Rightful resistance revisited

Kevin J. O’Brien

James Scott (1985) placed ‘everyday forms of resistance’ between quiescence and rebellion. Others have noted that defiance in unpromising circumstances need not be quiet, disguised and anonymous if the aggrieved use the language of power to mitigate the risks of confrontation. How does ‘rightful resistance’ (O’Brien and Li 2006) relate to Scott’s everyday resistance and other types of protest in contemporary China? Are rightful resisters sincere or strategic? Is their contention reactive or proactive? Does rightful resistance suggest growing rights consciousness or only a familiar rules consciousness? Rightful resistance in rural China has been criticized for (1) lacking ‘peasantness’, (2) shortchanging history and culture, (3) focusing on elite allies and one pattern of protest and (4) being overly rationalist, state-centric and caught in ‘developmental thinking’. How do I respond?

Keywords: protest; contention; peasants; China; rightful resistance; rights consciousness; everyday resistance; proactive; reactive

In the 1980s, James Scott transformed peasant studies with his work on ‘weapons of the weak’. Several years later, with Scott’s (1985, 1990) books firmly in mind, Lianjiang Li and I started noticing something a bit different in China. Rather than cloaking their dissent in dissimulation, deniability and ambiguous gestures, people we called rightful resisters were challenging the powerful head-on. In particular, when faced with illegal extraction, rigged elections or corrupt cadres, villagers were deploying the policies, laws and commitments of the state to combat local officials who were ignoring those policies, laws and commitments. Whereas Scott’s everyday forms of resistance were quiet, disguised and anonymous, rightful resistance was noisy, public and open. Whereas everyday resistance focused on relations between subordinates and superordinates, rightful resisters were engaged in a three-party game where divisions within the state and elite allies mattered greatly. Over the next decade, as we gained access to protest leaders in parts of Hunan where rightful resistance was especially vibrant, we concluded that this type of protest had four main attributes: it operated near the boundary of authorized channels, employed the rhetoric and

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commitments of the powerful to curb the exercise of power, hinged on locating and exploiting divisions within the state, and relied on mobilizing support from the community (O’Brien and Li 2006, 2).

Our research built directly on Scott’s and, like his, slotted an under-appreciated form of contention on the continuum between quiescence and rebellion. In particular, we sought to explain how skillful use of the language of power can at times allow the aggrieved to act up effectively without taking intolerable risks. As China scholars interested in both bottom-up and top-down sources of change, we also wanted to say as much as possible about the outcomes of protest, including its effects on rightful resisters, the community, and policy implementation (and sometimes policy itself).

In recent years, others have picked up the idea of rightful resistance and have explored aspects of its origins, dynamics and consequences. This research has taught us much but, alas, will receive little attention here. Instead, I will focus on several lines of criticism that have emerged, and their implications for taking the study of contention in China in new directions, both within the rightful resistance framework and outside or at the edges of it.

The ‘peasantness’ of rightful resisters

In a review in this journal, Susanne Brandstädter (2006) recognized an important fact about Rightful resistance in rural China: the book was designed to speak to social movement studies and political science as much as to peasant studies, and we hoped that the concept would prove useful for understanding contention by various social groups in China and elsewhere. Still, the argument’s empirical core is a treatment of protest in China’s countryside, engaged in by rural folk. So Brandstädter’s critique, that the analysis suffers from a lack of ‘peasantness’, is overly rationalistic and shortchanges history and culture, deserves attention. Indeed, the book does have a certain ‘what would I do if I was in this situation’ deductive logic to it. We, by and large, reason from interests and assume a fairly straightforward weighing of costs and benefits by prospective rightful resisters. We do not problematize notions such as risk or payoff (or situate them deeply in the rural Chinese context) and instead imagine a rather simple mapping of opportunities onto actions. In our defense, we do bring in perceptions of opportunity, as a side-door way to consider culture and history, and we treat expectations of assistance from the Centre as rooted in long-standing understandings of an emperor’s responsibilities. But to the extent that religion, morality or communal, ‘little tradition’ ways of thinking inform decisions by rightful resisters there is room for more discussion of what peasants bring to protest themselves. Despite our ground-level orientation, there is still a need for an ethnography of rural rightful resistance that focuses on ‘peasants involved in these protests and their reality: how they live, who they are, and what they think’, and ‘the historical particularities of the Chinese situation’ (Brandstädter 2006, 712, 711).1 In recent years, scholars have taken steps in this direction with research on ‘contractual ways of thinking’ (Pan 2008), the effects of neoliberal capitalism on agrarian contention (Walker 2008), ‘righteous’, moral economy-based resistance in the 1950s (Thaxton 2008,

