runway’ may stretch a point. Their downgrading of PLA prowess aims for a soberly balanced assessment but tilts toward positive thinking. While Christopher Findlay’s data on China and the regional economy ends with 1993, its solid presentation permits ready updating without serious change in analysis. Peter J. Rimmer is creative in mapping infrastructure networks and data that integrate China into East Asia through trade and communications. However, his analysis of the political implications presents the ‘optimists’ view without summary of the opposite approach. In contrast, Hu Angang views China’s environmental prospects through a glass darkly, and with good reason.

David Goodman’s treatment of domestic politics is both balanced and optimistic, although he also foresees that regionalism may block Beijing from having ‘a single foreign policy’, with ‘several governments of the PRC’ facing the world. In conclusion, Harris and Klintworth accentuate the positive in looking beyond the Deng era while summarizing the diverse views of their authors.

The editors showed courage in marshalling these contributions for publication during a time of uncertainty in Beijing as Deng Xiaoping slowly slipped away. They have achieved a span of perspectives that should stand the test of time unless wholly unforeseeable and unlikely events topple the regime. The endnotes offer a rich repository of further readings.

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While studies abound on the impact of ‘reform and opening’ (gaige kaifang) on China’s economy and polity, less attention has been focused on the influence of this ‘opening’ upon Chinese views of the world. Prior to 1978, Chinese views of the foreign were tightly controlled by the CCP propaganda apparatus, which painted the world in black and white, with few grays in between. Thus, the ‘big brother’ Soviet Union of the 1950s became a ‘northern bear’ in the 1960s, and the American ‘imperialists’ jargon of the
1950s and 1960s was toned down with Nixon’s visit in 1972. Has progressively increasing contact with the outside world in the 1980s and 1990s altered such Manichean views, or has it reinforced them?

Two Chinese bestsellers of the summer of 1996, China Can Say No and Studying in the USA, shed important light on this question. While the books share a common subject — Chinese views of America — the parochial nationalism of the former is based upon a Manichean vision, while the latter tries to blur the distinctions between black and white.

The experience of reading China Can Say No left this reader, to borrow a phrase from Lin Yutang, ‘between tears and laughter’ — laughter due to the tone of the book, and tears for its substance. The book uses outrageous titles like ‘Burn Hollywood!’ (p.122), ‘Only Blockheads Don’t Understand the American Mind’ (p.247) and ‘McCarthy Lives!’ (p.234). More amusing, however, is the way the authors seem to compete with each other in deriding the United States: Qiao Ben, for example, calls America a ‘spoiled child’ (p.323), while Song Qiang writes of America as an ‘insect with a hundred feet’ (p.34).

China Can Say No was written by a group of five young Chinese clearly more intent upon making a buck and venting their emotions than formulating a scholarly argument. The authors repeatedly contradict themselves: one minute, for example, attacking the United States for continuously meddling in other countries’ affairs (e.g., pp.222-7), the next minute arguing that America’s ‘new isolationism’ (xin guizhuyi) will be its downfall (e.g. pp.151-6). More importantly, they are ambivalent about a key issue: the principles that should underlie Chinese foreign policy. At times they subscribe to a traditional Chinese view that foreign policy should be guided by a moral vision. They thus criticize American foreign policy as ‘insincere and irresponsible’ (p.76) and argue that China’s diplomacy is ‘moral and just’ (p.49). Elsewhere, however, they argue that Chinese foreign policy should be based on its national interests (e.g. pp.43-5).

Han chauvinism is reflected in the authors’ belief that China has been great (e.g. China’s scientific glories of the past [p.319]), is great today (the Chinese are a ‘colossal nation’ [minzu juren], p.299), and will be great in the 21st century (‘In the next century ... Chinese thought, and Chinese entrepreneurial abilities will deeply influence the world, becoming the sole force leading human thought’ [p.51]). Their vision of economic nationalism involves both the promotion of Chinese products (‘promoting the purchase of national products is not parochial nationalism’ [p.181]), and the boycott of foreign goods (‘The Chinese masses should rise up and not buy [American] products. This will effectively contain them’ [p.165]). Their wrath is revealed in a section entitled ‘We don’t want MFN, and in the future, we won’t offer it to you either’, where they assert that China will get its revenge on the United States in 20 or 30 years time (pp.219-21). The authors also fan the flames of

militarism throughout the book. Asserting that it is ‘best to hit hard and hit early’ (p.41) and that ‘China was the first country to defeat the US’ (p.42), they delight in challenging the US Congress to a fight over the Taiwan issue, twice demanding: ‘Do you dare?!’ [ni gan?!?] (pp.35, 37). All of this would be dismissed lightly except that China Can Say No struck a cord with its audience, becoming an instant, and influential, bestseller.

