Special Orders


Congressional Response to the
September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks
 

Margaret F. Klemm, Purdue University

Albert C. Ringelstein, Moldova State University

While the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the 1995 bombing of an Oklahoma City federal building had demonstrated to the United States that it was no longer immune to terrorist attacks on its own soil, no one could have envisioned anything so traumatic as the terrorist actions of September 11, 2001. The hijackings and attacks on the World Trade Center towers, the Pentagon, and the crash of United Airlines Flight 93 in Pennsylvania had a profound effect on the institutions of, and life in, the United States. Indeed, outside the contingencies of war, never before had Americans witnessed such upheaval in their country. For the first time ever, the entire air traffic control system was shut down with ALL flights over and enroute to the United States diverted to the nearest suitable airport; commercial flights were grounded for several days with business and general aviation grounded even longer; airports were closed - some for months; people became reluctant to fly; flag-waving patriotism swept the nation; New York City fire fighters, police officers, and rescue workers became national heroes; the economic recovery was stalled as billions of dollars were channeled to industries and workers affected by the events; deficit spending returned; and President Bush became immensely popular as partisan politics was relegated to the sidelines in a spirit of national unity (Bond, 2001; Croft, 2002; Ott, 2002).


Nothing like this had ever happened to the United States, with the possible exception of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. But that event occurred within the context of a major war already existing in Europe and Asia, and although the actual event location and timing was a surprise, many people in and out of government expected U.S. entry into the conflict at some point. The events of September 11, 2001 caught the U.S. public and government officials, and all but a tiny handful of terrorist regional specialists, completely unaware. In the aftermath, the government reacted with a full scale investigation and ultimately with military action, President Bush having declared a "war on terrorism." Vice President Richard Cheney dropped out of daily sight as he took up more or less permanent residence in "undisclosed locations" and for the first time, long-standing plans, drafted during President Eisenhower's tenure, to implement an ongoing shadow government of about one hundred civilian executive branch employees permanently located in two fortified east coast locations, were implemented to prevent the collapse of essential government functions in the event of a catastrophic attack on Washington D.C. (Gellman and Schmidt, 2002, A-9).


Previously, Congress has reacted quickly to domestic terrorist attacks. In response to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Congress enacted P.L. 104-132, the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. This law provided for increased means to fight domestic and international terrorism including but not limited to a special deportation court for aliens suspected of terrorism, authorized grants to states to compensate residents who were victims of terrorism, authorized approximately $1 billion over four years to aid federal law enforcement officials to fight terrorism, and required foreign airlines using U.S. airports to use the same security measures as those required of U.S. airlines (Idelson, 1996, 1713).


This was nothing compared to Congress's reaction to the events of September 11. Demonstrating unaccustomed swiftness and cooperation, Congress reacted with a flurry of legislation addressing everything from prohibiting cutting instruments on aircraft to economic stabilization. From September 11, 2001 through June 18, 2002, 374 bills, resolutions, and amendments were introduced in the 107th Congress that the Congressional website THOMAS identified as being related to the September 11 attacks. Of these, 72 have seen some type of floor action (vote by at least one chamber), 16 resolutions have been approved, and 17 bills and joint resolutions have been signed into law. As will be seen, a plurality of the measures were introduced in September, with most receiving their initial floor action very quickly after their introduction. Sponsorship was almost equally divided among Republicans and Democrats, with each party dominating the chamber it controls, although co-sponsorship was largely bipartisan.


The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. prompted Congress to respond with hundreds of pieces of legislation. As such, we have not endeavored to analyze the large set of over 250 pieces of legislation that have been introduced but have received no floor action. As can be imagined, this group includes an eclectic array of bills and resolutions. The serious legislation which has yet to receive a floor hearing include:


It is likely that at least some of these will be debated, voted on, and passed in some form before the final adjournment of the 107th Congress. There are also many legislative endeavors that have a more limited scope and importance:


We think it quite probable that these bills were introduced in the spirit of national crisis, and as the immediate shock and devastation of September 11 has receded, it seems unlikely there will be further action on this and similar legislation.


