide any state-contingent claim at an expected rate of return $R$ so long as such claims satisfy the firms' and intermediaries' collateral constraints.

### 2.2 Financial intermediaries as collateralization specialists

There is a continuum of financial intermediaries (of measure 1) which are risk neutral, subject to limited liability, and discount future payoffs at $\beta_i$ where $\beta_i \in (\beta, R^{-1})$. Financial intermediaries are \textit{collateralization specialists}. Intermediaries are able to seize up to fraction $\theta_i \in (0, 1)$ of the (resale value of) collateral backing promises issued to them; we assume that $\theta_i > \theta$ where $\theta \in (0, 1)$ is the fraction of collateral that households can seize. The left-hand side of Figure 1 illustrates this, interpreting the fraction $\theta$ as structures, which both households and intermediaries can collateralize, and the fraction $\theta_i - \theta$ as equipment, which only financial intermediaries can collateralize. Financial intermediaries can in turn issue claims against their collateralized loans. Lenders to financial intermediaries can lend to intermediaries up to the amount of the collateral backing the intermediaries' loans that they themselves can seize. Consider the problem of a representative financial intermediary\footnote{We consider a representative financial intermediary since intermediaries have constant returns to scale in our model and hence aggregation in the intermediation sector is straightforward. The distribution of intermediaries’ net worth is hence irrelevant and only the aggregate capital of the intermediation sector matters.} with current net worth $w_i$ and given the state of the economy $Z = \{s, w, w_i\}$ which includes the exogenous state $s$ as well as two endogenous state variables, the net worth of the corporate sector $w$ and the net worth of the intermediary sector $w_i$. The state-contingent interest rate on intermediated finance $R_i'$ depends on state $s'$ and the state $Z$ of the economy, as shown below, but we suppress the argument for notational simplicity.

The intermediary maximizes the discounted value of future dividends by choosing a dividend payout policy $d_i$, state-contingent loans to households $l'$, state-contingent intermediated loans to firms $l_i'$, and state-contingent net worth $w_i'$ next period to solve

$$v_i(w_i, Z) = \max_{d_i, l', l_i', w_i', \theta_i \in R_i' + \theta} d_i + \beta_i E[v_i(l_i', Z')]$$

subject to the budget constraints

$$w_i \geq d_i + E[l'] + E[l_i'],$$

$$Rl' + R_i'l_i' \geq w_i.'$$
We denote variables which are measurable with respect to the next period, that is, depend on the state $s'$, with a prime; that is, we use the shorthand $w' \equiv w(s')$ and analogously for other variables.

Note that we state the intermediary's problem as if the intermediary only lends the additional amount it can collateralize. This simplifies the notation and analysis. We do not need to consider the intermediary's collateral constraint explicitly, as the firms' collateral constraint for financing ultimately provided by the households already ensures that this constraint is satisfied, rendering the additional constraint redundant. However, whenever the intermediary is essential in the sense that the allocation cannot be supported without an intermediary, the interpretation is that the firms' claims are held by the intermediary and the intermediary in turn refines the claims with households to the extent that they can collateralize the claims themselves. In contrast, we interpret financing which does not involve the intermediary as direct or unintermediated financing.

The first order conditions, which are necessary and sufficient, can be written as

\begin{align*}
\mu_i &= 1 + \eta_{i}, \\
\mu_i &= R\beta_i\mu_i^* + R\beta_i\eta_i^*, \\
\mu_i &= R_i\beta_i\mu_i^* + R_i\beta_i\eta_i^*, \\
\mu_i^* &= v_i(w_i', Z'),
\end{align*}

where the multipliers on the constraints (2) through (3) are $\mu_i$ and $\Pi(Z, Z')\beta_i\mu_i^*$, and $\eta_{i}$, $\Pi(Z, Z')R\beta_i\eta_i^*$, and $\Pi(Z, Z')R_i\beta_i\eta_i^*$ are the multipliers on the non-negativity constraints on dividends and direct and intermediated lending; the envelope condition is $v_i(w_i, Z) = \mu_i$.

### 2.3 Corporate sector

There is a representative firm which is risk neutral and subject to limited liability and discounts the future at rate $\beta$. The representative firm (which we at times refer to simply as the firm or the corporate sector) has limited net worth $w$ and has access to a standard neoclassical production technology $A'f(k)$ where $A' > 0$ is the stochastic total factor productivity, $f(\cdot)$ is the production function, and $k$ is the amount of capital the firm deploys next period, which depreciates at the rate $\delta \in (0, 1)$. We assume that the production function $f(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing and strictly concave and satisfies the usual Inada condition. Total factor productivity $A'$ depends on the exogenous state $s'$ next period, that is, $A' \equiv A(s')$. We suppress the dependence on $s'$ and use the short-hand $A'$ throughout as discussed above. The firm can raise financing from both households and intermediaries by issuing one-period collateralized state-contingent claims $b'$ to households and $b_i'$ to intermediaries.
We write the representative firm's problem recursively. The firm maximizes the discounted expected value of future dividends by choosing a dividend payout policy \( d \), capital \( k \), state-contingent promises \( b' \) and \( b'_i \) to households and intermediaries, and state-contingent net worth \( w' \) for the next period, taking the state-contingent interest rates on intermediated finance \( R'_i \) and their law of motion as given, to solve:

\[
v(w, Z) = \max_{\{d, k, b', b'_i, w'\} \in \mathbb{R}_+^4 \times \mathbb{R}^S \times \mathbb{R}_+^S} d + \beta E [v(w', Z')]
\]  

subject to the budget constraints

\[
w + E[b' + b'_i] \geq d + k, \quad A'f(k) + k(1 - \delta) \geq w' + Rb' + R'_i b'_i,
\]  

and the collateral constraints

\[
\theta k(1 - \delta) \geq Rb'_i, \quad (\theta_i - \theta) k(1 - \delta) \geq R'_i b'_i,
\]

where \( \theta \) is the fraction of tangible assets, that is, capital, that households can collateralize while \( \theta_i \) is the fraction of tangible assets that intermediaries can collateralize. Since the firm issues state-contingent claims to both households and intermediaries and pricing of the state-contingent loans is risk neutral, it is the expected value of the claims that enters the budget constraint in the current period, equation (9). Depending on the realized state next period, the firm repays \( Rb' \) to households and \( R'_i b'_i \) to financial intermediaries as the budget constraint for the next period, equation (10), shows. The interest rate on direct finance \( R \) is constant as discussed above. The middle and right-hand side of Figure 1 illustrate the collateral constraints (11) and (12). Note that the expectation operator \( E[\cdot] \) denotes the expectation conditional on state \( Z \), but the dependence on the state is again suppressed to simplify notation.

Importantly, to simplify the analysis we use notation that keeps track separately of the claims that are ultimately financed by households \((b')\) and the claims that are financed by intermediaries out of their own net worth \( b'_i \). In particular, whenever the firm borrows from financial intermediaries and issues strictly positive promises \( R'_i b'_i \), the corresponding promises \( Rb' \) should be interpreted as being financed by the intermediary who in turn refinances them by issuing equivalent promises to households. Thus, we do not distinguish between claims financed by households directly, and claims financed by households indirectly by lending to financial intermediaries against collateral backing intermediaries' loans. This allows a simple formulation of the collateral constraints: firms
can borrow up to fraction $\theta$ of the resale value of their capital by issuing claims to households (whether these are held directly or are indirectly financed via the intermediary) and can borrow up to the difference in collateralization rates, $\theta_i - \theta$, additionally by issuing claims which are financed by intermediaries out of their own net worth. We elaborate on the enforcement and settlement of claims below.\textsuperscript{5}

The first order conditions, which are necessary and sufficient, can be written as

$$\mu = 1 + \nu_d,$$

$$\mu = E[\gamma (\mu' [A'f_k(\kappa)] + (1 - \delta)) + [\lambda'\theta + \lambda'_i(\theta_i - \theta)](1 - \delta)],$$

$$\mu = R\beta \mu' + R\beta \lambda',$$

$$\mu = R_i\beta \mu' + R_i\beta \lambda_i - R_i\beta \nu_i,$$

$$\mu' = \nu_w(w', Z'),$$

where the multipliers on the constraints (9) through (12) are $\mu, \Pi(Z, Z')\beta \mu', \Pi(Z, Z')\beta \lambda'$, and $\Pi(Z, Z')\beta \lambda_i$, and $\nu_d$ and $\Pi(Z, Z')R_i\beta \nu_i$ are the multipliers on the non-negativity constraints on dividends and intermediated borrowing;\textsuperscript{6} the envelope condition is $v_w(w, Z) = \mu$.

\section{2.4 Enforcement and settlement}

Rampini and Viswanathan (2010, 2013) study an economy with limited enforcement and show that the optimal allocation can be implemented with complete markets in one period ahead Arrow securities subject to state-by-state collateral constraints. These collateral constraints are similar to the collateral constraints in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997a), except that they are state-contingent. The borrowers’ and intermediaries’ collateral constraints we analyze in this paper are in a similar spirit, although we do not derive them explicitly from limited enforcement constraints here.

An important additional aspect that arises in the context with financial intermediation is the enforcement of claims intermediaries issue against loans they hold. Our formulation of the contracting problem with separate constraints for promises ultimately issued to households and promises financed by intermediaries themselves allows us to

\textsuperscript{5}A model with two types of collateral constraints is also studied by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) who consider international financing in a model in which firms can raise funds from domestic and international financiers subject to separate collateral constraints.

\textsuperscript{6}We use $\Pi(Z, Z')$ for the transition probability of the state of the economy in a slight abuse of notation. We ignore the constraints that $k \geq 0$ and $w' \geq 0$ as they are redundant, due to the inada condition and the fact that the firms can never credibly promise their entire net worth next period (which can be seen by combining (10) at equality with (11) and (12)).
sidestep this issue. Nevertheless, it is important to be explicit about our assumptions about enforcement. We assume that collateralized promises can be used as collateral to back other promises, to the extent that other lenders themselves can enforce payment on such promises. Specifically, per unit of the resale value of tangible assets, firms in our model can borrow a fraction $\theta$ from households and a fraction $\theta_i$ from intermediaries. Intermediaries in turn can use the collateralized claims they own to back their own promises to other lenders. However, per unit of collateral value backing their loans, intermediaries can only refinance fraction $\theta$ from other lenders, which is less than the repayment they themselves can enforce, that is, $\theta_i$. Thus, intermediaries are forced to finance the difference, $\theta_i - \theta$, out of their own net worth. In contrast, an intermediary can promise the entire value $\theta_i$ to other intermediaries, that is, the interbank market is frictionless in our model, which is why we are able to consider a representative financial intermediary.

In terms of limited enforcement, the assumption is that firms can abscond with all cash flows and a fraction $1 - \theta$ of collateral backing promises to households and a fraction $1 - \theta_i$ of collateral backing promises to financial intermediaries. Financial intermediaries in turn can abscond with their collateralized claims except to the extent that the collateral backing their claims is in turn collateral backing their own promises to households, that is, they can abscond with $\theta_i - \theta$ per unit of collateral. If a financial intermediary were to default on its promises, its lenders could enforce a claim up to the fraction $\theta$ of collateral backing the intermediary’s loans directly from corporate borrowers.

2.5 Equilibrium

We now define an equilibrium in our economy. An equilibrium determines both aggregate economic activity and the cost of intermediated finance in our economy.

