The POLITICS of
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
How Ideology Divides Liberals and Conservatives over Foreign Affairs

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In a series of articles and a book on the Israel lobby, realist international relations theorists John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen Walt of Harvard argued in 2006–7 that America’s virtually unqualified support for Israel was damaging the U.S. national interest. “Now that the Cold War is over, Israel has become a strategic liability for the United States,” they argue. “Washington’s close relationship with Jerusalem makes it harder, not easier, to defeat the terrorists who are now targeting the United States.” America’s disastrous Middle East policy, they further contend, is best explained by the pernicious influence of the “Israel lobby” in Washington, especially the right-wing American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

The outraged response came fast and furious. Several former U.S. diplomats took it personally. Dennis Ross, who worked under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, insisted that “never in the time that I led the American negotiations on the Middle East peace process did we take a step because ‘the lobby’ wanted us to.” Princeton’s Aaron Friedberg, who served under Vice President Dick Cheney during the George W. Bush administration, was indignant: “Sadly, their argument here is not only unscientific, it is inflammatory, irresponsible, and wrong.”

Two Israelis hit back where it hurt most, arguing that U.S. Middle East policy was actually driven by a realist calculus. Shlomo Ben-Ami, former Israeli foreign minister, maintained that America’s Israel policy was grounded in “shared interests and considerations of realpolitik.” Historian Michael Oren, who would later become the Israeli ambassador to the United States, argued that “Arab oil (and not Israel) was America’s persistent focus in the Middle East.” Furthermore, U.S. “presidents have supported Israel for strategic and moral reasons, not political ones.”
Other critics turned their attention from K Street to Main Street. “In the United States, a pro-Israel foreign policy does not represent the triumph of a small lobby over the public will,” diplomatic historian Walter Russell Mead argued in *Foreign Affairs*. “It represents the power of public opinion.” Indeed, “the ultimate sources of the United States’ Middle East policy lie outside the Beltway and outside the Jewish community.” Specifically, U.S. Middle East policy cannot be understood apart from the long-standing but evolving Protestant American affinity for Israel.6

Mead is right that Mearsheimer and Walt err in reducing U.S. Middle East policy to an Israel lobby, especially one too focused on AIPAC and wealthy Jews.7 American foreign policies in the region should be understood within the context of broader American public opinion. But Mead goes a bit too far when he claims that support for Israel in the United States “commands broad public support.”8 Political scientist Michael Koplow certainly errs when he goes even further, asserting that support for Israel in the United States is “broad and deep” and even “crosscutting.”9

This chapter uses public opinion survey data to demonstrate that Americans are actually divided in their feelings and policy preferences towards Israel, Iran, the Palestinian people, and Muslims in general. While American conservatives today tend to feel quite warmly towards Israel, American liberals are more ambivalent and do not desire a friendlier Israel policy. The survey data suggests that Mead is more accurate when he acknowledges that “U.S. opinion on the Middle East is not monolithic.”10

**LIBERALS, CONSERVATIVES, AND THE MIDDLE EAST**

In our spring 2011 survey, the average American felt lukewarm (59°) towards Israel, cool towards “the Palestinian people” (41°) and “Muslims” (38°), and downright frigid towards Iran (19°). This is largely consistent with the 2010 Chicago Council survey, which found average feelings of 57°, 32°, and 27° towards Israel, the “Palestinian Authority,” and Iran, respectively.11 On Middle East policy, our 2011 survey also revealed that the median, or most typical, American was neutral about U.S. policy towards Israel, desiring it to be neither friendlier nor tougher. But the typical American did desire a “tougher” policy on Iran.

Ideology, however, systematically divides Americans in their feelings towards Middle Eastern countries and peoples (Figure 8.1). Conservatives (74°) felt 22° warmer towards Israel than liberals (52°) did. However, liberals felt 13°, 28°, and 32° warmer than conservatives towards Iran, the Palestinians, and Muslims, respectively. Data from both the 2009 Program on International Policy Attitudes and 2010 Chicago Council surveys replicate this robust pattern of ideological polarization; conservatives felt warmer than liberals towards Israel but cooler
towards Palestinians.\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, liberals reported feeling substantially more favorable towards the Palestinian people than conservatives did in a September 2011 CNN telephone poll.\textsuperscript{13}

Broad ideological differences in warmth were matched by differences in specific emotions. As noted in Chapter 7’s discussion of France, psychologist Susan Fiske’s stereotype content model predicts that we will admire or take pride in social groups that we perceive as both friendly and competent, such as Christians or the middle class. But we will envy or resent powerful groups whose intentions we suspect, such as rich businesspeople.\textsuperscript{14} Hypothesizing that all Americans would view Israel as a relatively powerful and competent country but would differ systematically by ideology in their warmth towards Israel, we included two additional items in our survey:

- \textit{I feel admiration/respect towards Israel.}
- \textit{I feel irritated/annoyed by Israel.}

As expected, conservatives greatly admired Israel and did not feel irritated by it; liberals, by contrast, were ambivalent, feeling neither admiration nor annoyance towards Israel. The ideological differences on both items were very large.\textsuperscript{15}

In addition to the Israel and Iran items in our fifteen-country “much friendlier” to “much tougher” foreign policy rating scale, our 2011 survey included two specific Israel policy items:
• The U.S. government should implement a more severe and uncompromising policy towards Israel.
• Our government should adopt a more supportive and obliging foreign policy towards Israel. (reverse coded)

Averaged together, the three Israel policy items formed a robust scale. American conservatives, it revealed, desired a vastly friendlier Israel policy—and a much tougher Iran policy—than liberals did. This is consistent with other surveys. In the 2011 CNN telephone poll mentioned above, 53 percent of liberals favored “the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” while only 26 percent of conservatives did. In a November 2011 CBS telephone poll, conservatives scored substantially higher than liberals on a four-point assessment of Israel, from “enemy” to “unfriendly” to “friendly but not an ally” to “ally.”

What best explains this consistent pattern of ideological differences in how Americans view the Middle East? This chapter will argue that while all four dimensions of American ideology contribute to liberal-conservative differences in feelings and policy preferences towards Israel, the Palestinians, Muslims, and Iran, it is differences in cultural and social ideology, along with nationalism, that matter the most. Differences in biblical literalism between cultural conservatives and cultural liberals contribute to their very different feelings and policy preferences towards both Israel and the Muslim world. And differences in social dominance orientation divide liberals and conservatives in their views of the Arab-Israeli conflict. A conservative morality of authority contributes to a view of Israel as the David and the surrounding Muslim world as the Goliath. Liberal moralities of compassion and justice, by contrast, contribute to a view of the Palestinians as the David resisting an oppressive Israeli Goliath. Finally, conservatives’ greater nationalism contributes to greater conservative than liberal warmth towards Israel and desires for tougher Iran policies.

