IN A SERIES OF ARTICLES AND A BOOK ON THE ISRAEL LOBBY, realist international relations theorists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argued in 2006–2007 that America’s virtually unqualified support for Israel was damaging the U.S. national interest. “Now that the Cold War is over, Israel has become a strategic liability for the United States,” they argue. “Washington’s close relationship with Jerusalem makes it harder, not easier, to defeat the terrorists who are now targeting the United States.”¹ America’s disastrous Middle East policy, they further contend, is best explained by the pernicious influence of the “Israel lobby” in Washington, especially wealthy Jews and the right-wing American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

The outraged response came fast and furious. Former U.S. diplomats took it personally. Dennis Ross, who worked under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, insisted that “never in the time that I led the American negotiations on the Middle East peace process did we take a step because ‘the lobby’ wanted us to.”² Princeton University’s Aaron Friedberg, who served

under Vice President Dick Cheney during the George W. Bush administration, was even more strident, concluding, “Sadly, their argument here is not only unscientific, it is inflammatory, irresponsible, and wrong.”

Several Israelis hit back where it likely hurt most, arguing that U.S. Middle East policy was actually driven by the very realist calculus that Mearsheimer and Walt claim to promote. Shlomo Ben-Ami, former Israeli foreign minister, maintained that America’s Israel policy was grounded in “shared interests and considerations of realpolitik.” Historian Michael Oren, who would later become the Israeli ambassador to the United States, argued that “Arab oil (and not Israel) was America’s persistent focus in the Middle East.” Furthermore, U.S. “presidents have supported Israel for strategic and moral reasons, not political ones.”

Other critics turned their attention to Main Street America. “In the United States, a pro-Israel foreign policy does not represent the triumph of a small lobby over the public will,” diplomatic historian Walter Russell Mead rightly argued in *Foreign Affairs*. “It represents the power of public opinion.” Indeed, “the ultimate sources of the United States’ Middle East policy lie outside the Beltway and outside the Jewish community.” Specifically, Mead argues that U.S. Middle East policy cannot be understood apart from the long-standing Protestant American affinity for Israel.

Mead is right that Mearsheimer and Walt err in reducing U.S. Middle East policy to an Israel lobby, especially one that is too focused on the AIPAC and wealthy Jews. American foreign policies in the region should be understood within the broader context of evolving American public opinion. But Mead errs when he claims that support for Israel in the United States “commands broad public support.” Political scientist Michael Koplow is certainly mistaken to go even further, asserting that support for Israel in the United States is “broad and deep” and even “crosscutting.”

Scholarship using data from the Pew Research Center, the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), and other extant surveys has already demonstrated that Americans are divided over the Middle East, with

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evangelical Christians being the strongest supporters of Israel. This article uses a new survey to build on this work, arguing that while American conservatives today tend to feel quite warmly toward Israel, American liberals are more ambivalent and do not on average desire a friendlier Israel policy. Liberals also feel much more warmly toward Palestinians and Muslims than conservatives do. Existing and new survey data strongly suggest that Mead is more accurate when he acknowledges that “U.S. opinion on the Middle East is not monolithic.”

By including extensive questions about both the dimensions of American ideology and attitudes toward Israel and the Palestinians within a single survey, our dataset provides new leverage to explore exactly how ideology polarizes American opinion toward the Middle East. Based on statistical analysis of our new data, this article argues that differing cultural and socioracial ideologies, and the disparate moral values that underlie them, are the major drivers of American ideological polarization over Israel. The Christian right and secular Americans view the Holy Land in very different ways, while social conservatives and civil rights liberals perceive very dissimilar Palestinian and Muslim worlds.

LIBERALS, CONSERVATIVES, AND THE MIDDLE EAST
To better understand the relationship between ideology and the Middle East attitudes and policy preferences of the American people, we hired the Palo Alto, California, survey research company YouGov to implement an Internet survey in spring 2011. The firm used a “sample matching” methodology to generate a representative national sample, first matching respondents to the full U.S. population on gender, age, race, education, party identification, ideology, and political interest and then weighting the final data set to match the population on age, gender, race, education, and religion.

We chose to implement our survey on the Internet to decrease measurement error. First, completing a survey in the privacy of one’s home on a personal computer reduces the response biases and self-presentation effects that are more likely in face-to-face and even telephone interviews, especially on sensitive topics such as prejudice. Second, the computer


interface allows for easier use of rating scales allowing for substantial choice, which are much more difficult to use over the telephone or even in person than on the Internet. That is one reason telephone surveys so often use yes/no or support/oppose questions, producing binary “variables” (which barely vary) that are of limited use for correlational analysis. The majority of our questions, by contrast, were measured on seven-point “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” scales, although there were also numerous 11-point rating scales and 101-point “placement rulers” in which respondents marked a position along an anchored but unnumbered ruler. Our goal was to create variables that vary—as much as possible. These methods, in short, allowed us to reduce measurement error and boost variation, increasing the likelihood that the true associations among our ideological and attitudinal variables would become apparent.

Finally, to our knowledge, our 2011 survey is the first to combine extensive questions about both ideology and about Middle East attitudes within a single, nationally representative U.S. sample. To date, existing national surveys have largely explored one or the other. The General Social Survey and the American National Election Studies have measured American ideology for decades, but they rarely ask questions about international affairs. By contrast, the Chicago Council, Pew, and PIPA surveys have been asking questions about the Middle East for years, but they rarely ask many questions about ideology. By combining these two types of questions within a single survey, our data set provides new leverage to explore exactly how ideology shapes the Middle East attitudes of the American people.

Adopting the 0° to 100° cool-to-warm country “feeling thermometer” long utilized by the Chicago Council, our 2011 survey revealed that the average American felt warmly (59°) toward Israel, cool toward “the Palestinian people” (41°) and “Muslims” (38°), and downright frigid toward Iran (19°). This is largely consistent with the Chicago Council’s 2010 poll, which found average feelings of 57°, 32°, and 27° toward Israel, the “Palestinian Authority,” and Iran, respectively. On Middle East policy, our survey also revealed that the median or most typical American was neutral about U.S. policy toward Israel, desiring it to be neither friendlier nor tougher. But he or she desired a “tougher” Iran policy.

