Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)

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Who and what shapes foreign policy? In recent years analyses have increasingly emphasized not national calculations of the national interest or the political goals of national leaders but rather bureaucratic procedures and bureaucratic politics. Starting with Richard Neustadt’s Presidential Power, a judicious study of leadership published in 1960, this approach has come to portray the American president as trapped by a permanent government more enemy than ally. Bureaucratic theorists imply that it is exceedingly difficult if not impossible for political leaders to control the organizational web which surrounds them. Important decisions result from numerous smaller actions taken by individuals at different levels in the bureaucracy who have partially incompatible national, bureaucratic, political, and personal objectives. They are not necessarily a reflection of the aims and values of high officials.

Presidential Power was well received by John Kennedy, who read it with interest, recommended it to his associates, and commissioned Neustadt to do a private study of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The approach has been developed and used by a number of scholars—Roger Hilsman, Morton Halperin, Arthur Schlesinger, Richard Barnett, and Graham Allison—some of whom held subcabinet positions during the 1960s. It was the subject of a special conference at the Rand Corporation, a main

theme of a course at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, and the subject of a faculty seminar at Harvard. It is the intellectual paradigm which guides the new public policy program in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Analyses of bureaucratic politics have been used to explain alliance behavior during the 1956 Suez crisis and the Skvibol incident, Truman's relations with MacArthur: American policy in Vietnam, and now, most thoroughly the Cuban missile crisis, published in 1971 (Little, Brown & Company). Allison's volume is the elaboration of an earlier and influential article on this subject. With the publication of his book this approach to foreign policy now receives its definitive statement. The bureaucratic interpretation of foreign policy has become the conventional wisdom.

My argument here is that this vision is misleading, dangerous, and compelling: misleading because it obscures the power of the president; dangerous because it undermines the assumptions of democratic politics by relieving high officials of responsibility; and compelling because it offers leaders an excuse for their failures and scholars an opportunity for innumerable reinterpretations and publications.

The contention that the chief executive is trammeled by the permanent government has disturbing implications for any effort to imprint responsibility on public officials. A democratic political philosophy assumes that responsibility for the acts of government can be attributed to elected officials. The charges of these men are embodied in legal statutes. The electorate punishes an erring official by rejecting him at the polls. Punishment is seditious unless high officials are responsible for the acts of government. Elections have some impact only if government that most complex of modern organizations, can be controlled. If the bureaucratic machine escapes manipulation and direction even by the highest officials, then punishment is illogical. Elections are a farce not because the people suffer from false consciousness, but because public officials are impotent. Bureaucracy so large that the actions of government are not responsive to their will. What sense to vote a man out of office when his successor, regardless of his values, will be trapped in the same web of only incrementally malleable standard operating procedures?

THE RATIONAL-ACTOR MODEL

Conventional analyses that focus on the values and objectives of foreign policy, what Allison calls the rational-actor model, are perfectly coincident with the ethical assumptions of democratic politics. The state is viewed as a rational unitled actor. The behavior of states is the outcome of a rational decision-making process. This process has three steps. The options for a given situation are spelled out. The consequences of each option are projected. A choice is made which maximizes the values held by decision makers. The analyst knows what the state did. His objective is to explain why by inquiring to decision makers a set of values which are maximized by observed behavior. These values are his explanation of foreign policy.
The citizen, like the analyst, attributes error to either inappropriate values or lack of foresight. Ideally the electorate judges the officeholder by governmental performance, which is assumed to reflect the objectives and perspicacity of political leaders. Poor policy is made by leaders who fail to foresee accurately the consequences of their decisions or attempt to maximize values not held by the electorate. Political appeals, couched in terms of aims and values, are an appropriate guide for voters. For both the analyst who adheres to the rational actor model and the citizen who decide elections, values are assumed to be the primary determinant of government behavior.

The bureaucratic-politics paradigm points to quite different determinants of policy. Political leaders can only with great difficulty overcome the inertia and self-serving interests of the permanent government. What counts is managerial skill. In *Essence of Decision* Graham Allison maintains that "the central questions of policy analysis are quite different from the kinds of questions analysts have traditionally asked. Indeed, the crucial questions seem to be matters of planning for management." Administrative feasibility, not substance, becomes the central concern.