In the late summer of 1996, Song Qiang and his colleagues wrote that ‘Quite a few Chinese took issue with Say No ... asking “Why were you so polite to Japan? ... Don’t you see that Japan is even more wicked than America?”’ This prompted them to write a sequel entitled China Can Still Say No, which turned its wrath from America to Japan (p.101). Published in October, a nadir in Sino-Japanese relations due to the Diaoyu Islands flare-up, it was banned the next month by the Foreign Ministry.

Song and his colleagues claim that they are seeking a Sino-Japanese relationship based upon the principle of equality (p.128), but the bulk of China Can Still Say No suggests otherwise. Zhang Yunling, Director of the Chinese Academy of Social Science’s Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, has recently written that: ‘Historically, Sino-Japanese relations have been established on the basis of one being strong and the other being weak. There has never been a situation [otherwise]*. Song and his co-authors cite a metaphor: ‘Sun Yat-sen said that “China and Japan are brothers: China is the older brother, and Japan is the younger brother”’. Unfortunately, this “younger brother” ... does not treat his older brother like a human’ (p.102). China Can Still Say No advocates not the equality of brothers but that the big brother get his revenge. Based on the premise that ‘Japan is an immoral neighbour ... immoral in the past, immoral in the present, immoral in politics, immoral in economics, etc’. (p.122), they argue that ‘Japan lacks the “national morality” [guojia daode] to participate in international affairs’ (p.87) and that ‘China has been too mild and accommodating towards Japan’ (p.101). The time for extreme measures has come: ‘To the majority of contemporary Chinese, the mission of containing Japan has already begun; the final battle of the Western Pacific — Protecting Diaoyu — has already become imminent’ (p.89).

But how does one justify violence? The authors’ solution is an old one: dehumanize the enemy. Where in China Can Say No Chinese are good and Americans are bad (but still human), China Can Still Say No denies the Japanese their humanity. In a section entitled ‘Being conciliatory towards Japan is to “indulge an evil-doer” [gu xi yang jian]’, Song and colleagues explain why ‘We’ve really been too tolerant with the Japanese’: ‘There is a saying that Japanese and Chinese are “of the same culture and same race”’ [tong wen tong zhong] ... But I don’t believe that the Japanese are the descendants of Chinese. Although they use Chinese characters and have

preserved some things from Chinese culture, the Japanese lack Chinese generosity, kindheartedness, and modesty. Theirs is a different kind of blood... We have probably made a mistake... you can only be humane towards humans; towards beasts you can only be bestial’ (p.161).

A reading of Studying in the USA is the perfect antidote to the China Can Say No books. Qian Ning, a former People’s Daily reporter who spent five years at the University of Michigan as a visiting scholar and teacher, writes with eloquence, and the book is a pleasure to read.

The ostensible topic of Studying in the USA is the experience of a generation of Chinese who studied in America in the 1980s and 1990s. It also touches upon the experiences of Chinese students in other Western countries, and contains a discussion of the 150-year history of Chinese students in the West, including two extended discussions of Yung Wing, China’s first student in America (pp.13-17, 294-9). The author’s real concern is with how the experience of going abroad has challenged the thought processes of Chinese students: ‘It is easy and natural to believe that all that one’s own society represents — whether good or bad — is normal’ (p.138). For Qian, the experience was fundamentally decentring. Arriving in Ann Arbor just three months after Tiananmen, he describes his first impression upon walking across campus: ‘In an instant I understood something very simple: we Chinese — at least the younger generation — could have another kind of life’ (p.101).

For many, the process begins even before leaving China. In a section entitled ‘Getting to the “New Mainland”’ (xin dalu), Qian describes the application process as an eye-opener: ‘Most Chinese are used to a life without choices, don’t find it terrible, but actually find it relaxing’ (p.50). The experience of reading catalogues to American universities challenged that lifestyle: ‘Although one is sitting in a quiet reading room, one’s mind is already far away... One can apply to Harvard, or to Berkeley, or go to Hawaii, or to Alaska... you are choosing your own fate’ (p.51).

In the preface, Qian describes the premise behind his reportage style of exposition: ‘I believe that the experiences of all people have something of true value in them, and that it is the diversity of those experiences that makes our lives and world rich and varied’ (p.3). It is his ability to find that value that makes his numerous anecdotes so interesting. Whereas the authors of China Can Say No chose/created anecdotes to ‘prove’ pre-existing beliefs, Qian’s choice of anecdotes brings out the complexity of issues.