Averages can be deceiving, however, when they hide differences among subpopulations. Ideology, it turns out, systematically and substantially

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13Chicago Council, “Global Views 2010-Constrained Internationalism: Adapting to New Realities,” 60, 31. Our focus on the Palestinian “people” rather than the Palestinian “Authority” likely accounts for the greater warmth that we found, while the intensification of the Iran nuclear situation likely accounts for the greater coolness toward Iran we found in 2011.
divides Americans in their feelings toward Middle Eastern countries and peoples (see Figure 1). Self-identified conservatives (74°) felt 22° warmer toward Israel than self-identified liberals (52°) did. However, liberals felt 13°, 28°, and 32° warmer than conservatives did toward Iran, the Palestinians, and Muslims, respectively. Data from both the 2009 PIPA and 2010 Chicago Council surveys replicate this robust pattern of ideological polarization, with conservatives feeling warmer than liberals toward Israel but cooler toward Palestinians.\textsuperscript{14} Similarly, liberals reported feeling substantially more favorably toward the Palestinian people than conservatives did in a September 2011 CNN telephone poll.\textsuperscript{15}

Americans were also divided in their policy preferences toward Israel. Survey participants were asked, using a seven-point scale ranging from “much friendlier” to “much tougher,” what kind of foreign policy they would prefer toward Israel. There were also two specific Israel policy items

\textsuperscript{14}In the 2009 PIPA survey, Republicans felt more “sympathy” toward Israelis and less toward Palestinians than Democrats did, $F(1, 458)=13.49, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .03; F(1, 458)=24.90, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .05$. Both PIPA ANCOVA control for age, gender, and education. In the 2010 Chicago Council Survey, conservatives felt 14° warmer toward Israel, and 11° cooler toward the Palestinian Authority than liberals did, $F(1, 441)=25.25, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .05; F(1, 478)=27.51, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .05$. Both Chicago Council ANCOVA control for age, gender, education, income, and being from the U.S. South.

\textsuperscript{15}F (1, 415) = 33.03, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .07. CNN ANCOVA controls for age, gender, education, and income.
that were rated on a seven-point “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” scale:

- The U.S. government should implement a more severe and uncompromising policy toward Israel.
- Our government should adopt a more supportive and obliging foreign policy toward Israel. (reverse coded)

Averaged together, the three Israel policy items formed a robust scale and revealed that American conservatives desired a vastly friendlier Israel policy than liberals did. These findings are consistent with other recent surveys. In the 2011 CNN telephone poll mentioned earlier, 53 percent of liberals favored “the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” while only 26 percent of conservatives did. In a November 2011 CBS telephone poll, conservatives scored higher than liberals on a four-point assessment of Israel, from “enemy” to “unfriendly” to “friendly but not an ally” to “ally.” And in an October 2012 Pew survey, Republicans were vastly more likely than Democrats to believe that the United States should be more supportive of Israel.

What best explains this consistent pattern of substantial ideological differences in American feelings and policy preferences toward Israel? This article will argue that while four distinct dimensions of American ideology contribute to overall liberal–conservative differences in feelings and policy preferences toward Israel and the Palestinians, it is differences in cultural and social ideology that matter the most. Differences in biblical literalism between cultural conservatives and cultural liberals contribute to very different feelings and policy preferences toward Israel and the Muslim world. Christian Zionists and nonreligious Americans hold very different views of the Holy Land. And differences in social dominance orientation divide liberals and conservatives in their views of the Arab–Israeli conflict. A morality of obedience and authority contributes to a conservative view of Israel as David and the surrounding Muslim world as Goliath. Moralities of compassion and justice, by contrast, contribute to a liberal view of the Palestinians as David resisting an oppressive Israeli Goliath.

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16Israel policy (three item scale, $\alpha = .88$): $F(1, 419) = 201.51, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .33$. ANCOVA controlled for seven standard demographics.

17Pearson’s $\chi^2(2, N = 321) = 32.97, p < .001$.

18$F(1, 541) = 34.31, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .06$. ANCOVA controls for age, gender, education, and income. “CBS News Poll: 2012 Presidential Election/Economy/Foreign Affairs” [USCBS2011–11A].

The article begins with a brief survey of the history of American engagement with Jews, Muslims, and the Middle East. It then turns to an exploration of how liberal–conservative differences on Israel policy are driven by differences in feelings toward both Israel and the Palestinians, as well as by differences in biblical literalism, libertarianism, and social dominance orientation. The article concludes with some thoughts on the implications of polarized American opinion toward Israel for U.S. Middle East policy.

GENTILES, JEWS, AND MUSLIMS: AMERICA’S EPIC ENCOUNTER WITH THE MIDDLE EAST

We Americans are the peculiar, chosen people—the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world.20
—Herman Melville, *White-Jacket* (1850)

The Egyptian, the Babylonian, and the Persian rose, filled the planet with sound and splendor, then faded to dream-stuff and passed away; the Greek and the Roman followed, and made a vast noise, and they are gone . . . All things are mortal but the Jew; all other forces pass, but he remains. What is the secret of his immortality?21
—Mark Twain, “Concerning the Jews” (1899)

The first Jews to arrive in North America landed on Manhattan Island in September 1654. New Netherland governor Peter Stuyvesant promptly declared the 23 immigrants “hateful enemies and blasphemers of the name of Christ.” He then petitioned the Dutch West India Company for permission to deport them.22

The first president of the United States was more welcoming. “May the children of the stock of Abraham who dwell in this land continue to merit and enjoy the good will of the other inhabitants,” George Washington declared to a Jewish leader in Newport, Rhode Island, in 1790. He also took the opportunity to champion both freedom of religion and separation of church and state: “The United States is not a Christian nation, any more than it is a Jewish or Mohammedan nation.”23

Many Americans nonetheless came to view their revolution and national mission through the lens of the Christian Bible. King George of England was the pharaoh of Egypt, and the American colonists were the “New

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23Ibid., 5.
Israel,” triumphing—with divine assistance—over tyranny. For instance, in 1776, Benjamin Franklin proposed that the Great Seal of the new United States of America evoke Exodus and the story of the Israelites. With the motto “Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God,” it would depict Moses parting the Red Sea, saving the fleeing Israelites while drowning the pharaoh and his pursing troops. As in the Old Testament, in the “New Israel” of the United States, liberty would defeat despotism.