This article discusses all pertinent measures that had floor action in at least one chamber. Using the THOMAS data set through April 25 (THOMAS did not update its data set from that date until the beginning of June), this consists of 91 bills, resolutions and amendments from which we could identify 11 separate categories:  (1) a symbolic category containing legislation involving rhetoric, gratitude, praise, and/or a benefit for a very small or narrow interest; (2) since the September 11 attacks were done with commercial aircraft and the aviation industry was seriously affected, an aviation category was obvious; (3) equally obvious was a category for bills dealing with terrorism; (4) a category for legislation providing relief for the victims; (5, 6, and 7) given the cost incurred in the attacks and the subsequent disruption of major sectors of the economy, some kind of economic relief for the nation constituted three economic relief categories - General, Small Business and Bonds; (8) the declaration of War on Terrorism by President Bush engendered a foreign policy and military legislation category; (9) the immigrant status of the perpetrators would no doubt see immigration regulations and procedures discussed, hence an immigration category; (10) the terrorist attendance at flight schools would no doubt create legislation affecting education institutions necessitating an education category; and, of course, (11) all would require budgetary considerations for a budget category (See Table 1).


Table 1: Action on Legislation

Type of Legislation

Bills/Joint Resolutions Signed into

Law

Non-Legally Binding (Other) Resolutions Approved

Bills/Joint Resolutions

Floor Action

Non-Legally Binding Resolutions

Floor Action
Total

Economic Relief - General

2

5

7

Economic Relief - Bonds

4

4

Economic Relief / Small Business

1

1

Victim Relief

2

10

12

Budget Acts

3

3

6

Aviation

2

5

7

General Terrorism / Security

1

10

11

Immigration

1

1

Foreign Affairs / Assistance / Military Affairs

3

1

1

5

Symbolic

2

15

6

10

33

Education

1

2

3

Total

15

15

47

11

91


By far, the category with the most legislation (35) was "symbolic". This type of legislation is non-controversial, hard to oppose, costs little or nothing, and gives the Congress righteous visibility. Included here are joint resolutions signed into law (H.J. Res. 71: Designating September 11 as "Patriot Day"), numerous non-legally binding resolutions (H. Con. Res. 227: Condemning bigotry and violence against Arab-Americans, American Muslims, and Americans from South Asia in the wake of terrorist attacks on New York City, New York, and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001; H. Res. 309: Honoring the United States Capitol police for their commitment to security at the capitol; a few bills/joint resolutions with floor action (S.J. Res. 25: National Day of Remembrance Act of 2001; S. AMDT. 2452 to H.R. 3338: To direct the security of the Smithsonian Institution to collect and preserve in the National Museum of American History artifacts relating to the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon); and some non-legally binding resolutions with floor action only (S. Con. Res. 91: A concurrent resolution expressing deep gratitude to the government and the people of the Philippines for the sympathy and support since September 11, 2001 and for other purposes; H. Con. Res. 232: Expressing the sense of the Congress in honoring the crew and passengers of United Airlines Flight 93).


The next largest category (12) was "Victim Relief", including H.R. 2884: Victims of Terrorism Relief Act 2001 (signed into law); S. 1729: Post Terrorism Health Improvement Act; S. 1858: Terrorist Victims Courtroom Access Act; S. AMDT. 2163 to H.R. 2884: To Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide tax relief for victims of the terrorist attacks against the United States, and for other purposes (the last 3 had floor action only). "General Terrorism/Security" was the only other category with double digit legislation entries - 11. Included here was the only one passed into law - H.R. 3162: Uniting and Strengthening America by providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) and a handful of bills/joint resolutions with floor action only, including H.R. 3004: Financial Anti-terrorism Act of 2001; S. 1981: Enhanced Penalties for Enabling Terrorist Act of 2002; and S. AMDT. 1562 to H.R. 2500: To enhance the capability of the United States to deter, prevent, and thwart domestic and international acts of terrorism against United States nationals and interests ("2001 Combating Terrorism Amendment").