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1See also Ortner (1995, 190): ‘Resistance studies are thin because they are ethnographically thin: thin on the internal politics of dominated groups, thin on the cultural richness of those groups, thin on the subjectivity – the intentions, desires, fear, projects – of the actors engaged in these dramas’. 
H.Y. Li (2009), the moral underpinnings of contemporary protest (Tong forthcoming), why residents of ‘cancer villages’ do not get angrier about the health consequences of pollution (Lora-Wainwright 2010), and our own work on the resilience of political trust (L.J. Li 2013) and the group dynamics of protest leadership (L.J. Li and O’Brien 2008; also Wang 2012). ‘Isolated individuals’ (Brandstätter 2006, 712) are often not the best unit of analysis to understand collective action. Rightful resistance is more than a matter of tallying up choices made by individual Homo economicus, each of whom decides to take a chance on protest. It is also a product of collectivities living in a specific political economy and socio-cultural setting: of people with histories and moral understandings who are grappling (individually and together) with marketization, legal reforms, post-socialism, neoliberalism and many other challenges and opportunities.

State-centredness and the Chinese State

Embedding rightful resistance deeper in the habits and values of peasant life would also address a second issue Brandstätter (2006) raises: the state-centredness of the analysis. In Rightful resistance in rural China, officials are essentially granted ‘first mover’ status. They emit signals and ordinary people respond. This assumption was carried over from the structural sociology that underlies social movement studies, and in particular its focus on the external aspects of opportunity. Awarding officialdom pride of place is also common in a country where the state figures so large and is always present when protest occurs. But signals are not just sent by officials and received and processed by rightful resisters. Protesters fill spaces that the state and its reforms create, but also push against boundaries in ways that cannot be read straight off an opportunity structure. Rightful resisters may, through persistence and probing the limits of the permissible, create their own opportunities. We need to learn more about how the aggrieved understand signals and also how they sometimes grab the initiative and wrong-foot their targets in unexpected ways. Reducing state-centredness and moving toward a richer, more interactive account of state-society communication, much like taking ‘peasantness’ more seriously, would accord greater agency to rightful resisters, embed their contention more securely in their world as well as the state’s, and drain a dollop of initiative away from officialdom and the opportunities a divided state provides.

In a state-centric analysis, it is noteworthy that there is not a more explicit theory of the Chinese state standing behind Rightful resistance in rural China or, for that matter, much recent research on protest in China. This is a lost opportunity, both for understanding how rightful resistance emerges and for making research on protest legible to China scholars who might not be overly concerned with contention but are certainly interested in the Chinese state (O’Brien 2011). As Rachel Stern and I have argued (Stern and O’Brien 2012), there is a partial, implicit theory of the state lurking in Rightful resistance in rural China and other work on activism in China that centres on mixed signals and words such as ambiguity, ambivalence and uncertainty. But this theory awaits fleshing out and research on the origins of mixed signals remains preliminary, speculative and deductive.

For a historian’s account of the path from righteous to rightful resistance in the 1950s, see H.Y. Li (2009).

On elderly protesters in Zhejiang and tactics they deployed to keep the authorities off balance, see Deng and O’Brien (2013 forthcoming). On Chinese protest tactics more broadly, see X. Chen (2012).

For ‘experience-near’, less state-centric accounts of the thinking that gives rise to protest, see G.D. Chen and Wu (2006), Chan and Pun (2009), Erie (2012), and Lora-Wainwright et al. (2012).

Nor does ruminating about the state typically take place at the level of abstraction of ‘modes of accumulation and legitimation’ that Lee (2007, 17) has observed is lacking in Rightful resistance in rural China, or commonly plunge into topics as grand as how post-socialism and state capitalism shape protest (Walker 2008).