Qian is critical of parochialism, and he lambastes Chinese students who retain a ‘Central Kingdom’ (zhongyang daguo) attitude while abroad (p.138). Referring to Qian Zhongshu’s famous novel, Qian Ning dubs it the ‘besieged city phenomenon’ (Weicheng xianxiang). In The Besieged City [Weicheng], Qian Zhongshu had exposed how ‘the experience that returned students [of the 1940s] had had [abroad] was often unable to change Chinese pettiness and triviality’ (p.201). Qian Ning finds a similar situation among students abroad in the 1980s and 1990s. Because ‘students abroad are always imprisoned in a tiny circle of living’ (p.204), they often become increasingly parochial and
self-satisfied. One example he gives is the pettiness of participants in Chinese student Internet discussion groups (pp.202-3): ‘Life abroad naturally fosters a patriotism that is always deeper than that cultivated by domestic “patriotic” thought education ... The reason is simple: China’s image in the world is intimately connected to the position of overseas Chinese abroad’ (p.244). Qian sees patriotism in the Chinese student community as a factor of the individual’s job prospects and adaptability to life in the United States. His rules of thumb are: visiting scholars are more patriotic than degree candidates, humanities students more patriotic than those in the natural sciences, those with poor English more patriotic than those with good English, men more patriotic than women, and older students more patriotic than younger students (p.247).

He notes, too, that the longer students stay abroad the more they begin to feel free of the clutches of their former work units (danwei): ‘In China, the state is above, the family below, and between the two as the key pivot lies the unit. You can leave or vilify your family, love or curse your state, but you had better not offend your unit. In China, the unit has always had an omnipotent social role’ (p.60). Qian also argues that the danwei provides a major reason why only 5-10 per cent of students return to China (p.282). The danwei controls the individual’s material conditions: ‘Without housing’, for example, ‘students abroad have a country to return to but no home to return to’ (p.289). Returned students are also often intellectually isolated in their units (p.291). ‘Lovable [keai de] China’, Qian writes caustically, ‘certainly has some not so lovable points’ (p.286).

But Qian Ning is no iconoclastic ‘total Westernizer’. He is equally critical of ‘the opposite extreme, which sees everything Western as rational and scientific, and everything Chinese as ugly and twisted’ (p.138). He is also critical of American provincialism: ‘Americans have the same problem ... believing that the American social model should be the model for all others ... After the failure of Vietnam, Americans had a bit of an opportunity to reflect [upon these attitudes]. Unfortunately, those reflections were not deep enough’ (p.139).

At the onset of China Can Say No, Song Qiang describes the process by which he went from loving (‘I worshipped Reagan’ [p.17]) to hating America. His four co-authors had similar experiences and the huge sales of their book points to the resonance of their message. The students whom Qian Ning describes in Studying in USA also tend to either love or hate America. Very few are able — as is Qian himself — to see both good and bad in America.

Chinese are taught from a young age to clearly distinguish between objects of love and hate (ai zeng fen ming), and to live up to a rigid set of moral standards (zuo ren). This creates a ‘Peking Opera’ style of public life in
which the good and the bad are clearly juxtaposed, contributing to what Tang Tsou has for 20 years called a ‘winner takes all’ elite political culture.*

I believe that Studying in the USA attests to a shift away from this Manichean political culture that is beginning to occur in Chinese private life under the reforms, while Chinese public life is still dominated by Song Qiangs — those who see the world in vivid black and white.

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This new volume is about the factors which have and will continue, in the view of the author, to provide Taiwan with a very special status in determining the future of East Asia. More specifically, Klintworth’s central thesis is that Taiwan is at a vortex between Japan, China and the United States and has benefitted from rivalries among the three, not to mention their cultural and economic influences. Taiwan’s future, he thinks, will be influenced by a move toward ‘a kind of independence’ that ‘can be seen as a long and complicated process deriving from the mix of historical, geographic, political and economic circumstances that have prevailed in the Western Pacific over the last few centuries’ (p.3). He rejects the idea that events since 1950 have sealed Taiwan’s fate.

In his Introduction plus a chapter on the Japanese period (1895 to 1945) and one on the American period (after 1950, presumably to the present), Klintworth argues that Taiwan acquired a basic ‘Chineseness’ through the Chinese immigration that populated the island beginning a thousand years ago, after which there were two additional overlays: fifty years of Japanese colonization (which built the island’s economic infrastructure, left a cultural influence, and ‘fertilized Taiwan’s roots as a society and state beyond the grip of mainland China’); and a period of American dominance that provided Taiwan again with non-Chinese ideas about economic development, business management and reform.

From this springboard, the author examines Taiwan’s recent past and present relations with China. The China threat, Klintworth argues, made