Appendix A

Typologies of Hunter, et al. (2000)
Strategy Definition Example
Openness Releasing all information about an issue immediately. Seek internal and external opportunities to tell your side of the story. Diet Pepsi: Hypodermic needle scare. Diet Pepsi opened its canning lines, its employees, and its CEO to media.
Agenda Setting Everything is on the record, especially during the beginning phase of a crisis. Communicate your values first, and then worry about what the media is asking. Exxon Valdez oil spill. Exxon DID NOT have an agenda in responding to issues in media, resulting in media-driven issues and information release.
Relevance Communicate during a crisis the importance of the issue that got you there in the first place. Don't allow the importance of an act to be called into question. Late 1980's BRAC rounds: Pentagon announced base closures by showing the relevance to overall military force strengths and goals associated with BRAC.
Legal Limitations Seek internal legal counsel immediately, however, all advice from counsel must come as fast as media's questions. 1st Lt Kelly Flinn. Legal advice didn't come quickly to public affairs.
Legal Implications: Cultural Counsel addressing crisis must understand legal implications in host country, and how the law will be enforced. Union Carbide gas leak in India, killed thousands. When UC's CEO arrived next day to assist in recovery operations, he was immediately arrested at the airport.
Release Coordination Make sure everyone in coordination process is aware of crisis issue and is not releasing conflicting information. EA-6B Prowler Italian cable cutting. Release coordination and authority weren't clear during the beginning phase of the crisis.
Public Think What will the public think about the crisis? Address internally and externally what they would want to know from you during a crisis. Exxon DID NOT use public think. Exxon communicators during oil spill only addressed company's concerns.
Responsiveness Acting quickly and responding to any requests for information, or requests about issues affecting crisis. Exxon CEO DID NOT respond quickly during the Valdez oil spill. Resulting in media-controlled, one-sided responses in newspapers and television.
Message Make sure the appropriate message is being addressed at all opportunities, especially during the initial phase of the crisis. 1st Lt Kelly Flinn. USAF did not emphasize key goals of case, resulting in negative messaging by media.
Cultural Being aware of cultural, ethnic sensitivities and language. EA-6B Prowler. U.S. Ambassador to Italy laid wreath at tragedy site, resulting in positive impact on Italian perception.
Single Spokesperson Create, train, and equip a single source to answer all internal and external queries regarding your role in the crisis: CEO or wing commander equivalent.  Exxon CEO DID NOT respond to media queries and was no where to be found during first phase of crisis, resulting in negative publicity for company.
Firefighter Someone, or a group of people, who examine issues during a crisis that can flare up and/or intensify the situation further. Diet Pepsi Hypodermic Needle: Pepsi headquarters put a team together that was charged with finding the latest media reports, and getting that information to others quickly.

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Appendix B

Cover letter and survey:

To:  Public Affairs Colleagues

From: DoD Joint Course in Communication Class 2000-D Students

Subject:  Crisis Communication Survey

We are students in the DoD JCC and are conducting a crisis communication survey to crosswalk between academia and best practice in the field in order to build a “toolkit” for PAs to use in proactive planning for crisis communication.

Please take time to complete the brief, voluntary and anonymous Internet survey at http://www.ou.edu/deptcomm/dodjcc/survey  not later than July 22, 2000. To access the survey, type dod for user name and survey as the password.

Thank you for your support in this endeavor. You can check out our results online at  http://www.ou.edu/deptcomm/dodjcc/groups after August 15, 2000.

If you have questions or concerns, contact:

TSgt Rob Ivie, USAF ivierv@mcbbutler.usmc.mil
SFC Emma Krouser krousere@emh1.ftmeade.army.mil
MAJ Shelly Stellwagen    major_mommy@yahoo.com
Click  icon to view complete survey
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Appendix C

Demographics of Respondents
Service Status Component

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Appendix D

Crises Experienced

Additional types of crises identified by respondents:

A-7 hit a Ramada Inn
Alaska Airlines Crash #2616. Y2K
Satellite failures, satellite/debris re-entry, hostile missile launch
Artillery rounds off post 
Ax murder on post 
BRAC (Base realignment and closure)
Civilian deaths on military installation
Deployment to hostile area
Deposed Head of State (Marcos) 
Exchange of Fire resulting in deaths (Korea DMZ) 
Explosion of ICBM 
Major drug busts 
Migrant events – Haitian ('91-'92), Cuban ('94) and Chinese migrant interdiction
Natural disasters - Northridge Earthquake, Malibu Fires
Numerous no notice deployments
Legal cases - adultery, conduct unbecoming
Lost nuke near Damascus, Ark. 
Operation Provide Refuge (Kosovar Refugees)
Failure of systems to work properly
Range fires 
RIFs (Reductions in force)
Rocket explosions
Senior leader misconduct
Stolen howitzers driven off post 
Appendix E

Openness Strategy

Reported Use
Answer   Frequency Percent
Yes  37 75.5
No 11 22.4
Unsure 1 2.0
Total 49 100.0

Perceived Effectiveness

Future Use
Answer Frequency Percent
Yes 43 87.8
No 2 4.1
Unsure 8.2
Total 49 100.0

Responses to Questions 19 and 20:

19.  Quick and open access to the media
19.  Maximum disclosure with minimum delay. We released the facts without editorializing.
19. maximum disclosure with minimum delay
21. The Coast Guard professes to have the best relationship of all service branches with the news media. Due to the nature of our missions, we deal daily with significant news events or public issues. And many of us career PA professionals were trained and continue to encourage all Coast Guard leaders to practice an open relationship with the news media and the American public.
19. Just that - release all information about an issue immediately, and aggressively pursue opportunities to follow up.
19. Maximum information, minimum time. Delaying action implies dishonesty and cover-up; more concern for institution's image than for public welfare.
19. Made search and rescue efforts available to media --able to change focus of F-15 crash to mission of Rescue and Recovery Squadron returning downed pilot. Also made firefighters as available as possible during significant brush fires -- focus changed from environmental disaster to "hard-working, dedicated firefighters"
21. Strategy depends on situation and willingness of commander. PA has to be able to sell the idea, predict the media future and risk selling french fries the next day.
21. This strategy needs to be taught to commanders, in addition to PAOs. Commanders are more likely to take the advice of their staff officers if they are familiar with and understand a particular strategy. We beat into commanders and PAOs about waiting until the investigation is complete to avoid speculation. This appears to be at odds with this policy.
19. Access to commander, employees, site (prior to actual arrival of refugees) and contingency planning. Note that this was during set-up phase only, operational control rested with DHHS once refugees arrived.
21. While use of this strategy is tempting because it is unambiguous and easy to defend, it only works well if you can absolutely rely on your internal information sources.
19. Gave tours of information and operations centers; told "feature" sides of stories -- focus on the human element
19. Releasing all information about the incident that wasn't classified or that would prejudice an investigation, i.e., explaining what happened but not the "why."
21. The hardest part is convincing your bosses that such openness is in their best interest. I've been shut down once or twice, but senior leaders are more open to this approach now.
19. Availability of on scene workers to media representatives and/or elected/appointed officials
19. Being open, honest and forthcoming with all releasable information. Promising to update the press whenever new information is available and then abiding by that promise. Telling how we were going to fix the situation.
19. Open interview access to commanders, soldiers, and family members. Media visits to area within hours of incident.
19. Immediate release in local, command-owned media with concurrent invite to local external media to cover
21. "Crisis Communication" incidents are the single MOST important time to inform the INTERNAL audience FIRST. Concurrent with that - but never, ever BEFORE that - is the importance of informing external publics. Use informed soldiers, employees, and family members, as appropriate, as spokespersons.
19. Immediate access to commanders, witnesses and information
19. Frequent press conferences and news releases
21. You want to make sure you have all facts straight before releasing them to the media.
21. With VERY few exceptions - perhaps none in the Garrison environment - I would always use this strategy.
19. Opening up the court martial process, providing SME, allowing coverage of the CM
21. Probably the best strategy, but the most difficult to convince the senior leadership to adopt.
19. Press releases/packets, briefings, emails, leader interviews, community meetings
19. Media access to people in the know
21. Depends on each particular incident and media in the locale.
19. We aggressively sought to contact media members by issuing immediate and frequent releases as well as through personal phone calls to media members who had covered stories here before.
21. Provides vast benefits to credibility and prevents rumors and distrust from springing up in the community. Some short-term pain yields long-term gain.
19. Having senior person release all known information at press conference; special internal releases to inform internal community of circumstances; community campaign...providing our position directly to community leaders
21. Much better than not releasing any information/stonewalling.
21. Until you have a firm grasp of the situation and are speaking to someone at the scene who also has a firm grasp, it is not a good idea to give out incomplete or possibly inaccurate information.