The paradoxical conclusion—that bureaucratic analysis with its emphasis on policy guidance implies political irresponsibility—has most clearly been brought out by discussions of American policy in Vietnam. Richard Neustadt in the concluding page of *Alliance Politics*, his recent book, raises a conversation he would have had with President Kennedy in the fall of 1963 had tragedy not intervened. "I considered asking whether, in the light of our machine's performance on a British problem, he conceived that it could cope with South Vietnam's . . . [It] was a good question, better than I knew. It haunts me still." For adherents of the bureaucratic-politics paradigm Vietnam was a failure of the "machine," a war in Arthur Schlesinger's words "which no president . . . desired or intended." The machine dictated a policy which it could not successfully terminate. The machine, not the cold war ideology and habits of Kennedy and Johnson, determined American behavior in Vietnam. Vietnam could hardly be a tragedy; for tragedies are made by choice and character, not fate. A knowing electorate would express sympathy, not levy blame. Machines cannot be held responsible for what they do, nor can the men caught in their workings.

The strength of the bureaucratic web has been attributed to two sources: organizational necessity and bureaucratic interest. The costs of coordination and search procedures are so high that complex organizations must settle for satisfactory rather than optimal solutions. Bureaucracies have interests defined in terms of budget allocation, autonomy, morale, and scope which they defend in a game of political bargaining and compromise within the executive branch.

The imperatives of organizational behavior limit flexibility. Without a division of labor and the establishment of standard operating procedures it would be impossible for large organizations to begin to fulfill their statutory objectives, that is to perform tasks designed to meet societal needs rather than merely to perpetuate the organization. A division of labor among and within organizations reduces the job of each particular division to manageable proportions. Once this division is made, the complexity confronting an organization or one of its parts is further
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reduced through the establishment of standard operating procedures. To deal with each problem as if it were sui generis would be impossible given limited resources and information-processing capacity and would make intraorganizational coordination extremely difficult. Bureaucracies are then unavoidably rigid, but without the rigidity imposed by division of labor and standard operating procedures, they could hardly begin to function at all.

However, this rigidity inevitably introduces distortions. All of the options to a given problem will not be presented with equal clarity and conviction unless by some happenstance the organization has worked out its scenario for that particular problem in advance. It is more likely that the organization will have addressed itself to something like the problem with which it is confronted, it has a set of options for such a hypothetical problem, and these options will be presented to deal with the actual issue at hand. Similarly, organizations cannot execute all policy suggestions with equal facility. The development of new standard operating procedures takes time. The procedures which would most faithfully execute a new policy are not likely to have been worked out. The clash between the rigidity of standard operating procedures which are absolutely necessary to achieve coordination among and within large organizations and the flexibility needed to spell out the options and their consequences for a new problem and to execute new policies is inevitable. It cannot be avoided even with the best of intentions by bureaucratic chiefs anxious to faithfully execute the desires of their leaders.

THE COSTS OF COORDINATION

The limitations imposed by the need to simplify and coordinate indicate that the great increase in governmental power accompanying industrialization has not been achieved without some costs in terms of control. Bureaucratic organizations and the material and symbolic resources which they direct have enormously increased the ability of the American president to influence the international environment. He operates, however, within limits set by organizational procedures and the rigidities attendant on them.

A recognition of the limits imposed by bureaucratic necessities is a useful qualification of the assumption that states always maximize their interest. This does not, however, imply that the analyst should abandon a focus on values or assumptions of rationality. Standard operating procedures are rational given the costs of search procedures and need for coordination. The behavior of states is still determined by values, although foreign policy may reflect satisfactorily rather than optimally outcomes.

An emphasis on the procedural limits of large organizations cannot explain nonincremental change, if government policy is an outcome of standard operating procedures, then behavior at time t is only incrementally different from behavior at time t - 1. The exceptions to this prediction leap out of events of even the last year—the Nixon visit to China and the new economic policy. Focusing on the needs dictated by organizational complexity is adequate only during periods when policy is altered very little or not at all. To reduce policy makers to nothing more than the caretakers and minor adjustors of standard operating procedures rings
hollow in an era rife with debates and changes of the most fundamental kind in America's conception of its objectives and capabilities.