Instead of starting from a theory of the Chinese state, Rightful resistance in rural China is better suited to help cobble together a theory of the state. By observing how state power is experienced by people testing the limits of the permissible, we can learn about the contours of an authoritarian regime and how the state appears from below. An indirect, bottom-up take on state power can be as revealing as examining political institutions, bureaucracies and ‘modes of accumulation’ directly. But to make a ‘state reflected in society approach’ (Stern and O’Brien 2012) more than a metaphor, we need to move beyond principle-agent logics about information-gathering and monitoring local officials characteristic of Rightful resistance in rural China and other research on signaling in China (Lorentzen 2013, Weiss 2008). When unpacking the state, it will be important, for instance, to disaggregate horizontally as well as vertically. This will confirm that territorial levels of government are not unified: they have as many divisions and conflicts within them as they have with superiors above and subordinates below. This is now taking place, as students of Chinese protest move away from notions like ‘the Centre’ and ‘lower levels’ to identify actors at each level who facilitate or inhibit contention (Mertha 2008, Sun and Zhao 2008, Cai 2010). Additional work of this sort will take us beyond informative but incomplete understandings of the Chinese state, including one embodied in a saying often heard in rural areas in the 1990s: ‘the centre is our benefactor, the province is our relative, the county is a good person, the township is an evil person, and the village is our enemy’ (O’Brien and Li 1995, 778). As Stern (2013) has noted, the standard story of parochial local officials who subvert the Centre’s good intentions can paper over other divisions and leaves too little room for variation. We should avoid blaming grassroots cadres for more than they deserve, and be alert to moments when the conventional central-local narrative breaks down: moments in which simple dichotomies no longer hold and a deeper understanding of pressures and divisions within the state is called for (Stern 2013).

Variation-finding

Disaggregating the state along multiple axes reminds us that although conceptual work requires lumping rather than splitting, variation-finding becomes the next task once a concept is put forward. One of the referees of Rightful resistance in rural China offered dozens of suggestions that basically came down to: pay more attention to differences across time and space. This reader wanted a scant, two-page ‘Note on variation’ to become a new, second half of the book. Our universalizing comparison (Tilly 1984, 97, 108), however, sought to do something else: to show that phenomena seldom discussed together (e.g. the pay equity struggle in the United States, ‘censoriousness’ by Norwegian prison inmates, anti-Apartheid activism in South Africa, ‘consentful contention’ in East Germany, rural protest in China) (O’Brien and Li 2006, 15–24) could be understood within one framework once we located acts of resistance – in China or elsewhere – that shared:

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6In the most repressive regimes, resistance is largely limited to ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985). In slightly less controlled settings, one or more features of rightful resistance may appear. As sanctioned coercion diminishes further and partial inclusion is formally extended, cases of more complete rightful resistance become possible. In circumstances where numerous rights are guaranteed, the rule of law is
• reliance on established principles to anchor defiance
• use of legitimating myths and persuasive normative language to frame claims
• deployment of existing statutes and commitments when leveling charges
• recognition and exploitation of congenial aspects of a shifting opportunity structure
• importance of allies, however uncertain, within officialdom.

Finding unexpected similarities rather than variation was the goal. We opted not to distinguish among grievances or locations in China, and deployed evidence in a manner that Scott (1976, 1990, 1998) does so well: as examples rather than cases, as telling, ground-level illustrations that hammer an analytical point home.

But this of course leaves much undone. As of the early 2000s, direct rightful resistance appeared to be especially common in the provinces of Sichuan, Anhui, Hunan, Jiangxi, Henan, Shaanxi and Hebei. Why? Perhaps because the ‘peasant burden’ (nongmin fudan) problem was more acute in ‘agricultural China’ (Bernstein and Lü 2003) and people with deeper grievances were more likely to give up on elite allies and rely on themselves? But we did not explore this possibility or consider competing explanations. Focusing on similarities also downplayed different motivations for rightful resistance and responses to it. Examining election, tax, corruption and other protests together, and using evidence to clarify a concept rather than establish a causal pattern, can gloss over sources of variation. Which kinds of misconduct are most amenable to rightful resistance? Are higher levels responsive to certain kinds of rightful claims but deaf to others? We are largely silent on these issues.

Our focus on one form of contention also obscures the obvious truth that rightful resistance is not the only type of protest in contemporary China. Rightful resistance in rural China is a conceptual book, where we select on the dependent variable unabashedly and say little about how common rightful resistance is compared to other forms of popular action. We stop following rightful resisters when they drop out or move on to other types of within-system resistance or violence. Many other patterns of protest in rural China deserve equal attention, and some are receiving it, including Yu Jianrong (2008) on violent, ‘anger-venting incidents’, Justin Hastings (2005) on Uighur protests in the shadow of a ‘unified state’, Paik and Lee (2012, 262, 270–71) on episodes where the aggrieved and local cadres join forces to challenge higher levels, and Ethan Michelson (2008) on ‘justice from below’ and local solutions. As these research programs unfold and multiply, we will be able speak more knowledgeably about the full palette of popular established and political participation is unquestionably legitimate, rightful resistance may still be viable and effective, when dissatisfied citizens try to make officials and business leaders prisoners of their own rhetoric and exploit the gap between rights promised and rights delivered.