The chapter begins with a brief overview of the history of American engagement with Jews, Muslims, and the Middle East. It then turns to an analysis of our 2011 survey data, exploring how liberal-conservative differences on Israel policy are driven by differences in their feelings towards both Israel and the Palestinians, as well as differences in biblical literalism, libertarianism, and social dominance orientation. The final section explores how nationalism divides American liberals and conservatives in both their feelings towards Israel and their Iran policy preferences.
“We Americans are the peculiar, chosen people—the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world.”
—Herman Melville, 1850

“The Egyptian, the Babylonian, and the Persian rose, filled the planet with sound and splendor, then faded to dream-stuff and passed away; the Greek and the Roman followed, and made a vast noise, and they are gone; other peoples have sprung up and held their torch high for a time, but it burned out, and they sit in twilight now, or have vanished. The Jew saw them all, beat them all, and is now what he always was, exhibiting no decadence, no infirmities of age, no weakening of his parts, no slowing of his energies, no dulling of his alert and aggressive mind. All things are mortal but the Jew; all other forces pass, but he remains. What is the secret of his immortality?”
—Mark Twain, 1899

The first Jews to arrive in North America landed on Manhattan Island in September 1654. New Netherlands governor Peter Stuyvesant promptly declared the twenty-three immigrants “hateful enemies and blasphemers of the name of Christ.” He then petitioned the Dutch West India Company for permission to deport them.

The first president of the United States was more welcoming. “May the children of the stock of Abraham who dwell in this land continue to merit and enjoy the good will of the other inhabitants,” George Washington declared to a Jewish leader in Newport, Rhode Island, in 1790. Washington also took the opportunity to champion both the freedom of religion and the separation of church and state: “The United States is not a Christian nation, any more than it is a Jewish or Mohammedan nation.”

Many Americans nonetheless came to view their revolution and national mission through the lens of the Christian Bible. King George of England was the Pharaoh of Egypt, and the American colonists were the “New Israel” triumphing—with divine assistance—over tyranny. For instance, in 1776 Benjamin Franklin proposed that the Great Seal of the new United States of America evoke Exodus and the story of the Israelites. With the motto “Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God,” it would depict Moses parting the Red Sea, saving the fleeing Israelites while drowning the Pharaoh and his pursing troops. As in the Old Testament, in the “New Israel” of the United States, liberty would defeat tyranny.

Gentile American ambivalence about the Jews in their midst intensified in the midnineteenth century with the arrival of new Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe and Russia. Both anti-Semitism and biblical literalism shaped early views of Palestine. The 1878 publication of Jesus Is Coming launched Wil-
liam E. Blackstone’s career as a prophet of the Second Coming and a Christian Zionist. But in his famous 1891 memorial to President Benjamin Harrison urging U.S. support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, he began with a little-disguised appeal to the anti-Semitism of his fellow Gentile elites: “What shall be done for the Russian Jews?” asked Blackstone. Rather than assimilating them into America, “Why not give Palestine back to them?” Only then did he appeal to humanitarianism and the authority of the Bible, arguing that Palestine was the Jews’ “inalienable possession, from which they were expelled by force.” He closed his argument with an appeal to Christian guilt: “Let us now restore them to the land of which they were so cruelly despoiled by our Roman ancestors.”

In the twentieth century, Americans often viewed the plight of the Jews in Europe through the prism of religious liberty. At the turn of the century, the harassment of American Jews traveling in czarist Russia became a major diplomatic issue. In April 1904, the U.S. Congress approved a resolution calling upon the czar to respect U.S. citizens regardless of faith. Emil Flohri addressed the issue in the editorial cartoon “Stop Your Cruel Oppression of the Jews” for a 1905 Judge magazine (Figure 8.2). An old man with a long white beard wears a

**STOP YOUR CRUEL OPPRESSION OF THE JEWS**

“Now that you have peace without, why not remove his burden and have peace within your borders?”

yarmulke. Labeled “Russian Jew,” he strains under a large bundle labeled “Oppression” that he carries on his back. Weights added to his burden are labeled “Cruelty,” “Autocracy,” “Robbery,” “Assassination,” “Deception,” and “Murder.” A mother and daughter follow him, fleeing a burning village in the distance. U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt resolutely declares to the emperor of Russia, Nicholas II: “Now that you have peace without, why not remove his burden and have peace within your borders?”

American concerns for the Jews persisted during the Cold War. As noted in Chapter 4, Henry Kissinger’s proposed rapprochement with the Soviet Union in 1973 was derailed when Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson mobilized opposition to détente based upon the Soviet Union’s continued persecution of Russian Jews.

Postwar changes in American Protestantism had a profound influence on evolving and diverging American views of Israel. In the first quarter century following World War II, the then dominant mainline and liberal Protestant denominations shifted from anti-Semitism to embracing Jews and support for Israel. For instance, Democratic president Harry Truman supported the creation of Israel out of humanitarianism. A devout Christian, Truman declared in 1945 that he could not “stand idly by while the victims of Hitler’s madness were not allowed to build new lives. The Jews needed someplace where they could go.”

By the 1980s, however, the rise of Evangelical and fundamentalist Protestantism and the slow decline of mainline and liberal denominations fundamentally altered American views of Israel. The newly dominant conservative Protestantism was much more preoccupied with personal salvation and prophesy. Taking heart in Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem in the 1967 Six-Day War, Christian Zionists eagerly awaited the End of Days, refusing compromise on the newly occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza.

American attitudes towards Muslims and the Arab world have an equally long lineage. Historian Andrew Preston argues that “The Puritans of colonial New England had thought of Muslims as a satanic force and the Ottoman empire as a hellish source of earthly evil.” Michael Oren suggests that attacks by the Barbary pirates of North Africa on American merchants in the Mediterranean helped motivate the newly independent Americans to convene a Constitutional Convention. The Articles of Confederation were no longer sufficient: a stronger federal government and a U.S. Navy were needed to defend American honor from Barbary affronts. Referring to “Algerian Corsairs and the Pirates of Tunis and Tripoli,” New York’s John Jay wrote that “The more we are ill-treated abroad the more we shall unite and consolidate at home.” Though wary of federal power, James Madison argued during the Constitutional Convention itself that the United States required a navy, as “weakness will invite insults.” Oren
concludes that “A threat from the Middle East had played a concrete role in creating a truly United States, a consolidated nation capable of defending not only its borders at home but its vital economic interests overseas.”