Bureaucratic analysts do not, however, place the burden of their argument on standard operating procedures but on bureaucratic politics. The objectives of officials are dictated by their bureaucratic position. Each bureau has its own interests. The interests which bureaucratic analysts emphasize are not clientelistic ties between government departments and societal groups or special relations with congressional committees. They are, rather, needs dictated by organizational survival and growth—budget allocations, internal morale, and autonomy. Conflicting objectives advocated by different bureau chiefs are reconciled by a political process. Policy results from compromises and bargaining. It does not necessarily reflect the values of the president but those of lesser actors.

The clearest expression of the motivational aspects of the bureaucratic-politics approach is the by-now well-known aphorism—where you stand depends upon where you sit. Decision makers, however, often do not stand where they sit. Sometimes they are not sitting anywhere. This is clearly illustrated by the positions taken by members of the EsCom during the Cuban missile crisis, which Allison elucidates at some length. While the military is Pavlovian fashion, urged the use of arms, the secretary of defense took a much more pacific position. The wise old men such as Ackerson, imported for the occasion, had no bureaucratic position to defend. Two of the most important members of the EsCom, Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen, were loyal to the president, not to some bureaucratic barony. Similarly, in discussions of Vietnam in 1966 and 1967, it was the secretary of defense who advocated diplomacy and the secretary of state who defended the pragmatics of the military. During Skybolt McNamara was attuned to the president's budgetary concerns, not those of the air force.

Allison, the most recent exponent of the bureaucratic-politics approach, realizes the problems which these facts present. In describing motivation he backs off from an exclusive focus on bureaucratic position, arguing instead that decision makers are motivated by national, organizational, group, and personal interests. While maintaining that the "propensities and priorities stemming from position are sufficient to allow analysts to make reliable predictions about a player's stand" (a proposition violated by his own presentation), he also notes that "these propen-
sities are filtered through the baggage that players bring to positions." For both the missile crisis and Vietnam it was the "baggage" of culture and values, not bureaucratic position, which determined the aims of high officials.

Bureaucratic analysis is also inadequate in its description of how policy is made. Its axiomatic assumption is that politics is a game with the preferences of players given and independent. This is not true. The president chooses most of the important players and sets the rules. He selects the men who head the large bureaucracies. These individuals must share his values. Certainly they identify with his beliefs to a greater extent than would a randomly chosen group of candidates. They also feel some personal fidelity to the president who has elevated them from positions of corporate or legal to ones of historic significance. While bureau chiefs are undoubtedly torn by conflicting pressures arising either from their need to protect their own bureaucracies or from personal conviction, they must remain
the president's men. At some point disagreement results in dismissal. The values which bureau chiefs assign to policy outcomes are not independent. They are related through a perspective shared with the president.

The president also structures the governmental environment in which he acts through his impact on what Allison calls "action-channels." These are decision-making processes which describe the participation of actors and their influence. The most important "action-channel in the government is the president's ear. The president has a major role in determining who whispers into it. John Kennedy's reliance on his brother, whose bureaucratic position did not afford him any claim to a decision-making role in the missile crisis, is merely an extreme example. By allocating tasks, selecting the White House bureaucracy, and demonstrating special affections, the president also influences "action-channels" at lower levels of the government.

The president has an important impact on bureaucratic interests. Internal morale is partially determined by presidential behavior. The obscurity in which Secretary of State Rogers languished during the China trip affected both State Department morale and recruitment prospects. Through the budget, the president has a direct impact on that most vital of bureaucratic interests. While a bureau may use its societal clients and congressional allies to secure desired allocations, it is rarely easier with the president's support than without it. The president can delimit or redefine the scope of an organization's activities by transferring tasks or establishing new agencies. Through public statements he can affect attitudes toward members of a particular bureaucracy and their functions.

THE PRESIDENT AS "KING"

The success a bureau enjoys in furthering its interests depends on maintaining the support and affection of the president. The implicit assumption of the bureaucratic-politics approach that departmental and presidential behavior are independent and comparatively important is false. Allison, for instance, vacillates between describing the president as "chief" among general and as a "king" standing above all other men. He describes in great detail the deliberations of the ExCom, implying that Kennedy's decision was in large part determined by its recommendations, yet notes that during the crisis Kennedy vetoed an ExCom decision to bomb a SAM base after an American U-2 was shot down on October 27. In general bureaucratic analysis ignore the critical effect which the president has in choosing his advisors, establishing their access to decision making, and influencing bureaucratic interests.

