LIBERALS, CONSERVATIVES, AND LATIN AMERICA

How Ideology Divides Americans over Immigration and Foreign Aid

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Abstract: Based on an original US survey, this article argues that, on average, US conservatives today feel substantially cooler toward Latin American countries than liberals do. They also desire massively tougher Mexico border policies and much less foreign aid than liberals do. Averages can hide substantial differences within groups, however. Not all liberals and conservatives are alike, and their differences shape attitudes toward Latin America. For instance, our survey reveals that libertarians and economic conservatives oppose foreign aid to places like Haiti out of a belief in the Protestant ethic of self-help and opposition to income redistribution. Communitarians and economic liberals, by contrast, are more supportive of foreign aid to Haiti. Cultural conservatives fear the impact of Mexican immigration on Christian values and a WASP American national identity more than cultural liberals do. But race and racism continue to divide Americans the most consistently in their attitudes and policy preferences toward Latin America. The policy implications of ideologically divided public opinion for US immigration reform are also addressed.

“You can come out of the shadows,” President Barack Obama declared in a prime-time address on November 20, 2014. He was speaking to the mostly Hispanic unauthorized immigrants who would be given social security cards under his new executive order.

“By ignoring the will of the American people, President Obama has cemented his legacy of lawlessness,” then House Speaker John Boehner responded. “Our allegiance lies with the American people. We will listen to them.”

Elite partisanship in the United States over issues like immigration is well known. But what do average Americans think? Is Boehner right that that they uniformly share his opposition to Obama’s immigration reforms? Or is Main Street also divided, so that liberal and conservative Americans differ in their feelings toward Latin America and their policy preferences over regional issues like immigration and foreign aid?

Since the publication of The American Voter over fifty years ago (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960), scholars of American public opinion have largely held that while political and media elites are polarized ideologically, the broad American public is not; it is “innocent” of ideology (e.g., Converse 1964; Wood and Oliver 2012, 637) and “disconnected” from polarized elites (e.g., Fiorina 2009). In this predominant view, ideology does not systematically constrain the political
attitudes and behaviors of any but the most politically attentive American citizens. On domestic issues, the American public is often depicted as nonideological and moderate. For instance, Stanford’s Morris Fiorina claims, “The simple truth is that there is no culture war in the United States” (Fiorina, with Abrams and Pope 2011). Regarding international issues, political scientist Benjamin Page (with Bouton 2006, 95–96) and pollster Andrew Kohut (and Stokes 2006, 218) dismissed the influence of ideology on international attitudes in separate 2006 books based on Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) and Pew Research Center surveys, two major sources of representative national data on the global views of the American people. While acknowledging partisan differences over immigration, the Chicago Council (2012, 49, 4) has similarly claimed that the media’s focus on popular polarization is “exaggerated,” as Main Street “Republicans and Democrats rarely disagree” over global affairs (for a critique, see Gries 2014b).

Based on a reexamination of existing surveys and the analysis of an original 2011 national survey, this article argues that these political scientists and pollsters have misinterpreted the public opinion data: the US public does possess coherent ideologies that divide them in their domestic and international attitudes. Specifically, American liberals and conservatives today are remarkably riven in their broad attitudes toward Latin America and policy preferences on regional issues like immigration and foreign aid. Differences in cultural, socioracial, economic, and political ideologies contribute to the large divide between liberals and conservatives over Latin America. The article also suggests—but cannot prove—that many of these ideological cleavages revealed in the 2011 survey data have deep historical roots. Divisions among the American people over Latin America are nothing new.

The article begins with an introduction to our new survey, followed by a presentation of the survey’s main empirical finding of consistent and substantial ideological differences in the American public’s attitudes toward Latin America and regional issues. It then introduces four dimensions of American ideology that suggest specific drivers of overall liberal-conservative differences over Latin America. The next three sections utilize these four dimensions of American ideology to interrogate three specific issues over which non-Hispanic white Americans disagree. First, when it comes to general warmth toward Latin American countries, among whites it is differing attitudes toward proper race relations that matter most. Of our four ideological dimensions, only social dominance orientation is associated with feelings toward three Latin American countries, and differing liberal and conservative moralities of compassion and authority undergird this ideological cleavage. Second, white conservative preferences for tougher Mexico border policies are partially explained by white conservatives’ greater average social dominance, but also by their greater average cultural traditionalism. The survey data reveal that cultural conservatives fear the impact of Mexican immigration on Christian values and a WASP (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant) American national identity more than cultural liberals do. Third, among whites, three of the four ideological dimensions mediate the relationship between ideology and aid for Haiti preferences: socioracial, economic, and political ideologies all contribute to a greater average conservative than liberal desire to limit aid. The article then briefly explores how the views of Hispanic Americans and African Americans to-
ward Latin America differ from those of their white compatriots. The conclusion addresses the policy implications of these ideological differences for immigration reform in the United States.

SURVEY METHODS

We hired the Palo Alto, California, survey research company YouGov to implement a national US Internet survey in spring 2011. Internet surveys are no longer limited to convenience samples; the Internet is now regularly used by major research organizations like the American National Election Surveys (ANES) to gather nationally representative samples of the US population. To study sensitive issues like prejudice, having participants take surveys in private on the Internet has major advantages over telephone or face-to-face surveys completed in public.

YouGov used a sample-matching methodology (see Ansolabehere and Rivers 2013) to generate a representative national sample of one thousand respondents for our survey, first matching them on gender, age, race, education, party identification, ideology, and political interest, and then weighting the final data set to match the full US general population on age, gender, race, education, and religion.

There are two major reasons why a new survey was needed. First, to our knowledge, existing national surveys have largely explored either ideology or international attitudes. The General Social Survey (GSS) and ANES have measured American ideology for decades but rarely ask questions about international affairs. By contrast, the Chicago Council, Pew, and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) have been asking questions about international affairs for years but rarely ask many questions about ideology. By combining these two types of questions within a single survey, we create a data set that provides new leverage to explore how ideology shapes the American public’s attitudes toward Latin America.

