Special Orders


Reorganizing the Federal Government for Homeland Security:
Congress Creates a New Department


Charles R. Wise, Indiana University


The attacks on September 11, 2001 brought heightened public attention to the capabilities of the federal government to counteract terrorist attacks. In particular, high level government officials were forced to focus seriously on flaws in governmental functioning that left several governmental agencies, and the federal government as a whole, ill prepared to confront what has now been recognized as a major multifaceted threat to the nation's security.


A widespread consensus formed that a major cause of the deficient federal government capability to combat terrorism was inadequate coordination and organization of federal activities that are directed at homeland security. In less than a month after the attacks, President Bush began to address the deficiencies by issuing an executive order establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council within the executive office of the president to "serve as the mechanism for ensuring coordination of homeland security-related activities of executive departments and agencies and effect the development and implementation of homeland security policies" (E.O. 13228, sec. 5). The office is headed by the Assistant to the President of Homeland Security. The first incumbent as assistant is Tom Ridge, the former governor of Pennsylvania.

Almost simultaneously in October, Senators Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) and Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) introduced a bill to create a Department of Homeland Security. About the same time, another organizational approach was put forward by Representative Alcee Hastings (D-Fla.) and Senator Bob Graham (D-Fla.) to establish the National Office for Combating Terrorism in the executive office of the president and to make the head of the office subject to Senate confirmation. In June 2002, the president announced his own proposal for Congress to create a Department of Homeland Security. The president's proposal, which shared numerous similarities with the Lieberman-Specter bill, and his call for speedy congressional action, dramatically increased the priority to process legislation.  As of this writing, Congress is actively engaged in consideration of bills to create a Department of Homeland Security.  The President proposed to merge 22 federal agencies that have a role in homeland security into the new department which would have a budget of $37.5 billion, and between 170, 000 and 225,000 employees, depending on whether the new airport baggage inspectors and new customs and border personnel to be hired are included in the total.


In actuality, neither congressional attention to federal organization issues regarding terrorism nor attempts to reorganize federal activities to confront terrorism are new.  The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (known as the Gilmore Commission) established by Congress in Public Law 105-261, reported in its second annual report on December 15, 2000: "Over the past five years, there have been a half-dozen Congressional attempts to reorganize the Executive Branch's efforts to combat terrorism, all of which failed" (Advisory Panel, 2000, vii).

The proposals embodied in the above-described legislation actually came from some commissions that had been examining issues associated with government preparedness for, and response to, terrorism for some years.  The Gilmore Commission recommended in 2000 that an office be established in the White House with a director subject to congressional approval and congressional oversight. The proposed responsibilities included development of a national strategy, coordinating agency implanting activities, and budget review and certification. These are essentially the contents of the Hastings and Graham bills. The commission also recommended the creation of a new joint committee or separate committees in the House and Senate to which the office would propose programs and budget requests.


Taking a different approach, the Commission on National Security/21st Century, known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, proposed  a new federal department  of homeland security. The proposal was to transfer several existing federal bureaus and agencies from existing departments to the new department which would have both operational and coordinating responsibilities. The Lieberman-Specter bill incorporated many of the recommendations of the Hart-Rudman Commission.


Once the president announced his proposal for a Department of Homeland Security, congressional action was focused on considering a departmental option. Support for creation of a new Department of Homeland Security was promptly announced by leaders of both parties in both houses of Congress. House and Senate leaders both pledged to support a bipartisan approach and process. Nonetheless, what began as a widely supported bipartisan initiative and process evolved into a process characterized by party polarization to the point of stalling final action on the bill.