Gentile American ambivalence about the Jews in their midst intensified in the mid-nineteenth century with the arrival of new Jewish immigrants from eastern Europe and Russia. Both anti-Semitism and biblical literalism influenced early views of Palestine. The 1878 publication of Jesus Is Coming launched William E. Blackstone’s career as a prophet of the Second Coming and Christian Zionism. But in his famous 1891 memorial to President Benjamin Harrison urging U.S. support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, Blackstone began with a little-disguised appeal to the anti-Semitism of his fellow Gentile elites: “What shall be done for the Russian Jews?” Rather than assimilating them into America, “Why not give Palestine back to them?” Only then did he appeal to humanitarianism and the authority of the Bible, arguing that Palestine was the Jews’ “inalienable possession, from which they were expelled by force.” Blackstone closed his argument with an appeal to Christian guilt: “Let us now restore them to the land of which they were so cruelly despoiled by our Roman ancestors.”

Postwar changes in American Protestantism had a profound influence on evolving and diverging American views of Israel. In the first quarter century following World War II, the dominant mainline and liberal Protestant denominations shifted from anti-Semitism to embracing Jews and support for Israel. For instance, Democratic president Harry S. Truman supported the creation of Israel out of humanitarianism. A devout Christian, Truman declared in 1945 that he could not “stand idly by while the victims of Hitler’s madness were not allowed to build new lives. The Jews needed someplace where they could go.”

By the 1980s, however, the rise of evangelical and fundamentalist Protestantism and the slow decline of mainline and liberal denominations fundamentally altered American views of Israel. The newly dominant conservative Protestantism was much more preoccupied with both

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personal salvation and prophesy. Taking heart in Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem in the 1967 Six-Day War, the new Christian Zionists eagerly awaited the End of Days, and so they refused compromise on the newly occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza. Ironically, the U.S. South, long a bastion of American anti-Semitism, has become, with the rise of evangelical Protestantism, a Christian Zionist stronghold. For instance, Christians United for Israel (CUFI), based in Texas, is the largest pro-Israel organization in the United States, with more than one million members.

Muslims and the Arab world have an equally long lineage in the American imagination. Historian Andrew Preston argues that “the Puritans of colonial New England had thought of Muslims as a satanic force and the Ottoman empire as a hellish source of earthly evil.” Michael Oren suggests that attacks by the Barbary pirates of North Africa on American merchants in the Mediterranean helped motivate the newly independent Americans to convene a Constitutional Convention. The Articles of Confederation were no longer sufficient: a stronger federal government and a U.S. Navy were needed to defend American honor from Barbary affronts. Referring to “Algerian Corsairs and the Pirates of Tunis and Tripoli,” New York’s John Jay wrote, “The more we are ill-treated abroad the more we shall unite and consolidate at home.” Oren concludes that a “threat from the Middle East had played a concrete role in creating a truly United States, a consolidated nation capable of defending not only its borders at home but its vital economic interests overseas.”

American fears of Islam persisted long after the threat of the Barbary pirates had receded. Conservative Protestants tended to have an antagonistic relationship with an Islam seen as led by a rival and false prophet. For instance, at the turn of the century, Presbyterian missionary to India E.M. Wherry depicted Christianity as in an existential battle against the “Moslem peril,” a battle that could only be won “with the Sword of the Spirit.”

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27My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
28Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith, 114.
29Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 30–32.
In his masterly 2007 ride through America’s tumultuous history in the Middle East, *Power, Faith and Fantasy*, Oren argues that in the American imagination, Christian fears of Islam have long coexisted with a romance of both the Arab, seen as a fellow David fighting against the Goliath of colonial oppression, and the Arab world, seen as a land of forbidden pleasures. On the former, he cites Bentley, an American journalist, in 1962’s *Lawrence of Arabia*: “We Americans were once a colonial people and we naturally feel sympathetic to any people, anywhere, who are struggling for their freedom.” On the latter, Oren cites the popular 1970s song “Midnight at the Oasis,” sung by the sensuous Maria Muldaur. “You won’t need no harem, honey, when I’m by your side,” she purred. “And you won’t need no camel, no, no, when I take you for a ride.”

For many Americans, Orientalist fantasies about the Middle East were shattered with the Iranian Revolution and subsequent hostage crisis. Fifty-two American diplomats from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran were held captive for 444 days, from November 1979 to January 1981. “The actions of Iran have shocked the civilized world,” President Jimmy Carter stated during a 1979 press conference. “For a government to applaud mob violence and terrorism . . . violates not only the most fundamental precepts of international law but the common ethical and religious heritage of humanity.” The Iran hostage crisis was one of the most widely covered stories in U.S. television history, rivaling Vietnam and Watergate. The nightly coverage highlighted the suffering of the U.S. diplomats and the fanaticism of Iran and Islam. Melani McAlister argues that this television news coverage, along with subsequent movies such as the 1986 Chuck Norris and Lee Marvin revenge fantasy *Delta Force*, cemented the link between terrorism, Iran, and Islam in the American imagination. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 likely strengthened this association.

THE DRIVERS OF U.S. ISRAEL POLICY PREFERENCES

“To stand against Israel is to stand against God.”

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I turn back to your ancient prophets in the Old Testament and the signs foretelling Armageddon, and I find myself wondering if—if we’re the generation that’s going to see that come about.35
—Republican president Ronald Reagan to the AIPAC, 1980

Why do conservatives desire a vastly friendlier Israel policy than liberals do? Would feelings toward the Palestinian people/Muslims matter for the Israel policy preferences of the American people, or would they be overwhelmed by feelings toward Israel? A mediation analysis revealed that both feelings toward the Palestinians/Muslims and feelings toward Israel helped account for liberal–conservative differences on Israel policy. Mediation models are used to explore the mechanisms or pathways through which two variables relate to one another.36 We then ran a pair of multiple mediation models in which four dimensions of American ideology (see Appendix A for scales and item wordings) were used to account for the impact of broad liberal–conservative ideology on feelings toward these two groups. They revealed that cultural, economic, and political (communitarian-libertarian) ideologies mediated the influence of ideology on feelings toward Israel, while cultural, social, and economic ideologies mediated the impact of ideology on feelings toward Muslims and the Palestinians, although the economic effect was quite small.