Second, improving the internal and external validity of our survey was necessary to allow the full extent of the relationships among our variables to fully emerge. Survey research in political science and psychology is marked by complementary strengths and weaknesses. Political science surveys are better at representative sampling than at measurement. Psychological surveys are the opposite, better at measurement than sampling. Our combined survey design sought to benefit from the strengths of each discipline while avoiding their weaknesses.

When psychologists limit themselves to university student samples, the external validity of the mean responses to any survey question is poor, as the samples are not representative of the full US population. Range restriction can also reduce the size of the observed associations among variables. For example, because most university students are about the same in age and education level, it is difficult to ascertain the true extent of any associations between age or education and any other variable using a student sample.

Political science surveys, for their part, can suffer from high measurement error, leading to type II errors, or false negatives. They often rely on single questions with limited response options. While single, dichotomous questions are fine for some substantive opinions—“Do you plan to vote for Barack Obama or
Mitt Romney?—they are insufficient to capture more complex ideologies and (international) attitudes. Single item measures can decrease the observed associations among such concepts as more error and less “true score” variation is captured and correlated (see Osterlind 2006). And binary response categories, such as whether current levels of immigration are “good” or “bad” for the country, fail to capture the nuances of complex attitudes toward immigration. They also limit the variation necessary to ensure that the full extent of the associations among variables can become apparent. In short, measures of low internal reliability and insufficient variability have often produced low or inconsistent associations between ideology and international attitudes in existing political science surveys, contributing to the many false negatives in the extant literature.

Poor question wording also plagues many existing US public opinion surveys, distorting our understanding of the role of ideology in American politics (Gries 2016). For instance, for decades ANES and GSS have measured ideology by asking respondents to place themselves on a seven-point scale from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative.” To be “extreme” is not normatively desirable, however. This has pushed respondents away from the edges of the distribution. In 2010 ANES substituted “very” for “extreme,” while also reporting the results from Knowledge Network’s public profile ideology question, which retained the “extreme” wording. While only 7.4 percent of their respondents were willing to describe themselves as “extremely” liberal or conservative, 18.4 percent of the very same respondents were willing to describe themselves as “very” liberal or conservative. “Extreme” even swelled the numbers of respondents choosing the neutral (4) position, from 30.9 percent to 38.1 percent, likely because of a negative exemplar effect: some people may associate “extremely liberal” and “extremely conservative” with people they find distasteful, like Bill Maher or Rush Limbaugh, and so distance themselves from any ideology. In short, a poor choice of diction—“extremely”—has artificially reduced dispersion from the mean, producing a moderate picture of the US ideological landscape for decades.1

By combining the best of political science (sampling) and psychological (measurement) survey methods, we hope to overcome these problems, providing a more accurate picture of the relationship between American ideologies and attitudes toward Latin America.

LIBERALS, CONSERVATIVES, AND LATIN AMERICA

In our YouGov survey, the average American felt cool to tepid toward Mexico (40°), Haiti (44°), and Brazil (52°), located in North America, the Caribbean, and South America respectively. The Chicago Council (2010, 60) reported 46° and 56° mean feelings toward Mexico and Brazil a year earlier. This is consistently a few degrees higher than our figures, likely because their feeling thermometer asked

1. While the means are similar, the standard deviation for the “very” wording ($M = 4.31, SD = 1.69$) is larger than with the “extremely” wording ($M = 4.27, SD = 1.45$). Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for differences between distributions, goodness-of-fit $= 1.90, p < .001$. Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance $= 39.17, p < .001$. 

for assessments of both “countries and peoples,” while ours asked solely about “countries.” This Chicago Council replication nonetheless gives us greater confidence in the external validity of our YouGov survey.

These mean scores, however, hide consistent and substantial ideological differences among Americans in their feelings toward these three Latin American countries. As displayed in figure 1, liberals felt 22° warmer than conservatives did toward both Haiti (55° vs. 33°) and Brazil (62° vs. 40°), and a full 30° warmer toward Mexico (54° vs. 24°), differences that ranged from medium/large to large/very large statistically. This is consistent with the Chicago Council’s 2010 data, in which liberals felt 12° and 19° warmer than conservatives did toward Brazil and Mexico, respectively.2 Liberals, in short, felt lukewarm to warm toward these Latin American countries, while conservatives felt cool to downright frigid toward them.

These stark ideological differences extend beyond diffuse feelings of warmth and coolness to specific emotions. Princeton social psychologist Susan Fiske (2012) argues that assessments of the intentions (based on feelings of warmth or friendliness) and capabilities (competence, strength) of other social groups to-

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2. $F(1, 997) = 31.67, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .03$ and $F(1, 440) = 50.14, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .10$ for Brazil and Mexico (2010 CCGA Q45) respectively. Both ANCOVA control for age, gender, education, income, and being black, Hispanic, and from the US South. Data from University of Oklahoma YouGov survey, 2011.
gether predict specific intergroup emotions. Her stereotype content model predicts that we will feel compassion for social groups that we perceive as friendly but incompetent, such as the elderly or the disabled. But we will dislike groups that we may feel are hostile and incompetent, such as drug addicts. Anticipating that all Americans would view Mexico as a relatively weak, incompetent country, but would differ systematically by ideology in their warmth toward Mexico, we included two additional 1–7 disagree-agree items in our survey:

- I feel compassion/sympathy toward Mexico.
- I dislike Mexico.

As expected, liberals scored vastly higher than conservatives did on feeling compassion for Mexico, while conservatives scored vastly higher than liberals on disliking Mexico.3

The large ideological impact on both general and specific feelings toward Latin American countries, furthermore, had policy consequences. On a 1–7 “much friendlier” to “much tougher” rating scale, the average conservative desired substantially tougher foreign policies toward Haiti and Brazil and a massively tougher Mexico policy than the average liberal did.4

We also measured two specific policy issues: Mexican border policy and aid to Haiti. To explore public attitudes toward immigration from Mexico today, we included two 1–7 disagree-agree items in our 2011 survey:

- The U.S. needs to improve its border security to prevent illegal immigration from Mexico.
- We do NOT need to tighten security along the Mexican border. (reverse coded)5

As the white bars in figure 2 reveal, the average conservative (a remarkable 6.6 out of 7) desired a vastly tighter Mexico border than did the average liberal (M = 4.2).