19. Comparison/historical data of accidents/percentages/development of three key messages focusing on solutions and further actions.
21. In the Navy, according to SECNAVINST it would be the call of the commanding officer and notification of next of kin issues.
19. Soldier Death: Held press conference, released all available information then and provided regular updates. 
21. It works. As long as you ensure you have accurate information before it is released, it is a win-win situation. It greatly reduces the appearance of hiding something. Your credibility is enhanced.
19. Access to senior officials, access to operational centers, provide subject matter expert OTR interviews
21. Provide senior leader or SME as single spokesperson early in the event to speak with "one voice" (consistency is a virtue). As event unfolds and facts become clearer, others can talk. 2.Split office responsibilities. Identify PA person/personnel as lead to handle the crisis event while others handle daily, routine events. 3. On an installation with multiple PA activities (unified, MACOM, installation), combining efforts during a long-term event helps. The 24-hour news cycle never sleeps and 24-hour ops might be useful.
19. It is critical to make sure that public affairs officers have the right information. The most important item of immediate concern is getting the correct information through operational channels and verifying all information quickly. The other critical tactic is to ensure that there is no release of classified or sensitive information.
21. It is absolutely imperative that you tell the truth; accurately and clearly. The story may not always be positive, however if you tell it truthfully and in a timely manner your command usually gets a fair, objective result from the media.
19. It is critical to make sure that public affairs officers have the right information. The most important item of immediate concern is getting the correct information through operational channels and verifying all information quickly. The other critical tactic is to ensure that there is no release of classified or sensitive information.
21. It is absolutely imperative that you tell the truth; accurately and clearly. The story may not always be positive, however if you tell it truthfully and in a timely manner your command usually gets a fair, objective result from the media.
21. Need to have buy-in from commanders to use open communication in all aspects of answering questions on the event, otherwise it looks like you are being forthright with some answers and covering up other information.
19. Press release, news conference
19. Disgruntled civilian employee murdered his boss. Local law enforcement had concurrent jurisdiction. Acted as go between between media and them. worked great. Damscus Ark. Acted as AF spokesman for first 6 hours or so. Told them the little I/we knew at the time i.e. had an explosion, working to rescue injured and secure the area. Was accepted. This strategy depends on the time of incident and the time in the incident cycle to be effective. Later on NOT discussing the lost nuke caused problems which resulted in DoD changing its policy.
21. See above. Talk with Dave Schillerstrom (USAF Col ret.) or Dick Kline (USAF LtCol, ret.) for more on Damascus.
19. The reality is that in the type of crisis I have had to deal with I came on the scene AFTER the event had already created negative publicity. Due to the nature of the incidents and privacy considerations, aggressively seeking opportunities to express the "other" side would have caused legal problems and brought more attention to the issue. The other reality is that tabloid journalism that now exists on major TV media outlets makes it dangerous to push a view particularly in gay issues area. Society does not have a consensus on these issues. So, while I am considered an aggressive PAO, I prefer to be aggressive on positive fronts and not in "reacting to negative news.
19. The truth isn't the best spin...it's the ONLY spin. Tell it all...tell it all right NOW!
19.  Open comments to media/questions and answers package.
19. Murder Board with spokesperson Press Conference.
21. The crisis was a cadet mail theft ring at the Air Force Academy.  A murder board prepared the spokesperson very well for the upcoming press conference.  The press conference provided an opportunity for all local and regional media to get the story once.  Only a few follow-ups were requested.  The immediate release of all available information about the mail theft ring satisfied the media and relayed our key messages to the community, not allowing any speculations about the integrity and character of cadets at the Academy.
21.  Consider it in cases where national security is not a risk.
19. Interviews, releases, updates, media opportunities.
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 Appendix F