Why would cultural ideology help account for conservative coolness toward Muslims and the Palestinians and warmth toward Israel? It was measured with three statements tapping traditionalism: attitudes toward nudity, sex, drugs, and alcohol (see Appendix A for item wordings). Our survey also measured biblical literalism with four items:

- The Bible is literally true, from Genesis to Revelations, from Adam and Eve to Armageddon.
- I have no doubt at all that God exists.
- Whenever science and scripture conflict, science is right. (reverse coded)
- The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting against God.

Participant assessments of these four statements cohered very well ($\alpha = .88$), and the resulting biblical literalism scale correlated very highly ($r = .71$) with cultural traditionalism (unless otherwise noted, all $p$-values

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35Ibid., 194.
36With cross-sectional survey data, however, we cannot be sure of the exact causal sequence. Our mediation models are thus best understood as demonstrating “syndromes” of variables that go together rather than as definitive causal claims. On mediation, see Andrew F. Hayes, Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach (New York: Guilford Press, 2013).
in this article can be assumed to be less than .001). But biblical literalism was a stronger mediator of the influence of liberal-conservative ideology on feelings toward Israel than traditionalism was. It appears, therefore, that traditionalism mediated the relationship between ideology and feelings toward Israel not so much because of respondents’ attitudes toward sex and drugs but because those higher or lower on traditionalism also tended to be higher or lower on biblical literalism.

Figure 2 combines four of these mediators—warmth toward Israel and the Palestinians/Muslims, social dominance orientation, and biblical literalism—into a single mediation model. Remarkably, whereas liberal to conservative ideology alone accounted for 20 percent of the variance in Israel policy preferences in an unmediated model, the addition of these four mediators reduced the direct effect to just 1 percent.37 So the four mediators account for the vast bulk of liberal-conservative ideology’s massive influence on Israel policy preferences.

We begin with warmth toward Israel at the bottom right of figure 2, which was by far the most powerful predictor ($\beta = -.74$) of Israel policy preferences. **Figure 2**

*Why Conservatives Desire a Friendlier Israel Policy than Liberals*


Notes: A multiple mediation model. ** $p < .01$; all other $p \leq .001$. Coefficients above an arrow indicate the unmediated relationship; those below an arrow reflect the inclusion of the mediator(s). All indirect paths displayed are statistically significant. See appendix B for details. Policy and warmth toward Israel were both three-item scales. Biblical literalism is a four-item scale. See appendix A for item wordings. To reduce clutter, seven demographic covariates, none of which was statistically significant, are not shown.

37From semipartial correlation $= -.45$ to semipartial correlation $= -.09$. 
preferences. Given the “affect heuristic,” by which we use our gut feelings to make difficult decisions, it is not surprising that feelings toward Israel strongly shape policy preferences toward Israel.38 This helps explain how the average American, who may not know very much about the Middle East, nonetheless maintains consistent attitudes toward it: gut feelings, shaped by preexisting ideologies, drive specific policy preferences.

Biblical literalism, at the bottom left, was associated with warmth toward Israel ($\beta = .17$). But it also had a direct influence on preferences for a friendlier Israel policy ($\beta = -.43$), even after controlling for warmth toward Israel ($\beta = -.07$, $p < .01$). How should these two effects of biblical literalism be interpreted? The direct effect of biblical literalism on support for a friendlier Israel policy seems best attributed to the Christian Zionist prophetic belief that Israel must hold on to the occupied territories to prepare for Christ’s Second Coming. Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza during the Six-Day War in 1967, Jerry Falwell avowed in 1988, was “the single greatest sign indicating the imminent return of Jesus Christ.”39 In his 2006 sensation Jerusalem Countdown, John Hagee similarly declares that “God’s word is very clear! There will be grave consequences for the nation or nations that attempt to divide up the land of Israel.”40 More recently, former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee has been one of the most public and outspoken defenders of the Israeli settlements, arguing both that outsiders should not tell Israelis where they should live in their own country and that Palestinians should settle in Arab countries outside Israel.

Our 2011 survey also included the item, “God gave Palestine (today’s Israel) to the Jewish people.” Not surprisingly, the degree of agreement with this statement almost completely mediated the relationship between biblical literalism and Israel policy preferences.41 “Much of America’s blessing as a nation can be traced to its benevolent treatment of the Jews and Israel,” writes Pastor Mark Hitchcock of Faith Bible Church in Edmond, Oklahoma. But, “if America continues on its current path and fails to bless the Jewish people, the final vestige of God’s blessing on our nation could be withdrawn, and the end could come quickly—very

39Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More, 189.
41Point estimate (PE) = -.31; 95 percent confidence interval (CI) from -3780 to -.2501. The direct relationship was reduced from $\beta = -.43$ to just $\beta = -.12$. 
quickly.” In *Allies for Armageddon*, Victoria Clark suggests that a fear of the “wrath of God” plays a major role in Christian Zionist support for Israel: “if America abandons Israel, then God will cancel America’s Most Divinely Favored Nation status.”

Not all conservative Christians believe that the End of Days is imminent, however. Many likely felt warmly toward Israel (β = .17, figure 2, center bottom) out of gratitude, remorse, or a desire for personal salvation. Gratitude and love stems from a deep sense of religious affinity. “Christians and Jews are united,” John Hagee proclaimed to the AIPAC in 2007. “We are indivisible, we are bound together by the Torah—the roots of Christianity are Jewish. We are spiritual brothers.” Huckabee was even more effusive during a trip to Israel in 2010. “I worship a Jew!,” he proclaimed. “I have a lot of Jewish friends, and they’re kind of, like, ‘You evangelicals love Israel more than we do.’ I’m, like, ‘Do you not get it? If there weren’t a Jewish faith, there wouldn’t be a Christian faith!’”