To examine popular American attitudes toward foreign aid to Latin America today, we included two questions in our April 2011 survey about a real world crisis. In January 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck the most populated area of Haiti, just west of the capital Port-au-Prince. Hundreds of thousands of Haitians were killed and over a million made homeless. The ongoing tragedy was a major media story in the United States, so we decided to measure attitudes toward helping Haiti with two items:

- Our government should provide more aid and assistance to Haiti. (reverse coded)
- We should NOT provide more aid to Haiti.6

3. F (1, 419) = 111.38, p < .001, ηp² = .21 and F (1, 419) = 136.33, p < .001, ηp² = .25 for compassion and dislike respectively. Both ANCOVA control for seven standard demographics: age, gender, education, income, and being Black, Hispanic, and from the US South.

4. Foreign policy preferences toward Haiti: F (1, 419) = 26.67, p < .001, ηp² = .06; Brazil: F (1, 419) = 35.41, p < .001, ηp² = .08; Mexico: F (1, 419) = 141.63, p < .001, ηp² = .25, controlling for seven standard demographics.

5. After reverse coding the second item, the two were averaged together, forming a two item scale of excellent internal reliability, α = .88.

6. These two items also cohered very well, α = .87.
As the dark bars in figure 2 reveal, conservatives ($M = 5.1$) were much more opposed to increased aid to Haiti than were liberals ($M = 3.2$). This country specific finding is consistent with data from the Chicago Council’s 2010 survey, which asked half of its respondents whether they favored or opposed the following generalized forms of assistance:

- Food and medical assistance to people in needy countries.
- Aid that helps needy countries develop their economies.
- Aid to help farmers in needy countries become more productive.

Liberals were 12 percent, 26 percent, and 25 percent more likely than conservatives to favor these three types of foreign aid, respectively.

AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES

This persistent pattern of large overall liberal-conservative differences in American feelings toward Latin America and policy preferences on regional issues is undergirded by many of the same ideological cleavages that divide American liberals and conservatives today over domestic issues like affirmative action, abortion, and taxation.

Not all liberals and conservatives are alike. While the unidimensional liberal-conservative self-placement scale that survey researchers have used for decades is
extremely useful (e.g., Jost 2006), political scientists have increasingly recognized its limits. “Parsimony is a desirable goal in science,” Stanley Feldman and Chris John Johnson (2014, 353) argue. “However, this must be balanced against the need for an accurate description of social phenomena. A unidimensional model of ideology . . . does not do justice to the ways in which people actually organize their political beliefs.” Shawn Treier and Sunshine Hillygus (2009, 680) similarly argue that “the belief systems of the mass public are multidimensional.” Many Americans, they rightly note, hold liberal views on some issues and conservative views on others.

We decided to explore whether American ideology could be usefully understood across not just two dimensions but four: cultural, socioracial, economic, and political. This analytic approach is consistent with commonsense understandings of the main issues that divide liberals and conservatives in the United States today. For instance, in a review of scholarship on American conservatism, Kim Phillips-Fein (2009, 727) argues that most historians believe that “its central concerns included anti-communism, a laissez-faire approach to economics, opposition to the civil rights movement, and commitment to traditional sexual norms.” In our terms, these refer precisely to the political, economic, socioracial, and cultural dimensions of American ideology, respectively. Liberals, by contrast, on average tend to counter libertarian individualism and anticommunism with a greater communitarian concern for the public good. On economics, liberals tend to favor more regulation of the market and redistribution of income than conservatives do. On social issues, liberals generally decry racism and support the civil rights movement. And on cultural issues, many liberals oppose a return to traditional sexual and religious norms in favor of a more modern and tolerant approach to morality.

**Cultural ideology** was measured using three items \(\alpha = .77\) from the “conventionalism” (Altemeyer 1996) or “traditionalism” (Duckitt et al. 2010) facet of Bob Altemeyer’s right-wing authoritarianism (RWA, 1996) scale:

1. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. (reverse coded)
2. This country will flourish if young people stop experimenting with drugs, alcohol, and sex, and focus on family values.
3. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. (reverse coded)

**Socioracial ideology** was measured using three items \(\alpha = .61\) from the group dominance subscale of Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto’s (1999) social dominance orientation (SDO) scale:

1. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
2. It’s probably a BAD thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom. (reverse coded)
3. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.

**Economic ideology** was measured with three items \(\alpha = .81\) we created exploring attitudes toward income inequality:

1. Differences between high and low incomes should remain as they are.
2. The government should decrease income differences. (reverse coded)
3. Class differences should be smaller than they are today. (reverse coded)
Finally, political ideology was measured with four items we created ($\alpha = .68$) assessing communitarian–libertarian beliefs:

1. American society has swung too far toward individual rights at the expense of social responsibilities. (reverse coded)
2. Individual rights are more important than the good of the group.
3. Individuals should be free to follow their own dreams in their own ways, without interference from government.
4. Government must limit our individual freedoms so as to prevent unchecked selfishness, greed, and immorality. (reverse coded)

In a simultaneous multiple regression controlling for seven standard demographic variables—age, gender, education, income, race, ethnicity, and region—cultural ($\beta = .41$), socioracial ($\beta = .12$), economic ($\beta = .37$), and political ($\beta = .12$) (all $p < .001$) ideologies each contributed statistically significant unique variance to the standard unidimensional measure of liberal-conservative ideology, together accounting for a remarkable half of its variation ($R^2 = .49$). Our four dimensions of American ideology are not just internally reliable and uniquely predictive of overall liberal-conservative ideology, however; we shall see that each also possesses predictive validity, uniquely accounting for disparate attitudes and policy preferences toward Latin America.