H.R. 3162, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, was perhaps the most controversial measure to emerge from September 11. It called for making the tracking of internet communications and obtaining warrants for searches and eavesdropping easier and allowing the detainment of non-citizens believed to be a national security risk for up to seven days, whereupon they must be charged with a crime or begin deportation hearings. If the person cannot be deported, the Attorney General must certify every six months that they are still a security risk. A number of Congressmen voiced civil liberties concerns and criticized the secret and hurried method of the bill's march through the legislative process. They protested the almost total lack of public comment and documentation. But many felt that anti-terrorism legislation needed to be passed quickly, and one day after its introduction on October 23, it passed the House 357-66 (62 Democrats, 3 Republicans, and an Independent in opposition). The Senate passed H.R. 3162 on October 25 by a 98-1 vote, and President Bush signed into law on October 26 (P.L. 107-56) (Palmer, 2001, 2533-5).


The other eight categories all had less than ten pieces of legislation each. Perhaps the most interesting of these categories to examine is "Aviation". The September 11 terrorist attacks were committed with hijacked airliners and there has been ample controversy surrounding the legislation passed to prevent such occurrences from happening again. Two key "Aviation" bills passed and signed into law were The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (P.L. 107-42) and The Aviation Security Act (P.L. 207-71).


The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act was introduced in the House on September 21, 2001. It was voted on and passed the same day by a vote of 356-54 (46 Democrats, 6 Republicans, and the 2 Independents voted against it). The Democratic opposition (siding with organized labor) objected to the failure to include provisions to help as many as 100,000 airline employees who faced layoffs in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. The Senate then dropped its companion bill (S. 1450) that it had just passed 96-1 and passed the house version by unanimous consent on the same day. The following day, President Bush signed it into law (P.L. 107-42). Essentially the law provided $5 billion in cash for airlines and freight carriers and up to $10 billion in loan guarantees for airlines plus some liability protection for deaths on the ground and property damage (James C. Barton and Peter Cohn, 2001, 2206-7).


On November 1, 2001, the House discussed H.R. 3150, the Secure Transportation For America Act of 2001, providing for a new secretary within the Department of Transportation to assume Federal control of U.S. airport security and screening devices. Representative Don Young (R-Alaska), the bill's sponsor, offered H. Amdt. 383 to make technical changes to the bill and to authorize the airlines to use technologies to create a secure and expedited passenger screening process. It also called for all airport screeners to be deputized as federal transportation agents, the main point of contention (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 2001, 2638). Democrats generally supported screeners becoming actual Federal employees, while Republicans opposed creating "another level of federal bureaucracy." The amendment passed 223-202 on an almost solid party line vote (12 Democrats supported it, 6 Republicans opposed it). Representative James Oberstar (D-Minn.) offered a Democratic substitute which would have federalized the screeners. It narrowly lost 214-218, with only 8 Republicans voting for it and 6 Democrats opposing it. The final passage vote on H.R. 3150 was 286-139, with 74 Democrats voting to support it. Compromise language said the screeners could be either federal employees or private workers, the President would make the determination, but employment, training and performance standards had to be strengthened (Benton, 2001, 2603-5).


On November 6, the House inserted H.R. 3150 into S. 1447 to replace its provisions, the Senate bill having been passed unanimously on October 11 and sent to the House. The House passed S. 1447 without objection. On November 16, the Senate agreed by voice vote to the Conference report which required the federalization of the screeners. The House passed it 410-9 (all the nay votes were Republican). The Aviation Security Act was signed into law by President Bush on November 19, 2001 (P.L. 107-71).