Definition 1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium is an allocation $x = [d, k, b', b_i', w']$ for the representative firm and $x_i = [d_i, l', l_i', w_i']$ for the representative intermediary for all dates and states and a state-contingent interest rate process $R'_t$ for intermediated finance such that (i) $x$ solves the firm’s problem in (8)-(12) and $x_i$ solves the intermediary’s problem (1)-(3) and (ii) the market for intermediated finance clears in all dates and states

$$l'_t = b'_t.$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)

Note that equilibrium promises are default free, as the promises satisfy the collateral constraints (11) and (12), which ensures that neither firms nor financial intermediaries are able to issue promises on which it is not credible to deliver. While this is of course the implementation that we study throughout, we emphasize that the promises traded in
our economy are contingent claims and that these contingent claims may be implemented in practice with noncontingent claims on which issuers are expected and in equilibrium indeed do default (see Kehoe and Levine (2006) for an implementation with equilibrium default in this spirit).

2.6 Endogenous minimum down payment requirement

Define the minimum down payment requirement $\varphi$ when the firm borrows the maximum amount it can from households only as $\varphi = 1 - R^{-1}\theta(1 - \delta)$. Similarly, define the minimum down payment requirement when the firm borrows the maximum amount it can from both households (at interest rate $R$) and intermediaries (at state-contingent interest rate $R_i^e$) as $\varphi_i(R_i^e) = 1 - [R^{-1}\theta + E[(R_i^e)^{-1}](\theta_i - \theta)](1 - \delta)$ (illustrated on the right-hand side of Figure 1). Note that the minimum down payment requirement, at times referred to as the margin requirement, is endogenous in our model. Using this definition and equations (14) through (16) the firm’s investment Euler equation can then be written concisely as

$$1 \geq E\left[\beta \frac{\mu L}{\mu} A f_k(k) + (1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta)\right]. \quad (19)$$

2.7 User cost of capital with intermediated finance

We can extend Jorgenson’s (1963) definition of the user cost of capital to our model with intermediated finance. Define the premium on internal funds $\rho$ as $1/(R + \rho) \equiv E[\beta \mu L / \mu]$ and the premium on intermediated finance $\rho_i$ as $1/(R + \rho_i) \equiv E[(R_i^e)^{-1}]$. Using (14) through (16) the user cost of capital $u$ is

$$u \equiv r + \delta + \frac{\rho}{R + \rho}(1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta) + \frac{\rho_i}{R + \rho_i}(\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta), \quad (20)$$

where $r + \delta$ is the frictionless user cost derived by Jorgenson (1963) and $r \equiv R - 1$. The user cost of capital exceeds the user cost in the frictionless model, because part of investment needs to be financed with internal funds which are scarce and hence command a premium $\rho$ (the second term on the right hand side) and part of investment is financed with intermediated finance which commands a premium $\rho_i$, as the funds of intermediaries are scarce as well (the last term on the right hand side).^{8}

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^{7}We use the character $\varphi$, a fancy script $\rho$, for down payment ($\varphi$ in LaTeX and available under miscellaneous symbols).

^{8}Alternatively, the user cost can be written in a weighted average cost of capital representation as $u \equiv R/(R + \rho)(r_w + \delta)$ where the weighted average cost of capital $r_w$ is defined as $r_w \equiv (r + \rho)p_i(R_i^e) +$
Internal funds and intermediated finance are both scarce in our model and command a premium as collateral constraints drive a wedge between the cost of different types of finance. The premium on internal finance is higher than the premium on intermediated finance, as the firm would never be willing to pay more for intermediated finance than the premium on internal funds.

**Proposition 1** (Premia on internal and intermediated finance). The premium on internal finance $\rho$ (weakly) exceeds the premium on intermediated finance $\rho_i$,

$$\rho \geq \rho_i \geq 0,$$

and the two premia are equal, $\rho = \rho_i$, iff the collateral constraint for intermediated finance does not bind for any state next period, that is, $E[\lambda_i^t] = 0$. Moreover, the premium on internal finance is strictly positive, $\rho > 0$, iff the collateral constraint for direct finance binds for some state next period, that is, $E[\lambda^t] > 0$.

When all collateral constraints are slack, there is no premium on either type of finance, but typically the inequalities are strict and both premia are strictly positive, with the premium on internal finance strictly exceeding the premium on intermediated finance.

## 3 Effect of intermediary capital on spreads

In this section we study how the choice between intermediated and direct finance varies with firm and intermediary net worth in a static (one period) version of our model with a representative firm.\(^9\) We further simplify by considering the deterministic case, although the results in this section do not depend on this assumption.\(^10\) The equilibrium spread on intermediated finance depends on both firm and intermediary net worth. Given firm net worth, spreads are higher when the intermediary is less well capitalized. Importantly, the spread on intermediated finance depends on the relative capitalization of firms and intermediaries. Spreads are particularly high when firms are poorly capitalized and intermediaries are relatively poorly capitalized at the same time. Poor capitalization of the investment financed with internal funds which cost $r + \rho$ (first term on the right hand side), the fraction financed with households funds at rate $r$ (second term), and the fraction financed with intermediated funds at rate $r + \rho_i$ (third term).

\(^9\)The capital structure implications for the cross section of firms with different net worth is analyzed in Appendix A.

\(^10\)With one period only, the interest rate on intermediated finance is independent of the state $s'$, as the marginal value of net worth next period for financial intermediaries and firms equals 1 for all states, that is, $\mu' = \mu_i' = 1$, rendering the model effectively deterministic.
corporate sector does not per se imply high spreads, as firms’ limited ability to pledge may result in a reduction in firms’ loan demand which intermediaries with given net worth can more easily accommodate.\(^{11}\)

The representative intermediary solves

\[
\max_{\{d_i', \nu_i', \nu_i', w_i'\} \in \mathbb{R}_+^4} d_i + \beta_i w_i'
\]

subject to (2) through (3). The representative firm solves

\[
\max_{\{d, k, \nu, \nu, w\} \in \mathbb{R}_+^4 \times \mathbb{R}_+^4} d + \beta w'
\]

subject to (9) through (12). An equilibrium is defined in Definition 1. In addition to the equilibrium allocation, the spread on intermediated finance, \(R'_i - R_i\), is determined in equilibrium.

The following proposition summarizes the characterization of the equilibrium spread. Figures 2 through 4 illustrate the results. The key insight is that the spread on intermediated finance depends on both the firm and intermediary net worth. Importantly, low capitalization of the corporate sector does not necessarily result in a high spread on intermediated finance. Indeed, it may reduce spreads. Similarly, while low capitalization of the intermediation sector raises spreads, spreads are substantial only when the corporate sector is poorly capitalized and intermediaries are poorly capitalized relative to the corporate sector at the same time.

**Proposition 2** (Firm and intermediary net worth). (i) For \(w_i > w_i^*\), intermediaries are well capitalized and there is a minimum spread on intermediated finance \(\beta_i^{-1} - R > 0\) for all levels of firm net worth. (ii) Otherwise, there is a threshold of firm net worth \(w(w_i)\) (which depends on \(w_i\)) such that intermediaries are well capitalized and the spread on intermediated finance is \(\beta_i^{-1} - R > 0\) as long as \(w \leq w(w_i)\). For \(w > w(w_i)\), intermediated finance is scarce and spreads are higher. For \(w_i \in [\tilde{w}_i, w_i^*]\), spreads are increasing in \(w\) until \(w\) reaches \(\tilde{w}(w_i)\), at which point spreads stay constant at \(\tilde{R}_i(w_i) - R \in (\beta_i^{-1} - R, \beta^{-1} - R)\). For \(w_i \in (0, \tilde{w}_i)\), spreads are increasing in \(w\) until \(w\) reaches \(\tilde{w}(w_i)\), then decreasing in \(w\) until \(\tilde{w}(w_i)\) is reached, at which point spreads stay constant at \(\beta^{-1} - R\). As \(w_i \to 0\), \(\tilde{w}(w_i) \to 0\).

Figure 2 displays the cost of intermediated finance as a function of firm net worth \((w)\) and intermediary net worth \((w_i)\). Figure 3 displays the contours of the various areas

\(^{11}\)Note that in Holmström and Tirole (1997) aggregate investment only depends on the sum of firm and intermediary capital.
in Figure 2. Figure 4 displays the cost of intermediated finance as a function of firm net worth for different levels of intermediary net worth, and is essentially a projection of Figure 2. When financial intermediaries are well capitalized the spread on intermediated finance is at its minimum, $\beta_i^{-1} - R > 0$. This is the case when financial intermediary net worth is high enough ($w_i \geq w^*_i$) so that they can accommodate the loan demand of even a well capitalized corporate sector or when corporate net worth is relatively low so that the financial intermediary sector is able to accommodate demand despite its low net worth ($w \leq \bar{w}(w_i)$). When intermediary capital is below $w^*_i$ and the corporate sector is not too poorly capitalized ($w > \bar{w}(w_i)$), spreads on intermediated finance are higher. Indeed, when intermediary capital is in this range, higher firm net worth initially raises spreads as loan demand increases (until firm net worth reaches $\bar{w}(w_i)$). This effect can be substantial when $w_i < \tilde{w}_i$. Indeed, interest rates in our example increase to around 200% when financial intermediary net worth is very low, albeit our example is not calibrated. If firm net worth is still higher, spreads decline as the marginal product of capital and hence firms’ willingness to borrow at high interest rates declines. When corporate net worth exceeds $\bar{w}(w_i)$, the cost on intermediated finance is constant at $\beta^{-1}$, which equals the shadow cost of internal funds of well capitalized firms.

To sum up, spreads are determined by firm and intermediary net worth jointly. Spreads are higher when intermediary net worth is lower. But firm net worth affects both the demand for intermediated loans and, via investment, the collateral available to back such loans. When collateral constraints bind, lower firm net worth reduces spreads.

4 Dynamics of intermediary capital

Our model allows the analysis of the dynamics of intermediary capital and indeed the joint dynamics of the capitalization of the corporate and intermediary sector. We first characterize a deterministic steady state and then analyze the deterministic dynamics of firm and intermediary capitalization. Both firms and intermediaries accumulate capital over time, but the corporate sector initially accumulates net worth faster than the intermediary sector, which has important implications for the dynamics of spreads on intermediated finance. We also study the dynamic effects of a credit crunch, and show that the economy may be slow to recover. Finally, we provide sufficient conditions for the marginal values of firm and intermediary net worth to commove.
4.1 Intermediaries are essential in a deterministic economy

We first show that intermediaries always have positive net worth, that is, they never choose to pay out their entire net worth as dividends if the economy is deterministic or eventually deterministic, that is, deterministic from some time $T < +\infty$ onward.

**Proposition 3** (Positive intermediary net worth). *Financial intermediaries always have positive net worth in an equilibrium in a deterministic or eventually deterministic economy.*

Since intermediaries always have positive net worth, the interest rate on intermediated finance $R_i'$ must in equilibrium be such that the representative firm never would want to lend at that interest rate, as the following lemma shows:

**Lemma 1.** In any equilibrium, (i) the cost of intermediated funds (weakly) exceeds the cost of direct finance, that is, $R_i' \geq R_i$; (ii) the multiplier on the collateral constraint for direct finance (weakly) exceeds the multiplier on the collateral constraint for intermediated finance, that is, $\lambda' \geq \lambda_i'$; and (iii) the constraint that the representative firm cannot lend at $R_i'$ never binds, that is, $\nu_i' = 0$ w.l.o.g. Moreover, in a deterministic economy, (iv) the constraint that the representative intermediary cannot borrow at $R_i'$ never binds, that is, $\eta_i' = 0$; and (v) the collateral constraint for direct financing always binds, that is, $\lambda' > 0$.