RACE, RACISM, AND LATIN AMERICA

Conflicting visions of proper race relations have long shaped American views of Latin America. “Color-conscious Americans” in the nineteenth century, historian Michael Hunt (2009, 59) argues, were horrified by “the wholesale miscegenation that had further blacked [Latinos] both literally and figuratively. With appalling freedom, white Spaniards had mixed with enslaved blacks and native Indians to produce degenerate mongrel offspring. This sexual license among the races set an example particularly disturbing to Americans dedicated to defending the color line at home.”

Other Americans, of course, opposed the “color line” at home and abroad. “The future, ladies and gentlemen, is going to be very different for this hemisphere from the past,” President Woodrow Wilson declared in 1913. “These states lying to the south of us, which have always been our neighbors, will now be drawn closer to us by . . . sympathy and understanding. . . . We must prove ourselves their friends and champions upon terms of equality and honor.” Wilson’s egalitarian vision of North-South relations would anticipate the “Good Neighbor Policy” that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt would champion two decades later. “The essential qualities of a true Americanism must be the same as those which constitute a good neighbor, namely, mutual understanding, and, through such understand-

8. If a $p$ value is not reported in this manuscript, it can be assumed to be less than .001. In other words, the likelihood that the observed relationship is actually due to chance is less than one in one thousand.
ing, a sympathetic appreciation of the other’s point of view,” Roosevelt declared to the Pan American Union in Washington, DC, on “Pan-American Day,” April 12, 1933. “Your Americanism and mine must be a structure built of confidence, cemented by a sympathy which recognizes only equality and fraternity” (both cited in Holden and Zolov 2011, 104–105, 134).

Racism against Latin Americans persisted, however. Opposition to Wilson’s League of Nations was often framed in terms of race. Speaking on the Senate floor on May 26, 1919, conservative Democrat James Reed of Missouri objected that Haiti, with its barbarous voodoo, would be treated as an equal to the United States: “These baby murderers, these creatures of the forest who sacrifice children to their idols, are to have a place in the council of nations, and their vote is to be the equal of the vote of the United States” (Luck 1999, 91). Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge also appealed to racial prejudices in opposing the league, which he argued would force immigrants into the United States, raising the problem of how to “maintain the purity of our race” (Luck 1999, 90, 91; emphasis added).

American debates over proper North-South race relations would persist during the Cold War. President John F. Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress in 1961 to promote liberty and equality in Latin America. But racism endured even within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. “I know my Latinos,” declared Thomas C. Mann, a Texan who served as US ambassador to Mexico and assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs in the 1960s. “They understand only two things—a buck in the pocket and a kick in the ass” (Hunt 2009, 166). Meanwhile, opponents of the civil rights movement at home opposed African independence movements as threatening to racial hierarchies in the American South. Segregationists like George Wallace praised the anticommunism of the white South African government while taking heart in the endurance of apartheid (Noer 2003, 145).

Our 2011 survey reveals that conflicting ideologies of race relations continue to divide non-Hispanic white Americans in their views of colored Latin America today. Of the four dimensions of American ideology we measured in our 2011 survey, only social dominance orientation—the desire that “inferior groups should stay in their place”—mediated the relationship between liberal-conservative ideology and white American feelings toward Mexico and Haiti.9 Mediation analyses explore the mechanisms or pathways through which two variables relate to one another.10 None of the four dimensions of American ideology mediated the relationship between ideology and warmth toward Brazil, but social dominance was by far the strongest, approaching marginal significance.11 Perhaps the much greater percentage of whites in Brazil (48 percent) than in Mexico (18 percent) or

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9. See “Ideology to warmth toward Mexico” and “Ideology to warmth toward Haiti” in the appendix for indirect effect statistics.
10. With cross-sectional survey data, however, we cannot be sure of the exact causal sequence. So the mediation analyses here are best understood as demonstrating “syndromes” of variables that go together, rather than as causal claims. On mediation, see Hayes 2013.
11. In a regression, $\beta = -.05, p = .19$; $\beta$ for the other three were .01 or less, with $p$ values all greater than .80.
Haiti (less than 5 percent) dilutes the influence of race on white American feelings toward Brazil today.

Put another way, cultural, economic, and political ideologies do not divide white Americans in their warmth toward Latin America. To take the latter example, ideological differences between US libertarians and communitarians over the individual and the state have no bearing on warmth toward Latin American countries. It is only the differences in socioracial ideology that divide supporters and opponents of minority civil rights at home that drive overall liberal-conservative differences over Latin America.

Why do liberals tend to score lower on social dominance than conservatives? Moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues have argued that while liberals tend to esteem the “individualizing” values of fairness and compassion more than conservatives do, conservatives tend to prize the “binding” values of loyalty, authority, and purity substantially more than liberals (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). We used the moral foundations questionnaire to measure each of these five values in our survey and found that three—fairness, compassion, and authority—uniquely mediated the relationship between self-identified liberal-conservative ideology and social dominance. Liberals are more likely than conservatives to value fairness and compassion, leading them to support greater equality among social and racial groups, while conservatives on average are much more likely than liberals to value authority, contributing to a greater average preference for social dominance—the maintenance of social hierarchies and the domination of subordinate socioracial groups. Differing views of fairness, compassion, and authority, in short, divide socioracial liberals and conservatives in their views of Latin America.

IDEOLOGIES OF IMMIGRATION

Americans have been debating immigration since colonial times. “The bosom of America is open to receive not only the Opulent and respectable Stranger,” President George Washington declared in 1783, “but the oppressed and persecuted of all Nations and Religions” (Fuchs 1990, 1). But by the mid-1850s, the nativist “Know Nothing Party,” whose membership was limited to white Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) males, targeted Catholic immigrants from Germany and Ireland. Beholden to the Pope in Rome, Catholics were seen as both treasonous and a threat to the republican values associated with Protestantism.