Following the abolition of the agricultural tax in 2006, extraction receded as a source of rural discontent and other issues came to the fore, including land grabs and environmental degradation. The time is ripe to explore how the nature and intensity of particular grievances influence the dynamics of contention, and to identify how different complaints can be linked, as happens when environmental claims are ‘piggybacked’ on land-related grievances (Deng and Yang 2013). On ‘issue linkage’ more generally, see Cai (2010, Ch. 4).

For a defense of this practice, in certain circumstances, see Collier and Mahoney (1996).

See Michelson (2008, 44, 45) on our focus on one strategy of contention and not seeking to evaluate the relative popularity of competing strategies. On selecting cases ‘according the value of the dependent variables’ and ‘caution in generalizing from [our] analysis’, see R.B. Wong (2007, 851).

John Kennedy (conference remarks, 28 September 2012) suggested that our differences with Michelson (2008) may be temporal rather than conceptual: the aggrieved may try ‘local solutions’
contention and the import of protest for China’s future. For our part, we have been surprised there is as much rightful resistance as surveys show, and we look forward to more research that addresses ‘the frequency problem’ (Michelson 2008, 51). This will involve taking aggrieved people as the starting point, observing how they move up (or exit) the dispute pyramid (Felstiner et al. 1980–81, Diamant et al. 2005, 7, Michelson 2007), and considering many types of contention, as well as giving up or never taking to the streets. This line of work promises insight into how often rural Chinese protest instead of giving up on a grievance, and how they act when they do.

The role of elite allies merits mention here. We of course are not the first to examine occasions on which ordinary people draw in the powerful to assist them in their struggles. But the presence or absence of allies is central to Rightful resistance in rural China and underpins the analysis. We anticipate more surveys, like Michelson’s (2008), on the extent to which the disaffected depend on ‘justice from below’ rather than (or in addition to) ‘justice from above’. How crucial are elite allies for the aggrieved? What happens when elites at higher levels are targets rather than allies? How available and effective are powerful allies if the targets are state-backed companies rather than governments? Are some third parties more useful for attacking certain kinds of misconduct? How are elite allies secured? What types of assistance do they provide? Perhaps owing to factional conflict, do officials sometimes seek out protesters rather than the other way around? How often are run-of-the-mill disputes resolved locally, so that escalation of claims and venues does not occur (Michelson 2008, 51)?

We need more research on the importance and availability of allies, and also on the consequences of depending on them. Does turning to third parties channel protest into safe precincts, lessen the chance of disruption, moderate demands and tactics and lead to unsatisfactory half-solutions? Are rightful resisters realizing over time that cultivating allies diverts energy from more productive strategies, and that elites are only willing to help so long as they are ineffective (McAdam 1982, 25–29)? Woodman (2011), for instance, has observed that lawyers who aid protesters sometimes hijack the framing of a dispute and deprive activists of their subjectivity, as they suppress social justice and gender-based claims in favor of their own concerns with democratic and legal reform. A nuanced understanding of the role elite allies play is crucial because their participation is a key reason that rightful resistance can be more effective than everyday resistance but safer than protest that edges toward rebellion.

first and then move on to rightful resistance. Michelson (2008) also considers a wider range of disputes than we do.

See Michelson (2008).


On villagers siding with different levels of government depending on the type of land expropriation they face, see Paik and Lee (2012, 273).

Michelson (2006) emphasizes family ties to government officials. On support ‘from individuals within the government, not “the government” more generally’, see Spires (2011, 14).

Shi and Cai (2006, 316) suggest that social networks with officials and media personnel provide information that helps protesters formulate and implement strategies, create a channel to influence decision-making and generate pressure, and offer access to the media.

Lianjiang Li, personal communication, 30 September 2012. On village cadres leading protests, see Wang (2012).
Conceptual questions

Sincere or strategic?