We define the essentiality of intermediaries as follows:

**Definition 2** (Essentiality of intermediation). *Intermediation is essential if an allocation can be supported with a financial intermediary but not without.*

The above results together imply that financial intermediaries must always be essential. First note that firms are always borrowing the maximal amount from households. If firms moreover always borrow a positive amount from intermediaries, then they must achieve an allocation that would not otherwise be feasible. If $R_i' = R_i$, then the firm must be collateral constrained in terms of intermediated finance, too, that is, borrow a positive amount. If $R_i' > R_i$, then intermediaries lend all their funds to the corporate sector and in equilibrium firms must be borrowing from intermediaries. We have proved the following:

**Proposition 4** (Essentiality of intermediaries). *In an equilibrium in a deterministic economy, financial intermediaries are always essential.*

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12This definition is analogous to the definition of essentiality of money in monetary theory (see, e.g., Hahn (1973)).
4.2 Intermediary capitalization and spreads in a steady state

We define a deterministic steady state in the economy with an infinite horizon as follows:

**Definition 3** (Steady state). A deterministic steady state equilibrium is an equilibrium with constant allocations, that is, \( x^* = [d^*, k^*, b^*, b^*_i, w^*] \) and \( x_i^* = [d_i^*, l_i^*, l_i^*, w_i^*] \).

In the deterministic steady state, intermediaries are essential, have positive capital, and spreads are positive.

**Proposition 5** (Steady state). In a steady state, intermediaries are essential, have positive net worth, and pay positive dividends. The spread on intermediated finance is \( R^*_i - R = \beta_i^{-1} - R > 0 \). Firms borrow the maximal amount from intermediaries. The relative (ex dividend) intermediary capitalization is

\[
\frac{w_i^*}{w^*} = \frac{\beta_i(\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta)}{\rho_i(\beta_i^{-1})}.
\]

The relative (ex dividend) intermediary capitalization, that is, the ratio of the representative intermediary’s net worth (ex dividend) relative to the representative firm’s net worth (ex dividend), is the ratio of the intermediary’s financing (per unit of capital) to the firm’s down payment requirement (per unit of capital). In a steady state, the shadow cost of internal funds of the firm is \( \beta^{-1} - 1 \) while the shadow cost of internal funds of the intermediary is \( \beta_i^{-1} - 1 \) and equals the interest rate on intermediated finance \( R_i^* - 1 \). Since \( \beta_i > \beta \), intermediated finance is cheaper than internal funds for firms in the steady state, and firms borrow as much as they can. In a steady state equilibrium, financial intermediaries have positive capital and pay out the steady state interest income as dividends \( d_i^* = (R_i^* - 1)l_i^* \). Both firms and intermediaries have positive net worth in the steady state despite the fact that their rates of time preference differ and both are less patient than households.

4.3 Deterministic dynamics of intermediary capital and spreads

Consider the dynamics of both firm and intermediary capitalization in an equilibrium converging to the steady state. We show that the equilibrium dynamics evolve in two main phases, an initial one in which the corporate sector pays no dividends and a second one in which the corporate sector pays dividends. Intermediaries do not pay dividends until the steady state is reached, except that they may pay an initial dividend (at time 0), if they are well capitalized relative to the corporate sector at time 0. We first state these results formally and then provide an intuitive discussion of the equilibrium dynamics.
Proposition 6 (Deterministic dynamics). Given $w$ and $w_i$, there exists a unique deterministic dynamic equilibrium which converges to the steady state characterized by a no dividend region (ND) and a dividend region (D) (which is absorbing) as follows:

Region ND $w_i \leq w_i^*$ (w.l.o.g.) and $w < \bar{w}(w_i)$, and (i) $d = 0$ ($\mu > 1$), (ii) the cost of intermediated finance is

$$R_i' = \max \left\{ R, \min \left\{ \frac{(\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta) \left( \frac{w}{w_i} + 1 \right)}{\varphi}, \frac{A'f_k \left( \frac{w + w_i}{\varphi} \right)}{(1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)} \right\} \right\},$$

(iii) investment $k = (w + w_i)/\varphi$ if $R_i' > R$ and $k = w/\varphi_i(R)$ if $R_i' = R$, and (iv) $w'/w_i' > w/w_i$, that is, firm net worth increases faster than intermediary net worth.

Region D $w \geq \bar{w}(w_i)$ and (i) $d > 0$ ($\mu = 1$). For $w_i \in (0, \bar{w}_i)$, (ii) $R_i' = \beta^{-1}$, (iii) $k = \bar{k}$ which solves $1 = \beta[A'f_k(\bar{k}) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi$, (iv) $w_{ex}'/w_i' < w_{ex}/w_i$, that is, firm net worth (ex dividend) increases more slowly than intermediary net worth, and (v) $\bar{w}(w_i) = \varphi \bar{k} - w_i$. For $w_i \in [\bar{w}_i, w_i^*)$, (ii) $R_i' = (\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta)k/w_i$, (iii) $k$ solves $1 = \beta[A'f_k(k) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)]/(\varphi - w_i/k)$, (iv) $w_{ex}'/w_i' < w_{ex}/w_i$, that is, firm net worth (ex dividend) increases more slowly than intermediary net worth, and (v) $\bar{w}(w_i) = \varphi_i(R_i')k$. For $w_i \geq w_i^*$, $\bar{w}(w_i) = w^*$ and the steady state of Proposition 5 is reached with $d = w - w^*$ and $d_i = w_i - w_i^*$.

Figure 5 displays the contours of the two regions in terms of firm net worth $w$ and intermediary net worth $w_i$ and Figure 6 illustrates the dynamics of firm and intermediary net worth, the interest rate on intermediated finance, and investment over time. The representative intermediary’s dividend policy is characterized as follows:

Lemma 2 (Initial intermediary dividend). The representative intermediary pays at most an initial dividend and no further dividends until the steady state is reached. If $w_i > w_i^*$, the initial dividend is strictly positive.

To understand the intuition, suppose both firms and financial intermediaries are initially poorly capitalized, and assume moreover that firms are poorly capitalized even relative to financial intermediaries. The dynamics of financial intermediary net worth are relatively simple, since as long as no dividends are paid (which is the case until the steady state is reached, except possibly at time 0), the intermediaries’ net worth evolves according to the law of motion $w_i' = R_i'(w_i)$, that is, intermediary net worth next period is simply intermediary net worth this period plus interest income. When no dividends are
paid, intermediaries lend out all their funds at the interest rate \( R_i' \). Of course, the interest rate \( R_i' \) needs to be determined in equilibrium.

Given our assumptions, the corporate sector's net worth, investment and loan demand evolve in several phases, which are reflected in the dynamics of the equilibrium interest rate. If firms are initially poorly capitalized even relative to financial intermediaries, as we assume, loan demand is low and intermediaries are relatively well capitalized. In this case, except for a potential initial dividend, intermediaries conserve net worth to meet future loan demand by lending some of their funds to households (see Panel B3 of Figure 6) and spreads are zero, that is, \( R_i' = R \) (see Panel B1). In fact, the intermediaries' lending to households exceeds their lending to the corporate sector early on. Corporate investment is then \( k = w/\varphi_i(R) \). Intermediaries accumulate net worth at rate \( R \) in this phase while the corporate sector accumulates net worth at a faster rate, given the high marginal product; thus, the net worth of the corporate sector rises relative to the net worth of intermediaries. In Figure 6, this phase last from time \( t = 0 \) to \( t = 3 \), except that the intermediary pays an initial dividend at \( t = 0 \), since Figure 6 considers an initial drop in corporate net worth only.

Eventually, the increased net worth of the corporate sector raises loan demand so that intermediated finance becomes scarce. The corporate sector then borrows all the funds intermediaries are able to lend and invests \( k = (w + w_i)/\varphi \). The interest rate on intermediated finance is determined by the collateral constraint, which is binding, and equals \( R_i' = (\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta)(w/w_i + 1)/\varphi \). Note that since corporate net worth increases faster than intermediary net worth, the interest rate on intermediated finance rises in this phase. As the corporate sector accumulates net worth, it can pledge more and the equilibrium interest rate rises. In Figure 6, this occurs between \( t = 3 \) and \( t = 4 \).

As the net worth and investment of the corporate sector continues to rise faster than intermediary net worth, the increase in firms' collateral means that firms' ability to pledge no longer constrains their ability to raise intermediated finance. Intermediated finance is scarce in this phase because of limited intermediary net worth, however, and so spreads are high but declining. The law of motion of investment is as in the previous phase \( k = (w + w_i)/\varphi \), while the equilibrium interest rate on intermediated finance is determined by \( R_i' = \frac{A'f_k(k) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)}{\varphi} \). Both firm and intermediary net worth continue to increase, and hence investment increases and the equilibrium interest rate on intermediated finance decreases. In Figure 6, this occurs between \( t = 4 \) and \( t = 5 \).

Eventually, the interest rate on intermediated finance reaches \( \beta^{-1} \), the shadow cost of internal funds of the corporate sector. At that point, corporate investment stays constant and firms start to pay dividends. However, intermediaries continue to accumulate net
worth and the economy is not yet in steady state. As intermediaries accumulate net worth, the corporate sector reduces its net worth by paying dividends. Essentially, the corporate sector leverages as the supply of intermediated finance increases when financial intermediary net worth increases. This is the case at \( t = 5 \) and \( t = 6 \) in Figure 6.

Once intermediary capital is sufficiently high to accommodate the entire loan demand of the corporate sector at an interest rate \( \beta^{-1} \), the cost of intermediated funds decreases further. As the interest rate on intermediated finance is now below the shadow cost of internal funds of the corporate sector, the collateral constraint binds again. Investment increases due to the reduced cost of intermediated financing. This phase lasts from \( t = 7 \) to \( t = 9 \) in Figure 6. Eventually, intermediaries accumulate their steady state level of net worth and the cost of intermediated finance reaches \( \beta_i^{-1} \), the intermediaries’ shadow cost of internal funds. The steady state is reached at \( t = 9 \) in Figure 6.

We emphasize two key aspects of the dynamics of intermediary capital, beyond the fact that intermediary and firm net worth affect the dynamics jointly. First, intermediary capital accumulates more slowly than corporate net worth in our model. Second, the interest rate on intermediated finance is low when intermediaries conserve net worth to meet the higher loan demand later on when the corporate sector is temporarily relatively poorly capitalized. And vice versa, the corporate sector accumulates additional net worth and spreads remain higher (and investment lower than in the steady state) as the corporate sector “waits” for intermediary net worth to rise and eventually reduce spreads, at which point firms relever. The second two observations of course are a reflection of the relatively slow pace of intermediary capital accumulation.

### 4.4 Dynamics of a credit crunch

Suppose the economy experiences a credit crunch, which we model here as an unanticipated one-time drop in intermediary net worth \( w_t \). We assume that the economy is otherwise deterministic and is in steady state when the credit crunch hits. Figure 7 illustrates the effects of such a credit crunch on interest rates, net worth, intermediary lending, and investment. The effect of a credit crunch depends on its size. Intermediaries can absorb a small enough credit crunch simply by cutting dividends. But a larger drop in intermediary net worth results in a reduction in lending and an increase in the spread on intermediated finance. Moreover, the higher cost of intermediated finance increases the user cost of capital (20) (as the premium on internal finance is either unchanged or increases) and so investment drops. Thus, a credit crunch has real effects in our model. Remarkably, investment drops even if the corporate sector is still well capitalized (that is, even if \( w^* > w \)). The reason is that the cost of capital increases even if the corporate
sector is well capitalized, as intermediaries' capacity to extend relatively cheap financing is reduced. In that case, the credit crunch results in a jump in the interest rate on intermediated finance to $R^*_i = \beta^{-1} > R^*_i = \beta_i^{-1}$ and an immediate drop in investment (and capital, which drops to $\bar{k} < k^*$). The real effects in our model are moreover persistent, even if the corporate sector remains well capitalized. Indeed, the recovery of the real economy can be delayed. After a sufficiently large credit crunch, investment and capital remain constant at the lower level, and spreads remain constant at the elevated level, until the intermediary sector accumulates sufficient capital to meet the loan demand. At that point, intermediary interest rates start to fall and investment begins to recover, until the economy eventually recovers fully.