By the early twentieth century, southern and eastern Europeans dominated immigration to the United States. President Herbert Hoover, of German descent, was contemptuous of the more recent Italian immigrants. “Italians are predominantly murderers and bootleggers,” he wrote in anger to his fellow Republican Fiorella LaGuardia. “You Italians,” he wrote, “should go back to where you belong” (Fuchs 1990, 66).

Immigration into the United States over the last half century, however, has

12. See “Ideology to social dominance” in the appendix for indirect effect statistics.
been dominated by Mexicans and Latin Americans (see Weeks and Weeks 2009). Radio talk show host Rush Limbaugh, like Hoover of German descent, has targeted much of his nativism against Mexicans. “You’re a foreigner,” Limbaugh declared to Mexicans on his April 6, 2006, show. “You shut your mouth or you get out, and if you come here illegally, you go straight to jail and we’re going to hunt you down ‘til we find you.”

In a comprehensive review of the history of immigration to America, historian Lawrence Fuchs (1990) argues that three distinct ideas have dominated American debates over immigration, each of which he associates with an early American colony. The “Virginia idea,” based on the plantation economy and its need for manual labor, promoted immigration without assimilation, first of indentured servants from the Old World, and later of slaves from Africa. Even after the Civil War and slavery, businessmen continued to look to immigration to keep the cost of labor down. In 2012 former Republican Congressman and anti-immigration crusader Tom Tancredo of Colorado lamented that little has changed: “The Republican Party looks at massive immigration, legal and illegal, as a source of cheap labor, satisfying a very important constituency” (McIntyre 2007).

The “Pennsylvania idea” also welcomed immigration, but on the basis of equality. As President George Washington suggested, settlers would be welcome to live, speak, and worship as they pleased in an open and tolerant America. The Pennsylvania Germans, for instance, would not be forced to speak English.

Fuchs’s “Massachusetts idea,” by contrast, was more restrictive, limiting immigration to those willing to adhere to Puritanism. This assimilationist approach would later evolve into the view that only those willing to learn English and adopt WASP values should be allowed to immigrate to the United States. This nativist strain runs from the Know Nothing movement of the 1850s through President Hoover to Rush Limbaugh today.

What best explains the massive difference between liberals and conservatives over Mexico border policy today? We ran a pair of mediation analyses on our non-Hispanic white subsample and found that, of the four dimensions of ideology that we measured, only social and cultural ideology mediated the relationship; of the five moral values, only compassion and authority did so. Figure 3 combines these four mediators into a single path model. It reveals that differences in social dominance orientation and cultural traditionalism (the top and bottom right), undergirded by differing moralities of compassion and authority (top and bottom left), together accounted for a remarkable three-quarters of the direct effect of overall liberal to conservative ideology on Mexico border policy preferences. Economic and political ideologies, in short, are largely irrelevant; it is social and cultural ideologies, undergirded by differing moralities of compassion and au-

15. Direct effect reduced from 20 percent (semipartial correlation = .45) to just 5 percent (semipartial correlation = .22).
authority, which best account for the massive overall disagreement between US liberals and conservatives over Mexico border policy.

The indirect path at the top of figure 3 reveals that liberals are more likely than conservatives to buy into the open and tolerant Pennsylvania idea of immigration. Moderately more compassionate than conservatives ($\beta = -0.19$), liberals are more likely to prefer the equality of different social and racial groups ($\beta = -0.29$), contributing to their greater opposition to tighter border security ($\beta = 0.14$).

Our 2011 survey data thus suggest that on average liberals feel greater compassion for the suffering of Hispanic immigrants, contributing to their greater opposition to social dominance and desire for a more relaxed border policy. But why didn’t fairness emerge as a third moral value mediating the relationship between ideology and border policy preferences? A closer look at our data suggests that fairness was not statistically significant because both liberals and conservatives view the border issue as one of fairness, but from opposing perspectives that cancel each other out: liberals see the issue as unfair from the perspective of vulnerable immigrants, while non-Hispanic white conservatives view it as unfair from the perspective of vulnerable white Americans.

Among the self-identified non-Hispanic white conservatives in our data set ($n = 158$), valuing fairness predicts support for tougher border policies ($\beta = 0.15, p = 0.05$). Lending anecdotal support to this statistical finding, conservative anti-immigration advocates chose to name their organization “FAIR,” the Federation for American Immigration Reform. Similarly, the 2012 Republican Party Platform (GOP 2012, 26) opposes amnesty and advocates tougher immigration policies on the grounds of fairness, both to legal immigrants and to American workers: “When Americans need jobs, it is absolutely essential that we protect them from illegal labor in the workplace.”
If the moral value of loyalty is allowed to mediate the relationship between fairness and tougher border policy preferences for all whites, however, the direct relationship goes from statistically insignificant ($\beta = -0.03, p = .44$) to both significant and negative ($\beta = -0.12, p = .001$). In other words, if you pull loyalty (which conservatives value more than liberals) out of the relationship between fairness and immigration policy, what’s left is a liberal conception of fairness from the perspective of the immigrant, which opposes tougher border policies. Many social liberals oppose tougher immigration policies out of compassion and a sense of injustice/fairness from the perspective of the immigrant, a perspective that conservatives are likely to view as disloyal.

The 2011 survey data also suggest that cultural conservatives are more likely than cultural liberals to buy into the more restrictive Massachusetts idea of immigration, supporting forced assimilation, as the indirect path at the bottom of figure 3 reveals. Much more concerned about maintaining authority and public order than liberals ($\beta = .44$), conservatives are more likely to support both racial hierarchies ($\beta = .19$) and cultural traditionalism ($\beta = .27$), both of which contribute to desires for tougher Mexico border policies ($\beta = .14$ and .13 respectively).