All of this is to say that bureaucratic interests may sometimes be decisive in the formulation of foreign policy. Some policy options are never presented to the president. Others he deals with only cursorily, not going beyond options presented by the bureaucracy. This will only be the case if presidential interest and attention are absent. The failure of the chief executive to specify policy does not mean that the government takes no action. Individual bureaucrats may initiate policies which suit their own needs and objectives. The actions of different organizations may work at cross-purposes. The behavior of the state, that is, of some of its official organizations, in the international system appears confused or even con-
traditory. This is a situation which develops, however, not because of the independent power of government organizations but because of failures by decision makers to assert control.

The ability of bureaucracies to independently establish policies is a function of presidential attention. Presidential attention is a function of presidential values. The chief executive involves himself in those areas which he determines to be important. When the president does devote time and attention to an issue, he can compel the bureaucracy to present him with alternatives. He may do this, as Nixon apparently has, by establishing an organization under his special assistant for national security affairs, whose only bureaucratic interest is maintaining the president's confidence. The president may also rely upon several bureaucracies to secure proposals. The president may even resort to his own knowledge and sense of history to find options which his bureaucracy fails to present. Even when presidential attention is totally absent, bureaucrats are sensitive to his values. Policies which violate presidential objectives may bring presidential wrath.

While the president is undoubtedly constrained in the implementation of policy by existing bureaucratic procedures, he even has options in this area. As Allison points out, he can choose which agencies will perform what tasks. Procrasines are fungible and can be broken down into their individual standard operating procedures and recomposed. Such exercises take time and effort, but the expenditure of such energies by the president is ultimately a reflection of his own values and not those of the bureaucracy. Within the structure which he has partially created himself he can, if he chooses, further manipulate both the options presented to him and the organizational tools for implementing them.

Neither organizational necessity nor bureaucratic interests are the fundamental determinants of policy. The limits imposed by standard operating procedures as well as the direction of policy are a function of the values of decision makers. The president creates much of the bureaucratic environment which surrounds him through his selection of bureau chiefs, determination of "active channels," and statutory powers.

THE MISSILE CRISIS

Adherents of the bureaucratic-polities framework have not relied exclusively on general argument. They have attempted to substantiate their contentions with detailed investigations of particular historical events. The most painstaking is Graham Allison's analysis of the Cuban missile crisis in his Essence of Decision. In a superlative benzoic exercise Allison attempts to show that critical facts and relationships are ignored by conventional analysis that assumes states are unified rational actors. Only by examining the missile crisis in terms of organizational necessity and bureaucratic interests and policies can the formulation and implementation of policy be understood.

The missile crisis, as Allison notes, is a situation in which conventional analysis would appear most appropriate. The president devoted large amounts of time to policy formulation and implementation. Regular bureaucratic channels were short-circuited by the creation of an executive committee which included representatives.
of the bipartisan foreign-policy establishment, bureau chiefs, and the president's special aides. The president dealt with details which would normally be left to bureaucratic subordinates. If under such circumstances the president could not effectively control policy formulation and implementation, then the rational-actor model is greatly suspect.

In his analysis of the missile crisis Allison dealt with three issues: the American choice of a blockade, the Soviet decision to place MRBS and IRBS on Cuba, and the Soviet decision to withdraw the missiles from Cuba. The American decision is given the most detailed attention. Allison notes three ways in which bureaucratic procedures and interests influenced the formulation of American policy: first in the elimination of the non-forceful alternatives; second through the collection of information; third through the standard operating procedures of the air force.

In formulating the U.S. response, the E.C.W. considered six alternatives. These were:

1. Do nothing
2. Diplomatic pressure
3. A secret approach to Castro
4. Invasion
5. A surgical air strike
6. A naval blockade

The approach to Castro was abandoned because he did not have direct control of the missiles. An invasion was eliminated as a first step because it would not have been precluded by any of the other options. Bureaucratic factors were not involved.