To begin the process, it was decided that in the Senate, the president's proposal would be processed by a regular standing committee, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee chaired by Senator Lieberman. In that the push for creation of a department had largely come from the Democrats, and particularly from Senator Lieberman, an expectation that bipartisanship would prevail in the consideration of the bill was widespread. The House used a different approach than the Senate, known as the task force approach. Speaker Tip O'Neill had used it in processing the consideration of President Carter's proposal to consolidate several federal agencies into a new Department of Energy. The approach is for the leadership to appoint a special committee to serve as the main committee to formulate the final bill before floor consideration instead of multiple referral to several committees with jurisdictional claims (Sinclair, 2000, p.219). Even more than in the case of energy, homeland security involved transferring numerous agencies with multiple constituencies. Such constituencies were concerned that their priorities would be lost in a new department. In addition, the proposed transfers threatened the prerogatives of the 11 committees which had jurisdiction. In order to avoid having 11 committees pick apart the proposal for the department, Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) worked out a procedure that  followed regular order with the standing committees  holding meetings and offering amendments in the first phase, but used a special procedure for the second phase. In the second phase, all committee amendments went to a Select Committee on Homeland Security consisting of 5 Republicans and 4 Democrats. This was a leadership committee chaired by House Majority Leader Richard Armey (R-Tex.) and included on the Republican side Majority Whip Tom Delay (Tex.), Conference Chair J.C. Watts (Okla.), Conference Vice-Chair Deborah Pryce (Ohio), and Representative Rob Portman (Ohio). On the Democratic side were Minority Whip Nancy Pelosi (Calif.), Caucus Chairman Martin Frost (Tex.), Caucus Vice-Chairman Robert Menendez (N.J.) and Representative Rosa DeLauro (Conn.). The regular committees were given three weeks to make their recommendations which could only be considered by the Select Committee.


Several committees made substantial changes to the president's proposal, which reflected committee jurisdictional protection concerns, operational disagreements, constituency politics and partisan differences. The leadership's decision to appoint a Select Committee to process all committee amendments demonstrated that House leaders anticipated that issues associated with committee jurisdiction could cause the most difficulty. What may not have been anticipated was how much the intersection of operational concerns and a different kind of constituency politics would complicate the bill's consideration.


 Nonetheless, issues associated with committee jurisdiction came to the fore early in the process. Several committees rejected the administration's plans to transfer agencies or parts of them. The Transportation and Infrastructure Committee voted against inclusion of the Coast Guard and the entire Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), while permitting FEMAÕs terrorism preparedness and response activities to be transferred. The Judiciary Committee voted against transferring the entire Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), opting instead to transfer only the law enforcement functions. The Science Committee voted against transferring the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Computer Security Division. The Ways and Means Committee modified the plan to move the Customs Service, by requiring that its revenue and trade functions be treated as a distinct entity under the control of  a newly created homeland security undersecretary for  border and transportation security, and providing that the Treasury Department must retain statutory authority over revenue collecting and trade enforcement. Demonstrating the powerful force of committee jurisdiction, the Chair of Ways and Means (Bill Thomas, R-Calif.) stated that "This is basically a defensive maneuver to keep the core of Customs and its relationship with this committee intact" (Congress Daily, 11 July 2002). Concerned that the new department would be too dependent on the FBI and CIA for intelligence data, the Intelligence Committee voted to create a separate intelligence agency within the new department.


Committees also changed provisions that would affect how the new department would be managed. Previewing a battle that would ignite partisan differences and tie up consideration of the entire bill in the Senate, the House Government Reform Committee narrowly adopted language that would allow employees who were transferred to the new department to retain union rights by a vote of 21-19. The chair of the committee, Representative Dan Burton (R-Ind.), would later urge the Select Committee to delete the amendment. The administration objected that the amendment provided less authority than the President had under existing law, whereby he could deny collective bargaining status to employees on grounds of national security. Democrats argued that exempting homeland security employees from the president's authority to waive civil service rules on national security grounds was necessary to sustain employee morale and for retention of skilled workers. Republicans largely argued that such an exemption would give the president less flexibility and authority over the new department than he has over existing departments and that he needs more flexibility - not less - to undertake the homeland security mission against terrorists.


The president's proposal also included authority to transfer within the Homeland Security Department up to 5 percent of the money appropriated for programs in the department and the ability to transfer 5 percent of unobligated balances available to the agencies being relocated to the new department. The Appropriations Committee voted to retain "regular order." That committee's proposal would have allowed funds to be transferred if they would be used for similar purposes, but changes would require congressional approval.