Opponents of immigration frequently warn of a breakdown of public order. “The People of California,” the ballot initiative Proposition 187 declared in 1994, “have suffered and are suffering personal injury and damage caused by the criminal conduct of illegal aliens in this state” (Holden and Zolov 2011, 348). More recently, following Obama’s November 2014 directive on immigration reform, Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) predicted that “The country’s going to go nuts. . . . You . . . could see instances of anarchy. . . . You could see violence” (Page 2014).

For many white cultural conservatives, immigration is not just a threat to law and order; immigrants also threaten WASP cultural values. Hispanic immigration “threatens to divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages,” Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington (2004, 33) has famously lamented, because he believes that Hispanics reject “Anglo-Protestant values.”

The “English as the official language” movement seems motivated by a similar desire to protect WASP American culture from foreign contamination. For instance, while campaigning for the Republican presidential nomination in March 2012, Rick Santorum declared that Puerto Rico must adopt English as its official language to become a US state. For those whites who scored high on the cultural traditionalism scale, a tougher border policy is needed not just to protect Americans from Mexican gangs and violence but to protect our WASP national identity.

Figure 3 thus reveals two distinct ideological pathways to Mexico border policy preferences. Social psychologists John Duckitt and Chris Sibley (2007) have shown that while both social dominance and cultural traditionalism predict prejudice, they are driven by distinct psychological dynamics. Conservatives high in social dominance orientation view the social world as a competitive jungle, so they seek to maintain group dominance. Those high in cultural traditionalism, by contrast,
tend to view the world as a dangerous place requiring the vigorous defense of traditional values. Both sociocultural and cultural ideologies, our 2011 survey data reveal, contribute substantially to the massively greater average conservative than liberal support for tougher Mexico border policies. Aid to Haiti, we will see in the next section, triggers a very different mix of American ideologies.

IDEOLOGIES OF FOREIGN AID

During the Cold War, both Republican and Democratic political elites supported aid to Latin America to avert the spread of communism. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy of nonintervention was replaced by a more active US role in the region. “There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that revolution is inevitable in Latin America. The people are angry. They are shackled to the past with bonds of ignorance, injustice, and poverty,” Milton Eisenhower, the president’s brother and roving ambassador for Latin America, wrote in 1963 in The Wine is Bitter. “The United States has a crucial role in this drama. Our aid can be decisive in helping Latin Americans build better institutions, increase income, and purge injustice from their society. We must be swift and generous” (Holden and Zolov 2011, 241–242).

The Kennedy and Johnson administrations continued this foreign aid policy. “Throughout Latin America . . . millions of men and women suffer the daily degradations of poverty and hunger,” John F. Kennedy declared in 1961 (cited in Holden and Zolov 2011, 222). “Therefore I have called on all people of the hemisphere to join in a new Alliance for Progress . . . to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools.”

With the end of the Cold War and a reduced need to combat communism, however, elite partisan divisions over foreign aid have reemerged. The 2012 Democratic Party platform states, “Together with the American people and the international community, we will continue to respond to humanitarian crises around the globe.” The 2012 Republican Party platform (GOP 2012, 45–46), by contrast, argues for “limiting foreign aid spending” in favor of private charity work.

These elite partisan divisions over foreign aid reflect attitudinal differences between Main Street liberals and conservatives, as seen in figure 2 on aid to Haiti. How is this cleavage in US public opinion best understood? Three of our four dimensions of American ideology were statistically significant mediators of the relationship between liberal to conservative ideology and preferences regarding aid to Haiti (see figure 4). Together, they accounted for over 80 percent of the direct relationship.17

First, we have already seen that social dominance orientation helped account for overall liberal-conservative differences in feelings toward Mexico and Haiti, and Mexican border policy preferences. It is thus not surprising that, as shown in the second path in figure 4, much greater average conservative group dominance ($\beta = .37$) also contributes to a desire for less aid for a Haiti ($\beta = .19$).

17. Inclusion of the four mediators reduced the direct effect from 13.7 percent (semipartial correlation $= .37$) to just 2.6 percent (semipartial correlation $= .16$).
Second, the third path in figure 4 reveals that vastly greater average conservative than liberal opposition to income redistribution ($\beta = .64$) also helps account for greater average conservative than liberal opposition to humanitarian aid to Haiti ($\beta = .17$). In *The Revolution*, Ron Paul (2008, 99) argues, “Morally, I cannot justify the violent seizure of property from Americans in order to redistribute that property to a foreign government.” From Paul’s perspective, economic redistribution is immoral, in part because it violates the Protestant ethic of self-help.

Anticipating that it might be important for understanding liberal-conservative differences, our survey measured the Protestant ethic with two items:

1. People are responsible for their own situation in life.
2. People should not count on others to solve their problems.

Averaged together, these items mediated the relationship between liberal-conservative ideology and support for economic inequality, accounting for close to a third of the direct relationship.\(^{18}\) From the perspective of economic conservatives, it seems, Haitians should be allowed to stand alone and help themselves.

Third, the bottom path in figure 4 reveals that their greater average libertarianism ($\beta = .25$) also helps account for greater conservative than liberal opposition to

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\(^{18}\) Direct effect reduced from 36 percent (semi-partial correlation = .6) to 25 percent (semi-partial correlation = .5). Indirect effect via the Protestant Ethic, PE = .1248, 95 percent CI from 0.0806 to 0.1721.
helping Haiti (β = .10). Echoing libertarian economist Friedrich Hayek’s skepticism about state intervention, Bill O’Reilly (2006, 111) declared in *Culture Warrior* that “no government can impose prosperity or benign thinking on masses of people. It is simply impossible.” Foreign aid, from this libertarian perspective, is both normatively wrong and practically infeasible. The communitarian perspective, by contrast, is less skeptical about the efficacy of collective action to help others, contributing to greater average liberal support for increased aid to Haiti.