Agenda Setting Strategy

Reported Use
Answer Frequency Percent
Yes 34 69.4
No 12 24.5
Unsure 3  6.1
Total 49 100.0

Perceived Effectiveness

Future Use
Answer Frequency Percent
Yes 36 73.4
No 9 18.4
Unsure 4 8.2
Total 49 100.0

Responses to questions 24 and 26:

26. Great plan, but not likely for the military.
24. Providing key messages to key communicators
24. We controlled the message by telling the truth and answering questions before they were asked.
24. Deliver a "we care, we are competent "message first - then explain the facts
24. During "Men Behaving Badly" incidents in the community, Air Force policy on zero tolerance is stated upfront. Without suggesting guilt of the accused, media understands we take this issue seriously, will give it thorough review, and appropriate action, if any, will be taken
26. Some media, especially TV, will spin and dictate the issue regardless of what you do.
24. If PAO is the only and/or most credible information source early in a crisis, then this tactic can be effective. On several occasions, I have seen my releases printed or repeated verbatim, including the command messages. The most that can be said about this strategy is it buys some time. Eventually, you will have to deal with the media's queries.
24. During Alaska Airlines crash, immediately sent out release w/key messages -- launched a massive response, looking for survivors (not black box, etc.), greatest sympathy with the families.
26. I believe wholeheartedly in this strategy. The earlier I get my key messages said, the more the media trusts me. I tell them everything I can, and I tell them why I can't release other information (don't have it, can't speculate, won't jeopardize investigations)
24. Up-front press conference with commander to lay out mobilization and deployment mission, issues facing soldiers, issues for installation, parameters of information that would be available. Had SMEs present to answer specific issue questions. Dealt with other questions primarily one-on-one.
26. Although we are in a very large media market, rapid turnover means that few reporters have little if any experience with the military. Setting parameters early and handing out concrete packages of information actually makes it easier for reporters and helps ensure they understand what to look for as mobilizations or other large issues continue. Twenty-two points, plus triple-word-score, plus fifty points for using all my letters.  Game's over.  I'm outta here.
24. The individual who was tasked with presenting the agenda switched gears without concurrence of other team members and opened the floor to questions. It was a disaster.
24. Prepared statements; designating subject matter experts as spokespersons
24. We are always prepared to give our "command messages" and there is no better time to communicate your values than during a crisis. But they will not suffice for hard core information about a specific incident. Also, if your actions do not demonstrate your values, communicating the "approved" values is meaningless. The CEO (commander) must practice what he/she preaches. The public is watching very closely during a crisis!
26. "Everything" of anything is too absolute to be a thoughtful PA strategy.
24. Tried to develop command messages based on the incident. Tried to make sure we got out the information correctly as quickly as possible, but all of it with a command message imbedded.
26. Good idea, but many times we have our hands tied in the field based on PA Guidance from the DoD or service PA shops. We sometimes have talking points or command messages, but many times we are not allowed to develop ones that will work locally because of the guidance.
24. Prepared fact sheets, information papers, etc. for media with limited or no military knowledge. This is sometimes extremely challenging since incidents are often reported without the journalist verifying the accuracy of the report prior to broadcast/publication.
26. You can never "over-prepare."
24. Most people don't know how to do it. Therefore, "communicating values" too quickly becomes defensive sounding. The issue in a crisis is to talk about what happened, how and why, and about what we're going to do to prevent its recurrence. Trying to push values TOO hard in a crisis can come off as hypocritical ... "Uh, excuse me, Gen. Clark ... if you're all that sensitive and committed to your so-called 'values' here at Fort Campbell, how is it his fellow soldiers bashed PFC Winchell to death as he slept?" 
26. Be very careful using a crisis situation as an opportunity to present the Army as an institution of values. Deal with the crisis at hand and get it behind you. Anyway, and ultimately, how we deal with crisis tells a story of its own about our values.
24. Clearly state institution will not condone misbehavior (sexual misconduct, for example) which occurred, then answer specific questions, etc
24. Communicating on the record should be the norm anyway, and getting out your values of 'doing the right thing in response', caring about victims' families, etc, VERY important. But ONE OF the organization's values should be to 'worry about what the media is asking' because it's the public - internal and external - who are listening. Rather than avoid, take advantage of the media's interest to get the facts out. 
24. During the early stage of an operational crisis, before information is clear, I have given briefings based on capabilities. This buys time.
26. About the only thing you can do during the first stage of an operational crisis.
24. Ensuring command objectives, concerns and priorities were incorporated into position papers and talking points for use by all officials
26. Not by choice
24. Demonstrate compassion/caring...get public on your side, but you must have a strategy on why you're doing it and what outcome you intend. Not that you want to be manipulative or dishonest, but you must have public sentiment on your side.
26. Depends on circumstances...you must have a plan to achieve a desired outcome...you can't go into something blind or without direction...or else you will get bloodied.
24. It is very effective but difficult to pull off in a short timeframe. We were proactive about a drill sergeant misconduct case. We released the information upfront and drove the information release from start to finish.
26. You have to be prepared and proactive
24. Facts are often limited during the early phase and there isn't much to say, especially with national security issues at stake. Often, talking on background was more helpful to put the situation in perspective to the larger event until facts unfolded. The media appreciate the talk on background so it doesn't appear as if you are hiding anything. 
26. While it is important to communicate your values, I think that one can weave those values into the answers to the media's questions - if you want to get the get your story told by the media first you have to present the information right away. Those who tell their story aggressively can get their story out...those who do not get their story out first end up reacting to other agendas.
26. Necessary to get your messages out early and effectively, especially since the media often arrive with their pre-determined agenda. Sometimes the only way to have our messages heard is to get them out there initially, bypassing the original media question.
26. Does not allow for the very useful and effective tactic of off-the-record interviews with senior leaders
24. We blew a rocket motor up during a test at Edwards. We couldn't/didn't want to talk about the "cause" of the accident. We did want to signal what we were pretty sure did NOT cause it. In this case, we were successful in using this strategy. The response to this won "best crisis response in the AF that year (around 1990).
24. Never conduct press conferences or make announcements without carefully designing three basic messages... then stick to them.
26. This is a poorly defined strategy. I certainly set (try to set) the agenda at all times but not as you defined it. Not good! Next question...
24.  Everything that is releasable is made available to the media.  Within an hour of the incident, releasable information is always provided to the media about the crisis.
26.  Many times all information about the crisis is not immediately available to the media, such as deaths in an aircraft training accident and the cause of an accident.  However, by providing the basic releasable information about the incident keeps the media from speculating what happened. 
24. Command liked it, but media reps felt as if they had to speculate to fill in missing details. Overall, I'd say this approach was moderately effective from a PA perspectivesus
26. Use sparingly, because the media is left with numerous questions.
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 Appendix G

Relevance Strategy

Reported Use
Answer Frequency Percent
Yes 30 61.2
No 9 18.4
Unsure 10  20.4
Total 49 100.0

Perceived effectiveness

Projected Use
Answer Frequency Percent
Yes  40 81.6
No  2 4.1
Unsure  14.3
Total 49 100.0

Responses to questions 29 and 31:

29. Restating the importance of training mission, etc
29. Every negative has a positive. 
29. Briefed relevant background information
29. When a soldier is killed or injured in an on duty accident or training event, it is important to link what the soldier was doing (training/deploying) to the incident. Further, emphasizing that even when military operations are conducted properly, they are inherently dangerous and may result in death or injury puts the incident in context for the audience and highlights the increased risk that soldiers endure as a result of their service.
29. Example: Reduction in Force. Explain what brought it about. We have had Commanding General go before media and layout the budget. Explain what we are doing to mitigate effects on the workforce and on services provided to the community.
31. Good planning and timing is extremely important. In the case of a RIF, work it so management tells employees and PAO tells media on the same day. Supervisors need to know what to say to their workers, and what PAO is going to say to the media. Don't want media hearing first from angry employees, or employees hearing it first from the media, or the importance of the issue will be tossed aside. If possible, time it so your own in-house weekly newspaper isn't left out, because it will do the best job of explaining the issue. Sometimes we have to cajole bosses into timing the process so the in-house organ and the downtown media can break the news at the same time. It is important to management that employees view their newspaper as a credible source of information during a crisis.
29. The audience didn't care about what we had to say, only about how it affected them personally. 
29. Pre-brief senior leaders and SMEs about the context of the situation
31. The public may have a different interpretation of what is or is not "important". Must listen to the public and NOT get intransigent with your perceptions.
29. Understand the relevance yourself first before you communicate. Why is it relevant? What are the impacts? What are the alternatives? Why are we doing this? Be firm in your convictions and then communicate this.
29. It was a BRAC situation where we were forced to move A/C to a new location. Fell back repeatedly on the need to reduce infrastructure as a means to maintain military readiness.
31. This works in the case of BRAC, but for most crises you need to be careful that it does not look like you are trying to dodge a bullet by laying the blame elsewhere.
29. We announced the incident before the media found out about it.
31. It's the best course-of-action. ALWAYS!
31. Again, be very careful using a crisis situation as an opportunity to "spin" the story into something it is not. The story is what it is, not what we SAY it is. Deal with
29. Interviews w/ SMEs, command reps
29. Attempting to get the messages behind the decision making out early helped diffuse some concerns, however, it did nothing to change the emotions of those who held a significant stake in the outcome.
31. Depending on the incident or crisis, sometimes one's audiences don't care about the big picture and if you only provide information in that context, it sounds too much like an uncaring 'party line.' When appropriate, it is important to provide the bigger picture, but be sensitive to the fact that locals want local information. BRAC is a classic example. I was at Dix in 1988-89. It was okay to discuss the long-term spending-cut benefits of BRAC on the DoD scale, but no one locally really honestly cared that someplace like Cameron Station in Alexandria was also on the list...or that the MP school would move to Fort Leonard Wood, etc etc saving lots of operating costs in the future DoD-wide. Locals there wanted to know how it would affect THEM. So, big picture is good and important but should be balanced with local picture in a crisis.
29. During challenges to a planned civilian reduction in force, emphasized the factors leading to the RIF, the process being used to implement it, and the protections and procedures being taken to help affected employees.
29. full disclosure -- it quelled many of the antagonistic questions
31. Depends on the specific incident that arises 
29. you have to put the focus on the real issue(s), taking the emotion out of the equation. this often defuses a bad situation.
31. again, you must consider the circumstances and apply that which you believe will best achieve your desired outcome...no one thing works in every situation...remember, BRAC was a planned event, not a crisis according to your definition
29. In crisis times/situations honesty builds trust and credibility which enhances communication effectiveness.
29. It's important to remind the public that we began a mission for positive, professional reasons. Sometimes incidents happen that are not positive, however they are usually isolated incidents.
29. It's important to remind the public that we began a mission for positive, professional reasons. Sometimes incidents happen that are not positive, however they are usually isolated incidents.
29. Pitches to media.
31. Relevance is subjective. What the organization thinks is relevant often is not to a reporter.
29. SAC (if you remember this command) began its Global Shield exercises in 1979. One of the aspects was that we would be doing a LOT of flying in places we didn't normally fly. We decided to communicate that 1) the flying was necessary (to determine our sortie surge rate) and 2) was of a limited duration. We briefed government and elected officials along the routes on these two point. We also put out a series of releases in advance. It worked like a charm. We only had a handful of noise complaints as a result of somewhere around 1000 sorties over a multistate area.
29. The key to this strategy is knowing what the general objectives are. DOD/USN PAG is a great place to start as is coordination with PAO at higher echelon command.
31.  This is pretty much the same as the last section. We set the tone for what we're going to discuss.
29. I try to put the immediate situation in context with it's environment. 
31. It's "why" you did it versus "what" you did. Hard to keep reporters on target but pretty effective.
29. The key to this strategy is knowing what the general objectives are. DOD/USN PAG is a great place to start as is coordination with PAO at higher echelon command.
29.  Tried this combined with another strategy.
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Appendix H

Legal Limitations Strategy

Reported Use
Answer Frequency Percent
Yes 37 75.5
No 11 22.4
Unsure 1 2.0
Total  49 100.0

Perceived efficiency

Projected Use
Answer Frequency Percent
Yes  36 73.5
No 5 10.2
Unsure 8 16.3
Total 49 100.0

Responses to questions 34 and 36:

34.  Close coordination of releases with SJA prior to sending them to the command group for release authority. 
36.  Coordinate sensitive releases and Q’s & A’s with SJA - - do not wait until there is a crisis to establish a relationship with your lawyer.  Remember that the PAO drives the train on releasability and more is better - most of the time. 
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Appendix I

Legal Implications: Cultural Strategy

Reported Use
Answer Frequency Percent
Yes 15 30.6
No 24 49.0
Unsure 10 20.4
Total  49 100.0

Perceived efficiency

Projected use
Answer  Frequency Percent
Yes 30  61.2
No 3 6.1
Unsure 16 32.7
Total 49  100.0

Reponses to questions 39 and 41:

No comments were received from survey respondents on this strategy.
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Appendix J

Release Coordination Strategy

Reported use
Answer Frequency Percent
Yes 45 91.8
No 333V 6.1
Unsure 1 2.0
Total  49 100.0

Perceived effectiveness

Projected Use
Answer Frequency Percent
Yes  45 91.8
No 6.1
Unsure 1 2.0
Total  49 100.0

Reponses to questions 44 and 46:

44. Crisis Management Team is a good avenue to make this strategy work.
44. The command needs to speak with one voice. By sticking to the truth and the facts, no matter how bad it may seem, this will normally diffuse media attacks. Information is power and the sooner everyone is informed of the situation the sooner damage will be under control.
44. The PA on scene should be the one talking. They're the ones who should have the most information. When it becomes too great a policy, then the focus should switch to the policy makers at higher level. Always one voice. Coordinate answers. But at the initial onset of an accident, release information quickly. It should be coordinated with on-scene CCs. If mistakes in reporting were made, correct them ASAP. People forgive things like that if they know you're trying your best to inform them quickly. They don't forgive a slow answer that looks like a cover-up or craftily prepared legal statement.
44. US Forces Korea HQ PA made all crisis communications releases in country
44. Must have established ground rules with all PAs involved before an incident occurs or contact involved PAOs immediately after the incident to determine who has the lead. Follow up by sharing all releases and query responses and periodic meetings. This happens particularly in the Joint environment or when soldiers from one command are serving in another AOR.
44. Attempted to route releases through standard approval chain before dispersing them to media.
44.  Attempt to establish comms with all releasing authorities (difficult when releasing information from several different cities) to establish key messages. Also difficult when working with several different agencies, i.e. INS, DEA, FBI etc. Not everyone seems to want to be on the same page. Although difficult at times, still worth doing.
44. Coordinate, coordinate, coordinate, but do it quickly.
44. Setting up or being part of the Crises Response Team in physical proximity (or fast commo proximity) of the operators and battle staff.
44. When an issue crosses organization lines, decide and get everyone's blessing on how the process for releasing information will be accomplished. Realize that this sometimes involves agencies outside of DoD who do not understand chain of command and do not care about your needs. At best, all you may be able to accomplish is at least being informed first about what the other agency is going to release. Don't let this drive your train however. Even when an agreement can't be made, don't be petty in public. It serves no purpose.
44. Did extensive coordination with the Texas Rangers, US Border Patrol, JTF 6, the DOJ and the Marine Corps when releasing information about the shooting of Ezequiel Hernandez.
44. Worked through the JTF-SWA, DoD, DA, 3rd Army and 3Corps PA shops while deployed for Desert Strike. Made sure all our releases were cleared before we sent them out. The only problem was timely release, since everyone had to chop on it. We were given authority to discuss issues on the ground.
44. Ensured all services/activities reviewed information prior to release.
44. Commander tells all points on the coordination scale that PAO is single point of release to media. Period.
44. There is too much risk involved in not coordinating releases with higher headquarters and involved subordinate units. We tried to keep everyone informed with phone calls. Today timely status reports could be handled with email--we didn't have that luxury.
44. Central spokesman - all questions referred to crisis team - ensures institution speaks with one voice
44. Everyone was instructed not to release any pertinent information until getting the go ahead from PAO. This was to ensure that next of kin is notified and information is accurate.
44. Very difficult, but very important. Coordination process can be derailed by decision-makers who are afraid of bad news. Political appointees can be a major stumbling block. They release info to fit their agenda, despite coordination.
44. Use of a standard PA release/statement coordination process
44. PAO should be the sole releasing authority in any situation
44. I've been on both sides of the fence where we were the sole releasing authority and where we should have been the sole releasing authority but others wanted to get involved without having all the information or correct information. Coordination is paramount...we all look bad (and not believable) if we release different information.
44. It is hard to keep control of all the people who might know about the issue, and feel that they are 'experts' on the subject. However, contacting the key people and reiterating the importance of coordination is the first thing to do, and an ongoing action during a crisis.
44. Constant communication with everyone involved.
44. The initial stages of a crisis always has difficulty in getting subject matter experts together and briefed. If these individuals are newcomers, or lack experience there can be challenges and errors made in communication.
44. Very important to establish "lead" agency when unsure such as during potential hurricane strike. Must refer media questions to the lead agency always and not get forced into answering questions.
44. ID lead agency immediately and stay in your lane.
44. Ensuring clear coordination with all involved. Coordination must happen quickly. We must work to get "on the record" first and get our story told.
44. Ensuring clear coordination with all involved. Coordination must happen quickly. We must work to get "on the record" first and get our story told.
44. Damascus, Ark incident was an example of this NOT happening. Washington, Omaha and Arkansas got out of synch. After this, I always tried to establish clear lines of communication authority when I was working a "crisis". Used this idea successfully in the A-t incident, a stealth crash in California (before we acknowledged we had the F-117), rocket explosions, etc.
44. Again, coordination with upper echelon PAOs and DOD/OSDPA is critical.
44. This is where it's good to be in the military. Go as far up the chain of command as you can and get permission to beat the crud outta anyone who opens their mouth without your permission.
44.  Establish coordinating release procedures so everyone knows what to do and how it gets done.  This is best done by practicing the crisis management team often and on diverse types of incidents.
44.  The on-scene public affairs representative coordinates with the on-scene commander during a crisis, such as the crash of a training aircraft.  The process works great as the PA representative and Commander coordinate all facts about the incident to release information about the incident.  The facts are then coordinated and approved with the command post commander and public affairs crisis action team representative for release. 
44.  Coordination turned into phone calls; severe drawback if a point of contact will NOT make a decision and keeps "rowing in a circle."
44. Understood who else was involved prior to the crisis, coordinated or "walked-through" potential situations, and kept commanders informed.
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 Appendix K

Public Think Strategy

Reported Use
Answer  Frequency Percent
Yes 36 73.5
No 14.3
Unsure 12.2
Total  49 100.0

Perceived effectiveness

Projected use
Answer  Frequency Percent
Yes  43 87.8
No  3 6.1
Unsure 3 6.1
Total  49 100.0

Reponses to questions 49 and 51:

51.  Public think appears to be a good strategy to anticipate public interests and putting incidents into context.  It seems especially useful for developing Q's and A's but I don't think it will stand on its own, must be coupled with openness and message to be successful, otherwise, we're letting the public control the agenda.
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Appendix L