American fears of Islam persisted long after the threat of the Barbary pirates had receded. Conservative Protestants tended to have an antagonistic relationship with Islam, seen as led by a rival and false prophet. For instance, at the turn of the century, Presbyterian missionary to India E. M. Wherry depicted Christianity as in an existential battle against the “Moslem peril,” a battle that could only be won “with the Sword of the Spirit.”29 American liberals, by contrast, tended to view Islam as a threat to Enlightenment values and modernity. “Islam is intellectually stagnant, an ironic punishment for a religion which . . . for centuries carried the lamp of learning,” Time magazine lamented in 1951. Islam had “deliberately turned its back upon reason as the enemy of faith.”30

In his masterly 2007 ride through America’s tumultuous history in the Middle East, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, Michael Oren argues that in the American imagination, Christian fears of Islam have long coexisted with a romance with both the Arab, seen as a fellow David fighting against the Goliath of colonial oppression, and the Arab world, seen as a land of forbidden pleasures. On the former, he cites Bentley, an American journalist in the 1962 film Lawrence of Arabia: “We Americans were once a colonial people and we naturally feel sympathetic to any people, anywhere, who are struggling for their freedom.” On the latter, he cites the popular 1970s song “Midnight at the Oasis,” sung by the sensuous Maria Muldaur. “You won’t need no harem, honey, when I’m by your side,” she purred. “And you won’t need no camel, no, no, when I take you for a ride.”31

For many Americans, “Orientalist” fantasies about the Arab world were shattered with the Iranian Revolution and subsequent hostage crisis. Fifty-two American diplomats from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran were held captive for 444 days, from November 1979 to January 1981. “The actions of Iran have shocked the civilized world,” President Jimmy Carter stated during a press conference on November 28, 1979. “For a government to applaud mob violence and terrorism . . . violates not only the most fundamental precepts of international law but the common ethical and religious heritage of humanity.”32 The Iran hostage crisis was one of the most widely covered stories in U.S. television history, rivaling Vietnam and Watergate. The nightly coverage highlighted the suffering of the U.S. diplomats and the fanaticism of Iran and Islam. Melani McAlister argues that this TV news coverage, along with subsequent movies like the 1986 Chuck Norris and Lee Marvin revenge fantasy Delta Force, cemented a link between terrorism, Iran, and Islam in the American imagination.33
THE SOURCES OF U.S. ISRAEL POLICY PREFERENCES

“To stand against Israel is to stand against God.”

—The Reverend Jerry Falwell, 1980

“I turn back to your ancient prophets in the Old Testament and the signs foretelling Armageddon, and I find myself wondering if—if we’re the generation that’s going to see that come about.”

—Republican President Ronald Reagan, 1983

Why do conservatives desire a vastly friendlier Israel policy than liberals do? Would feelings towards the Palestinian people and Muslims in general matter for the Israel policy preferences of the American people, or would they be overwhelmed by feelings towards Israel? A mediation analysis revealed that both feelings towards the Palestinians/Muslims and feelings towards Israel helped account for liberal-conservative differences on Israel policy. We then ran a pair of multiple mediation models in which our four dimensions of American ideology were used to account for the impact of broad liberal-conservative ideology on feelings towards these two groups. They revealed that cultural, economic, and political ideologies mediated the influence of ideology on feelings towards Israel, while cultural, social, and economic ideologies mediated the impact of ideology on feelings towards Muslims and the Palestinians, though the economic effect was quite small.

Why would cultural traditionalism help account for conservative coolness towards Muslims and the Palestinians and warmth towards Israel? As noted in Chapter 2, traditionalism was measured with three statements assessing attitudes towards nudity, sex, drugs, and alcohol. Our 2011 survey also measured biblical literalism:

• The Bible is literally true, from Genesis to Revelation, from Adam and Eve to Armageddon.
• I have no doubt at all that God exists.
• Whenever science and scripture conflict, science is right. (reverse coded)
• The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly & ferociously fighting against God.

Participant assessments of these four statements cohered very well ($a = .88$), and the resulting biblical literalism scale shared about half of its variance ($r = .71; R^2 = .50$) with traditionalism. But biblical literalism was a stronger mediator of the influence of ideology on feelings towards Israel than was traditionalism. It appears, therefore, that traditionalism mediated the relationship between ideology and feelings towards Israel not so much because of respondents’ attitudes towards sex and drugs but because those higher or lower on traditionalism also tended to be higher or lower on biblical literalism.
Figure 8.3 combines four of these mediators—feelings towards Israel and the Palestinians/Muslims, social dominance orientation, and biblical literalism—into a single mediation model. Remarkably, where liberal-conservative ideology alone accounted for 20 percent of the variance in Israel policy preferences in an unmediated model, the addition of these four mediators reduced its effect to just 1 percent. So our four mediators account for 95 percent of ideology’s massive influence on Israel policy preferences.

We begin with warmth towards Israel at the bottom right of Figure 8.3, which was by far the most powerful predictor ($\beta = -0.74$) of Israel policy preferences. Given the affect heuristic discussed in Chapter 1, it is not surprising that feelings towards Israel strongly shape the policy preferences towards Israel of the American people.

Biblical literalism, bottom left, was associated with warmth towards Israel ($\beta = 0.17$). But it also had a direct influence on preferences for a friendlier Israel policy ($\beta = -0.43$), even after controlling for warmth towards Israel ($\beta = -0.07$, $p = .002$).

How should these two effects of biblical literalism be interpreted? The direct effect of biblical literalism on opposition to a tougher Israel policy seems best attributed to the Christian Zionist prophetic belief that Israel must hold on to the occupied territories to prepare for Christ’s Second Coming. Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza during the Six-Day War in
1967, Jerry Falwell avowed in 1988, is “the single greatest sign indicating the imminent return of Jesus Christ.” In his 2006 sensation Jerusalem Countdown, John Hagee similarly declares that “God’s word is very clear! There will be grave consequences for the nation or nations that attempt to divide up the land of Israel.” Former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee has been one of the most public and outspoken defenders of the Israeli settlements, arguing both that outsiders should not tell Israelis where they should live in their own country, and that Palestinians should settle in Arab countries outside of Israel.

Our 2011 survey included the item “God gave Palestine (today’s Israel) to the Jewish people.” Not surprisingly, the degree of agreement with this statement accounted for 95 percent of the relationship between greater biblical literalism and opposition to a tougher Israel policy. “Much of America’s blessing as a nation can be traced to its benevolent treatment of the Jews and Israel,” writes Pastor Mark Hitchcock of Faith Bible Church in Edmond, Oklahoma. But “if America continues on its current path and fails to bless the Jewish people, the final vestige of God’s blessing on our nation could be withdrawn, and the end could come quickly—very quickly.” In Allies for Armageddon, Victoria Clark suggests that a fear of the “wrath of God” plays a major role in Christian Zionist support for Israel: “if America abandons Israel, then God will cancel America’s Most Divinely Favored Nation status.”