Fourth and finally, the top path of figure 4 reveals that while cultural traditionalism was significantly correlated with both conservatism (β = .59) and opposition to decreased aid for Haiti (β = −10), the combined indirect effect was not statistically significant (hence the dashed box outline). It is intriguing, however, that the negative sign of traditionalism’s effect on Haiti aid preferences was the opposite of the other three dimensions of ideology, suggesting a suppression effect. Indeed, when traditionalism is run as the sole mediator of the relationship between liberal-conservative ideology and aid to Haiti preferences among whites, the strength of the direct relationship slightly increases. So it appears that if it were not for the fact that conservatives on average maintain more traditionalist attitudes than liberals, conservative opposition to aid for Haiti might be even stronger.

A benign interpretation of this possible suppression effect involves Christian charity. While Habitat for Humanity may be associated with Jimmy Carter and mainline or liberal Christian denominations, many conservative Christians also support aiding the downtrodden, both at home and abroad. For instance, conservative Catholics, who might be high on traditionalism, disagreeing strongly with statements like, “There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse,” might also be strong supporters of the disaster relief and refugee resettlement work of religious groups like Catholic Charities.

The conservative anti-immigration group FAIR suggests a more malign interpretation of any suppression effect, however. “The era of mass international migration to the United States as a solution to international problems must come to an end,” FAIR declares on its website. “Problems of poverty and overpopulation must be vigorously confronted where people live, rather than . . . by . . . the importation of masses of people.” For some cultural conservatives, reducing immigration into the United States could be the real driver of a preference to provide aid to Haitians in Haiti. Supporting this interpretation, the moral value of purity mediates the relationship between liberal-conservative ideology and aid to Haiti, also suppressing the full impact of conservatism on opposition to helping Haiti. Fleeing poverty and political instability, Haitian immigrants had been entering the United States long before the 2010 earthquake. For some cultural conservatives, desires to maintain WASP purity by limiting black Haitian immigration into the United States could contribute to support for aid to Haitians in Haiti.

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21. Direct effect increases from β = .39 to β = .45 with the inclusion of purity as a mediator. Indirect effect PE = −.0873, 95 percent CI from −.1673 to −.0142. Whites only.
In short, differences in social, economic, and political ideologies all contribute to the much greater average liberal than conservative support for aid to Haiti among white Americans, but cultural ideology does not.

BLACK AND HISPANIC VIEWS OF LATIN AMERICA

American blacks and Hispanics, not surprisingly, maintain feelings and policy preferences toward different parts of Latin America that are distinct from those of both non-Hispanic white Americans and each other. For instance, while both blacks (β = .16) and Hispanics (β = .16) feel warmer than the overall American population toward Mexico, only Hispanics (β = −.10) oppose a tougher Mexican border policy. Indeed, African Americans support very slightly tougher Mexican border policies (β = .06, p = .04). Competition for jobs or concerns about the downward pressure that immigration places on wages may counteract black warmth toward Mexico. Among our black subsample (n = 110), only age (β = .53) and being from the South (β = .18, p = .03) predicted support for tougher border policies. Older African Americans, well established within their communities, may oppose immigration to protect their social status.22

By contrast, only blacks (β = .21) and not Hispanics (β = .004, p = .89) felt more warmly toward Haiti. And while blacks were very opposed to limiting aid to Haiti (β = −.29), Hispanics were only marginally opposed to it (β = −.05, p = .08).

Similarly, only blacks (β = .10) and not Hispanics (β = .01, p = .65) felt warmer than the overall US population toward Brazil. Perhaps because of the language barrier (Spanish vs. Portuguese) Hispanic-Americans may not identify with Brazilians mestizos, while language may not be an issue for African Americans who can identify positively with Afro-Brazilians. It is also possible that those Hispanic Americans originally from South America fear Brazilian regional hegemony.

Another possible interpretation of the lack of Hispanic American warmth toward Brazil has to do with gender and cultural traditionalism. Hispanic women (50°) felt 7° cooler toward Brazil than Hispanic men (57°) did.23 A mediation analysis revealed, however, that differences in cultural traditionalism accounted for this small-to-medium-sized gender difference.24 Hispanic women held more traditional attitudes toward nudity, sex, drugs, and alcohol than Hispanic men (β = −.24) did, contributing to much cooler feelings toward Brazil (β = −.56). This might be interpreted as a “Carnival” effect: rightly or wrongly, in the United States Brazil is associated with skimpy bikinis and hedonism. Hispanic American women could disdain Brazilian women as libertines or view them as competitors for Hispanic men.

How recently Hispanics in our 2011 sample had immigrated to the United States had a remarkably strong influence on their feelings toward Mexico. Our survey asked all respondents, “Which of these statements best describes you?”

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22. My thanks to an anonymous LARR reviewer for this interpretation.
23. Hispanics only: F(1, 133) = 3.95, p = .049, η² = .03, controlling for age, education, income, and region.
24. The direct effect of gender on warmth toward Brazil was reduced from β = .17 to statistical non-significance, β = −.02, p = .92. The indirect effect was statistically significant, PE = 2.68, 95 percent CI from 0.1535 to 7.735.
1. Immigrant citizen (naturalized) or non-citizen: I am an immigrant to the USA.
2. First generation: I was born in the USA but at least one of my parents is an immigrant.
3. Second generation: My parents and I were born in the USA but at least one of my grandparents was an immigrant.
4. Third generation: My parents, grandparents, and I were all born in the USA.

In our sample, 72 percent of the whites and 81 percent of the blacks chose “third generation,” resulting in skewed distributions of limited use for correlational analysis. But our Hispanic subsample \((n = 127)\) was remarkably well balanced across all four categories at 29 percent, 32 percent, 16 percent, and 23 percent, respectively. A regression analysis revealed that the more generations a Hispanic family had lived in the United States, the more coolly they felt toward Mexico, \(\beta = -.32\).