Responsiveness Strategy

Reported Use
Answer Frequency  Percent
Yes  44  89.8
No  3  6.1
Unsure  2 4.1
Total 49  100.0

Perceived effectiveness

Projected Use
Answer Frequency Percent
Yes  45  91.8
No 2 4.1
Unsure 4.1
Total 49 100.0

Responses to questions 53 and 55:

53. The key to success with this strategy is to anticipate the needs of the media and plan to meet them before they even know they have them.  Gather up fact sheets/photos/b-roll of equipment involved in a mission or accident so the press doesn’t have to scramble to get them to complete their stories.
55. This requires heads up thinking and team play amongst the commanders’ entire staff – the PA must have the boss' endorsement to make their PAO/media information needs to be a priority for the command so that time-sensitive taskings don’t get put at the bottom of the inbox.
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Appendix M

Message Strategy

Reported Use
Answer Frequency Percent
Yes 45 91.8
No 1 2.0
Unsure  3 6.1
Total  49 100.0

Perceived effectiveness

Projected Use
Answer  Frequency Percent
Yes  47 95.9
No  0
Unsure 4.1
Total  49 100.0

Responses to questions 58 and 60:
58.  Command messages get worked into every document - - not in an obvious, tacked on way, but as part of the substance and form of the release, story, etc.
60.  To paraphrase McLuhan (sp?) and the great Vince Lombardi,  "Message isn't everything - it's the only thing.  If you don't have any, why communicate?"  This is DINFOS 101.
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Appendix N

Cultural Strategy

Reported Use
Answer  Frequency Percent
Yes  27  55.1
No 14  28.6
Unsure 16.3
Total 49 100.0

Perceived effectiveness

Projected Use
Answer Frequency  Percent
Yes  44 89.8
No 4.1
Unsure 3  6.1
Total  49 100.0

Reponses to questions 63 and 65:

65. When faced with an increase in Cuban migrant smuggling, our Coast Guard PA staff in Miami developed an awareness campaign in Spanish that targeted those who may consider migrant smuggling for financial gain and told of the consequences smugglers face when they are apprehended. We've also conducted awareness campaigns addressing the risk Cubans rafters take crossing the Florida Straits in unseaworthy craft.
65. Essential to communication overseas
65. This strategy was a huge success. We told media what we were trying to do, did it and drew overwhelmingly positive response from the refugees. Down side: Everything went so well, reporters started looking for negatives (crimes, disease, people demanding to return to Kosovo) where there really weren't any.
65. Don't underestimate the importance of the Native American tribes in your area.
65. See earlier question on cultural issues. Insure that cultural leaders are treated with a higher degree of protocol and recognition of their sovereign status.
65. must show empathy
65. Sometimes the things that you take for granted are the things that leap out at other people. Be aware of your environment and your audience, and adjust for their sensibilities, not your own.
65. This does not necessarily need to be inter-cultural, as your example implies, but intra-cultural. For instance, understanding the philosophy and culture of certain left-wing peace or environmental organizations. Sun-Tzu "know your enemy"
65. It is critical to research how the media in different locations receive and put out information. We have 43 countries in our area of responsibility. We assess the cultural differences and adapt the communication process to ensure that we get an effective result.
65. All overseas PAOs should establish relationships with local universities to develop a mentor relationship with someone who teaches both journalism and knows the local culture. I have done this and it works.
65. I resent calling this a strategy. Love of others is not a strategy...it's a way of life. You can't fake it. The essence of true public relations is the desire to bring people together to a common understanding. You can't wear it like a shirt and change it whenever you want. You must live it.
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Appendix O

Single Spokesperson Strategy

Reported Use
Answer Frequency Percent
Yes 36  73.5
No 11 22.4
Unsure 2 4.1
Total  49  100.0

Perceived effectiveness

Projected Use
Answer  Frequency Percent
Yes  33 67.3
No 16.3
Unsure 16.3
Total 49 100.0

Reponses to questions 68 and 70:

68.  Except in immediate crisis, this shouldn't be the PAO, the press hears enough talking heads, find a subject matter expert, train them well and use them consistently.
70.  Commanders or other SMEs are better than the PAO - we should craft the messages and murder board the spokesperson, they should do the talking.  Make sure if you only have one spokesperson that he/she is accessible to the media for the duration of the crisis.
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Appendix P

Firefighter Strategy

Reported Use
Answer Frequency Percent
Yes 28  57.1
No  14  28.6
Unsure  14.3
Total  49 100.0

Perceived effectiveness

Projected Use
Answer Frequency  Percent
Yes 39 79.6
No 6.1
Unsure 14.3
Total 49 100.0

Reponses to questions 73 and 75:

75.  Although I've not used this strategy in practice, it would seem to have applicability for crisis management planning and development of Qs and As for potential crises.  An integrated team of PAOs, lawyers, safety personnel, etc. could brainstorm a list of potential crises and develop skeleton releases and supporting Q's and A's to "fill in the blanks" in the event of an actual crisis.
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Appendix Q

