60 Minutes
The officials who investigated and convicted Kevin Mallory for conspiracy to commit espionage tell 60 Minutes how their case came together.
Kevin Mallory was a down on his luck former clandestine case officer for the CIA when he was approached by a man the department of justice believes was a Chinese spy. Officials say Mallory was a prime target for recruitment. He was out of work, three months behind on his mortgage, and thousands of dollars in debt. But as the Chinese would discover, Kevin Mallory wasn't exactly James Bond. The Department of Justice agreed to show us how they caught Mr. Mallory and why they believe his recruitment by China is part of a massive clandestine campaign to steal not just national security secrets from the U.S. government, but industrial and technological secrets from American companies.
Click here to read more.
60 Minutes Overtime
“I would not take any electronics to China that I owned that has my own personal data on it or my company’s data…. China knows your business deal offerings before you get there…. When you go to China, you are connecting to the government of China which owns everything you do or say. They have the ability to get inside your phone….a whole country approach to being the superpower of all superpowers.” Bill Evanina, Office of the Dir. Of National Intelligence.
Click here to read more.
Tulsa World
A Chinese national has been arrested after being named in a federal criminal complaint that alleged he stole battery-related trade secrets from an Oklahoma energy company.
Hongjin Tan, a 35-year-old citizen of the People’s Republic of China and legal permanent resident of the U.S., made an initial appearance before a magistrate Thursday in Tulsa federal court and was booked later that same day into the Creek County Jail on a theft of trade secrets complaint, records show.
Click here to read more.
Click here to view the complaint.
NIH Report
NIH is aware that some foreign entities have mounted systematic programs to influence NIH researchers and peer reviewers and to take advantage of the long tradition of trust, fairness, and excellence of NIH supported research activities. This kind of inappropriate influence is not limited to biomedical research; it has been a significant issue for defense and energy research for some time. Three areas of concern have emerged:
- Diversion of intellectual property (IP) in grant applications or produced by NIH supported biomedical research to other entities, including other countries;
- Sharing of confidential information on grant applications by NIH peer reviewers with others, including foreign entities, or otherwise attempting to influence funding decisions; and
- Failure by some researchers working at NIH-funded institutions in the U.S. to disclose substantial resources from other organizations, including foreign governments, which threatens to distort decisions about the appropriate use of NIH funds.
Click here to read more.
Click here to view report.
NDAA
On August 13, 2018, the President signed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019 (“NDAA”), which has a number of provisions that may impact universities and its faculty.
Section 889 of the NDAA prohibits federal agencies from entering into contracts, including research contracts, with entities that use equipment, systems, or services that, in turn, use Chinese-origin telecommunications equipment or services deemed to be a “substantial or essential component of any system” or “critical technology as part of any system.” Section 889 further prohibits the use of federal loan or grant funds to procure or obtain covered telecommunications equipment or services. These prohibitions will be effective August 13, 2020.
Section 1049 requires DoD to develop a list of critical technologies to maintain U.S. national security advantage. The list will be used for export licensing purposes among other things as well as to inform development of government research investment strategies.
Section 1286 of the NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to establish an initiative to work with academic institutions on protection of intellectual property and information about critical technologies while also protecting open scientific exchange in fundamental research. One of the key areas of focus is the undue influences of countries through foreign talent programs in exploiting U.S. defense technologies. The initiative is tasked with developing regulations and procedures, including policies that may limit DoD funding for institutions or researchers who knowingly violate regulations or who participate in foreign talent programs.