The Select Committee held three days of hearings and then moved to mark-up to consider the committees' amendments. In large part, the strategy to have a leadership committee acting as final processor to avoid committee jurisdictional concerns predominating worked. Most of the amendments exempting agencies from inclusion in the new department such as the Coast Guard, FEMA, Customs Service and the new Transportation Security Administration were not accepted by the Select Committee. The Committee did accept the Judiciary Committee's amendment to split the Immigration and Naturalization Service by including only its enforcement and border protection activities in the new department. It also accepted the International Relations Committee's amendment to leave visa authority with the State Department.


The administration's request to allow the secretary of the new department to transfer up to 5% of appropriated funds between agencies within the department, provided that the appropriations committees are given 15 days notice, drew significant opposition. Numerous members worried that the power would be used to the detriment of non-homeland security services provided by agencies within the new department. Others objected that the power represented a fundamental shift in power to the executive branch of one of Congress's central and most closely guarded powers. The Select Committee adopted a compromise, allowing the secretary of the department to transfer up to 2 per cent of appropriations between departmental functions for up to two years, provided that Congress gets 15 days notice.


The Committee also adopted a compromise on the personnel issue. Language offered by Representative Portman affirmed the bargaining rights of workers transferred to the new department, but allowed the secretary to exclude individuals involved in national security matters. The bill also allowed the department to establish its own rules for hiring and firing, pay scales, and performance reviews.


The issue of government-wide coordination of homeland security activities, including those of agencies and departments not included in the new department also sparked controversy. Numerous members of Congress had not been convinced that the presidentÕs Homeland Security Coordinator, which the president had established by executive order, was positioned effectively to coordinate homeland security across the government. Others were displeased that the president refused to allow the current coordinator to testify officially before congressional committees. The president maintained that Tom Ridge was a presidential advisor and could not be compelled to testify. Ridge had provided numerous informal briefings to members. Some members felt that the current arrangement did not empower the coordinator sufficiently, nor did it provide for the requisite accountability to Congress. Representative Pelosi offered an amendment that would have established the position and powers of the White House Office of Homeland Security in law and subject it to congressional oversight. However, the Select Committee did not adopt the amendment by a vote of 5-4, with members voting along party lines.


House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt (D-Mo.) initially pressed for a completely open rule but then negotiated with House Republican leaders, which produced a compromise. Pursuant to the compromise, the House Rules Committee sorted through the 103 proposed amendments and chose 27 for floor debate, with 90 minutes for general debate, and time limits for amendments between 10 and 45 minutes.  Several of the amendments revisited battles fought in the standing committees and the Select Committee. An amendment to reinsert the labor union protections and deny the President the authority to waive civil service laws was defeated by a vote of 222-208 mostly along party lines. An amendment to subject the head of the White House security office to congressional approval was also defeated. Amendments to keep FEMA and the Customs Service out of the new department also went down. The final vote on the bill, which for the most part tracked the administration's proposals, was 295-132.


Senate leaders decided that the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee would have the lead in processing legislation to create the new department but would allow suggestions from other committees with domestic security jurisdiction. The Governmental Affairs Committee held two days of mark-up at the end of July, and approved a bill by a vote of 12-5. It was in the form of a comprehensive amendment that Senator Lieberman would add to his own existing homeland security bill that was awaiting floor action.


Some of the same issues relating to management flexibility that served to cause partisan conflict in the House had the same effect in the Senate. Chief among these was the issue of the presidentÕs power to modify civil service rules in the new department. Senator Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.), ranking Republican on the committee, sought to remove language that Senator Lieberman had included in the bill which affirmed employees' rights to belong to unions unless their jobs are materially changed in the new department. Senator Thompson's amendment was defeated by a vote of 7-10. He then tried a different amendment which would give the new secretary discretion in hiring, firing, recruiting, and transferring employees. Nonetheless, that amendment was also defeated 7-10. A third Thompson amendment to give the secretary reorganization authority that existed throughout the federal government from 1973-1984, whereby the secretary could submit a plan to Congress and reorganize agencies within 75 days, was defeated 8-9 along straight party lines.  Senator Voinovich (R-Ohio) was successful with an amendment that would give the department the power to raise the salaries of experienced managers from $166,700 to $192,000, and also expanded powers to offer early retirement buyouts to enable  the secretary to restructure the work force.