The two nonmilitary options of doing nothing and lodging diplomatic protests were also abandoned from the outset because the president was not interested in them. In terms of both domestic and international politics this was the most important decision of the crisis. It was a decision which the president had authority to make. Allison's case rests on proving that this decision was foreordained by bureaucratic rules. He lists several reasons for Kennedy's elimination of the non-forceful alternatives. Failure to act decisively would undermine the confidence of members of his administration, convince the permanent government that his administration lacked leadership, hurt the Democrats in the forthcoming election, destroy his reputation among members of Congress, create public distrust, encourage American allies and enemies to question American courage, invite a second Bay of Pigs, and feed his own doubts about himself. Allison quotes a statement by Kennedy that he feared impeachment and concludes that the 'non-forceful paths—avoiding military measures, resorting instead to diplomacy—could not have been more irrelevant to his problems.' Thus Allison argues that Kennedy had no choice.

Bureaucratic analysis, what Allison calls in his book the governmental policy model, implies that any man in the same position would have had no choice. The elimination of passivity and diplomacy was ordained by the office and not by the man.
Such a judgment is essential to the governmental-politics model, for the reason to the "baggage" of values, culture, and psychology which the president carries with him undermines the explanatory and predictive power of the approach. To adopt, however, the view that the office determines Kennedy's action is both to underrate his power and to relieve him of responsibility. The president defines his own role. A different man could have chosen differently. Kennedy's Profiles in Courage had precisely dealt with men who had risked losing their political roles because of their "baggage" of values and culture.

Allison's use of the term intragovernmental balance of power to describe John Kennedy's elimination of diplomacy and passivity is misleading. The American government is not a balance-of-power system; at the very least it is a loose hierarchical one. Kennedy's judgments of the domestic, international, bureaucratic, and personal ramifications of his choice were determined by who he was as well as what he was. The central mystery of the crisis remains why Kennedy chose to risk nuclear war over missile placements which he knew did not dramatically alter the strategic balance. The answer to this puzzle can only be found through an examination of values, the central concern of conventional analysis.

The impact of bureaucratic interests and standard operating procedures is reduced here to the choice of the blockade instead of the surgical air strike. Allison places considerable emphasis on intelligence gathering in the determination of this choice. U-2 flights were the most important source of data about Cuba; their information was supplemented by refugee reports, analyses of shipping, and other kinds of intelligence. The timing of the U-2 flights, which Allison argues was determined primarily by bureaucratic struggles, was instrumental in determining Kennedy's decision:

Had a U-2 flown over the western end of Cuba three weeks earlier, it could have discovered the missiles, giving the administration more time to consider alternatives and to act before the danger of operational missiles in Cuba became a major factor in the equation. Had the missiles not been discovered until two weeks later, the blockade would have been irrelevant, since the Soviet missile shipments would have been completed ... An explanation of the politics of the discovery is consequently a considerable piece of the explanation of the U.S. blockade.

The delay, however, from September 15 to October 14, when the missiles were discovered reflected presidential values more than bureaucratic politics. The October 14 flight took place ten days after COMOR, the interdepartmental committee which directed the activity of the U-2s, had decided the flights should be made. "This ten-day delay constitutes some form of 'failure,'" Allison contends. It was the result, he argues, of a struggle between the Central Intelligence Agency and the air force over who would control the flights. The air force maintained that the flights over Cuba were sufficiently dangerous to warrant military supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency, anxious to guard its own prerogatives, maintained that its U-2s were technically superior. However, the ten-day delay after the decision to make a flight over western Cuba was not entirely attributable to bureaucratic bickering. Allison reports an
attempt to make a flight on October 9, which failed because the U-2 flew out. Further delays resulted from bad weather. Thus the ineptitude caused by bureaucratic infighting amounted to only five days (October 4 to October 9) once the general decision to make the flight was taken. The other five days' delay caused by engine failure and the weather must be attributed to some higher source than the malfunctioning of the American bureaucracy.

However, there was also a long period of hesitation before October 4. John McCone, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, had indicated to the president on August 22 that he thought there was a strong possibility that the Soviets were preparing to put offensive missiles on Cuba. He did not have firm evidence, and his contentions were met with skepticism in the administration.

**INCREASED RISKS**

On September 10 COMOR had decided to restrict further U-2 flights over western Cuba. This decision was based upon factors which closely fit the rational-actor model of foreign policy formulation. COMOR decided to halt the flights because the recent installation of SAMs in western Cuba coupled with the loss of a Nationalist Chinese U-2 increased the probability and costs of a U-2 loss over Cuba. International opinion might force the cancellation of the flights altogether. The absence of information from U-2s would be a national, not simply a bureaucratic, cost. The president had been forcefully attacking the critics of his Cuba policy, arguing that patience and restraint were the best course of action. The loss of a U-2 over Cuba would tend to undermine the president's position. Thus, COMOR's decision on September 10 reflected a sensitivity to the needs and policies of the president rather than the peremptory concerns of the permanent government.

