In J Forge, ed., Measurement, Realism and Objectivity, D. Reidel, 1987; 235-290.

I argue that there are good reasons for a philosophical account of measurement to deal primarily with the properties or magnitudes of objects measured, rather than with the objects themselves. I then set out and account that embodies both a realism about measurement and a realism about the existence of the properties involved in measurement. For purposes of illustration I present a formal language for dealing with properties and formulate a standard set of axioms for extensive measurement in it, though the general approach should work for many other types of measurement as well.

Work on related topics

1. "Structural Representation and Surrogative Reasoning," Synthese, 87 1991; 449-508. [Abstract]
2. "The Nature of Natural Laws," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 60, 1982; 203-223. [Abstract]
3. "Theory Testing in Psychology" (with Thomas Monson), Philosophy of Science, 42, 1975; 487-502