The administration's request to have budgetary flexibility was also denied. Instead, an amendment to require that most funding and assets transferred from existing departments and agencies to the Department of Homeland Security could be used only for purposes for which the money was originally appropriated, and thus not for funding new positions created by the new law establishing the department. Relatedly, the committee adopted an amendment that would create a special status for the Coast Guard by specifying that its assets could not be diverted from its core missions of search and rescue, enforcement of fisheries laws, and maritime navigation.


The Senate bill also differed from the House bill on the issue of the status of the Director of the White House Office of Homeland Security, in that the Senate version would codify the office in law and make its director subject to Senate confirmation. The administration and Senate Republicans objected that no such requirements were placed on the National Security Advisor, a comparable position in their view, and such a requirement would limit the presidentÕs choices.


Senate floor consideration of the legislation became stalled over the personnel issues. In September and October, those opposed to the personnel provisions in the committee bill conducted a filibuster. Senators Phil Graham (R-Tex.) and Zell Miller (D-Ga.) developed an amendment that  would allow the development of a new personnel system for the new department outside the existing civil service rules. It would also allow the president to exclude employees of the new department from belonging to labor unions if their individual agency's mission has materially changed and if their duties primarily involve intelligence, counterintelligence, or the investigation of terrorism. A competing amendment developed by Senators John Breaux (D-La.), Ben Nelson (D-Neb.), and John Chafee (R-R.I.) would allow the administration to change civil service rules as they apply to the new department, but only following consultation with representatives of federal employee unions. If the administration and the union representatives disagree, the issue would have to be submitted to arbitration before the Federal Services Impasses Panel, which consists of seven members appointed by the president. The amendment would also only allow the president to exclude employees from unions if their responsibilities changed so significantly that a majority of their duties involve intelligence, counterintelligence, or the investigation of terrorism.


The Democrats wanted to proceed with a vote on the Breaux-Nelson-Chafee amendment, while the Republicans insisted that the Graham-Miller amendment be voted on first. Six attempts to invoke cloture to end debate and move to a vote failed. The president repeatedly stated that he would veto a bill that did not give him the necessary flexibility to manage the personnel of the new department. The House and Senate adjourned for the elections without the full Senate having taken a vote on the bill. The leadership of both houses announced that they would reconvene for a lame duck session on November 12 after the election, and would resume consideration of the bill to create a Department of Homeland Security.


The failure to enact the bill creating the department became a campaign issue in some key races during the election. In particular, the Republicans ran ads in the Senate races in Georgia and Missouri criticizing Max Cleland and Jean Carnahan and both lost, which ensured the turnover of party control of the Senate to the Republicans. Senate Democratic Majority Whip Harry Reid admitted, "It was a good campaign issue for them" (Mullins, 11 Nov. 2002).  It is difficult to underestimate the effect of the congressional election outcome on the resolution of the conflict over the personnel issue and passage of the bill. Early in the lame duck session, the president let it be known that he wanted the bill passed; and, following a White House meeting of several senators and representatives with the president, the key swing senators (Breaux, Nelson, and Chafee) announced that they would support the agreement on the personnel issue which resolved the issue overwhelmingly in the president's favor. The three senators, in explaining their action, issued a statement: "There is no doubt that the supporters of the GOP amendment are in a better negotiating position following the elections of last week" (Mullins, 11 Nov. 2002).


The agreement permits the secretary to adjust the civil service regulations  that govern such things as the way employees are hired, paid, promoted, and disciplined once he or she notifies them in writing of the proposed system or adjustment and gives employee representatives 30 days to review and make recommendations. The secretary must notify Congress of the proposal and the employees' recommendations and if there are differences, they can be submitted to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in an attempt to reach an agreement. However, the secretary is empowered to determine in the secretary's sole and unreviewable discretion that further consultation and mediation is unlikely to produce agreement to implement the modified system. The bill also preserves the president's authority to exempt workers from collective bargaining agreements on ground of national security, but he would have to give 10 days notice and send a written explanation to Congress. The House took up the modified bill first and passed it by a vote of 299-121 with 212 Republicans and 87 Democrats voting yes and 114 Democrats, 6 Republicans, and 1 independent voting no. The Senate followed the same week.