But not all conservative Christians believe that the End of Days is imminent. They likely feel warmly towards Israel out of gratitude, remorse, or desires for personal salvation. Gratitude and love stem from a deep sense of religious affinity. “Christians and Jews are united,” John Hagee proclaimed at AIPAC in 2007. “We are indivisible, we are bound together by the Torah—the roots of Christianity are Jewish. We are spiritual brothers.” Mike Huckabee was even more effusive during a trip to Israel in 2010. “I worship a Jew!” Huckabee proclaimed. “I have a lot of Jewish friends, and they’re kind of, like, ‘You evangelicals love Israel more than we do.’ I’m, like, ‘Do you not get it? If there weren’t a Jewish faith, there wouldn’t be a Christian faith!’

Guilt also contributes to conservative Christian warmth towards Israel. Christianity scholar Stephen Spector reports that his “evangelical informants repeatedly expressed their deep remorse for the Church’s abuse of Jews in the name of Christ.” In this view, Martin Luther was an anti-Semite, and the Church was complicit in the Holocaust. In his 1973 The Promised Land: The Future of Israel Revealed in Prophecy, radio Bible teacher Derek Prince repented that “the Nazis merely reaped a harvest that the Church had sown.” John Hagee’s 2006 Jerusalem Countdown similarly contains several contrite chapters chronicling Christian anti-Semitism. “For centuries, the Jews have been beaten, murdered, robbed, and raped while fanatics have screamed, ‘You are the Christ killers!’”
Biblical literalism may also contribute to Christian conservative warmth towards Israel out of a more self-interested desire for God’s blessings. In Genesis 12:3, the Lord says to Abram, “I will bless those who bless you, and I will curse him who curses you.” The desire for personal salvation likely contributes to Christian warmth towards Israel. “God promised long ago that those who bless Abraham and his descendants will be blessed, and those who curse them will be cursed,” writes Oklahoma pastor Mark Hitchcock. The 2012 “Texas GOP Platform” opposes “pressuring Israel to make concessions it believes would jeopardize its security, including the trading of land for the recognition of its right to exist.” Why? The Platform is explicit: “Our policy is based on God’s biblical promise to bless those who bless Israel and curse those who curse Israel.”

As noted in Chapter 2, religiosity—the frequency and importance of religious practice—is conceptually distinct from the set of beliefs that is biblical literalism. But they are highly intercorrelated ($r = .71$), and they correlate similarly with feelings towards Israel ($r = .33, .32$). However, when set against each other, biblical literalism accounts for almost twice the variance in feelings towards Israel than religiosity does. A moderation analysis revealed that among Protestants the influence of religiosity on warmth towards Israel depends upon denomination (Figure 8.4). Greater religiosity was only associated with increased warmth towards Israel among Protestants of Evangelical denominations.

**FIG. 8.4.** Among American Protestants, religiosity dramatically increases warmth towards Israel, but only for those of Evangelical denominations.

*Note:* A moderation analysis. Interaction $\Delta R^2 = .01, F(1, 468) = 5.97, p = .015$. The positive slope for Evangelical Protestants was statistically significant: $B = .32, p < .001$; the slope for mainline Protestants was not: $B = .02, p = .82$. Religiosity = frequency of (1) church attendance, (2) prayer, and (3) importance of religion. *Data source:* OU Institute for US-China Issues, 2011.
Evangelical denominations. Greater frequency of church attendance or prayer had no effect on feelings towards Israel among Protestants of mainline or liberal denominations; hence, the stronger influence of biblical literalism. In other words, the kind of church an American Protestant attends has powerful implications for his or her feelings towards Israel.

Although greater average biblical literalism accounted for some of why conservatives felt warmer towards Israel than liberals did, it did not account for all of it. How should we interpret the substantial remaining direct relationship ($\beta = .30$) between conservatism and warmth towards Israel? Although not included in Figure 8.3, to reduce clutter, greater libertarianism (political ideology) also mediated the relationship between conservatism and warmth towards Israel. Many conservatives follow Benjamin Franklin in viewing America as the New Israel, not so much in religious terms as in the political terms of freedom triumphing over tyranny. House majority leader Tom DeLay emphasized this libertarian theme in a remarkable speech to the Israeli Knesset on July 30, 2003:

"I stand before you today, in solidarity, as an Israeli of the heart. The solidarity between the United States and Israel is deeper than the various interests we share. It goes to the very nature of man, to the endowment of our God-given rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. It is the universal solidarity of freedom. It transcends geography, culture and generations. It is the solidarity of all people—in all times—who dream of and sacrifice for liberty. It is the solidarity of Moses and Lincoln. Of Tiananmen Square and the Prague Spring. Of Andrei Sakharov and Anne Frank."

To DeLay, a Manichean view of freedom against tyranny appears to provide an overarching libertarian framework to understand the entire world and its history. With Israel firmly lodged on the side of liberty, there can be no doubt about where his loyalties lie. Mike Huckabee has similarly argued that “Even if there was nothing about eschatology involved, the reason this [Israel], as an American, matters to me is because freedom and liberty matter to me.” For conservatives like Huckabee, support for Israel is driven by multiple dimensions of his ideological profile.

Many American liberals, by contrast, question whether Israel really is a David fighting heroically against an Arab Goliath. With the 1967 Six-Day War and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, liberals now often suggest that the Israeli David has become a Goliath oppressing the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. Bill Mauldin captured this liberal view of Israel in a 1978 cartoon entitled “Endangered Species” (Figure 8.5). It depicts two birds in hats labeled “Israel’s doves.” The olive branches they hold in their beaks are wilting. With Israeli successes in the 1967 and 1973 wars, Israeli pacifists were
approaching extinction. “To me the great charm of the Israelis when I was there before, during, and after the Six Day War was that they disliked militarism but knew how to handle it,” Mauldin later wrote. “I wondered if eventually all those wars might turn them into Spartans. To a degree it seems to have happened.”

Greater liberal than conservative coolness towards Israel may in part be due to a view that Israelis have changed from doves into hawks.

**BIBLICAL LITERALISM AND FEELINGS TOWARDS ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS**

“The first thing, then, which the Lord will do, will be to purify His land (the land which belongs to the Jews) of the Tyrians, the Philistines the Sidonians—of all the wicked, in short, from the Nile to the Euphrates.”

—John Darby, 1840

Figure 8.3 revealed that biblical literalism predicts not just warmth towards Israel ($\beta = .17$) but also coolness towards the Palestinians ($\beta = -.30$). Figure 8.6 depicts the relationship between biblical literalism and feelings towards Israel and the Palestinians by American religious group. The two lines represent how coolly or warmly each religious group feels towards Israel and the Palestinians.
The bars represent each group’s mean level of biblical literalism. The sequence of religious groups is in ascending left-to-right order of warmth towards Israel; atheists and nonreligious Americans are the most ambivalent towards both groups.