Free Response Comments on Military Crisis Communication

76. I responses seem somewhat negative, it's because my limited experience with crisis communication was in 1994, the earliest period of TF Able Sentry in Macedonia, when the TF was completely under U.N. control. At that time the U.N. preferred to practice "ostrich public affairs." In other words, they hid their heads in the sand. After two separate serious incidents, we were forbidden to say word one about anything. Of course the information leaked and we were left looking like we were trying to manage a huge cover up and conspiracy. It was very frustrating knowing what should be done, explaining repeatedly to the U.N Cdr., a Norwegian general at the time, why we should take a certain course of action, and ultimately being dismissed from his office. U.S. forces should demand release authority regarding our own activities, even in situations where to U.N. is ultimately in control of operations. You can't explain to the media, "Well, we wanted to tell you but those other guys said no."
76. I know you need numeric data, but who keeps track of this stuff? I sure don't. While your examples were good, I didn't understand the response. For example--one speaker. Example was Exxon people weren't anywhere to be found. Did I use that? Was that what you were asking? Or were you asking should we have one spokesman? I took it that you were asking if we should use one spokesman. And yes, I think we should. Either one or the same ones, unless you have experts who know more and can address the issue better. But overall, one spokesman who calls in the experts.
76. No other corporation offers the opportunity for crisis communication than the military. Hopefully, civilian corporations recognize this when old, retired PA officers and NCOs come looking for work.
76. While there are obviously some basics to be universally observed, please don't try to fit all incidents into one category. There will never be "a" successful PAO method of responding to emergencies. There is too much diversity in place and mission for such a system to work well.
76. The most important element is trust: the trust of your superiors, your peers on the staff, and the media. They need to have absolute confidence in your competence, and in your understanding of their needs. Build those relationships now. P.S. I'm the Fort XXXXX PAO. Hope this is helpful
76. The problem with to detailed Crises plans is that they do not force the PA practitioner to consider all the ramifications of the current crises. There are similarities in all crises and planning of processes and strategy is great. To detailed a plan for specific tactics may not be the best approach. "Think before you leap".
76. My values: think, listen, understand, prepare and gain approval for the communication, communicate responsibly. 
76. We are getting much better about preparing for and working crisis.
76. Overall, I think the military does a pretty good job of handling crisis communications, especially when you consider we have limited resources and severe constraints from the leadership.
76. In a crisis situation of the sort your survey concerns, there is never under any circumstance any such thing as "John Q. Public" has more of a need to know than "PFC Joe Dokes." If I had MG XXXXX and GEN XXXXX in a room for just one minute and could tell them only one thing about what their priorities should be in a crisis, that one thing would be, "Expend the same energy and resources to tell soldiers about the crisis as you do to tell the external public. It is the soldiers who are most affected by the crisis, and it is soldiers who will solve it. Therein lies their right to - and leadership's obligation to provide - equal access to information about the crisis.
76. A great training ground. Accidents keep happening and we keep doing some of these crises to ourselves.
76. The military is an agency that deals with sensitive issues everyday. How we communicate with the media affects how the public trusts us.
76. The Army's program lacks, because many military schools are teaching leaders to avoid PAO and ignore them. Thus, they think we are the enemy.
76. It's a large percent of what we do and train for. It's difficult to prepare for, however, when faced with the day-to-day demands of running a shop. But the benefits of being prepared when need be far outweigh the difficulty of finding the time to prepare. Being ready is like driving with insurance. You don't like to pay the bill, but you love having it when you need it. 
76. key is planning...on the fundamentals of our business...you must know how to do public affairs...waiting until a crisis occurs is too late.
76. Commanders still ultimately want only "happy" news to make its way to the public -- including internal audience. Job of PAO even more important to continue to educate command and staff about need for open communication channel to dispel rumors, keep public adequately informed about the world in which they live and work.
76. Essential training for PA types and Unit Commanders/senior leaders. An abridged version, demonstrating the necessity of following a particular pattern when dealing with a crisis, should be presented to all service members.
76. Handling crises and the media is, I believe, always the most important job a PAO has, and sometimes the hardest thing to accomplish effectively. There's always room for improvement and surveys like this may help to improve our responses. 
76. To often PA does not learn from its mistakes. Take the time to finish an AAR and implement new procedures if applicable so the situation is such a crisis next time.
76. Fight to be first on the record with the media. Work closely with operations personnel so that they think of you when good and bad things happen. Tell the truth and tell it quickly. Be ahead of the media and get your messages out. Provide information at all levels of the chain of command so that the messages are echoed by all.
76. Over emphasized at the expense of other public relations programs that would prevent the organization from having a crisis in the first place
76. I think all of the elements you picked are important and have a place. There is no one "right" way to do this. Think of it as a cafeteria menu. Consider all of the strategies and uses the elements that fit your situation. Some ideas are basic: 1) have a clear, simple message and 2) have as few as possible (a single is often the best) spokesperson per subject. You didn't mention anything about logistics. This is important in long-term situations. Think about establishing shifts, get someone to handle the record keeping. We were critiqued in the Damascus Titan II incident because we did not keep an accurate media log. At the time that seemed unreasonable. Later I accepted the criticism as saying we should have recognized the gravity of the situation in called in reinforcements. I'm retired now, working as a contractor. Please feel free to call me at XXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXX
76. Get confidence of CO. Link to JAG and all major operators BEFORE there is a crisis. Only release info when you are comfortable that events won't contradict earlier statements. Focus on positive messages and be willing to admit there are problems ... 
76. First place this survey was too *&^%$ long!!!!! Second to answer your question there is too much "crisis" in military crisis communication. There is a real need to be able to remain calm and in good humor in the center of a storm.
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