However, the new personnel section was not the only new provision inserted into the bill. Among the provisions that Republican supporters also inserted were:


Senate Democrats, led by Majority Leader Daschle and Senator Lieberman, offered an amendment to delete several of these provisions and others they considered offensive, including the limitations on liability for vaccine manufacturers, liability protection for airport screeners, liability protection for manufacturers of security items, waiver provisions that would allow some companies who have their headquarters offshore to sign contracts with the government, and the creation of a homeland security research center program. The criteria specified for the research center appeared to direct the center be established at Texas A&M University.  However, the House had recessed and Senate supporters of the bill argued that any significant amendment such as that offered by Senators Daschle and Lieberman would kill the bill for this Congress. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 52-47. The supporters were not assured of victory until Minority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) agreed to a deal demanded by Senators Susan Collins (R-Maine), Olympia Snowe (R-Maine), and Chafee: that Minority Leader Lott and Speaker Hastert agree to rescind three provisions in the first appropriations bill in the next Congress. The three provisions were liability protections for vaccine manufacturers, waiver provisions that would allow some companies who have their headquarters offshore to sign contracts with the government, and the creation of the homeland security research center program specified to favor Texas A&M University. The three senators waited in the Senate cloakroom with Senator Lott for the call from Speaker Hastert (who was traveling in Turkey) to confirm that he would sign onto the deal. The bill passed with a final vote of 90-8.


The new secretary of the department will immediately confront several major implementation issues. Chief among these is integrating the separate operations, missions, and cultures of 22 different federal organizations. While Congress considered the legislation, a task force within the Office of Management and Budget was working for months to plan for the transition. Nonetheless, previous experience with creating merged agencies and departments out of a collection of previously existing agencies indicates that consolidation takes years rather than months, and involves overcoming numerous organizational, management, and political obstacles. FEMA was created in the Carter administration by consolidating 6 agencies and programs, but experienced so many problems, and came under such intense public and congressional criticism for performance failures that, in fact, several bills were introduced to abolish the agency. It took over 15 years for the agency to overcome its most serious operating and coordination problems (See Wise, 2002, pp. 138-139).


Another major implementation issue will be the establishment of workable operational and policy coordination relationships with all the other agencies which were not included in the department. Prior to September 11, the General Accounting Office testified before Congress that there were 40 federal agencies involved in countering terrorism, with $11 billion programmed to be spent during fiscal year 2001 (Decker 2001). The fact is a new Department of Homeland Security will only include a portion of the federal agencies involved in the federal homeland security mission. Agencies and departments integral to the fight against terrorism , such as the FBI, CIA, and the Department of Defense's new Northern Command, which is responsible for the continental U.S. plus Canada and Mexico, are not to be included in the new department. These are obviously crucial partners in the enterprise of homeland security and a myriad of relationships on multiple levels will have to be negotiated and worked out with them. In fact, the three above-mentioned agencies hardly constitute the universe of crucial federal organizations with which the new department will have to establish coordinated working relationships. The anthrax attack demonstrated that a host of other agencies from the Department of Health and Human Services to the Postal Service can play critical roles in a given terrorist situation.


In addition, the new department will have to establish workable relationships on many levels with state and local government agencies as well as private sector organizations. The reality of homeland security is that thousands of agencies based in state and local governments are involved in all stages of homeland security from preparedness to response, to dealing with the consequences of terrorism, and they are in the front lines for all of these functions. To impact homeland security, the new department will have to relate to, and serve as, a catalyst for change for thousands of such agencies, from local fire departments to state health departments. This will involve working through numerous difficult issues in several dimensions including operational, financial, legal and regulatory, and political dimensions (For analysis of these dimensions, see Wise, Sept. 2002).


Perhaps the most difficult implementation issue for the new department will involve how congressional oversight will be conducted. Both high-level commissions that recommended changes in executive branch structure to deal with homeland security stressed the need to change congressional structure if the reorganization was going to be effective. The Gilmore Commission pointed out that 11 full committees in the Senate and 14 full committees in the House - as well as their numerous subcommittees - have oversight responsibilities for various federal programs for combating terrorism. Including both authorizing and appropriating committees and subcommittees, 61 congressional panels have significant jurisdiction (Sharma, 31 Aug. 2002, 2226).