If the corporate sector is no longer well capitalized after the credit crunch, the spread on intermediated finance rises further and investment drops even more. This is the case in Figure 7 at time 0 (see Panel B1 and B4). Moreover, after an initial partial recovery, the recovery stalls, potentially for a long time (from time 1 to time 23 in Figure 7), in the sense that the interest rate on intermediated finance remains at $R^*_i = \beta^{-1}$ and investment remains constant below its steady state level (in fact, capital remains constant at $\bar{k}$), until the intermediaries accumulate sufficient capital. Then the recovery resumes.

If net worth of both the intermediaries and the corporate sector drop at the same time, for example, because of a one-time depreciation shock to capital, then investment and output fall more substantially. The dynamics of the recovery from such a downturn are as described in Section 4.3. It is noteworthy, though, that the spreads on intermediated finance may or may not go up in such a general downturn, and in fact may well go down despite the scarcity of intermediary capital. The point is that the lower net worth of the corporate sector reduces loan demand, possibly by more than the drop in intermediary net worth reduces loanable funds. If corporate loan demand drops sufficiently, intermediaries may pay a one time dividend when the downturn hits, and then cut dividends to zero until the economy recovers.

### 4.5 Comovement of firm and intermediary capital

Do the marginal value of firm and intermediary net worth comove? We consider this question in a stochastic economy which is deterministic from time 1 onward. Importantly, this allows both firms and intermediaries to engage in risk management at time 0 and hedge the net worth available to them in different states $s' \in S$ at time 1. We first show that the representative firm optimally engages in incomplete risk management, that is, the collateral constraint for direct finance against at least one state $s' \in S$ must bind. We then provide sufficient conditions for the marginal value of net worth of the representative
firm and the representative intermediary to comove.

**Proposition 7** (Comovement of the value of firm and intermediary capital). *In an economy that is deterministic from time 1 onward and has constant expected productivity, (i) the representative firm must be collateral constrained for direct finance against at least one state at time 1; (ii) the marginal value of firm and intermediary net worth comove, in fact \( \mu(s')/\mu(s'_+) = \mu_i(s')/\mu_i(s'_+) \), \( \forall s', s'_+ \in S \), if \( \lambda_i(s') = 0 \), \( \forall s' \in S \). (iii) Suppose moreover that there are just two states, that is, \( S = \{s', \bar{s}'\} \). If only one of the collateral constraints for direct finance binds, \( \lambda(s') > 0 = \lambda(\bar{s}') \), then the marginal values must comove, \( \mu(s') > \mu(\bar{s}') \) and \( \mu_i(s') \geq \mu_i(\bar{s}') \).

Proposition 7 implies that the marginal values of firm and intermediary net worth comove, for example, when the intermediary has very limited net worth and hence the collateral constraints for intermediated finance are slack for all states. They also comove if the firm hedges one of two possible states, as then the intermediary effectively must be hedging that state, too. Thus, the marginal value of intermediary net worth may be high exactly when the marginal value of firm net worth is high, too. The marginal values may however move in opposite directions, for example, if a high realization of productivity raises firm net worth substantially, which lowers the marginal product of capital and hence the marginal value of firm net worth, while it may raise loan demand substantially and hence raise the marginal value of intermediary net worth.

## 5 Conclusion

We develop a dynamic theory of financial intermediation and show that the capital of both the financial intermediary and corporate sector affect real economic activity, such as firm investment, financing, and the spread between intermediated and direct finance. Financial intermediaries are modeled as collateralization specialists that are better able to collateralize claims than households themselves. Financial intermediaries require capital as their ability to borrow against their collateralized loans is limited by households' ability to collateralize the assets backing the loans themselves.

The spread on intermediated finance is high when both firms and intermediaries are poorly capitalized, and in particular when intermediaries are moreover poorly capitalized relative to firms. Intermediary capital in our model accumulates more slowly than the capital of firms, and thus spreads on intermediated finance may initially rise as loan demand increases more than loanable funds as the net worth of the corporate sector increases relative to the net worth of financial intermediaries. A credit crunch, that is,
a drop in intermediary net worth results in a drop in intermediated finance, a rise in spreads on intermediated loans, and a drop in real activity. The recovery can be delayed, or stall, with real activity constant at a reduced level and persistently high spreads on intermediated finance, because it takes time for intermediaries to reaccumulate sufficient net worth. In the cross section, the model predicts that more constrained firms borrow from financial intermediaries, consistent with stylized facts. In addition, the model shows that the marginal value of intermediary and firm net worth may comove. Our model may provide a useful framework for the analysis of the dynamic interaction between financial structure and economic activity.
Appendix

Appendix A: Intermediated vs. direct finance in the cross section

This appendix considers the static environment without uncertainty of Section 3 taking the spread on intermediated finance as given to show that our model has plausible implications for the choice between intermediated and direct finance in the cross section of firms. Consider the firm's problem taking the interest rate on intermediated finance $R^*_L$ as given. Each firm maximizes (22) subject to (9) through (12) given its net worth $w$. Severely constrained firms borrow as much as possible from intermediaries while less constrained firms borrow less from intermediaries and dividend paying firms do not borrow from intermediaries at all, consistent with the cross sectional stylized facts. These cross-sectional results are similar to the ones in Holmström and Tirole (1997).

**Proposition 8** (Intermediated vs. direct finance across firms). Suppose $R^*_L > \beta^{-1}$.13 (i) Firms with net worth $w \leq w_L$ borrow as much as possible from intermediaries, firms with net worth $w_L < w < w_u$ borrow a positive amount from intermediaries but less than the maximal amount, and firms with net worth exceeding $w_u$ do not borrow from intermediaries, where $0 < w_L < w_u$. (ii) Only firms with net worth exceeding $\bar{w}$ pay dividends at time 0, where $w_u < \bar{w} < \infty$. (iii) Investment is increasing in $w$ and strictly increasing for $w \leq w_L$ and $w_u < w < \bar{w}$.

Intermediated finance is costlier than direct finance. Indeed, under the conditions of the proposition, intermediated finance is costlier than the shadow cost of internal finance of well capitalized firms. Thus, well capitalized firms, which pay dividends, do not borrow from financial intermediaries. In contrast, firms with net worth below some threshold ($w_u$) have a shadow cost of internal finance which is sufficiently high that they choose to borrow a positive amount from intermediaries. For severely constrained firms, with net worth below $w_L$, the shadow cost of internal funds is so high that they borrow as much as they can from intermediaries, that is, their collateral constraint for intermediated finance binds. Moreover, more constrained firms have lower investment and are hence smaller.

The cross-sectional capital structure implications are plausible: smaller (and more constrained) firms borrow more from financial intermediaries and have higher costs of financing, while larger (and less constrained firms) borrow from households, for example in bond markets, and have lower financing costs.

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13 We consider the case in which $R^*_L > \beta^{-1}$ since, proceeding analogously as in the first part of the proof, one can show that $R^*_L < \beta^{-1}$ would imply that $\lambda^*_L > 0$ and thus the cross sectional financing implications would be trivial as all firms would borrow the maximal amount from intermediaries. When $R^*_L = \beta^{-1}$, this would also be true without loss of generality.
Appendix B: Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1. Using (16) and the fact that $\nu'_i = 0$ (proved below in Lemma 1, part (iii)), we have $(R'_i)^{-1} = \beta \mu'_i / \mu + \beta \lambda'_i / \mu$ and, taking expectations,

$$
\frac{1}{R + \rho_i} \equiv E[(R'_i)^{-1}] = \frac{1}{R + \rho} + E\left[ \frac{\lambda'_i}{\mu} \right]
$$

and hence $\rho \geq \rho_i$ with equality iff $E[\lambda'_i] = 0$. Moreover, since $R'_i \geq R$ (proved below in Lemma 1, part (i)), $\rho_i \geq 0$. Finally, using (15), we have $1/(R + \rho) \equiv E[\beta \mu'_i / \mu] = 1/R - E[\beta \lambda'_i / \mu]$, implying that $\rho > 0$ iff $E[\lambda'_i] > 0$. $\Box$

Proof of Proposition 2. First, consider the intermediary’s problem. The first order conditions are (4)-(6) and $\mu'_i = 1 + \eta'_d$, where $\beta \eta'_d$ is the multiplier on the constraint $w'_i \geq 0$. Since (3) holds with equality, the non-negativity constraints on $l'$ and $l'_d$ render the non-negativity constraint on $w'_i$ redundant and hence $\mu'_i = 1$. Using (5) we have $\eta' = (R \beta_i)^{-1} \mu - 1 \geq (R \beta_i)^{-1} - 1 > 0$ (and $l' = 0$) and similarly using (6) $\eta'_d > 0$ as long as $R'_i < \beta_i^{-1}$. Therefore, for $l'_i > 0$ it is necessary that $R'_i \geq \beta_i^{-1}$. If $R'_i > \beta_i^{-1}$, then $\mu'_i > 1$ (and $l'_i = w_i$) while if $R'_i = \beta_i^{-1}$, $0 \leq l'_i \leq w_i$.

Now consider the representative firm’s problem. The first order conditions are (4)-(6) and $\mu' = 1 + \nu'_d$, where $\beta \nu'_d$ is the multiplier on the constraint $w' \geq 0$. Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 8 one can show that $\mu' = 1$. Suppose $\nu'_i > 0$ (and hence $b'_i = 0$). Since $k > 0$, (12) is slack and $\lambda'_i = 0$. Using (13) and (16) we have $1 \leq \mu < R_i \beta$ which implies that $R'_i > \beta^{-1}$. But at such an interest rate on intermediated finance $l'_i = w_i > 0$, which is not an equilibrium as $b'_i = 0$. Therefore, $\nu'_i = 0$ and $R'_i \leq \beta^{-1}$. Moreover, if $R'_i < \beta^{-1}$, then $\lambda'_i = (R'_i \beta)^{-1} \mu - 1 > 0$ and hence $b'_i = (R'_i)^{-1} (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta) > 0$. Since $l'_i = 0$ if $R'_i < \beta_i^{-1}$, we have $R'_i \in [\beta_i^{-1}, \beta^{-1}]$ in equilibrium. The firm’s investment Euler equation (19) simplifies to $1 = \beta(1/\mu)[A'f_k(k) + (1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi_i(R'_i)$. Given the interest rate on intermediated finance, the firm’s problem induces a concave value function and thus $\mu$ (weakly) decreases in $w$, implying that $k$ (weakly) increases.

We first show that intermediaries are well capitalized and there is a minimum spread on intermediated finance $\beta_i^{-1} - R > 0$ for all levels of firm net worth when $w_i \geq w_i^*$ and for levels of firm net worth $w \leq w(w_i)$ when $w_i < w_i^*$. If $R'_i = \beta_i^{-1}$, a well capitalized firm invests $k^*$ which solves (19) specialized to $1 = \beta[A'f_k(k^*) + (1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi_i(\beta_i^{-1})$, while less well capitalized firms invests $k \leq k^*$. The intermediary can meet the required demand for intermediated finance for any level of firm net worth $w$ if $w_i \geq w_i^* \equiv \beta_i(\theta_i - \theta)k^*(1 - \delta)$. Suppose instead that $w_i < w_i^*$. In this case the intermediary is able to meet the firm’s loan demand at $R'_i = \beta_i^{-1}$ only if the firm is sufficiently constrained; the constrained firm invests

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\[ k = w / \varphi_i (\beta_i^{-1}) \] using (9), (11), and (12) at equality, and thus \( b'_i = \beta_i (\theta_i - \theta) k (1 - \delta) \); the intermediary can meet this demand as long as \( w \leq w(w_i) = \varphi_i (\beta_i^{-1}) / [\beta_i (\theta_i - \theta) (1 - \delta)] w_i \).