The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were a shock to the nation, and speculation was that legislation would be swiftly introduced to deal with the crisis, and that it would be a bipartisan effort. An examination of the introduction date of the 91 pieces of legislation shows this to be the case. Most legislation, 33 pieces, was introduced in September. Each succeeding month saw fewer and fewer pieces of legislation introduced: 26 in October, 16 in November, and 11 in December. January and February record no legislation being introduced that had any floor action. March and April had a little action, with 2 and 3 bills respectively being introduced. While a few more bills will be introduced in the remaining months of the 107th Congress's second session, and some languishing legislation will appear for chamber discussion and action, it seems safe to say that the vast majority of legislation pertaining to the assaults that is going to merit attention has already received it, and received it quickly.


Swift congressional action is further supported by observing the time gap between the introduction of the legislation and its first floor action. Of the 91 measures considered, nearly half (41) were voted upon the same day. Nineteen of those were the universe of amendments; every single pertinent amendment was voted on on the day it was introduced. This is to be expected, since amendments are often introduced during the floor debate of a bill, and after some time for debate, are voted upon. Amendments aside, 22 bills/resolutions were acted upon the same day they were introduced. Another eight were considered the following day. Four others were acted upon in less than a week; 10 more in less than 2 weeks; 6 in less than 3 weeks; 3 in less than 4 weeks; and 1 in under a month. Thus, fully 73 of the 91 measures with at least some floor action (80.2%) had it occur in under a month from their introduction date. Of the others, 9 saw action in less than 2 months, and 5 in less than 3 months. Only 4 bills/resolutions had their first floor action 4 months or more after their introduction.


Lastly, let us examine sponsorship. Every measure considered in the House and Senate must have a sponsor as only members of Congress can introduce legislation (Davidson and Oleszek, 2000, 229). The sponsor may be acting as an agent for the president, interest groups, or constituents, and they may have many reasons for doing so: personal, political, or professional. Nevertheless, who sponsors a measure says something about it and its chances of passage. Is it a member of the leadership, a respected legislator (for instance a ranking committee member), or a gadfly maverick (James "Beam me up, Scotty" Trafficant, D-Ohio)? With the assumption that a spirit of bipartisanship is prevalent, we expected a close balance between the two parties in terms of sponsorship. Upon initial examination this appears to be the case. Of the 91 measures, 49 had Republican sponsors and 42 had Democratic sponsors. However, if this is broken down by chamber, a different picture emerges. Although an almost equal number of measures (46 in the House and 45 in the Senate) were introduced in each chamber, the Republican controlled house had 32 Republican sponsors (80%), while the Democratically controlled Senate had 33 Democratic sponsors (73%). Overall then, the data shows a bipartisan balance for party sponsorship, with each chamber having September 11 generated legislation overwhelmingly sponsored by the respective controlling party.


However, while only a single member can introduce a measure, any number of other representatives or senators can cosponsor legislation. Cosponsors are sought often to demonstrate wide support for a measure (Davidson and Oleszek, 2000, 229; Campbell, 1982, 419). If a spirit of bipartisanship is behind the September 11 legislation, we would expect to find split-party cosponsorship of the measures. The majority party introduces legislation to give it a boost towards passage, and then seeks wide support from both parties to signal its bipartisan nature. And, indeed, this appears to be the case. While 20 measures had no cosponsors, 11 of these were amendments, not surprising since they were introduced and voted upon the same day. There is less time available for the sponsor to recruit formal cosponsors. Their time is usually better spent trying to round up actual votes for the impending roll call. Of the 17 measures with 1 cosponsor, 12 had one of the opposite party of the sponsor. Of the 12 with 2 to 5 cosponsors, 8 contained members of both parties. Of the 20 measures with between 6 and 30 cosponsors, 10 had at least 25% from the party with the fewer cosponsors. And of the 22 measures with more than 30 cosponsors (the largest number was 226 on H. Con. Res 243, Proposing a Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor), 136 had at least 25% from the party with the fewer cosponsors. So, excluding the 20 measures with no cosponsors, 52 of the remaining 71 legislative entries (70%) had formal bipartisan support. Although not absolute, it strongly suggests that bipartisanship is behind the majority of September 11 generated legislation.