Guilt also contributes to conservative Christian warmth toward Israel. Christianity scholar Stephen Spector reports that his “evangelical informants repeatedly expressed their deep remorse for the Church’s abuse of Jews in the name of Christ.” In this contrite view, Martin Luther was an anti-Semite, and the church was complicit in the Holocaust. In his 1973 work *The Promised Land: The Future of Israel Revealed in Prophecy*, radio Bible teacher Derek Prince repented that “the Nazis merely reaped a harvest that the Church had sown.” Hagee’s 2006 *Jerusalem Countdown* similarly contains several penitent chapters chronicling Christian anti-Semitism. “For centuries, the Jews have been beaten, murdered, robbed, and raped while fanatics have screamed, ‘You are the Christ killers!’”

Biblical literalism also likely contributes to Christian conservative warmth toward Israel out of a more self-interested desire for God’s blessings. In Genesis 12:3, the Lord says to Abram, “I will bless those who bless you, and I will curse him who curses you.” The desire for personal salvation likely contributes to much Christian warmth toward Israel. “God promised long ago that those who bless Abraham and his descendants will be blessed,

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47Hagee, *Jerusalem Countdown*, 64.
and those who curse them will be cursed,” writes Oklahoma pastor Mark Hitchcock.\(^{48}\) The 2012 Texas GOP Platform opposed “pressuring Israel to make concessions it believes would jeopardize its security, including the trading of land for the recognition of its right to exist.” Why? The platform was explicit: “Our policy is based on God’s biblical promise to bless those who bless Israel and curse those who curse Israel.”\(^{49}\)

Religiosity—the frequency and importance of religious practice—is conceptually distinct from the set of beliefs that is biblical literalism. But they were highly intercorrelated \((r = .71)\) in our 2011 survey and correlated similarly with feelings toward Israel \((r = .33, .32)\). However, when pit against each other in a regression analysis, biblical literalism accounted for more of the variance in feelings toward Israel \((2.5 \text{ percent})\) than religiosity did \((1.4 \text{ percent})\).\(^{50}\) What best accounts for this pattern? A moderation analysis\(^{51}\) revealed that among Protestants, the influence of religiosity on warmth toward Israel depended on denomination (Figure 3). Greater religiosity was only associated with increased warmth toward Israel among Protestants of evangelical denominations (the steep dashed line). Greater frequency of church attendance or prayer had no effect on feelings toward Israel among Protestants of mainline or liberal denominations (the flat solid line)—hence the stronger influence of biblical literalism. In other words, prayer and church attendance are not enough; the kind of church an American Protestant attends has powerful implications for his or her feelings toward Israel.

Although greater average biblical literalism accounted for some of conservatives’ warmer feelings toward Israel than liberals, it did not account for all of it. How should we interpret the remaining direct relationship \((\beta = .30, \text{Figure 2, near bottom left})\) between conservatism and warmth toward Israel? Although not included in Figure 2 to reduce clutter, greater libertarianism (as opposed to communitarianism; see Appendix A for item wordings), as noted earlier, also mediated the positive relationship between conservatism and warmth toward Israel. Many conservatives view America as the New Israel not so much in religious terms as in the political terms of freedom triumphing over tyranny. House majority leader Tom

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\(^{48}\)Hitchcock, *Middle East Burning*, 193.

\(^{49}\)“2012 Republican Party of Texas Platform,” 22.

\(^{50}\)Semipartial correlations of .158 and .117. Three-item measure of feelings toward Israel listed in Appendix A.

\(^{51}\)Moderation analyses are used to test whether the relationship between two (or more) variables depends on the level of a third variable. They thus address the boundary conditions or circumstances under which a relationship between two variables holds. See Hayes, *Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process Analysis*. 
DeLay emphasized this libertarian theme in a remarkable speech to the Israeli Knesset on 30 July 2003:

I stand before you today, in solidarity, as an Israeli of the heart. The solidarity between the United States and Israel is deeper than the various interests we share. It goes to the very nature of man, to the endowment of our God-given rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. It is the universal solidarity of freedom.\textsuperscript{52}

With Israel firmly lodged on the side of liberty, there can be no doubt where DeLay’s loyalties lie. Huckabee has similarly argued, “Even if there was nothing about eschatology involved, the reason this [Israel], as an American, matters to me is because freedom and liberty matter to me.” For conservatives like Huckabee, support for Israel is driven by multiple dimensions of his ideological profile.

Many American liberals, by contrast, appear to have begun questioning whether Israel really is a David fighting heroically for freedom against an Arab Goliath. With the 1967 Six-Day War and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, liberals began viewing Israel as a Goliath oppressing the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. Bill Mauldin captured this emerging liberal view of Israel in a 1978 editorial cartoon entitled “Endangered Species” (Figure 4). It depicts two birds in hats labeled “Israel’s doves.” The olive branches they hold in their beaks are wilting. With Israeli successes in the 1967 and 1973 wars, Israeli pacifists were approaching extinction. “To me the great charm of the Israelis when I was there before, during, and after the Six Day War was that they disliked militarism but knew how to handle it,” Mauldin later wrote. “I wondered if eventually all those wars might turn them into Spartans. To a degree it seems to have happened.”\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{53}Bill Mauldin, \textit{Let’s Declare Ourselves Winners... and Get the Hell Out} (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985), 7.
BIBLICAL LITERALISM AND FEELINGS TOWARD ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS

The first thing, then, which the Lord will do, will be to purify His land (the land which belongs to the Jews) of the Tyrians, the Philistines the Sidonians—of all the wicked, in short, from the Nile to the Euphrates.54
—John Darby, Hopes of the Church (1840)

Figure 2 revealed that biblical literalism predicts not just warmth toward Israel (β = .17) but also coolness toward the Palestinians (β = -.30). Figure 5 depicts the relationship between biblical literalism and feelings toward Israel and the Palestinians by American religious group. The two lines represent how coolly or warmly the average member of each religious group feels toward Israel and the Palestinians. The bars represent each group’s mean level of biblical literalism. The sequence of religious groups is in ascending left-to-right order of warmth toward Israel (the rising solid line), with atheists and those Americans claiming no religion first and evangelical Protestants and American Jews last.