After reading the first article on rightful resistance (O’Brien 1996), James Scott (personal communication, 14 December 1995) asked a vexing question: are rightful resisters sincere or cynical? Nearly two decades later, I still can’t say. Consider this remark by a rightful resister: ‘If I didn’t believe in the Centre, what would I have left?’ Does this man really have faith in the Centre or does he merely recognize it is prudent to frame his attack on local misconduct as an effort to ensure state commitments are carried out? My best guess is that the motivations of rightful resisters are a mixture of belief and calculation that differs from person to person, and that often a protester cannot readily say if resistance is sincere or strategic because it has elements of both impulses.17 This is why outcomes and the passage of time are important: what a rightful resister believes today depends on the last round of contention (and events elsewhere) and few people will act on, or even form, sincere beliefs if they are strategically suicidal. In a changing China, popular consciousness is neither static nor one-dimensional. A rightful resister may hold beliefs that spring from multiple and mixed motives.18

Reactive or proactive?

Whether rightful resistance is reactive or proactive is another knotty question best not forced into an either/or answer. What is new and ‘has no grounding in current rules’ (L.J. Li 2010, 59) and what is old and ‘based on existing political rules’ (L.J. Li 2010, 58) is always hard to agree upon.19 As Sally Sargeson has pointed out (conference comments, 28 September 2012), it is also somewhat artificial and ahistorical to speak of an initial action when a long series of events precedes any episode of claimsmaking. Instead of freeze-framing a given moment and asking if rightful claims are transgressive, it is better to live with the contradiction. That rightful resistance is both loyal and can ask for something new is at the oxymoronic heart of an oxymoronic concept. Despite Tilly’s (1993) forsaking of his competitive, reactive, proactive framework, we agree with Sewell (1990) that the trichotomy remains useful to think with, as a means to examine claims and ironies that arise during the spread of citizenship norms (which need not be liberal democratic) in authoritarian circumstances.20 For us, at least, the idea of cloaking proactive claims in reactive garb helped make sense of a string of characters scrawled on a Hebei storefront: ‘We’re citizens. Return us our citizenship rights. We’re not rural labor power, even less are we slaves’. In one sense, the graffiti artist was using a familiar tactic (writing a wall poster) and seeking a ‘return’ of his rights; in another sense, he was demanding rights he had never enjoyed while making it appear he had just been deprived of them.

17Lee (2007, 17) sees rightful resistance as mainly a form of strategic framing. It was not our intent to leave readers with this impression.
18Analytically, distinct types of political consciousness often co-exist in the mind of the same individual’ (L.J. Li 2010, 65).
19On recognition that contention in China is evolving, but doubts that proactive protest is overtaking reactive protest, see Bianco (2001, 249–53).
20Perry (2002, 275–308) also found it helpful to categorize protest in China as competitive, reactive or proactive.
Developmental thinking?

One reason that Tilly (1993, 266) abandoned his competitive, reactive, proactive tri-chotomy and introduced ‘repertoires of contention’ is that he came to believe the framework was teleological and amounted to an inadvertent endorsement of modernization theory. Brandstädter (2006) sees similar signs of ‘developmental thinking’ in Rightful resistance in rural China, while others have suggested that the book points to China’s coming democratization. In my view, the presence and spread of rightful resistance implies little about democracy or systemic change. Although its outcomes can have implications for policy (e.g. ending the agricultural tax and providing resources for reformers), it does not foreshadow political convergence. In fact, if rightful resistance performs as intended, it could help legitimate the current regime by proving to those perched on the verge of rebellion that the system works well enough. That a group of complainants could be thrilled when an official wrote on their petition ‘it’s legal to disseminate central policies’ reminds us that rightful resisters sometimes interpret tiny concessions as great victories.

Like everyday resistance, rightful resistance is a within-system form of contention that operates in the reform, not the revolution, paradigm. For a clumsy authoritarian regime that has long been struggling to grow fingers, it offers a means for higher levels to learn about local misconduct and deal with social pressures. Should it continue to develop, it could dampen demands for far-reaching change and contribute to regime resilience rather than hastening the end of authoritarian rule. Pulling back to consider ‘larger implications’ and imagining China’s future are often encouraged by editors and can be tempting for authors, but searching for hints of democratization says more about China studies than it does about China.

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21Lianjiang Li is more inclined to link rightful resistance and growing rights consciousness with regime change. ‘Compared to those who only have rules consciousness, individuals who also have rights consciousness are more likely to press for institutional changes in the hope of converting revocable “state-endowed rights” into inalienable rights. If rights consciousness keeps a democracy healthy by turning citizens into active participants in governance, the mobilization of rights consciousness may help chart a course toward a more participatory political system in China’ (L.J. Li 2010, 66).