Suppose now that \( w_i < w_i^* \) and \( w > w(w_i) \) as defined above. First, consider \( w_i \in [\bar{w}_i, w_i^*] \) where \( \bar{w}_i \equiv \beta (\theta_i - \theta) k (1 - \delta) \) and \( 1 = \beta [A' f_k (\bar{k}) + (1 - \theta) (1 - \delta)] / \varphi \), that is, \( \bar{w}_i \) is the loan demand of the well capitalized firm when the cost of intermediated finance is \( R'_i = \beta^{-1} \). Note that \( R'_i < \beta^{-1} \) on \( (\bar{w}_i, w_i^*) \) since the intermediary has more than enough net worth to accommodate the loan demand of the well capitalized firm (and thus any constrained firm) at \( R'_i = \beta^{-1} \). Thus, the firm’s collateral constraint binds, that is, \( w_i = (R'_i)^{-1} (\theta_i - \theta) k (1 - \delta) \). If the firm is poorly capitalized, \( d = 0 \) and (9) implies \( w + w_i = \varphi k \), and \( R'_i = (\theta_i - \theta) (1 - \delta) (w / w_i + 1) \). If the firm is well capitalized, \( \mu = 1 \) and \( \bar{k}(w_i) \) solves \( 1 = \beta [A' f_k (\bar{k}(w_i)) + (1 - \theta) (1 - \delta)] / [\varphi - w_i / \bar{k}(w_i)] \). Moreover, \( \bar{w}(w_i) \equiv \varphi \bar{k}(w_i) - w_i \) and for \( w \geq \bar{w}(w_i) \) the cost of intermediated finance is constant at \( \bar{R}'_i(w_i) = (\theta_i - \theta) \bar{k}(w_i) (1 - \delta) / w_i \). Note that \( \bar{R}'_i(w_i^*) = \beta_i^{-1} \) and \( \bar{w}(w_i^*) = \varphi k^* - w_i = \varphi_i (\beta_i^{-1}) k^* = w(w_i^*) \), that is, the two boundaries coincide at \( w_i^* \). In contrast, at \( \bar{w}_i \) we have \( \bar{w}(w_i) = \varphi_i (\beta_i^{-1}) / [\beta_i (\theta_i - \theta) (1 - \delta)] \bar{w}_i = \varphi_i (\beta_i^{-1}) \beta / \beta_i \bar{k} = \varphi \bar{k} \beta / \beta_i - \bar{w}_i < \bar{w}(w_i) \) and \( \bar{R}'_i(w_i) = \beta^{-1} \).

Finally, consider \( w_i \in (0, \bar{w}_i) \) and \( w > w(w_i) \) as defined above. If the firm is well capitalized (16) implies \( \lambda'_i = (R'_i \beta)^{-1} - 1 \geq 0 \). Moreover, since \( w_i < \bar{w}_i \) the intermediary cannot meet the well capitalized firm’s loan demand at \( R'_i = \beta^{-1} \) and thus the cost of intermediated finance is in fact \( \beta^{-1} \) and \( \lambda'_i = 0 \), that is, the collateral constraint for intermediated finance does not bind. Thus, the firm’s investment Euler equation (19) simplifies to \( 1 = \beta [A' f_k (\bar{k}) + (1 - \theta) (1 - \delta)] / \varphi \) which is solved by \( \bar{k} \) as defined earlier in the proof. Define \( \bar{w}(w_i) \equiv \varphi \bar{k} - w_i \); the firm is well capitalized for \( w \geq \bar{w}(w_i) \). Suppose \( w < \bar{w}(w_i) \) and hence \( \mu > 1 \). If the collateral constraint for intermediated finance does not bind, then (16) implies \( R'_i = \beta^{-1} \mu > \beta^{-1} \) and (19) implies \( R'_i = [A' f_k (k) + (1 - \theta) (1 - \delta)] / \varphi \), while (9) yields \( w + w_i = \varphi k \). Observe that \( k < \bar{k} \) and \( R'_i \) decreases in \( w \). If instead the collateral constraint binds, then \( R'_i = (\theta_i - \theta) k (1 - \delta) / w_i \) and \( w + w_i = \varphi k \) (so long as \( w > w(w_i) \)). Note that \( k \) and \( R'_i \) increase in \( w \) in this range. The collateral constrain is just binding at \( \bar{w}(w_i) \equiv \varphi \bar{k}(w_i) - w_i \) where \( [A' f_k (\bar{k}(w_i)) + (1 - \theta) (1 - \delta)] / \varphi = (\theta_i - \theta) \bar{k}(w_i) (1 - \delta) / w_i \).

We now show that if the collateral constraint for intermediated finance binds at some \( w < \bar{w}(w_i) \) then it binds for all \( w < w_i \). Note that \( d = 0 \) in this range and \( w + w_i = \varphi k \).

At \( w^- \), either \( b'^{-}_i < w_i \) and \( R'_i = \beta_i^{-1} \) and hence \( \lambda'^{-}_i = (\beta_i^{-1} \beta)^{-1} \mu^- - 1 > 0 \) or \( b'^{-}_i = w_i \) and \( w^- + w_i = \varphi k^- \), implying \( k^- < k \). Suppose the collateral constraint for intermediated finance is slack at \( w^- \). Then \( R'^{-}_i b'^{-}_i < (\theta_i - \theta) k^- (1 - \delta) < (\theta_i - \theta) k (1 - \delta) = R'_i b'_i \) and
since $b_i^* = w_i$ and $b_i' \leq w_i$ by above $R_i^\prime - w_i < R_i^\prime b_i' \leq R_i^\prime w_i$ which implies $R_i^\prime - b_i^* = \mu > R_i^\prime \beta$ or $R_i^\prime - R_i^\prime_1$, a contradiction.

Moreover, $\hat{w}(w_i) < \hat{w}(w_i) < \hat{w}(w_i)$ on $w_i \in (0, \bar{w}_i)$. Suppose, by contradiction, that $\hat{w}(w_i) = w_i$. Recall that $w_i + w_i = \varphi \hat{k}$ and $\hat{w}(w_i) + w_i = \varphi \hat{k}(w_i)$, so $\hat{k}(w_i) \leq k$. But $\tilde{R}_i^\prime(w_i) = (\theta_i - \theta) \hat{k}(w_i)(1 - \delta) / w_i \leq (\theta_i - \theta) k(1 - \delta) / w_i = \beta_i^{-1}$. But if $\tilde{R}_i^\prime(w_i) \leq \beta_i^{-1}$, then at $\hat{w}(w_i)$ we have $\mu = \tilde{R}_i^\prime(w_i) < 1$ (since the collateral constraint is slack), a contradiction. Thus, $\hat{w}(w_i) < \hat{w}(w_i)$. Suppose, again by contradiction, that $\hat{w}(w_i) \leq \hat{w}(w_i)$ and hence $\hat{k} \leq \hat{k}(w_i)$. Recall that $\hat{k}(w_i)$ solves $[A_i^\prime f_k(\hat{k}(w_i)) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)] / \varphi = (\theta_i - \theta) \hat{k}(w_i)(1 - \delta) / w_i$. At $\hat{w}$ this equation is solved by $\tilde{k}$ (and $\tilde{R}_i^\prime(\tilde{w}) = \beta_i^{-1}$), but since $w_i < w_i$, $\tilde{k}(w_i) < \tilde{k}$, a contradiction. Moreover, as $w_i \rightarrow 0$, $\tilde{k}(w_i) \rightarrow 0$ and $\tilde{w}(w_i) = \varphi \tilde{k}(w_i) - w_i \rightarrow 0$. □

**Proof of Proposition 3.** Consider a deterministic economy. Suppose intermediaries pay out their entire net worth at some point. From that point on, the firm’s problem is as if there is no intermediary. We first characterize the solution to this problem and then show that the solution implies shadow interest rates on intermediated finance at which it would not be optimal for intermediaries to exit.

To characterize the solution in the absence of intermediaries, consider a steady state at which $\mu = \mu' \equiv \bar{\mu}$ and note that (15) implies $\bar{\lambda} = (R_0\bar{\beta} - 1)\bar{\mu} > 0$. The investment Euler equation (19) simplifies to $1 = \beta[A_i^\prime f_k(\bar{k}) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)] / \varphi$ which defines $\bar{k}$. The firm’s steady state net worth is $\bar{w} = A_i^\prime f(\bar{k}) + (1 - \theta) \bar{k}(1 - \delta)$ and the firm pays out

$$
\bar{a} = \bar{w} - \varphi \bar{k} = A_i^\prime f(\bar{k}) - \bar{k}[1 - (R^{-1}\bar{\theta} + (1 - \theta))(1 - \delta)] \\
\geq A_i^\prime f(\bar{k}) - \beta^{-1} \bar{k}[1 - (R^{-1}\bar{\theta} + (1 - \theta))(1 - \delta)] \\
= \int_{\bar{\epsilon}}^\epsilon [A_i^\prime f_k(k) - \beta^{-1}(1 - (R^{-1}\bar{\theta} + (1 - \theta))(1 - \delta))]dk > 0.
$$

Therefore, $\bar{\mu} = 1$. Investment $\bar{k}$ is feasible as long as $w \geq \bar{w} = \bar{w} - \bar{a}$. Whenever $w < \bar{w}$, $k < \bar{k}$ and hence using (19) we have $\mu / \mu' = \beta[A_i^\prime f_k(k) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)] / \varphi > 1$. The shadow interest rate on intermediated finance is $R_i^\prime = \beta^{-1} \mu / \mu' \geq \beta^{-1}$ for all values of $w$. But then it cannot be optimal for intermediaries to pay out all their net worth in a deterministic economy as keeping $\epsilon > 0$ net worth for one more period improves the objective by $(\beta R_i^\prime - 1) \epsilon > 0$.

Consider now an eventually deterministic economy. From time $T_i$ onward, the economy is deterministic and the conclusion obtains by above as long as the intermediary has
positive net worth in all states at time $T$. Suppose not, that is, suppose intermediary net worth is zero for some state. As before the discounted marginal value on an infinitesimal amount of intermediary net worth at time $T$ lent out for one period is at least $\beta_i R'_i \geq \beta_i \beta^{-1} > 1$ since $R'_i \geq \beta^{-1}$. Lending for $\tau$ periods thus guarantees a discounted marginal value of $(\beta_i \beta)^\tau$. As $\tau \to \infty$, the marginal value grows without bound. (Note that since we consider an infinitesimal amount, the collateral constraint cannot be binding for any finite $\tau$.) The expected marginal value of this lending policy at time $0$ is at least $(\beta_i R)^T$ times the marginal value at time $T$ and hence grows without bound as $\tau \to \infty$.

But the marginal value of intermediary net worth at time $0$ is finite as either the intermediary pays dividends and the marginal value is one, or the intermediary saves into at least one state at $R'_i$ and thus $\mu'_i = R'_i \beta \mu'_i$ and $R'_i$ is bounded above by (12) and otherwise $R'_i = R$. Furthermore, $\mu'_i$ is bounded by a similar argument going forward until dividends are paid at which point the marginal value is one. But then it cannot be an equilibrium for intermediaries to pay out all their net worth. \(\Box\)

**Proof of Lemma 1.** Part (i): If $R'_i < R$, then using (15) and (16) we have $0 < (R - R'_i) \beta \mu'_i \leq R'_i \beta \lambda'_i$ and thus $b'_i > 0$. But (5) and (6) imply that $0 < (R - R'_i) \beta \mu'_i \leq R'_i \beta \eta'_i$ and thus $l'_i = 0$, which is not an equilibrium.

Part (ii): Given $\nu'_i = 0$ (see part (iii)), (15) and (16) imply that $\lambda' = (R'_i / R - 1) \mu'_i + R'_i / R \lambda'_i \geq \lambda'_i$.