The decision on October 4 to allow further flights was taken only after consultation with the president. The timing was determined largely by the wishes of the president. His actions were not circumscribed by decisions made at lower levels of the bureaucracy of which he was not aware. The flights were delayed because of conflicting pressures and risks confronting Kennedy. He was forced to weigh the potential benefits of additional knowledge against the possible losses if a U-2 were shot down.

What if the missile had not been discovered until after October 14? Allison argues that had the missiles been discovered two weeks later, the blockade would have been irrelevant, since the missile shipments would have been completed. This is true, but only to a limited extent. The blockade was irrelevant even when it was put in place, for there were missiles already on the island. As Allison points out in his rational-actor cut at explaining the crisis, the blockade was both an act preventing the shipment of additional missiles and a signal of American firmness. The missiles already on Cuba were removed because of what the blockade meant and not because of what it did.

An insurmountable dilemma confronted the United States. It could not retaliate until the missiles were on the island. Military threats or action required definitive
proof. The United States could only justify actions with photographic evidence. It could only take photos after the missiles were on Cuba. The blockade could only be a demonstration of American firmness. Even if the missiles had not been discovered until they were operational, the United States might still have begun its response with a blockade.

Aside from the timing of the discovery of the missiles, Allison argues that the standard operating procedures of the air force affected the decision to blockade rather than to launch a surgical air strike. When the missiles were first discovered, the air force had no specific contingency plans for dealing with such a situation. They did, however, have a plan for a large-scale air strike carried out in conjunction with an invasion of Cuba. The plus called for the air bombardment of many targets. This led to some confusion during the first week of the ExCom's deliberations because the air force was talking in terms of an air strike of some five hundred sorties, while there were only some forty known missile sites on Cuba. Before this confusion was clarified, a strong coalition of advisors was backing the blockade.

As a further example of the impact of standard operating procedures, Allison notes that the air force had classified the missiles as mobile. Because this classification assumed that the missiles might be moved immediately before an air strike, the commander of the air force would not guarantee that a surgical air strike would be completely effective. By the end of the first week of the ExCom's deliberations, when Kennedy made his decision for a blockade, the surgical air strike was presented as a "null option." The examination of the strike was not reopened until the following week, when civilian experts found that the missiles were not in fact mobile.

This incident suggests one caveat to Allison's assertion that the missile crisis is a case which discriminates against bureaucratic analysis. In crisis, when time is short, the president may have to accept bureaucratic options which could be amended under more leisurely conditions.

NOT ANOTHER PEARL HARBOR

The impact of the air force's standard operating procedures on Kennedy's decision must, however, to some extent remain obscure. It is not likely that either McNamara, who initially called for a diplomatic response, or Robert Kennedy, who was partially concerned with the ethical implications of a surprise air strike, would have changed their recommendations even if the air force had estimated its capacities more optimistically. There were other reasons for choosing the blockade aside from the apparent infeasibility of the air strike. John Kennedy was not anxious to have the Pearl Harbor analogy and applied to the United States. At one of the early meetings of the ExCom his brother had passed a note saying, "I now know how Togo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor." The air strike could still be considered even if the blockade failed. A chief executive anxious to keep his options open would find a blockade a more prudent initial course of action.

Even if the air force had stated that a surgical air strike was feasible, this might have been discounted by the president. Kennedy had already experienced unrealistic military estimates. The Bay of Pigs was the most notable example. The United
States did not use low-flying photographic reconnaissance until after the president had made his public announcement of the blockade. Prior to the president’s speech on October 22, twenty high-altitude U-2 flights were made. After the speech, there were eighty-five low-level missions, indicating that the intelligence community was not entirely confident that U-2 flights alone would reveal all of the missile sites. The Soviets might have been camouflaging some missiles on Cuba. Thus, even if the immutability of the missiles had been correctly estimated, it would have been rash to assume that an air strike would have neutralized all of the missiles. There were several reasons, aside from the air force’s estimate, for rejecting the surgical strike.

