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At the other extreme, one can conduct individual-level analyses and treat every CC member as an observation. With this dataset, one can infer the characteristics that would earn CC members promotions to the Politburo level. The individual-level data can be augmented by various economic and political indicators to provide a comprehensive look at the factors that drive elite promotions. Instead of focusing only on regional administrators (Landry, 2008a; Li and Zhou, 2009), a general theory of the factors that drive elite promotions across the various segments of the CCP regime can be tested rigorously.

Furthermore, this dataset also allows the researcher to segment the CC population into sectors or geographical regions and to correlate characteristics of regional or sectoral elite with various policy outcomes. Regional elite indicators, including regional representation in the CC, provincial factional affiliations, and the average education level of provincial elite, can be used to explain a host of regional economic and policy outcomes. With the development of these various indicators, we hope to make quantitative studies of the Chinese elite a less burdensome task.

4

Experimental Methods and Psychological Measures in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy

Peter Hays Gries

Do concerns over “face” play a greater role in Chinese than American foreign policy? What is the nature of Chinese national identity? Can it be empirically measured and compared to other national identities, and is it consequential for foreign policy outcomes? For instance, how do Chinese patriotism and nationalism compare with, say, American patriotism and nationalism?

This chapter argues that experimental methods and psychological measures provide valuable tools to the political scientist interested in answering such questions. Experiments have long been the first choice for establishing causality in the hard sciences. The social sciences are catching on, with psychology and behavioral economics leading the way. Political scientists, led by Americanists interested in voting behavior, are beginning to follow suit (Druckman et al., 2006). International relations scholars have taken notice. As Rose McDermott (2006: 356) has recently argued, “experiments offer a unique opportunity to make a clear causal argument ... which is why it has been differentially adopted by the hard sciences, psychology, and behavioral economics as the gold standard method of choice.” It is the random assignment of subjects to experimental and control conditions that allows analysts to be confident that variation between groups of subjects on dependent measures was “caused” by variation in the independent variables that were manipulated. By contrast, the majority of quantitative work in political science, which is based on research designs that are correlational in nature, cannot confidently make causal claims.

The postwar histories of comparative politics in general and China studies in particular make the idea of utilizing psychological measures in the study of Chinese foreign policy particularly contentious. In the 1960s and 1970s, modernization theory emerged as a major intellectual paradigm, with the concept of “political culture” at its core. Unfortunately, “political culture” was often used as a residual variable to explain what the theory could not otherwise explain. Its deterministic conclusions — certain nations could not democratize because of their “backward” cultures — also came under sustained criticism.
In the China field, Lucian Pye (e.g., 1968) took “political culture” in a psychoanalytic direction, put the entire Chinese people “on the couch,” and declared the Chinese race to be stuck at the anal stage of development. Such arguments rubbed many younger China scholars the wrong way. Many of the Vietnam generation, often organizing around the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, revolted against Pye and modernization theory. “Political culture” and psychology in general have largely been taboo topics in the China field ever since.

The China studies taboo on the study of political psychology is extremely unfortunate. Psychology in general and social and cross-cultural psychology in particular have much to offer the political scientist interested in Chinese politics and foreign policy today. In addition to useful theory, psychologists have developed reliable instruments to measure a variety of phenomena central to the study of Chinese foreign policy. For instance, Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) collective self-esteem (CSE) scale, developed to study gender, ethnic, and other social identities, can easily be adapted to study constructs like Chinese and American patriotism, as is done in the second study in this chapter. Instead of “I am proud to be a woman or black,” the researcher can use “I am proud to be Chinese or American” and take advantage of the hard work in psychometrics Luhtanen and Crocker undertook to develop a robust 16-item CSE scale. The methodology of psychometrics, furthermore, provides the China scholar with the desire to study new or China-specific phenomena, such as U.S. policy preferences, with the tools to develop their own internally reliable measures to tap such constructs.

To illustrate these methodological and measurement issues, I first introduce selected results from two separate studies. The first shows how an experimental design and survey data can be used to test the popular assumption that Chinese are more driven by “face” in their foreign policy than Americans. The second shows how psychological measures and exploratory factor analysis can be used on survey data to inductively uncover differing Chinese and American structures of “patriotism” and “nationalism.” It then uses the statistical technique of path analysis to uncover a possible model of the consequences of variations in Chinese patriotism and nationalism for the perception of U.S. threats and even U.S. policy preferences. In the final section, I draw on these two case studies to discuss the challenges and opportunities of experimental work and psychological measures in the study of Chinese foreign policy.

“FACE” AND FOREIGN POLICY: AN EXPERIMENT

Are Chinese more concerned about “face” in their foreign policy than Americans? This question was addressed in one part of a larger study (Gries, Peng, and Crowson, under review) exploring symbolic and material gains and losses as determinants of (in)security in international relations.

Experimental Methods and Psychological Measures

Design

A pair of student surveys was implemented in the United States and China in 2006. The design included both experimental (random assignment) and quasi-experimental (natural group) variables. It also included both between and within subjects designs. In other words, students’ responses were compared to each other’s as well as to their own responses to other questions. A 2 (domain) by 2 (frame) by 2 (level) by 2 (nation) factorial design with 16 conditions was employed, thus requiring a large sample size (N = 512). But this complexity allowed for the analysis of four key issues underlying the security studies debate over the fundamental determinants of (in)security in international affairs.