Part (iii): First, suppose to the contrary that $\nu'_i > 0$. Then $\lambda'_i = 0$ as $b'_i = 0 < (R'_i)^{-1} (\theta_i - \theta) k (1 - \delta)$ implies that (12) is slack. Using (16) and (15) we have $\mu \geq \mu' R$ and thus $R'_i > R$. Equations (5) and (6) imply that $R \eta'_i - R'_i \eta'_i = (R'_i - R) \mu'_i > 0$ and thus $\eta'_i > 0$ and $l' = 0$. But if $w'_i > 0$, which is always true under the conditions of Proposition 3, we have $l'_i = (R'_i)^{-1} w'_i > 0 = b'_i$, which is not an equilibrium. If instead $w'_i = 0$, then $l'_i = 0$ and we can set $R'_i = (\mu' / \mu)^{-1}$ and $\eta'_i = 0$ w.l.o.g.

Part (iv): Suppose to the contrary that $\eta'_i > 0$ (and hence $l'_i = 0$). Since intermediaries never pay out all their net worth in a deterministic economy, equation (3) implies $0 < w'_i \leq R l'$ and hence $\eta'_i = 0$. But then (5) and (6) imply $\beta_i \mu'_i / \mu_i R = 1 > \beta_i \mu'_i / R'_i$ or $R > R'_i$ contradicting the result of part (i). Thus, $\eta'_i = 0$ and $\mu'_i = (\beta_i R')^{-1} \mu_i$.

Part (v): Suppose $\lambda' = 0$. Then (15) reduces to $1 = \beta \mu' / \mu R$ and thus $1 \leq \mu = \beta R \mu' < \mu'$ and $d' = 0$. By part (ii), $\lambda'_i = 0$ and using (16) we have $R'_i = R$, $\mu'_i = (\beta R)^{-1} \mu_i > 1$, and $d'_i = 0$. The investment $k^{**}$ solves $R = [A' f_k(k^{**}) + (1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta)] / \varphi_i(R)$ or $R - 1 + \delta = A' f_k(k^{**})$; this is the first best investment when dividends are discounted at $R$ and it can never be optimal to invest more than that. To see this use (19) and note $[A' f_k(k) + (1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta)] / \varphi_i(R'_i) = \mu / (\beta \mu') \geq R = [A' f_k(k^{**}) + (1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta)] / \varphi_i(R)$,
that is, \( f_k(k) \geq f_k(k^{**}) \). Note that the firm's net worth next period, using (10) and (19), is

\[
w' = A'f(k^{**}) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)k^{**} - [Rb' - \theta(1 - \delta)k^{**}] - [Rb'_i - (\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta)k^{**}] > Rg_k(R)k^{**} - [Rb' - \theta(1 - \delta)k^{**}] - [Rb'_i - (\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta)k^{**}] = R[k^{**} - b' - b'_i] = Rw_{ex}.
\]

Note that if \( d' = 0, d'_i = 0, k' \leq k^{**}, \) and \( w' > w_{ex} \), and from (9) next period, \( k' = w' + b'' + b''_i \).

If \( R_i'' > R \), then \( b''_i = w'_i \) and \( b'' = R^{-1}\theta(1 - \delta)k' \). Therefore, \( \varphi k' = w' + w'_i \), but using (9) we have \( \varphi k'' \leq k'' - b' = w_{ex} + b'_i < w' + w'_i = \varphi k' \), a contradiction. If \( R_i'' = R \), then \( b'' + b''_i = k' - w'' < k^{**} - w_{ex} = b' + b'_i \), that is, the firm is paying down debt, and \( w'' > w' \) and \( w''_i > w'_i \). But then \( w \) and \( w_i \) grow without bound unless the firm or the intermediary eventually pay a dividend. But since \( \mu \) and \( \mu_i \) are strictly increasing as long as \( R_i' = R_i \), if either pays a dividend at some future date, then \( \mu < 1 \) or \( \mu_i < 1 \) currently, a contradiction. □

**Proof of Proposition 5.** First, note that \( k^* > 0 \) due to the Inada condition and hence \( w'^* \geq A'f(k^*) + k^*(1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta) > 0 \). Moreover, \( d^* > 0 \) since otherwise the value would be zero which would be dominated by paying out all net worth. Hence, \( \mu^* = \mu^*_i = 1 \). By Proposition 3 intermediary net worth is positive and hence \( d_i^* > 0 \) (arguing as above), which implies \( \mu^*_i = \mu^*_i = 1 \). But then \( \eta^* = (R\beta_i)^{-1} = 1 > 0 \) and \( \beta_i^* > 0 \) (and \( \eta_i^* = 0 \)), since otherwise intermediary net worth would be 0 next period. Therefore, \( R_i^* = \beta_i^{-1} \), and thus \( \lambda_i^* = (\beta_i^{-1})^{-1} - 1 > 0 \), that is, the firm's collateral constraint for intermediated finance binds. Moreover, \( k^* \) solves

\[
1 = \beta[A'f(k^*) + (1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi_i(\beta_i^{-1})
\]

and \( d^* = A'f(k^*) + k^*(1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta) - \varphi_i(\beta_i^{-1})k^* > 0 \) and \( \beta_i^* = \beta_i(\theta_i - \theta)k^*(1 - \delta) \). The net worth of the firm after dividends is

\[
w^* = \varphi_i(\beta_i^{-1})k^*.
\]

Finally, \( \lambda_i^* = \beta_i^* = w_i^* \) and \( \beta_i^* = (\beta_i^{-1} - 1)w_i^* \). □

**Proof of Proposition 6.** Consider first region D and take \( w \geq \bar{w}(w_i) \) (to be defined below) and \( d > 0 \) forever (\( \mu = \mu' = 1 \)). The investment Euler equation then implies

\[
1 = \beta[A'f_k(k) + (1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi_i(R_i).\]

If the collateral constraint for intermediated finance (12) does not bind, then \( \mu = R_i^* = \beta_i^{-1} \), and investment is constant at \( k \) which solves

\[
1 = \beta[A'f_k(k) + (1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi_i(\beta_i^{-1})
\]

or, equivalently,

\[
1 = \beta[A'f_k(k) + (1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi_i.
\]

Define \( \bar{w}(w_i) \equiv \varphi k - w_i \) and \( \bar{w}_i = \beta(\theta_i - \theta)k(1 - \delta) \). At \( \bar{w}_i \), (12) is just binding. For \( w_i \in (0, \bar{w}_i) \), (12) is slack. Moreover, \( w'_i = \beta_i^{-1}w_i \) and if \( w'_i < 0 \), the ex dividend net worth is \( w_{ex} = \bar{w}(w_i) \) both in the current and next period, and we have
immediately \( w_{ex}' / w_i' < w_{ex} / w_i \). Further, using (10) and (19) we have
\[
w' = A'f(k) + (1 - \theta)k(1 - \delta) - R'_i w_i > |A'f_k(k) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)|k - R'_i w_i = R'_i \bar{w}(w_i).
\]
But \( w_{ex}' = \bar{w}(w_i') < \bar{w}(w_i) w_i' / w_i = R'_i w_{ex} \), so \( d' = w' - w_{ex}' > 0 \). For \( w_i \in [\bar{w}_i, w_i^0] \), (12) binds and \( k(w_i) \) solves
\[
1 = \beta [A'f_k(k(w_i)) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)]/[\bar{w} - w_i / k(w_i)]
\]
and \( R'_i = (\theta(t) - \theta)k(w_i) / w_i(1 - \delta) \). Note that the last two equations imply that \( k(w_i) \geq k \), \( w_i / k(w_i) \geq \bar{w}_i / k \), and \( R'_i \leq \beta^{-1} \) in this region. As before, define \( \bar{w}(w_i) = \beta k(w_i) - w_i \), and note that the ex dividend net worth is \( w_{ex} = \bar{w}(w_i) \). Suppose \( w_i^+ > w_i \) then \( k(w_i^+) > k(w_i), k(w_i^+) / w_i^+ < k(w_i) / w_i \), and \( w_{ex}^+ / w_i^+ = \beta k(w_i^+) / w_i^+ - 1 < w_{ex} / w_i \). Moreover, \( w_i' = R'_i w_i > w_i \) and hence \( k \) (strictly) increases and \( R'_i \) (strictly) decreases in this region.
Proceeding as before,
\[
w' = A'f(k(w_i)) + (1 - \theta)k(w_i)(1 - \delta) > |A'f_k(k(w_i)) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)|k(w_i)
\geq R'_i \beta [A'f_k(k(w_i)) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)] k(w_i) = R'_i \bar{w}(w_i).
\]
But \( w_{ex}' = \bar{w}(w_i') < \bar{w}(w_i) w_i' / w_i = R'_i w_{ex} \), so \( d' = w' - w_{ex}' > 0 \). Finally, if \( w_i \geq w_i^* \) and \( w \geq \bar{w}(w_i) = w^* \), the steady state of Proposition 5 is reached.

We now show that the above policies are optimal for both the firm and the intermediary given the interest rate process in region D and hence constitute an equilibrium. Since \( R'_i > \beta_i^{-1} \) before the steady state is reached, the intermediary lends its entire net worth to the firm, \( l_i' = w_i \), and does not pay dividends until the steady state is reached. Hence, the intermediary’s policy is optimal. To see that the firm’s policy is optimal in region D, suppose that the firm follows the optimal policy from the next period onward but sets \( \tilde{d} = 0 \) in the current period. If the firm invests the additional amount, then \( \tilde{k} = (w_i + \tilde{d}) / \bar{w} > k \) and \( \tilde{w'} > w' \) (and therefore \( \tilde{\mu}' = 1 \)). The investment Euler equation requires \( 1 = \beta / \bar{w} [A'f_k(\tilde{k}) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)] / \bar{w}(R'_i) \), but since \( f_k(\tilde{k}) < f_k(k) \) and \( k \) satisfies the investment Euler equation at \( \mu = \mu' = 1 \), this implies \( \tilde{\mu} < 1 \), a contradiction. Suppose the firm instead invests the same amount \( \tilde{k} = k \) but borrows less \( \tilde{b}_i < b_i' \). Then \( \tilde{w'} > w' \), \( \tilde{\mu}' = 1 \), and from (19) \( \tilde{\mu} = 1 \). If \( R'_i < \beta^{-1} \), then (12) is binding, a contradiction. If \( R'_i = \beta^{-1} \), then the firm is indifferent between paying dividends in the current period or in the next period. But in equilibrium \( b_i' = w_i \) and hence \( \tilde{d} = d > 0 \) for the representative firm. By induction starting at the steady state and working backwards, the firm’s policy is optimal in region D. Further, we show in Lemmata 3 and 4 that the equilibrium in region D is the unique equilibrium converging to the steady state.

Consider now region ND with \( w_i \leq w_i^* \) (as Lemma 2 shows) and \( w < \bar{w}(w_i) \) as defined in the characterization of region D above and \( d = 0 \). Denote the firm’s ex dividend net worth by \( w_{ex} \leq w \). There are 3 cases to consider: \( w_{ex} / w_i > \bar{w} / \bar{w}_i \), \( w_{ex} / w_i \in [\bar{w} / \bar{w}_i, \bar{w} / \bar{w}_i] \), and \( w_{ex} / w_i < \bar{w} / \bar{w}_i^* \).
First, if \( w_{ex}/w_i > \bar{w}/\tilde{w}_i \), then \( w_{ex} + w_i < \bar{w}(w_i) + w_i = \bar{w} + \tilde{w}_i \) and \( k \leq (w_{ex} + w_i)/\varphi < (\bar{w} + \tilde{w}_i)/\varphi = k \). Note that since \( \tilde{b}_i' \leq \tilde{d}_i - \tilde{d}_i \leq \tilde{w}_i \), we have \( w_{ex}/b_i' \geq w_{ex}/w_i > \bar{w}/\tilde{w}_i \). If (12) binds, then \( R_i' = (\tilde{\theta} - \theta)(1 - \delta)(w_{ex}/b_i' + 1)/\varphi > (\tilde{\theta} - \theta)(1 - \delta)(\bar{w}/\tilde{w}_i + 1)/\varphi = \beta_i^{-1} \). If (12) does not bind, then \( R_i' = [A'f_\tilde{k}(k) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi > [A'f_\tilde{k}(\tilde{k}) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi = \beta_i^{-1} \). In either case, \( R_i' > \beta_i^{-1} \), and hence \( d_i = 0 \), \( \tilde{d}_i = 0 \), and \( b_i' = w_i \).