The Gilmore Commission had recommended a statutorily created coordination office in the White House for terrorism and concluded that Congress also had to be better organized. It recommended creation of a new joint committee or separate committees in each house, and stated for this to work, other authorizing committees must recognize the concurrent, consolidated authority of the committee(s), and appropriations committees must exercise restraint and respect authorizing legislation of the new statute (Advisory Panel, 2000). Similarly, the Hart-Rudman Commission recommended that Congress establish a special oversight body to deal with homeland security, but then move to create a single, select committee in each house with authorization, appropriations, and oversight responsibilities for all homeland security issues (U.S. Commission, 2001, 28).


For the most part, Congress has not considered its own reorganization to deal with homeland security in the context of passing a bill to establish a new department. A spokesman for House Majority Leader Dick Armey stated,  "We're more interested in getting a department right now, before we start oversight battles" (Sharma, 31 Aug. 2002, 2227). Senator Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) introduced a resolution to create a Select Committee on Homeland Security and Terrorism in the Senate, which is pending in the Rules Committee, but he has not had much success in finding support (Ibid). Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) observed, "It's going to be one hell of a turf battle. What committees here are going to be willing to give up jurisdiction?" (Nather and Foerstel, 8 June 2002, 1507). A high degree of conflict was projected by Senator Robert Bennett (R-Utah), "Hell hath no fury like a committee chairman whose jurisdiction has been taken away" (Nather and Foerstel, 8 June 2002, 1505). Nonetheless, a provision was included that declared that it is the sense of  Congress that each House of Congress should review its committee structure in light of the reorganization of responsibilities within the executive branch by the establishment of the department.


Nonetheless, implementation concerns may never become an issue if a bill is not passed. With the election to determine which parties control which houses of Congress, both sides in the debate appear to have decided that they may have greater leverage on the management issues following the election. In addition, constituency concerns, such as the union representation issue, are most difficult to compromise immediately prior to an election.  The final fate of the effort to create a Department of Homeland Security may not even be decided in the lame duck session but may await the new Congress in January.


References



Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2000 II.  "Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism." www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel.


Congress Daily, 11 July 2002. "Panel Wants Part of Customs Service Kept in Treasury."


Decker, Raymond J.  2001.  Combating Terrorism.  Statement before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, & Emergency Management, "Hearing on Combating Terrorism: Options to Improve the Federal Response." House of Representatives, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 April 2001.


Nather,  David and Foerstel, Karen. 8 June 2002. "Proposal Presages Turf Wars." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1505-1509.


Sinclair, Barbara. 2000. Unorthodox Lawmaking. 2nd ed. Washington, D. C.: CQ Press.

Sharma, Amol, 31 Aug.  2002. "New Department, Old Issues." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 2226-2231.


U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century. 2001. Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change.


Wise, Charles R. Sept. 2002. "Organizing the Federal System for Homeland Security: Problems, Issues, and Dilemmas." Public Administration Review 62, 44-57.


Wise, Charles R. March 2002. "Organizing for Homeland Security." Public Administration Review 62, 131-144.



Charles R. Wise is professor of political science at Indiana University where he teaches classes in public law and policy,  public management, public organization, and democratization. He is also director of the Parliamentary Development Project, which is assisting the Parliament of Ukraine in developing legislative processes. Professor Wise has served in the United States Department of Justice, first as Special Assistant for Policy Analysis in the Office of Legislative Affairs and then as Director of Intergovernmental Affairs, and as a consultant to the U.S. Air Safety Commission. He has three times been awarded the William E. Mosher Award (1985, 1992, 1993) by the American Society for Public Administration for the best academic article to be published in The Public Administration Review for the year. He has published a book entitled The Dynamics of Legislation (Jossey-Bass) and has published in many academic journals. His email address is wise@indiana.edu.



Table of Contents| |Editor's Introduction| |Special Orders| |News|
 |Announcements| |Other Issues of Extensions |



| HOME | | Contact Us |
| Teaching & Research | | Public Outreach | | Congressional Archives | | Graduate Fellowship |

This page is best viewed at a resolution of 800 x 600 pixels.
Copyright, The Carl Albert Center