Intriguingly, this substantial generational effect on Hispanic American feelings toward Mexico would be even stronger if it were not for a suppression effect involving cultural ideology. When traditionalism is included as a mediator, the direct relationship between immigrant generation and feelings toward Mexico actually increases in absolute size, accounting for about a third more variance.\(^{25}\) This may be due to a secularizing influence of living in a family with longer residence in the United States. More generations in the United States is associated with reduced \((\beta = -.13)\) cultural traditionalism. And given that cultural traditionalism is a powerful predictor of coolness \((\beta = -.49)\) toward Mexico, the combined indirect effect is positive, the opposite of the direct effect, which was negative. In other words, more time in the United States contributes to Hispanic Americans becoming more culturally liberal, attenuating what would otherwise be an even cooler feeling toward Mexico among Hispanic Americans with more time in the United States.

THE MAIN STREET POLITICS OF US IMMIGRATION REFORM

Based on the first nationally representative survey to simultaneously measure both American ideologies and attitudes toward Latin America in depth, this article has argued that there is a profound ideological divide in Main Street America over Latin America. These findings are consistent with recent work revealing how ideology powerfully divides the American public in its attitudes and policy preferences toward China (Gries 2014a), Israel (Gries 2015), multilateralism (Rathbun 2012), and indeed American foreign policy more broadly (Gries 2014b).

This article further argues that the liberal-conservative divide over Latin America is driven by four distinct dimensions of American ideology. Libertarians and economic conservatives are more likely than communitarians and economic liberals to oppose foreign aid to places like Haiti out of a belief in the Protestant ethic of self-help, and opposition to income redistribution. Cultural conservatives are more likely than cultural liberals to fear the impact of Mexican immigration

\(^{25}\) Adding traditionalism as a mediator increases the direct relationship between immigration generation and feelings toward Mexico from 9 percent (semipartial correlation = −.30) to 14 percent (semipartial correlation = −.37). Indirect effect statistics: \(PE = 2.12, 95\text{ percent CI from 0.1934 to 4.858}\).
not only on law and order but also on Christian values and a WASP American national identity. But it is social dominance orientation that most consistently divides non-Hispanic white Americans over Latin America. Desires for order and the maintenance of racial hierarchies continue to cool social conservative views of the world south of the border, while social liberals warm to a Latin America where they extend their advocacy of racial equality.

Does this polarized public opinion matter? This final section explores US immigration reform as a case study of the policy implications of divided American public opinion over Latin America.

Following President Obama’s reelection in November 2012, Republican post-mortems focused on the Hispanic vote. Appealing to social and cultural conservative Republican primary voters, Mitt Romney had argued for making life so difficult for undocumented immigrants that they would pursue “self-deportation.” The Hispanic vote went 71 percent to Obama and just 27 percent to Romney. “If Republicans do not do better in the Hispanic community,” Republican Senator Ted Cruz of Texas warned, “in a few short years Republicans will no longer be the majority in our state.”

Our 2011 survey data suggest that a Republican Party makeover on immigration will be easier said than done. Conservatives on average felt a frigid 25° toward Mexico, and scored a full 6.6 on a 7-point scale tapping preferences for a tougher Mexico border policy. But the problem is even worse when we focus on the Republican primary voters that Republican congressmen and senators fear most. “Teavangelical” (Tea Party/Evangelical Christian) Republicans (24°), who are highly motivated to vote in Republican primaries, felt 12° cooler toward Mexico than did moderate Republicans (36°). Teavangelicals also desired a substantially tougher border policy than moderate Republicans.26

Efforts by moderate Republican elites to soften their party’s position on immigration are therefore likely to be met with hostility by the conservative primary voters who have become more influential with recent structural changes in the US electoral landscape. The vast majority of congressional districts today have become hyperpartisan and noncompetitive, solidly blue or red districts. Voters increasingly chose where to live based on their politics: liberals choose the two coasts and urban areas, while conservatives choose the heartland and suburban or rural areas. Americans cluster into communities of the like-minded (Bishop with Cushing 2008). This ideological self-sorting is exacerbated by gerrymandering, as the two parties manipulate district boundaries following each US Census.

Analyzing the fall 2012 elections, statistician Nate Silver (2012) estimates that just 8 percent of House districts today are competitive, while a remarkable 56 percent are “landslide districts” in which the presidential vote margin differed from the national result by over 20 percentage points. “Most members of the House now come from hyperpartisan districts where they face essentially no threat of losing their seat to the other party.” Deep blue and deep red are in; purple has become passé.

26. $F(1, 205) = 11.03, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .05$ and $F(1, 205) = 14.59, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .07$, respectively, controlling for seven standard demographics.
To keep their jobs, therefore, most US politicians today no longer need to cater to the “median voter” in their districts, let alone voters from the other party. Instead, their main job is to curry favor with the primary voters most likely to remove them from office—the most conservative and liberal slices of the American public.

Shannon O’Neil (2013, 165, 166–167) is right that US “policy towards Mexico has been caught in the crosshairs of deep political divides,” becoming “fodder for partisan skirmishes over immigration.” But she is likely overly optimistic when she sees an “opening to redefine US-Mexico relations” in recent surveys depicting the average American as moderate on issues like a border wall. Averages, we have seen, can hide deep cleavages. American liberals and conservatives are deeply divided on immigration, and because of recent changes in the American electoral landscape, it is the views of the ideological extremes that matter, not those of the average American.

Republican Speaker of the House Paul Ryan is therefore likely to have a tough time marshaling the Republican votes need to pass comprehensive immigration reform. Too many House Republicans represent deep red districts where compromise on immigration is abhorrent to conservative primary voters. To satisfy them and avoid being “primaried,” therefore, it seems likely that the majority of these House Republicans will continue to block comprehensive immigration reform.

### APPENDIX

**Appendix Table 1 Indirect effect statistics for mediation analyses**

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<th>Point estimate</th>
<th>95 percent Confidence Intervals*</th>
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(continued)
### Appendix Table 1 (continued)

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*Bias corrected with one thousand bootstrapped samples using Andrew Hayes’s PROCESS plugin for SPSS. Italicized paths were not statistically significant, ns. Non-Hispanic white subsample (N = 735) only.

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