Note: Israel: $F(12, 789) = 7.45, p < .001, \eta^2 = .088$; Palestinians: $F(12, 789) = 5.09, p < .001, \eta^2 = .062$; biblical literalism (four-item scale, $\alpha = .88$): $F(12, 890) = 43.48, p < .001, \eta^2 = .37$. All ANCOVA control for seven standard demographics. Survey ($N = 1,050$) oversamples Jews and Mormons. Data source: OU Institute for US-China Issues, 2011.

The bars represent each group’s mean level of biblical literalism. The sequence of religious groups is in ascending left-to-right order of warmth towards Israel; atheists and those Americans claiming no religion are first, and Evangelical Christians and American Jews, last.

The value added in Figure 8.6 over Figure 8.3 is that the former simultaneously displays the general pattern of the polarizing influence of biblical literalism on feelings towards Israel and the Palestinians of Americans of different religious groups, on one hand, and the outliers to the pattern, on the other. For example, American Jews (at the far right) are a clear exception to the rule. Not surprisingly, they feel the warmest of all religious groups towards Israel and the coolest of all towards the Palestinians—even though they score as low on our biblical literalism scale (which included an item on Revelation from the New Testament) as those Americans who report no religion at all.

At the opposite extreme, atheists, agnostics, and those Americans reporting no religion are not just the coolest towards Israel of all religious groups but also the warmest towards the Palestinians. They appear to be “religion blind,” refus-
ing to allow religious or cultural differences to shape their views of Israel or the Palestinians. Robert Weber mocks this secular American position in a 2001 cartoon for the *New Yorker* (Figure 8.7). A Caucasian American man wearing a suit is at an outdoor cocktail party. He faces a woman covered in a head-to-toe burka, with only her eyes peeking out, and asks, “Do I detect a Middle Eastern Accent?” Weber is poking fun at liberals for their willful blindness to cultural and religious differences. The cartoon is particularly poignant, as it was published just a month and a half before the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C.

By contrast, Figure 8.6 also reveals that Pentecostals, white Baptists, and other white Evangelical Protestants are the highest on biblical literalism and display the largest gaps (with the exception of American Jews) between their warmth towards Israel and their coolness towards Palestinians. As the epigraph from John Darby, the father of modern dispensationalism, suggests, prophesy-writers have long identified Muhammad and Islam with the Gog and Magog of the Bible, contributing to conservative Protestant prejudice against Arabs and Palestinians.

*Fig. 8.7. Secular liberals disregard cultural/religious differences, 2001.*

More recently, Florida pastor Terry Jones has given voice to Evangelical Protestant hostility towards Islam. By burning a Koran and provoking Muslim violence, and promoting slogans like “Everything I need to know about Islam, I learned on 9–11,” Jones has sought to link Islam with violence and terrorism. Other conservative Christians have similarly expressed deep skepticism about the “Arab Spring,” which first erupted in Tunisia in late 2010. In his 2012 *Middle East Burning*, Evangelical pastor Mark Hitchcock writes that “It’s likely that the Arab awakening will be hijacked and exploited by murderous Islamists and jihadists who are more oppressive and dangerous than the despots they replace.”

Race is an outlier that Figure 8.6 highlights. White and black Baptists do not differ in their average religiosity, and white Baptists score just slightly higher than black Baptists on biblical literalism. But there are large differences in their feelings towards the Middle East. White Baptists (71°) feel 17° warmer than black Baptists (54°) towards Israel, while black Baptists (47°) feel 15° warmer than white Baptists (32°) towards the Palestinian people, both medium-large differences statistically.54

Race appears to drive this difference in black and white Baptist feelings towards the Palestinians. We created a composite variable of mean feelings towards the eleven non-white countries in our 2011 survey. Added to the standard demographics as another control variable, feelings towards these colored countries reduced the 15° difference between white and black Baptists on feelings towards the Palestinian people to zero.55 In other words, if we could remove their different feelings about colored countries, black and white Baptists would feel similarly cool (38°) towards the Palestinians. As anthropologist Melani McAlister argues in *Epic Encounters*, racial politics at home has powerfully shaped how black and white Americans understand the Middle East.56

The same is true of the small but statistically significant 6° difference between white Catholic (38°) and Hispanic Catholic (44°) feelings towards the Palestinian people, also displayed in Figure 8.6.57 When feelings towards colored countries is added to the analysis as a control variable, the difference between white (39°) and Hispanic (40°) Catholics is reduced to a statistically non-significant 1°.58 Race matters for American views of the Middle East.

**ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS: DAVID AND GOLIATH?**

“It will be a tragedy—for the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the world—if peace is rejected and a system of oppression, apartheid, and sustained violence is permitted to prevail.”59

—Former Democratic President Jimmy Carter, 2006
“As you travel through the West Bank, you get a sense of the differences between life for Palestinians and Israelis in this region. Palestinians have to suffer through the checkpoint system, the barriers, the fenced-in wall that exists just to get to their job, often times to travel from north and south even within the West Bank. It’s created enormous hardship for them.”

—Senator Barack Obama (Democrat–Illinois), 2006

The top left corner of Figure 8.3 reveals that another reason that American conservatives feel cooler than liberals do towards the Palestinians and Muslims is because of their greater average social dominance orientation (SDO), the desire that “Inferior groups should stay in their place.” This finding replicates the work of social psychologists who have also found, with American samples, that greater SDO predicts greater prejudice against Muslims.

Chapter 3 argued that differing moral psychologies partially account for liberal-conservative differences in SDO (see Figure 3.4). Conservatives value authority more than liberals do, contributing to their greater desire for group dominance. Liberals, by contrast, value justice and compassion more than conservatives do, contributing to their greater opposition to social dominance and greater support for the equality of racial and social groups.

Conservatives feel cooler than liberals do towards the Palestinians and Muslims, in part because they are more sensitive to threats to authority and social order. Harvard sociologist Theda Skocpol and her colleague Vanessa Williamson attended local Tea Party meetings in Massachusetts, Virginia, and Arizona in 2010 and 2011, and concluded that the dominant sentiment was fear. “A sense of ‘us versus them’ along racial and ethnic fault lines clearly marks the worldview of many people active in the Tea Party,” Skocpol and Williamson write. “Fear and hatred of Islam and Muslims were commonly expressed.”

Some politicians have sought to harness this widespread conservative fear of Islam. “We have been under attack by the irreconcilable wing of Islam since the Iranians illegally seized our embassy in 1979,” Newt Gingrich wrote in his 2010 To Save America. “For thirty-one years our enemies have been plotting and maneuvering to kill us. Time is not on our side. We have to defeat them decisively before they acquire weapons that could destroy our very civilization.” From this conservative perspective, the Israelis are in the front line of a battle to keep the Palestinians and other Muslims from upsetting the global pecking order. If the Israelis need to rule the occupied territories with an iron fist to maintain law and order, so be it.