Thus in terms of policy formulation it is not clear that the examples offered by Allison concerning the timing of discovery of the missiles and the standard operating procedures of the air force had a decisive impact on the choice of a blockade over a surgical air strike. The ultimate decision did not rest with the president. The elimination of the不可逆等的option was a reflection of Kennedy’s values. An exploration of the Cuban missile crisis which fails to emphasize the importance of terms of the values of the chief decision maker must inevitably lose sight of the forest for the trees.

The most chilling passages in Essence of Decision are concerned not with the formulation of policy but with its implementation. In carrying out the blockade the limitations on the president’s ability to control events became painfully clear. Kennedy did keep extraordinarily close tabs on the workings of the blockade. The first Russian ship to reach the blockade was allowed to pass through without being intercepted or directed back to the president. Kennedy felt it would be wise to allow Khrushchev more time. The president overrode the ESCOM’s decision to fire on a Cuban SAM base after a U-2 was shot down on October 27. A spy ship similar to the Pueblo was patrolling perilously close to Cuba and was ordered to move further out to sea.

Despite concerted presidential attention coupled with an awareness of the necessity of matching minute details which would normally be left to lower levels of the bureaucracy, the president still had exceptional difficulty in controlling events. Kennedy personally ordered the navy to fall in the blockade from eight hundred miles to five hundred miles to give Khrushchev additional time in which to make his decision. Allison suggests that the ships were not ready in time. The navy, being both anxious to guard its prerogatives and confronted with the difficulty of moving large numbers of ships over millions of square miles of ocean, failed to promptly execute a presidential directive.

There were several random events which might have changed the outcome of the crisis. The navy used the blockade to test its anti-submarine equipment. It was forcing Soviet submarines to surface at a time when the president and his advisors were unaware that contact with Russian ships had been made. A U-2 accidentally strayed over Sibona on October 22. Any one of these events, and perhaps others still unknown, could have triggered escalatory actions by the Russians.

Taken together, they strongly indicate how much caution is necessary when a random event may have costly consequences. A nation like a drunk staggering is a shift should stay far from the edge. The only conclusion which can be drawn from the inability of the chief executive to fully control the implementation of a policy in which he was intensely interested and to which he devoted virtually all of his time
for an extended period is that the risks were even greater than the president knew. Allison is more convincing on the problems concerned with policy implementation than on questions relating to policy formulation. Neither bureaucratic interests nor organizational procedures explain the positions taken by members of the Enron: the elimination of passivity and diplomacy, or the choice of a blockade instead of an air strike.

CONCLUSION

A glimpse at almost any one of the major problems confronting American society indicates that a reformulation and clarification of objectives, not better control and direction of the bureaucracy, is critical. Conceptuals of man and society long accepted are being undermined. The environmentalists present a fundamental challenge to the assumption that man can control and stand above nature, an assumption rooted both in the successes of technology and industrialization and Judeo-Christian assertions of man's exceptionalism. The nation's failure to formulate a consistent crime policy reflects in part an inability to decide whether criminals are freely willing rational men subject to determinations of guilt or innocence or the victims of socioeconomic conditions or psychological circumstances over which they have no control. The economy manages to defy accepted economic precepts by sustaining relatively high inflation and unemployment at the same time. Public officials and economists question the wisdom of economic growth. Conflicts exist over what the objectives of the nation should be and what its capacities are. On a whole range of social issues the society is torn between attributing problems to individual inadequacies and social injustice.

None of these issues can be decided just by improving managerial techniques. Before the nineties of bureaucratic implementation are investigated, it is necessary to know what objectives are being sought. Objectives are ultimately a reflection of values, of beliefs concerning what man and society ought to be. The failure of the American government to take decisive action in a number of critical areas reflects so much the inertia of a large bureaucratic machine as a confusion over values which afflicts the society in general and its leaders in particular. It is in such circumstances too comforting to attribute failure to organizational inertia, although nothing could be more convenient for political leaders who having either not formulated any policy or advocated had policies can blame their failures on the governmental structure. Both psychologically and politically, leaders may find it advantageous to have others think of them as ineffectual rather than evil. But the facts are otherwise—particularly in foreign policy. There the choices—and the responsibility—rest squarely with the president.

NOTE