Second, consider \( w_{ex}/w_i \in [w^*/w_i^*, \bar{w}/\tilde{w}_i] \). If \( w_{ex}/b_i' > \bar{w}/\tilde{w}_i \) we are in the first region and hence \( d_i = 0 \) and \( b_i' = w_i \), a contradiction. Hence, w.l.o.g. \( w_{ex}/b_i' \in [w^*/w_i^*, \bar{w}/\tilde{w}_i] \). Take \( \tilde{w}_i \) such that \( w_{ex}/b_i' = \tilde{w}(\tilde{w}_i)/\tilde{w}_i \). Note that (12) binds at \( \tilde{w}_i \) and \( \bar{w}(\tilde{w}_i) \), and thus \( b_i' + w_{ex} < \tilde{w}_i + \bar{w}(\tilde{w}_i) \) and moreover \( k < \tilde{k}(\tilde{w}_i) \). If (12) does not bind, then

\[
\tilde{R}_i' = (\tilde{\theta} - \theta)(1 - \delta)(\bar{w}(\tilde{w}_i)/\tilde{w}_i + 1)/\varphi > (\tilde{\theta} - \theta)(1 - \delta)(w_{ex}/b_i' + 1)/\varphi \geq R_i'
\]

But since (12) binds at \( \tilde{w}_i \) and \( \bar{w}(\tilde{w}_i) \), \( \tilde{R}_i' < [A'f_\tilde{k}(\tilde{k}(\tilde{w}_i)) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi \), a contradiction. Therefore, (12) binds and \( R_i' = \tilde{R}_i'(\tilde{w}_i) \). From (19), \( \beta \mu'/\mu[A'f_\tilde{k}(k) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi_i(R_i') = 1 = \beta[A'f_\tilde{k}(\tilde{k}(\tilde{w}_i)) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi_i(\tilde{R}_i'(\tilde{w}_i)) \) and, since \( k < \tilde{k}(\tilde{w}_i) \), \( \mu > \mu' \geq 1 \), that is, \( d = 0 \). Further, if \( w_{ex}/w_i \in [w^*/w_i^*, \bar{w}/\tilde{w}_i] \), then \( R_i' \in (\beta_i^{-1}, \beta_i^{-1}] \), and thus \( d_i = 0 \) and \( b_i' = w_i \). If \( w_{ex}/w_i = w^*/w_i^* \), then either \( d_i > 0 \) or \( b_i' < w_i \) yields \( R_i' > \beta_i^{-1} \) and therefore \( d_i = 0 \) and \( b_i' = w_i \) at such \( w_{ex}/w_i \) as well.

Third, consider \( w_{ex}/w_i < w^*/w_i^* \). As before, w.l.o.g. \( w_{ex}/b_i' < w^*/w_i^* \). Then from (12), \( R_i' \leq (\tilde{\theta} - \theta)(1 - \delta)(w_{ex}/b_i' + 1)/\varphi < (\tilde{\theta} - \theta)(1 - \delta)(w^*/w_i^* + 1)/\varphi = \beta_i^{-1} \), that is, \( R_i' < \beta_i^{-1} \). From (19), \( \beta \mu'/\mu[A'f_\tilde{k}(k) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi_i(R_i') = 1 = \beta[A'f_\tilde{k}(w^*_i) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi_i(\beta_i^{-1}) \) and, since \( k < k^* \) and \( R_i' < \beta_i^{-1} \), \( \mu > \mu' \geq 1 \), that is, \( d = 0 \). Moreover, (12) binds, since otherwise \( \beta_i^{-1} > R_i' = [A'f_\tilde{k}(k) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi > [A'f_\tilde{k}(k^*) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi \), but since in the steady state (12) binds \( \beta_i^{-1} < [A'f_\tilde{k}(k^*) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)]/\varphi \), a contradiction.

Thus, we conclude that \( d = 0 \), (property (i) in the statement of the proposition), \( d_i = 0 \) (except possibly in the first period (see Lemma 2), that \( R_i' \) satisfies the equation in property (ii) of the proposition), and that \( b_i' = w_i \) and \( k = (w + w_i)/\varphi \) if \( R_i' > R \) and \( k = w/\varphi_i(R) \) if \( R_i' = R \) (property (iii)). Moreover, using (10) and (19) we have

\[
w' = A'f(k) + (1 - \tilde{\theta})(1 - \delta)k - [R_i'b_i' - (\tilde{\theta} - \theta)(1 - \delta)k] > R_i'\varphi_i(R_i'k) - [R_i'\varphi_i(R_i'k) - (\tilde{\theta} - \theta)(1 - \delta)k] \geq R_i'\varphi_i(k) - R_i'b_i' = R_i'w,
\]

which, together with the fact that \( w'_i = R_i'w_i \), implies that \( w'/w_i > w/w_i \) (property (iv)). Note that the equilibrium is thus unique in region ND as well. \( \Box \)

**Proof of Lemma 2.** We first show that \( d_i > 0 \) when \( w_i > w_i^* \). If \( w \geq w_i \), the stationary state is reached and the result is immediate. Suppose hence that \( w < w_i \). Suppose
instead that \( d_i = 0 \). We claim that \( R_i' < \beta_i^{-1} \) for such \( w_i \) and \( w \). Either \( R_i' = R \) and hence the claim is obviously true or \( R_i' > R \), but then \( b_i' = w_i \). Using (12) and (9) we have \( R_i' \leq (\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta)k / b_i' \leq (\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta)(w / w_i + 1) < (\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta)(w^*/w_i^* + 1) = \beta_i^{-1} \), that is, \( R \leq R_i' < \beta_i^{-1} \). But as long as \( d_i = 0 \), \( w_i' = R_i'w_i \geq Rw_i > w_i \), that is, intermediary net worth keeps rising. If eventually firm net worth exceeds \( w^* \), then the steady state is reached and \( \mu_i' = 1 \) from then onward. But then \( \mu_i = \beta_i R_i' \mu_i' = \beta_i R_i' < 1 \), which is not possible. The intermediary must pay a dividend in the first period, because if it pays a dividend at any point after that, an analogous argument would again imply that \( \mu_i < 1 \) in the first period, which is not possible. Similarly, if \( w < w^* \) forever, then \( w > w_i^* \) forever and the firm must eventually pay a dividend in this region, as never paying a dividend cannot be optimal. But by the same argument again then the dividend must be paid in the first period.

To see that at most an initial dividend is paid and no further dividends are paid until the steady state is reached, note that in equilibrium once \( R_i' > \beta_i^{-1} \), then this is the case until the steady state is reached. But as long as \( R_i' > \beta_i^{-1} \), the intermediary does not pay a dividend (and this is true w.l.o.g. also at a point where \( R_i' = \beta_i^{-1} \) before the steady state is reached). Before this region is reached, \( R_i' < \beta_i^{-1} \), but then the intermediary would not postpone a dividend in this region, as other wise again \( \mu_i = \beta_i R_i' \mu_i' = \beta_i R_i' < 1 \), which is not possible. \( \square \)

**Lemma 3.** Consider an equilibrium with \( R_i' \in [\beta_i^{-1}, \beta_i^{-1}] \) and \( \mu = \mu' = 1 \) and assume the equilibrium is unique from the next period onward. Consider another equilibrium interest rate \( \bar{R}_i' \), then \( \bar{k} \leq k \) and \( \bar{R}_i' \leq R_i' \) is impossible.

**Proof of Lemma 3.** Using (19) at the two different equilibria, if \( \bar{k} \leq k \) and \( \bar{R}_i' \leq R_i' \), then
\[
\bar{\mu} = \beta A' f_k(\bar{k}) + (1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta) \bar{\mu}' \geq \beta A' f_k(k) + (1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta) \mu' = 1
\]  
(23)

If \( \bar{k} < k \) and \( \bar{R}_i' < R_i' = \beta_i^{-1} \), then by (23) \( \bar{\mu} > \bar{\mu}' \). Thus, \( \bar{\mu} > \bar{\mu}' \bar{R}_i' \beta_i \) implying that (12) must be binding. But then the firm must pay a dividend and \( 1 = \bar{\mu} > \bar{\mu}' \), a contradiction.

If \( \bar{k} > k \) and \( \bar{R}_i' > R_i' \) and the collateral constraint binds at the original equilibrium, then \( \bar{w}' \geq A' f(\bar{k}) + (1 - \theta_i)\bar{k} > A' f(k) + (1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta)k = w' \). Since \( \bar{w}' > w' \), \( \mu' = 1 \), and the equilibrium is unique, \( \mu' = 1 \). By (23), \( \bar{\mu} < \bar{\mu}' = 1 \), a contradiction.

If \( \bar{k} > k \) and \( \bar{R}_i' > R_i' \) and the collateral constraint does not bind at the original equilibrium, the \( R_i' = \beta_i^{-1} \) (using (16)). But then \( \bar{\mu}' / \bar{\mu}' \geq R_i' / \beta_i > 1 \) while (23) implies \( \bar{\mu} / \bar{\mu}' < 1 \), a contradiction. \( \square \)
Lemma 4. The equilibrium in region D is the unique equilibrium converging to the steady state.

Proof of Lemma 4. The proof is by induction. First, note that if \( w \geq w^* \) and \( w_i \geq w^*_i \), then the unique steady state is reached. Consider an equilibrium interest rate \( R'_i \) in region D and suppose the equilibrium is unique from the next period on. Suppose \( R'_i \in [\beta_i^{-1}, \beta_i^{-1}] \) and consider another equilibrium with \( \tilde{R}'_i \). If the collateral constraint (12) binds at this equilibrium, then \( \tilde{R}'_i = (\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta)\tilde{k}/w_i \geq (\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta)k/w_i = R'_i \), which is impossible by Lemma (3). If the collateral constraint (12) does not bind at this equilibrium and \( \tilde{k} < k \), then \( \tilde{R}'_i < (\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta)\tilde{k}/w_i < (\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta)k/w_i = R'_i \), which is also impossible by Lemma (3). If the collateral constraint (12) does not bind at this equilibrium and \( \tilde{k} > k \), by Lemma (3) \( \tilde{R}'_i < R_i \). But then by (16) \( \tilde{\mu}/\mu' = \beta \tilde{R}'_i < \beta R'_i < 1 \). Since \( \tilde{k} > k \) and the collateral constraint binds at \( R'_i \), \( \tilde{w}' > w' \) implying \( \tilde{\mu}' = 1 \) and by above inequality \( \tilde{\mu} < 1 \), a contradiction. Thus for \( R'_i \in [\beta_i^{-1}, \beta_i^{-1}] \) the equilibrium is unique. Suppose \( R_i = \beta_i^{-1} \). By Lemma (3), we need only consider the two cases \( \tilde{k} \geq k \) and \( \tilde{R}'_i \leq R'_i \leq \beta_i^{-1} \). If \( \tilde{k} < k \) and \( \tilde{R}'_i > \beta_i^{-1} \), (16) implies that \( \tilde{\mu} > 1 \) and hence the firm does not pay a dividend. But then the firm must be borrowing less from intermediaries, which cannot be an equilibrium as \( w_i = w_i \) at this interest rate. If \( \tilde{k} > k \) and \( \tilde{R}'_i < \beta_i^{-1} \), and if (12) binds at \( \tilde{R}'_i \), \( \tilde{R}'_i = (\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta)\tilde{k}/w_i > (\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta)k/w_i \geq R'_i \), a contradiction; if (12) instead does not bind at \( \tilde{R}'_i \), \( \tilde{\mu}/\mu' = \beta \tilde{R}'_i \). Since \( \tilde{k} > k \) and \( \tilde{R}'_i \leq R'_i \), \( \tilde{w}' > w' \) implying \( \tilde{\mu}' = 1 \) and by above inequality \( \tilde{\mu} < 1 \), a contradiction. Therefore the equilibrium in region D is unique. \( \square \)