The value added of Figure 5 over Figure 2 is that it simultaneously displays the general pattern of the polarizing influence of biblical literalism on the feelings toward Israel and the Palestinians of Americans of different religious groups—and the outliers to the pattern. For example, American Jews (at the far right) are a clear exception to the rule. Not surprisingly, they felt the warmest of all American religious groups toward Israel and the coolest of all toward the Palestinians—even though they scored as low on biblical literalism as those Americans who reported no religion at all (recall that our biblical literalism scale included an item on Revelation and Armageddon from the New Testament).

At the opposite extreme, atheists, agnostics, and those Americans reporting no religion were not just the coolest of all religious groups toward Israel but also the warmest toward the Palestinians. They appear to be “religion blind,” refusing to allow religious or cultural differences to shape their feelings toward Israel or the Palestinians.

By contrast, Figure 5 also reveals that Pentecostals, white Baptists, and other white evangelical Protestants were both the highest on biblical literalism and displayed the largest gaps (with the exception of American Jews) between their warmth toward Israel and their coolness toward Palestinians. As the epigraph from John Darby, the father of modern dispensationalism,

54Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More, 200.
suggests, prophesy writers have long identified Muhammad and Islam with the Gog and Magog of the Bible, contributing to conservative Protestant prejudice against Arabs and Palestinians. More recently, Florida pastor Terry Jones has given voice to evangelical Protestant hostility toward Islam. By burning a Koran and provoking Muslim violence, and promoting slogans such as “Everything I need to know about Islam, I learned on 9–11,” Jones has sought to link Islam with violence and terrorism.

Race is another variable that Figure 5 highlights. White and black Baptists did not differ in their average religiosity, and white Baptists scored just slightly higher than black Baptists on biblical literalism (the bars in Figure 5). But there were substantial differences in their feelings toward the Middle East. On average, white Baptists (71°) felt 17° warmer than black Baptists (54°) toward Israel, placing them on opposite sides of

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55Religiosity: $F(1, 153) = 1.45, p = .23$; biblical literalism: $F(1, 153) = 5.62, p = .02, \eta_p^2 = .04$. ANCOVA control for six demographics (race is excluded).
Figure 5. Meanwhile, black Baptists (47°) felt 15° warmer than white Baptists (32°) toward the Palestinian people. Both differences were medium-to-large statistically.56

Race appears to drive this difference between black and white American Baptist feelings toward the Palestinians. We created a composite variable of mean feelings toward 11 nonwhite countries also included in our 2011 survey (North and South Korea, Japan, Pakistan, Haiti, Brazil, India, Iran, Mexico, China, and Taiwan; $\alpha = .87$). Added to the standard demographics as another control variable, feelings toward colored countries reduced the 15° difference between white and black Baptists on feelings toward the Palestinian people to zero.57 In other words, if you could remove their different feelings about colored countries, black and white Baptists would feel similarly (38°) toward the Palestinians. As anthropologist Melani McAlister argues in *Epic Encounters*, racial politics at home powerfully shapes how black and white Americans understand the Middle East.58

The same is true of the small but statistically significant 6° difference between white (38°) and Hispanic (44°) Catholic feelings toward the Palestinian people, also displayed in Figure 5.59 When feelings toward colored countries were added to the analysis as a control variable, the difference between white (39°) and Hispanic (40°) Catholics was reduced to a statistically nonsignificant 1°.60 Race still matters for American views of the Middle East.

These findings are consistent with Pew survey data. Although Pew declared in the title of a February 2014 press release that “Strong Support for Israel in U.S. Cuts across Religious Lines,” its own survey data tell a very different story: substantial religious differences in support for Israel. For instance, in Pew data evangelical Protestants desired that the United States be much more supportive of Israel than those who described themselves as atheist, agnostic, or “nothing in particular.” There were even substantial differences within the much more homogeneous group of white Protestants, with those describing themselves as “evangelical” or “born-again” substantially more desirous of greater U.S. support for Israel than those who did not.61

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56Israel: $F(1, 153) = 14.36, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .09$; Palestinians: $F(1, 153) = 13.38, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .08$. ANCOVA control for six demographics (race is excluded).
57$\alpha = .87, F(1, 153) = .005, p = .95$.
58McAlister, *Epic Encounters*.
59$F(1, 241) = 3.87, p = .05, \eta_p^2 = .02$.
60$F(1, 240) = .22, p = .64$.
61$F(1, 523) = 70.71, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .12$, and $F(1, 434) = 33.29, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .07$, respectively. Both ANCOVA control for age, gender, and education. "Pew Early October 2012 Political Survey."
The 2000–2001 Cooperative Clergy Study Project, which surveyed close to 9,000 American clergy, tells a similar story of denominational differences over Israel—but at an elite level. As James Guth notes, evangelical Protestant clergy were more supportive of Israel than mainline Protestant clergy, Protestant clergy were more supportive than Catholic clergy, and white clergy were more supportive than black clergy. When it comes to support for Israel, therefore, differences among the Christian public appear to mirror those among Christian clergy.

ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS: DAVID AND GOLIATH?

“It will be a tragedy—for the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the world—if peace is rejected and a system of oppression, apartheid, and sustained violence is permitted to prevail.”


Palestinians have to suffer through the checkpoint system, the barriers, the fenced-in wall that exists just to get to their job, often times to travel from north and south even within the West Bank. It's created enormous hardship for them.

—Barack Obama, 14 January, 2006

The top-left corner of Figure 2 reveals that another reason that American conservatives feel cooler than liberals toward the Palestinians and Muslims is their greater “social dominance orientation” (SDO), the desire that “inferior groups should stay in their place” (see all three item wordings in appendix A). This finding replicates the work of social psychologists who have also found, with American samples, that greater SDO predicts greater prejudice against Muslims.

Liberal–conservative differences in SDO ($\beta = .36$) can be explained in part by their differing moral psychologies. On average, conservatives value authority and obedience more than liberals do, contributing to their greater average desire for group dominance. Liberals, by contrast, value justice and compassion more than conservatives do, contributing to their

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greater average opposition to social dominance and support for intergroup equality.