Gingrich actually builds on a conservative tradition of viewing Israel as a model for the forceful response to perceived Muslim threat that dates to the late 1960s—not just 1979. The 1967 Six-Day War thrilled American conservatives, not just because of biblical prophecy but also because of Israel’s remarkable military victory. In the late 1960s, conservatives celebrated Israeli military suc-
cesses as a way to counter the antiwar movement at home. Melani McAlister argues that after Vietnam, “Israel and its military played a key symbolic role for those who advocated the remilitarization of U.S. policy.” For instance, conservative hawks could bask in the reflected glory of the dramatic Israeli rescue of over one hundred Israeli hostages in Entebbe, Uganda, in July 1976. Walter Russell Mead similarly argues that following the 1967 war, “Jacksonian” conservatives—nationalists favoring a strong military—formed a negative view of Arabs as terrorists and a positive view of Israeli uses of overwhelming force.

By contrast, the greater value that liberals place on compassion and fairness contributes to their opposition to what they view as Israeli domination over the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Compassion is displayed in the second epigraph as Barack Obama speaks of the suffering and hardship of the Palestinian people living in the West Bank. And justice is frequently invoked by liberals seeking a more balanced policy towards the Palestinian question. “If we Americans are to be successful peace brokers, we have to be as sensitive toward Arab concerns and aspirations as we are to the Israelis,” George McGovern wrote in 2011. “I believe it is in the best interest of America for us to be equally fair to the Israelis and the Arabs.”

For some liberals, the prolonged Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and ongoing settlement activity make the Israelis as bad as Palestinian terrorists. Herblock captured this liberal view in a 1994 cartoon for the Washington Post (Figure 8.8). It depicts two similarly gruff and battle-hardened men carrying smoking machine guns. The only difference between them is that one is labeled “Israeli fanatics” while the other is labeled “Palestinian terrorists.” Entitled “Blood Brothers,” it is a clear statement of moral condemnation.

But it is former president Jimmy Carter who best expressed liberal unease with Israeli treatment of the Palestinians in his highly controversial 2006 book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid. As noted in the epigraph, Carter views the situation in the West Bank and Gaza as “a system of oppression, apartheid, and sustained violence.” He later explained that “I intended the word apartheid to describe a situation where two peoples dwelling on the same land are forcibly segregated from each other, and one group dominates the other.” Like Carter, many liberals oppose such group dominance, contributing to their greater relative warmth towards the Palestinians (see top of Figure 8.3).

Jimmy Carter is certainly not alone. Mainline Protestant denominations have begun protesting Israeli treatment of the Palestinians. In 2004, during the second Palestinian intifada, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church voted 413–62 to divest from multinational corporations doing business in Israel. Methodists and Episcopalians soon followed suit. More recently, on October 5, 2012, fifteen mainline Protestant leaders sent a letter to Congress claiming that U.S. aid to Israel was in violation of U.S. foreign aid laws concerning hu-
man rights violations. “As Christian leaders in the United States, it is our moral responsibility to question the continuation of unconditional U.S. financial assistance to the government of Israel.”

—Republican presidential candidate Newt Gingrich, 2012

“Let’s just stop throwing the word ‘war’ around so casually.”

—Senate majority leader Harry Reid (Democrat–Nevada), 2012

Iran was a major issue in the lead-up to the 2008 presidential election. Speaking in January 2007 at the Herzliya Conference in Israel, Republican pres-
idential primary candidate Mitt Romney declared that “It is time for the world to speak three truths: (1) Iran must be stopped; (2) Iran can be stopped; (3) Iran will be stopped!”\textsuperscript{71} Iran was also center stage at the annual AIPAC conference back in Washington, D.C., just two months later. “Iran poses a threat to the State of Israel that promises nothing less than a nuclear holocaust,” asserted John Hagee of Christians United for Israel (CUFI). “Iran is Germany and Ahmadinejad is the new Hitler.”\textsuperscript{72}

Iran returned as an even bigger issue in the 2012 presidential election, when many politicians reenacted their earlier roles in the political theater. The Republican primary contenders competed to be seen as the most hawkish on Iran. Rick Santorum accused President Obama of engaging in “appeasement.” Mitt Romney told the March 2012 AIPAC meeting that “the only thing respected by thugs and tyrants is our resolve, backed by our power and our readiness to use it.” Newt Gingrich, whose campaign was largely funded by the pro-Israel billionaire Sheldon Adelson, argued that the time for talk was over: Iran’s nuclear program should be attacked now (see epigraph).

Democrats fought back, accusing Republicans of saber rattling and politicizing national security. “Distorting the president’s position and needlessly dividing Americans on a critical national security question may score political points with some, but it doesn’t serve the national interest,” declared Democratic senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island on March 5, 2012.\textsuperscript{73} And as the second epigraph reveals, Senator Harry Reid sought to paint the Republican presidential contenders as reckless warmongers who would drag the American people into another war in the Middle East.

The American debate over Iran policy reaches well beyond Washington. Alarmed by “increasingly inflammatory rhetoric that could spark military action and war against Iran,” in July 2012 a coalition of Oklahomans raised money to pay for three antiwar billboards in Oklahoma City, in the heart of the Bible Belt (Figure 8.9). “Americans Against the Next War” included Oklahomans from both the left and the right. “We are especially concerned that a constant state of war now seems normal to a whole generation of Americans,” said Nathaniel Batchelder, director of Peace House in Oklahoma City. “The same people who were cheerleading for the Iraq War are now fear-mongering about the threat from Iran,” said Katherine Scheirman, a retired U.S. Air Force colonel. “I agree with Ron Paul who said that the threat to U.S. national security is not Iran, but endless wars.”\textsuperscript{74}

What can our 2011 survey data tell us about the Iran policy preferences of the American people? Why did conservatives desire a much tougher Iran policy than liberals did? Given that Iran’s nuclear program is a potential threat to both Israel and the United States, we were interested to see whether American na-
tionalism and feelings towards Israel would be sources of Iran policy preferences. Figure 8.10 depicts the results of a statistical analysis in which nationalism and feelings towards Israel sequentially mediate the relationship between ideology and desires for a tougher Iran policy, accounting for 80 percent of the direct relationship. Conservatives desired a tougher Iran policy than liberals did, in part because they were more nationalistic, in part because they felt warmer towards Israel, and in part because their greater nationalism contributed to greater warmth towards Israel.

In political psychology, patriotism is understood and operationalized as the internally oriented love of country, while nationalism is the externally oriented belief in the superiority of one’s country over other countries. In Chapter 4 we saw that only nationalism and not patriotism accounts for the greater conservative than liberal preference for tougher overall foreign policies (see Figure 4.9). It is not surprising, therefore, that Figure 8.10 reveals that nationalism as an American kicks in ($\beta = .32$) when confronted by the threat that Iran poses to American superiority. Indeed, of the fifteen countries that we measured foreign policy preferences towards, nationalism as an American correlated the strongest with Iran ($r = .38$), likely seen as the greatest threat to the United States.