Proof of Proposition 7. Part (i): By assumption the expected productivity in the first period equals the deterministic productivity from time 1 onward (denoted \( \bar{A}' \) here), that is, \( E[A'] = \bar{A}' \). Define the first best level of capital \( k_{fb} \) by \( r + \delta = \bar{A}'f_k(k_{fb}) \). Using the definition of the user cost of capital the investment Euler equation (19) for the deterministic case can be written as

\[
r + \delta + \frac{\rho}{R + \rho}(1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta) + \frac{\rho_i}{R + \rho_i}(\theta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta) = R\beta \bar{A}'f_k(k^*) < \bar{A}'f_k(k^*)
\]

and thus \( k^* < k_{fb} \). Now suppose that \( \lambda(s') = 0, \forall s' \in S \). Part (ii) of Lemma 1 then implies that \( \lambda_i(s') = 0, \forall s' \in S \), and (15) and (16) simplify to \( \mu = R\beta \mu' \) and \( \mu = R'_i \beta \mu' \), implying that \( R'_i = R, \forall s' \in S \), and that \( d' = 0, \forall s' \in S \), as otherwise \( \mu < 1 \). Moreover, (6) simplifies to \( \mu_i = R\beta \mu_i \) and thus \( d'_i = 0, \forall s' \in S \), as well since otherwise \( \mu_i < 1 \). Investment Euler equation (19) reduces to \( r + \delta = \bar{A}'f_k(k_{fb}) \), that is, investment must be \( k_{fb} \). We now show that this implies that the sum of the net worth of the intermediary and the firm exceeds their steady state (cum dividend) net worth in at least one state,
which in turn implies that at least one of them pays a dividend, a contradiction. To see this note that \( w' = A'f(k_{fb}) + k_{fb}(1 - \delta) - RB' - R_i^b b_i' \) and \( w'_i = R_i' + R_i^b b_i' \geq R_i^b b_i' = R_i^b b_i' \) and thus

\[
  w' + w'_i \geq A'f(k_{fb}) + k_{fb}(1 - \delta) - RB' \geq A'f(k_{fb}) + (1 - \theta)k_{fb}(1 - \delta) > A'f(k^*) + (1 - \theta)k^*(1 - \delta)
\]

whereas \( w^* + w_i^* = A'f(k^*) + (1 - \theta)k^*(1 - \delta) \). For \( A' > A_i \), \( w' + w'_i > w^* + w_i^* \), and either the intermediary or the firm (or both) must pay a dividend, a contradiction.

Part (ii): If \( \lambda_i(s') = 0 \), \( \forall s' \in S \), then \( (\beta \mu' / \mu)^{-1} = R_i' = (\beta_i \mu_i' / \mu_i)^{-1} \) where the first equality uses (16) and the second equality uses (6) and the fact that part (iv) of Lemma 1 holds for an eventually deterministic economy.

Part (iii): Since \( \lambda(s') = 0 \), \( \lambda_i(s') = 0 \) by part (ii) of Lemma 1 and \( R_i(s') = R \). From (15), \( \mu(s') = \mu_i(s') = \lambda(s') > \mu(s') \). Using (6), \( (\beta_i \mu_i(s') / \mu_i)^{-1} = R \leq R_i(s') = (\beta_i \mu_i(s') / \mu_i)^{-1} \) and thus \( \mu_i(s') \geq \mu_i(s') \). □

**Proof of Proposition 8.** The first order conditions are (13)-(16) and \( \mu' = 1 + \nu_d' \) where \( \beta \nu_d' \) is the multiplier on the constraint \( w' \geq 0 \). By the Inada condition, (14) implies that \( k > 0 \) and using (10) at equality and (11) and (12) we have \( d' \geq A'f(k) + k(1 - \theta_i)(1 - \delta) > 0 \) and \( \mu' = 1 \). But (13) and (15) imply \( 1 \leq \mu = R \beta + R \beta \lambda' \) and thus \( \lambda' > 0 \) since \( R \beta < 1 \) by assumption; that is, all firms raise as much financing as possible from households.

Suppose the firm pays dividends at time 0. Then \( \mu = \mu' = 1 \) and (16) implies

\[
  0 > 1 - R_i^b \beta = R_i^b \lambda_i' - R_i^b \nu_i' \quad \text{and thus} \quad \nu_i' = 1 - (R_i^b \beta)^{-1} > 0, \ b_i' = 0, \ \text{and} \ \lambda_i' = 0; \quad \text{thus, the firm does not use intermediated finance. Note that the problem of maximizing (22) subject to (9) through (12) has a (weakly) concave objective and a convex constraint set and hence induces a (weakly) concave value function. Thus, \( \mu \) is (weakly) decreasing in \( w \) and let \( \bar{w} \) be the lowest value of net worth for which \( \mu = 1 \); by the Inada condition, such a \( \bar{w} < +\infty \) exists. At \( \bar{w}, \ d = 0, \ \bar{w} = \bar{k} \bar{p} \) (using (9)), and \( \bar{k} \) solves \( 1 = \beta[A'f(k)(\bar{k}) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)]/\bar{p} \) (using (14)). For \( w \geq \bar{w} \), \( d = w - \bar{w} \) while the rest of the optimal policy is unchanged.

Suppose \( \lambda_i' = 0 \) and \( \nu_i' = 0 \). Then \( \mu = R_i^b \beta > 1 \). Moreover, rearranging (14) we have \( 1 = \beta/(R_i^b \beta)[A'f_k(k) + (1 - \theta)(1 - \delta)]/\bar{p} \) which defines \( \bar{k} < \bar{k} \). Define \( \bar{w}_u \) such that investment is \( \bar{k} \) and \( b_i' = 0 \); then \( \bar{w}_u = \bar{k} \bar{p} \). Similarly, define \( \bar{w}_t \) such that investment is \( \bar{k} \) and \( b'_t = (R_i^b)^{-1} (\beta_i - \theta) k(1 - \delta) \); then \( \bar{w}_t = \bar{k} \bar{p} (\rho - (R_i^b)^{-1} (\beta_i - \theta)(1 - \delta)) \). Note that \( \bar{w}_t < \bar{w}_u < \bar{w} \). So firms below \( \bar{w}_t \) raise as much financing as possible from intermediaries (since \( \mu > R_i^b \beta \) by concavity and hence \( \lambda_i' > 0 \)). Firms with net worth between \( \bar{w}_t \) and \( \bar{w}_u \) pay down intermediary financing linearly. Firms with net worth above \( \bar{w}_u \) do not borrow from intermediaries and scale up until \( \bar{k} \) is reached at \( \bar{w} \), at which point firms initiate dividends. □
References


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Figure 1: Capital, Collateral Value, and Financing

This figure shows, on the left, the extent to which one unit of capital can be collateralized by households (fraction $\theta$, interpreted as structures) and intermediaries (fraction $\theta_i$, interpreted to include equipment), in the middle, the collateral value next period after depreciation, and on the right, the maximal amount that households and intermediaries can finance, as well as the minimum amount of internal funds required.

Figure 2: Role of Firm and Financial Intermediary Net Worth

Interest rate on intermediated finance $R_i' - 1$ (percent) as a function of firm ($w$) and intermediary net worth ($w_i$). The parameter values are: $\beta = 0.90$, $R = 1.05$, $\beta_i = 0.94$, $\delta = 0.10$, $\theta = 0.80$, $\theta_i = 0.90$, $A' = 0.20$, and $f(k) = k^\alpha$ with $\alpha = 0.333$. 
Figure 3: Role of Firm and Financial Intermediary Net Worth
Contour of area where spread exceeds $\beta^{-1}_i - R$: $w_i^*$ (solid) and $w_i(w_i)$ (dashed); contour of area where spread equals $\beta^{-1} - R$: $\tilde{w}_i$ (dash dotted) and $\tilde{w}(w_i)$ (dash dotted). The parameter values are as in Figure 2.

Figure 4: Role of Firm and Financial Intermediary Net Worth
Interest rate on intermediated finance $R'_i - 1$ (percent) as a function of firm ($w$) for different levels of intermediary net worth ($w_i$). The parameter values are as in Figure 2.
Figure 5: Dynamics of Firm and Financial Intermediary Net Worth

Contours of the regions describing the deterministic dynamics of firm and financial intermediary net worth (see Proposition 6). Region ND, in which firms pay no dividends, is to the left of the solid line and Region D, in which firms pay positive dividends, is to the right of (and including) the solid line. The point where the solid line reaches the dotted line is the deterministic steady state \((w^*, w_i^*)\). The kink in the solid line is the point \((\bar{w}, \bar{w}_i)\) where \(R'_i = \beta^{-1}\) and the collateral constraint just binds. The solid line segment between these two points is \(\bar{w}(w_i) = \varphi k(w_i) - w_i\) (with \(R'_i \in (\beta_i^{-1}, \beta^{-1})\)). The solid line segment sloping down is \(\bar{w}(w_i) = \varphi k - w_i\) (with \(R'_i = \beta^{-1}\)). Region ND is dividend by two dash dotted lines: below the dash dotted line through \((\bar{w}, \bar{w}_i)\) \(R'_i > \beta_i^{-1}\); between the two dash dotted lines \(R'_i \in (\beta_i^{-1}, \beta^{-1})\); and above the dash dotted line through \((w^*, w_i^*)\) \(R'_i < \beta_i^{-1}\). The parameter values are as in Figure 2.
Figure 6: Dynamics of Firm and Financial Intermediary Net Worth

This figure illustrates the deterministic dynamics starting from initial values of net worth \( w = 0.0222 \) and \( w_t = w_t^0 \). Panel A traces out the path of firm and intermediary net worth in \( w \) vs. \( w_t \) space with the contours as in Figure 5. Panel B shows the evolution of the interest rate on intermediated finance (Panel B1), firm net worth (dashed) and intermediary net worth (solid) (cum dividends (higher) and ex dividend (lower)) (Panel B2), intermediated lending to firms (solid) and households (dashed) (Panel B3), and investment (Panel B4). The parameter values are as in Figure 2 except that \( \alpha = 0.8 \).

Panel A: Joint evolution of firm and intermediary net worth

Panel B: Interest rates, net worth, lending, and investment over time
Figure 7: Dynamics of a Credit Crunch

This figure illustrates the deterministic dynamics after a credit crunch starting from initial values of net worth \( w = w^* \) and \( w_t = 0.01 \). Panel A traces out the path of firm and intermediary net worth in \( w \) vs. \( w_t \) space with the contours as in Figure 5. Panel B shows the evolution of the interest rate on intermediated finance (Panel B1), firm net worth (dashed) and intermediary net worth (solid) (cum dividends (higher) and ex dividend (lower)) (Panel B2), intermediated lending to firms (solid) and households (dashed) (Panel B3), and investment (Panel B4). The parameter values are as in Figure 6 except that \( \theta = 0.65 \).

Panel A: Joint evolution of firm and intermediary net worth

Panel B: Interest rates, net worth, lending, and investment over time