22There are signs, however, that this is becoming less common, as small, often symbolic victories may lead to larger demands. The popular notion that ‘no disturbance leads to no solution’ while a ‘large disturbance leads to a large solution’ also points to the value of risk-taking, persistence, and an unwillingness to settle for partial solutions.

23On authority systems with ‘strong thumbs, no fingers’, see Lindblom (1977). This image refers to the ability of centralized, non-market systems to do homogeneous, repetitive activities well, but not to discriminate or adapt.

24Froissart (2007, 119) writes: ‘By seeking intervention from higher levels of administration, this form of resistance helps the Centre respond to conflicts through ad hoc solutions that expand its capacity to manage contradictions while withholding political reform… It would thus appear that this form of resistance is an integral part of the regime’s dynamic stability, though that does not rule out the possibility of the balance being upset some day’. Perry (2008, 45) also suggests that today’s pattern of protest ‘may prove more system-supportive than system-subversive. In an authoritarian polity, where elections do not provide an effective check on the misbehavior of state authorities, protests can help serve that function – thereby undergirding rather than undermining the political system’. In a highly hedged passage (O’Brien and Li 2006, 123–29), we mention that rightful resistance ‘could evolve into a more far-reaching counter-hegemonic project’, but I do not believe it is ‘poised to mount a counter-hegemonic project’ (Perry 2010, 24).
Rights consciousness or rules consciousness?

Elizabeth Perry (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010) has been at the forefront of a debate over whether rightful resistance and similar activities reflect growing rights consciousness or a rules consciousness that has existed for centuries. Lianjiang Li (2010) has responded to Perry’s discussion of protesters’ sensitivity to government rhetoric with a creative survey that finds both types of consciousness and suggests they can be distinguished by assessing whether claims are focused on rule-making or rule enforcement. Peter Lorentzen and Suzanne Scoggins (2012) have deployed formal modeling to show that findings about rights consciousness may refer to changes in values, rhetoric or beliefs about government policy. Both qualitative (Goldman 2007) and survey researchers (L. Wong 2011) continue to produce studies that document growing rights consciousness.

I find myself mostly unmoved by a ‘debate’ in which the parties agree on the empirics and disagree mainly about what to label their findings (O’Brien 2011, 536). Once we recall that there are many forms of citizenship (Mann 1996), based on both individual and collective notions of rights, and that rights consciousness need not evoke Locke and Jefferson (Perry 2008, 43) or imply convergence or ‘something resembling an Anglo-American “rights revolution”’ (Perry 2008, 47), the heat in this debate dissipates. There is no need to make a choice between rights or rules consciousness (O’Brien 2001, 408, 426–29) or to argue that one precludes the other, either logically or historically. As L.J. Li (2010) and Lorentzen and Scoggins (2012) demonstrate, both may be present at the same time, and my hunch is that coexistence is the path along which citizenship rights appeared in many places. In fact, it may well be ahistorical to suggest otherwise, at least for China. As a legal status that draws boundaries and ranks a population, and a set of practices that implies a willingness to confront the powers-that-be, citizenship and the expectations that surround it are a product of historical processes that bring forth changes in popular thinking and claimsmaking. In this regard, rightful resistance is a chapter in the history of Chinese rules and rights consciousness that demonstrates changes in modes of thought do not take place by leaps but through intermediate steps. Rules-based, righteous and moral economy claims coexist with (and inform) rightful ones, and the crucial issue is the mixture of claims in a game that is still in early innings.

References


25Mann (1996) identifies five varieties of citizenship, only one of which is associated with free association, strong legislatures and liberal democracy.

26Although rights talk always implies a certain assertiveness, in contemporary American discourse, for example, it tends toward the absolute, individualistic, and ontological in that individuals possess rights by virtue of being human beings. In contrast, Chinese rights talk tends to be relative, social and phenomenological in that subject-citizens of a given state only have rights defined in relation to obligations to each other and their relationship to rulers’ (O’Brien and Li 2006, 117). ‘Unlike the rights discourse employed by some liberal intellectuals, there is little evidence that most rural rightful resisters consider rights to be inherent, natural, or inalienable; nor do most of them break with the common Chinese practice of viewing rights as granted by the state mainly for societal purposes rather than to protect an individual’s autonomous being’ (O’Brien and Li 2006, 122).


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