Given the centrality of Israel to the Iran policy debate among American elites, it is not surprising that warmth towards Israel also mediated the relationship between ideology and Iran policy preferences. When Senator Joe Lieberman told AIPAC in 2012 that “The United States will prevent Iran from
acquiring a nuclear-weapons capability, by peaceful means if we can, but with military force if we absolutely must,” he was representing the views of many of his fellow Jewish Americans. “As an American Jew who has children and grandchildren living in Israel, I have seen firsthand the threat that the people of Israel face from their Middle East neighbors,” Harvey Caras wrote in a March 12, 2012, letter to USA Today. “Obama has done nothing to earn the trust of Israelis or American Jews.” Of course, the feelings towards Israel of Gentile elites from Mike Huckabee to Jimmy Carter also find their analogues in Protestant American discourse on Israel.

Of the three indirect paths in Figure 8.10, perhaps the most interesting is the longest one running from ideology to nationalism ($\beta = .47$) to feelings towards Israel ($\beta = .21$) to Iran policy ($\beta = .14$). As noted in Chapter 7, nationalism as an American only correlated positively with warmth towards two of our fifteen foreign countries, England ($r = .11$) and Israel ($r = .30$). Given that nationalism correlated negatively with warmth towards eleven other countries, this finding demands explanation.77 A multiple mediation model reveals that the cultural, economic, and libertarian dimensions of American ideology all mediate the substantial positive relationship between American nationalism and warmth towards Israel.78 Not surprisingly, the effect of cultural ideology was the largest, and is likely best interpreted by the cultural affinity that many American Christians feel towards Israel and Judaism, leading them to incorporate Israel into their Christian nationalism. Indeed, Israeli flags often hang side by side with U.S. flags at many Christian Zionist events. The mediating role of libertarianism, for its part, is likely best interpreted by the widespread view of America as a New Israel. As Tom DeLay’s passionate 2003 speech to the Israeli Knesset quoted above suggests, many Americans internalize Israel into their view of America as a David fighting for freedom against the Goliath.
of tyranny. For both cultural and political conservatives, in short, nationalism as an American contributes to warmth towards Israel and desires for tougher Iran policies.79

CONCLUSION: THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION

“The so-called Israel lobby succeeds in Washington for exactly the same reason that Mothers Against Drunk Driving has succeeded in their lobbying: because it has public opinion on their side.”80

—Congressman Steve Rothman (Democrat–New Jersey), 2008

“I believe it is vitally important that we cast our ballots for candidates who base their decisions on biblical principles and support the nation of Israel.”81

—The Reverend Billy Graham, 2012

This chapter has argued that American liberals and conservatives differ substantially in their feelings and foreign policy preferences towards the Middle East. Conservatives feel warmer towards Israel but cooler towards Iran, the Palestinians, and Muslims, more broadly, than liberals do.

It has further argued that these differences have their origins in many of the same ideological fissures that cleave domestic American politics. The same culture wars that divide Americans on abortion, gay marriage, and prayer in public schools also divide them over Israel, Iran, and the Palestinians. For instance, our 2011 survey reveals that biblical literalism is a powerful predictor of both opposition to abortion ($\beta = .62$) and warmth towards Israel ($\beta = .36$). Similarly, the racial politics that has divided Americans from the civil rights movement of the 1960s to the affirmative action battles of today also divides liberals and conservatives in their feelings towards Palestinians and Muslims. Conservatives tend to view them as threats to both Christianity and established authorities, while liberals have a greater tendency to view their plight in the West Bank and Gaza as analogous to segregation or even apartheid, triggering moralities of compassion and social justice. Finally, the same nationalism that divides Americans on flag burning and defense spending also divides them over Iran policy.

What are the policy implications of the polarizing influence of ideology on American attitudes towards the Middle East? Because America is a democracy and its elected leaders are accountable to their constituents, the “electoral connection” ensures that American public opinion is a vital driver of U.S. foreign policy.82 I thus agree with Walter Russell Mead, first in that John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt are too reductionist in their narrow focus on American Jews and AIPAC as drivers of U.S. Middle East policy, and second that greater attention should be paid to the role of broader American opinion, especially that of the Christian majority.
But Michael Koplow goes too far, not just when he argues that American opinion on Israel is uniformly positive but also when he promotes the influence of public opinion to the exclusion of other sources of U.S. policy towards the Middle East, asserting, for instance, that “pro-Israel lobbying does not drive policy decisions.” A more nuanced understanding of U.S. Middle East policy must be multicausal, including public opinion, vital lobbying groups like AIPAC, CUFI, and J Street, as well as the roles of individual politicians (e.g., Tom DeLay, Newt Gingrich), media personalities (Mike Huckabee), religious leaders (Jerry Falwell, John Hagee), and even campaign donors (Sheldon Adelson). Thomas Friedman was on to something when he wrote in a March 2012 New York Times column that “The Israel lobby—both its Jewish and evangelical Christian wings—has never been more influential.” But that is not just “because of its ability to direct campaign contributions to supportive candidates.” It is also, this chapter argues, because of the “electoral connection”: politicians cater to the citizens who vote for them.

The influence of American opinion on Israel policy, however, is not uniform. Due to gerrymandering and the ongoing ideological sorting of the American electorate, very few congressional races today are competitive. The only challenge most incumbents face comes from potential primary challengers within their own party. As a result, the “electoral connection” does not mean that politicians heed the opinions of their average constituent. Instead, politicians seek the support of their primary voters, usually the ideological extremes of their parties.

A similar dynamic also plays out in presidential elections. During the 2008 and 2012 Republican primaries, most candidates sought to portray themselves as strongly pro-Israel to appeal to highly conservative primary voters, who, this chapter has argued, are extremely pro-Israel. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mitt Romney was extremely pro-Israel and hawkish on Iran during the 2012 Republican primaries. Romney later tacked back to the center during the third and final presidential debate on foreign policy, however. At that point, Romney was competing with President Obama for undecided voters in the center. By stating that he supported sanctions against Iran, Romney hoped to neutralize Obama’s argument that Romney and the Republicans were warmongers who would lead the country into a war with Iran.