Conservatives feel cooler than liberals toward the Palestinians and Muslims in part because on average they are more sensitive to threats to authority and social order. Harvard sociologists Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson attended local Tea Party meetings in Massachusetts, Virginia, and Arizona in 2010 and 2011 and concluded that the dominant sentiment was fear. “A sense of ‘us versus them’ along racial and ethnic fault lines clearly marks the worldview of many people active in the Tea Party,” Skocpol and Williamson write. “Fear and hatred of Islam and Muslims were commonly expressed.”66

Some politicians have sought to harness this widespread conservative fear of Islam. “We have been under attack by the irreconcilable wing of Islam since the Iranians illegally seized our embassy in 1979,” Newt Gingrich wrote in his 2010 To Save America. “For thirty-one years our enemies have been plotting and maneuvering to kill us. Time is not on our side. We have to defeat them decisively before they acquire weapons that could destroy our very civilization.”67 From this conservative perspective, the Israelis are on the front line of a battle to keep the Palestinians and other Muslims from upsetting the global pecking order. If the Israelis need to rule the occupied territories with an iron fist to maintain law and order, so be it.

Gingrich actually builds on a conservative tradition of viewing Israel as a model for the forceful response to perceived Muslim threat that dates to the late 1960s—not just 1979. The 1967 Six-Day War thrilled some American conservatives, not just because of biblical prophecy but also because of Israel’s remarkable military victory. In the late 1960s, many conservatives celebrated Israeli military successes as a way to counter the antiwar movement at home. Melani McAlister argues that after Vietnam, “Israel and its military played a key symbolic role for those who advocated the remilitarization of U.S. policy.”68 For instance, conservative hawks could bask in the reflected glory of the dramatic Israeli rescue of more than 100 Israeli hostages in Entebbe, Uganda, in July 1976. Walter Russell Mead similarly argues that following the 1967 war, “Jacksonian” conservatives—nationalists favoring a strong military—formed a negative view of Arab terrorists and a positive view of Israeli uses of overwhelming force.69

67Newt Gingrich and Joe DeSantis, To Save America (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2010), 303.
68McAlister, Epic Encounters, 157.
By contrast, the greater value that liberals place on compassion and fairness contributes to their opposition to what they view as Israeli oppression of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Compassion is displayed in the second epigraph above, as President Obama speaks of the suffering and hardship of the Palestinian people living in the West Bank. And justice is frequently invoked by liberals seeking a more balanced policy toward the Palestinian question. “If we Americans are to be successful peace brokers, we have to be as sensitive toward Arab concerns and aspirations as we are to the Israelis,” the late George McGovern wrote in 2011. “I believe it is in the best interest of America for us to be equally fair to the Israelis and the Arabs.”

But it is former president Jimmy Carter who perhaps best expressed the widespread liberal unease with Israeli treatment of the Palestinians in his highly controversial 2006 book, *Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid*. As noted in the first epigraph above, Carter views the situation in the West Bank and Gaza as “a system of oppression, apartheid, and sustained violence.” He later explained that, “I intended the word *apartheid* to describe a situation where two peoples dwelling on the same land are forcibly segregated from each other, and one group dominates the other.” While Carter is an atypical liberal—both more religious and more involved with the Middle East issue—the top path in Figure 2 reveals that greater average liberal than conservative opposition to group dominance \( (\beta = .36) \) contributes to their greater relative warmth toward the Palestinians \( (\beta = -.21) \).

It is not surprising, therefore, that mainline and liberal Protestant denominations have begun protesting Israeli treatment of the Palestinians. During the second Palestinian intifada in 2004, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church voted 413–62 to divest from multinational corporations doing business in Israel. Methodists and Episcopalians soon followed suit. More recently, in October 2012, 15 mainline Protestant leaders sent a letter to Congress focusing on the suffering of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. “As Christian leaders in the United States, it is our moral responsibility to question the continuation of unconditional U.S. financial assistance to the government of Israel.”

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CONCLUSION: THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND THE “ELECTORAL CONNECTION”

The so-called Israel lobby succeeds in Washington for exactly the same reason that Mothers Against Drunk Driving has succeeded in their lobbying: because it has public opinion on their side.73

—Democratic congressman Steve Rothman of New Jersey, 2008

I believe it is vitally important that we cast our ballots for candidates who base their decisions on biblical principles and support the nation of Israel.

—Reverend Billy Graham, 19 October 2012

This article has argued that Main Street American liberals and conservatives differ substantially in their feelings and foreign policy preferences toward the Middle East. Conservatives feel warmer toward Israel but cooler toward Iran, the Palestinians, and Muslims than liberals do. Conservatives, furthermore, desire a friendlier foreign policy toward Israel than liberals do.

It has further argued that these differences have their origins in many of the same ideological fissures that cleave domestic American politics. The same culture wars that divide Americans on abortion and gay marriage also divide Americans on Israel and the Palestinians. For instance, our 2011 survey revealed that biblical literalism is a powerful predictor of both opposition to abortion (β = .62), and warmth toward Israel (β = .36). Similarly, the racial politics that has divided Americans from the civil rights movement of the 1960s to the voting rights battles of today also divides social liberals and conservatives in their feelings toward the Palestinian people. Conservatives tend to view Palestinians and other Muslims as threats to both Christianity and established authorities, while liberals have a greater tendency to view their plight in the West Bank and Gaza as analogous to segregation or even apartheid, triggering liberal moralities of compassion and social justice.

What are the policy implications of the polarizing influence of ideology on American attitudes toward Israel? Because America is a democracy, and our elected leaders are accountable to their constituents, the “electoral connection” ensures that American public opinion is a vital driver of U.S. foreign policy.74 I thus agree with Walter Russell Mead

73David M. Haugen, Susan Musser, and Kacy Lovelace, eds., The Middle East (Detroit, MI: Greenhaven Press, 2009), 73.
both that John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt are too reductionist in their narrow focus on American Jews and AIPAC as drivers of U.S. Middle East policy and that greater attention should be paid to the role of broader American opinion, especially that of the Christian majority.