If one were to judge by the Senate alone, none of the September 11 related legislation that made it to the floor was controversial. Of 62 votes, 50 passed by unanimous consent or voice vote. Of the 12 roll call votes, 8 were unanimous and 3 others registered only a single dissenting vote each. The remaining vote found only 9 senators voting nay. Any opposition that emerged in the Senate apparently took place off the floor, with legislation being stalled in committee and/or kept off the floor agenda.


This was not the case in the openly more contentious House. There were only 55 votes in the House. More than half (28) of the measures were approved without objection or by voice vote. Of the 26 roll call votes, 11 were unanimous, 2 had only 1 dissenting vote (including California Representative Barbara Lee's controversial lone stand against the Authorization for Use of Military Force Resolution), 2 others had only 2 dissenting votes, and 2 had 3 dissenting votes. But 9 roll call votes did demonstrate serious opposition to the measure under consideration. All 9 of these votes occurred on measures in 1 of 3 categories: 2 in General Economic Relief, 3 in General Terrorism/Security, and 4 in the above mentioned Aviation category.


In conclusion, we found that Congress did respond quickly and with a general bipartisan spirit to the events of September 11, 2001. There was a mix of symbolic and substantive legislation, but some basic party differences did exhibit themselves in a minority of the measures. As time wore on, the amount of legislation introduced dropped and the easily agreed on measures passed at least one chamber by the end of the 107th Congress's first session. Nothing with floor action was introduced between December 19 and March 1, after which only 5 measures have been submitted that have received formal consideration. No doubt, most of the legislation that is going to be enacted has; of the 91 total measures, 32 have been enacted, the 19 amendments were voted on the day they were introduced (17 were adopted), 11 are duplicated companion measures, and 1 is in conference committee. There are only 28 measures awaiting action in the second chamber. Barring further terrorist acts and crises in the overseas war, only a few more (probably controversial) measures pertaining to September 11 will emerge on the floor of Congress. And, as might be expected with distance between the attacks increasing and midterm election politics blossoming, the spirit of bipartisanship is returning to its normally lower level.


References

Barton, James C. and Peter Cohn. 22 Sept. 2001. "Hill Clears Aid for Airlines," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 59:36, 2206-7.


Bond, David. 17 Dec. 2001. "Crisis at Herndon: 11 Airplanes Array," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 96-97.


Campbell, James E.  1982. "Cosponsoring Legislation in the U.S. Congress," Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. VII, 415-422.


Croft, John.  18 Feb. 2002. "Bush Backs Limited Local Airport Ops," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 40-41.


Davidson, Roger H., and Walter J. Oleszek. 2000.  Congress and Its Members, 7th ed. CQ Press, Washington, D.C.


Gellman, Barton, and Susan Schmidt. 1 Mar. 2002. "Plans to Preserve Government after Nuclear Attack Enacted," The Times-Picaynne, A-9.


Idelson, Holly (1996). "Provisions of Terrorism Law," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, June 15, 54:24, pp. 1713-1714.


Ott, James.  18 Feb. 2002. "Tight Airport Security Compels Airport Design Shakeup," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 48-51.


Dr. Margaret F. Klemm received her Ph.D. from the University of New Orleans and is an airline transport rated pilot (ATP) who is presently at Purdue University in the Aviation Technology Department. She has previously taught in the political science departments at Saginaw Valley State University and Northern Illinois University and in the Aviation Departments at Central Missouri State University and Auburn University. Her research interests include public policy and aviation. Her email address is mfklemm@tech.purdue.edu.

Dr. Albert C. Ringelstein received his Ph.D. from the University of New Orleans. He has previously taught at East Carolina University and Nicholls State University and is presently a Fulbright Scholar at Moldova State University. His research interests include presidential politics and legislative behavior.



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