More difficult to explain is why Democratic elites have been pulled so far to the right on Middle East policy. The Chicago Council’s 2008 survey data reveals that liberals then (50°) felt 17° cooler towards Israel than conservatives did (67°), differences consistent with our 2011 and their 2010 survey data. So if Democratic primary voters were ambivalent in their feelings towards Israel, why didn’t we hear more from the 2008 Democratic primary candidates about a more balanced approach to resolving the Arab-Israeli issue?
It could be that the more ambivalent nature of liberal opinion on Israel makes it harder for lobbying groups like J Street and politicians like Jimmy Carter and George McGovern to mobilize liberal support for a two-state solution. But other factors could play a role as well. Jews, while a tiny portion of the U.S. population overall, represent a larger proportion of the much smaller pool of Democratic primary voters, especially in swing states like Florida. American Jews also represent a surprisingly large percentage of Democratic campaign volunteers and donors.86

Mearsheimer and Walt’s real gripe is not with the existence of an Israel lobby but with the dominance of its right wing, with CUFI and AIPAC lining up behind Likud and right-wing Israelis.87 They would prefer J Street and other, more liberal elements of the Israel lobby to predominate, enabling a two-state solution that they believe would ease tensions in the Middle East and thus serve the U.S. national interest. By demonstrating that American opinion on the Middle East is divided along ideological lines, I hope that this chapter has shown that the dominance of the right wing of the Israel lobby today does not represent the subversion of the democratic process by an elite few, but is instead the natural product of an American electoral system that caters to the extreme ends of Main Street.

82. $F(1, 416) = 19.35, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .04$, covarying for the seven standard demographic variables and feelings towards the United Nations and Europeans, and belief in Satan.

83. Lindsey 1994: 156.


Chapter Eight

11. Chicago Council 2010: 60. Our focus on the Palestinian “people” rather than the Palestinian “Authority” likely accounts for the greater warmth we found, while the intensification of the Iran nuclear situation likely accounts for our survey’s greater coolness towards Iran.

12. In the 2009 PIPA survey, Republicans felt more “sympathy” towards Israelis and less towards Palestinians than Democrats did: $F(1, 458) = 13.49, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .03$; $F(1, 458) = 24.90, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .05$, both controlling for age, gender, and education only. In the 2010 Chicago Council Survey, conservatives felt 14° warmer towards Israel, and 11° cooler towards the Palestinian Authority than liberals did: $F(1, 441) = 25.25, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .05$; $F(1, 478) = 27.51, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .05$, both controlling for age, gender, education, income, and being from the South.

13. 2011 CNN: $F(1, 415) = 33.03, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .07$, controlling for age, gender, education, and income.
14. Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu 2002; Fiske 2012.
15. Israel: admiration: $F(1, 419) = 99.08, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .19$; annoyed: $F(1, 419) = 76.94, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .16$, both controlling for seven standard demographics.
16. $\alpha = .88$.
17. Israel policy (three-item scale): $F(1, 419) = 201.51, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .33$; Iran policy (single item): $F(1, 419) = 64.17, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .13$, both controlling for seven standard demographics.
19. CBS 2011: $F(1, 541) = 34.31, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .06$, controlling for age, gender, education, and income.
34. From his *Listen America*, cited in Carenan 2012: 189.
36. Direct effect reduced from 20 percent (semipartial correlation = −.45) to just .08 percent (semipartial correlation = −.09).
39. The direct relationship was reduced from 17 percent (semipartial correlation = −.41) to just .08 percent (semipartial correlation = −.09). The indirect effect was significant: PE = −.31, 95% CI from −.3780 to −.2501.
41. Clark 2007: 263.
47. convention.texasgop.org.
48. 2.5 percent to 1.4 percent, based on semipartial correlations of .158 and .117.

Three-item measure of feelings towards Israel.
53. Religiosity: \(F(1, 153) = 1.45, p = .23\); biblical literalism: \(F(1, 153) = 5.62, p = .02, \eta^2_p = .035\), controlling for six demographics (race is excluded).
54. Israel: \(F(1, 153) = 14.36, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .09\); Palestinians: \(F(1, 153) = 13.38, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .08\), controlling for six demographics (race is excluded).
55. Eleven colored countries scale $\alpha = .87$. $F(1, 153) = .005, p = .95$, controlling for six demographics (race is excluded).


57. $F(1, 241) = 3.87, p = .05, \eta^2_p = .02$, controlling for six demographics (ethnicity is excluded).

58. $F(1, 240) = .22, p = .64$, controlling for six demographics (ethnicity is excluded).


61. E.g., Thomsen, Green, and Sidanius 2008.


63. Gingrich and DeSantis 2010: 303.


73. “Reed Concerned with Romney’s Overheated Iran Rhetoric,” March 5, 2012, news release, reed.senate.gov.


75. Inclusion of the two mediators reduced the shared variance between ideology and Iran policy from 7.5 percent (semipartial correlation = .27) to just 1.5 percent (semipartial correlation = .12).

76. Nationalism also correlated positively with preferences for tougher foreign policies towards North Korea ($r = .29$), Russia ($r = .27$), and China ($r = .27$). All of these countries represent potential threats to the nationalist belief that “America is the best country in the world.” The zero-order correlation $r = .38$ is greater than the $\beta = .32$ in the mediation analysis because the latter factors in the seven standard demographic covariates, not displayed in Figure 8–10, to reduce clutter.

77. Nationalism did not correlate at all with feelings towards Japan or South Korea.

78. Indirect effect statistics are online at SUP.org under “Chapter 8, Iran section: Nationalism to warmth towards Israel (simultaneous).”

79. Why support for income inequality would also contribute to American nationalism’s positive relationship with warmth towards Israel is harder to interpret. Perhaps American nationalists take pride in Israel’s economic success.

Chapter Nine


4. Page and Xie 2010: 37. See also 57, 66, and 103. For a critique, see Gries 2011.

5. Feelings towards Taiwan: $F(1, 420) = 6.94, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .02$; South Korea: $F(1, 420) = 6.00, p = .015, \eta^2_p = .01$; Japan: $F(1, 420) = 10.75, p = .001, \eta^2_p = .03$, controlling for the seven standard demographics.

6. In the Chicago Council’s 2010 “countries and peoples” feeling thermometer, the average American felt coolest towards North Korea (26°), followed by China (45°), South Korea (52°), and Japan (61°), the same sequence as our 2011 survey (it did not measure feelings towards Taiwan). Conservatives (39°) in its survey felt 10° cooler towards China than liberals (49°) did, a small-to-medium-sized difference statistically: $F(1, 1002) = 41.41, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .04$, controlling for age, gender, education, income, and being from the South. Democrats had a more favorable view of China than Republicans in Pew’s 2010 global attitudes telephone survey: $F(1, 1869) = 36.31, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .02$, controlling for age, gender, education, and income. And in a September 2011 CNN telephone poll, conservatives scored higher than liberals did on a China as ally-to-enemy question: $F(1, 270) = 8.53, p = .004, \eta^2_p = .03$. The smaller effect sizes in the CNN and Pew polls are likely due to the greater measurement error in telephone polls, as well as the more restricted response options, which limited the variation they captured.

8. $F(1, 419) = 89.47, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .18$, controlling for the seven standard demographics. Three-item China policy scale $\alpha = .68$.