But Michael Koplow errs not just when he asserts that American opinion on Israel is uniformly positive, but also when he promotes the influence of public opinion to the exclusion of other drivers of U.S. Middle East policy, asserting, for instance, that “pro-Israel lobbying does not drive policy decisions.” A more nuanced understanding of U.S. Middle East policymaking must be multicausal, including public opinion, vital lobbying groups such as AIPAC, CUFI, and J Street, as well as the roles of individual politicians (such as Tom DeLay, Newt Gingrich), media personalities (Mike Huckabee), religious leaders (Jerry Falwell, John Hagee), and even campaign donors (Sheldon Adelson). Thomas Friedman was onto something when he wrote in a March 2012 *New York Times* column that “the Israel lobby—both its Jewish and evangelical Christian wings—has never been more influential.” But that is not just “because of its ability to direct campaign contributions to supportive candidates.” It is also, this article maintains, because of the “electoral connection”: politicians both represent and respond to the policy preferences of the citizens who vote for them.

The influence of American opinion on Israel policy, however, is not uniform. As a result of gerrymandering and the ongoing ideological sorting of the American electorate, very few congressional races today are competitive. The only challenge most incumbents face comes from potential primary challengers within their own party. As a result, the “electoral connection” today does not mean that politicians heed the opinions of their average constituent. Instead, most politicians today seek the support of their primary voters—the ideological extremes of their parties.

These changes are reflected in the behavior of elected politicians. In the 1970s, partisanship does not appear to have been correlated with support for Israel in the U.S. Congress. By the turn of the twenty-first century, however, it became clear from bill sponsorship decisions that in the House

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and Senate, Republicans and conservatives had become the more outspoken supporters of Israel.78

A similar dynamic also plays out in presidential elections. During the 2008 and 2012 Republican primaries, many candidates sought to portray themselves as the most pro-Israel to appeal to highly conservative primary voters, who, this article has argued, are extremely pro-Israel. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mitt Romney, who was extremely pro-Israel and hawkish on Iran during the 2012 Republican primaries, tacked back to the center during the third and final presidential debate on foreign policy. At that point, Romney was competing with President Obama for undecided voters in the center. By stating that he supported sanctions against Iran, Romney hoped to neutralize Obama’s argument that Romney and the Republicans were warmongers who would lead the United States into a war with Iran.

More difficult to explain is why Democratic elites are also far to the right on Middle East policy. The Chicago Council’s 2008 survey data revealed that Main Street liberals then (50°) felt 17° cooler toward Israel than conservatives did (67°), differences that are consistent with our 2011 and their 2010 survey data.79 So if the average Democratic voter then was ambivalent toward Israel, why did we not hear more from the 2008 Democratic primary candidates about a balanced approach to resolving the Arab–Israeli issue?

It could be that the more ambivalent nature of liberal opinion on Israel made it harder for lobbying groups such as J Street and politicians such as Jimmy Carter and the late George McGovern to mobilize liberal support for a two state solution. But other factors could play a role as well. Jews, while a tiny portion of the U.S. population overall, represent a larger proportion of the much smaller pool of Democratic primary voters, especially in swing states such as Florida. American Jews also represent a surprisingly large percentage of Democratic campaign volunteers and donors.80 It may also be that the Middle East is an area where Democratic politicians seek to neutralize Republican claims that Democrats are soft on national security.

Many Republican politicians today appear to be representing the extreme pro-Israel views of their core constituents—very conservative primary voters. It is Democratic elites that may be more disconnected from

79$F\left(1, 441\right) = 35.50, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .08$. ANCOVA controlled for age, gender, income, and education.
80Spector, Evangelicals and Israel, 245.
their core constituents, adopting more pro-Israel and anti-Arab positions than their liberal primary voters, who our survey reveals are ambivalent toward Israel and sympathetic toward the Palestinians and Muslims.

By demonstrating that American opinion on the Middle East is divided along ideological lines, I hope that this article has shown that the dominance of the right wing of the Israel lobby today does not represent the subversion of the democratic process by a Jewish elite; it is instead the natural product of an American electoral system that increasingly represents and responds to the extreme ends of Main Street American opinion.

APPENDIX A: 2011 SURVEY ITEM WORDING

Cultural traditionalism ($\alpha = .77$). “Conventionalism” or “traditionalism” subscale of right wing authoritarianism (RWA).$^{81}$ All items on 7-point scales.

- There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. (reverse coded)
- This country will flourish if young people stop experimenting with drugs, alcohol, and sex, and focus on family values.
- There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. (reverse coded)

Communitarianism-libertarianism ($\alpha = .68$). All items on 7-point scales.

- American society has swung too far toward individual rights at the expense of social responsibilities. (reverse coded)
- Individual rights are more important than the good of the group.
- Individuals should be free to follow their own dreams in their own ways, without interference from government.
- Government must limit our individual freedoms so as to prevent unchecked selfishness, greed, and immorality. (reverse coded)

Social dominance ($\alpha = .61$) Items from group dominance subscale of social dominance orientation (SDO).$^{82}$ All items on 7-point scales.

- Inferior groups should stay in their place.
- It’s probably a BAD thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom. (reverse coded)
- Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.


Religiosity ($\alpha = .86$) Three items were on 5, 7, and 4-point scales, respectively, so were standardized prior to averaging. Item wordings from Pew.

- Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?
- People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services, how often do you pray?
- How important is religion in your life?

Warmth toward Israel ($\alpha = .88$) Last item was on an 11-point scale, so all three items were standardized prior to averaging.

- I feel admiration/respect toward Israel.
- I feel irritated/annoyed by Israel. (reverse coded)
- On a 0 to 100° feeling thermometer, with 0° meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, 50° meaning neither warm nor cold, and 100° meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, how do you feel about the following countries? . . . Israel

Tougher Israel policy ($\alpha = .88$) All items on 7-point scales.

- The U.S. government should implement a more severe and uncompromising policy toward Israel.
- Our government should adopt a more supportive and obliging foreign policy toward Israel. (reverse coded)
- Should the U.S. government adopt friendlier or tougher foreign policies toward the following countries? . . . Israel

### APPENDIX B: INDIRECT EFFECT STATISTICS FOR FIGURE 2

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*Bias corrected with 1,000 bootstrapped samples.

**ns** = path is not statistically significant; also italicized.