Independent Variables

The core of the design is an experimental 2 by 2 involving domain (material/symbolic) and frame (gains/losses). This portion of the design is a pure between-subjects experiment, with student participants randomly assigned to one of four conditions: (1) material gain, (2) material loss, (3) symbolic gain, and (4) symbolic loss. Each condition was operationalized with a set of scenarios that participants read and that differed only on the issues of domain and frame. For instance, “You have been dating your boy/girlfriend for over three months and realize that you love him/her. You decide to take a risk and tell him/her that you love him/her. He/She responds by saying that he/she doesn’t love you anymore and wants to break up” was a symbolic loss scenario.

Both the materialist and symbolic security studies camps rely on an analogy with individual human needs. Materialists assume that states, like individuals, prioritize survival. Symbolic analysts posit that states are driven by higher human needs for belonging and esteem. Both camps thus appear to share the assumption that the dynamics of security and insecurity are the same at the individual and international levels. To put this assumption to the test, we included a third variable in our design, level, by adding to the individual-level scenarios a parallel set of scenarios at the international level. For instance, “Sports analysis now predicts that China will double the American medal count at the 2008 Beijing Olympics. In their view, China will be the only sports superpower in the 21st century” was an international symbolic loss scenario for American subjects.

The final independent variable, and the one of central interest here, in the 2 by 2 by 2 design is nation (U.S./China). Orientalist notions of a Chinese obsession with “face” persist today and have a direct bearing on the issue of symbolic and material gains and losses. The Chinese, both Western (e.g., Smith, 1990) and Chinese (e.g., Ho, 1976; Hu, 1944) sources have long told us, are culturally predisposed to be sensitive to issues of “face.” Americans, meanwhile, supposedly disregard face in favor of a more rational calculation of their material self-interest.
Hypothesis: Chinese are more sensitive to symbolic gains and losses than Americans, and Americans are more sensitive to material gains and losses than Chinese.

To put this hypothesis to the test we first adapted the original English-language survey to the Chinese perspective. For instance, in the Chinese version, the material-gain condition of the energy scenario read, "A Chinese oil company has just purchased a large portion of the two largest oil fields in Africa, at a U.S. company." This reverses the words "Chinese" and "U.S." from the U.S. material gain condition, thus making the context of the U.S. material-gain version the same as the Chinese material-loss condition, and the U.S. material loss the same as the Chinese material gain. We then translated the adapted survey into Chinese and then back-translated it to ensure comparability. (For instance, “一家中国石油公司刚刚打败美国一家公司，购买了在非洲两个最大油田的独立采矿的权力.”)

Dependent Measures

Each of the scenarios used to tap the different conditions was followed by a battery of emotional response items. Each was on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) seven-point Likert-type scale. At its most fundamental level, security means the absence of concern or anxiety. We therefore constructed an anxiety score by averaging the self-reported responses to the "I feel worried" (我感到担心) and "I feel afraid" (我感到害怕) items.

Davis Bobrow (2001: 4) has perceptively noted that "threat centered work provides rich ground for security dilemmas spirals of action and reaction, measure and countermeasure." He thus urges that the study of threats be balanced with the study of opportunities. To balance our negative anxiety measure with a more positive one, we decided to supplement it with a single item measure of pride, "I feel proud" (我感到骄傲).

Participants and Method

Because our 2 by 2 by 2 design entailed 16 conditions, and we desired at least 30 students per condition (actual M = 32.56), a large sample of 52x 1 university students (284 female, 235 male, and 25 who did not indicate their gender) was recruited to participate in the study on a voluntary basis in spring 2006. Among these students, 240 were American at the University of Colorado and 281 were Chinese at Peking University. Participants ranged in age from 17 to 32 (median age = 20), and a t-test revealed that the American students (M = 20.58, SD = 4.44) were only slightly older than the Chinese students (M = 19.88, SD = 2.23), t = 2.27, p = .024.

We tested the Chinese and American participants in 15-minute sessions. The experimenter told the participants that the purpose of the study was to assess their reactions to eight scenarios. After assuring the participants that their responses would remain anonymous, the experimenter administered the survey packets. The participants filled out a series of questionnaires individually. After completing the packet, the participants were thanked for their participation, debriefed (i.e., informed that none of the scenarios that they had read were real), and released. The ethical standards of the American Political Science (APSA) and the American Psychological Association (APA) were strictly followed during data collection and analysis.

Selected Results

To see whether nation had any impact on our dependent measures, we ran a series of four three-way (image X domain X nation) analyses of variance (ANOVAs). The first, with individual level anxiety as our dependent variable, revealed the main effects of gain/loss and material/symbolic, but not nation. Losses (M = 5.17) produced much more anxiety than gains (M = 3.54), F (1, 495) = 302.68, p < .001. And material scenarios (M = 4.84) produced more anxiety than symbolic scenarios (M = 3.68), F (1, 495) = 128.88, p < .001. The effect size of gain/loss (η² = .38) was massive: about twice that of material/symbolic (η² = .26). The p value for nation (p = .49), however, was not even close to statistical significance. None of the two-way interactions was statistically significant either. The three-way interaction of nation, domain, and frame was statistically significant, F (1, 495) = 12.66, p < .001, but not in any obviously meaningful way, and the effect size, η² = .025, was quite small. The mean overall levels of anxiety were also very close for both the United States (M = 4.27) and China (M = 4.18), suggesting that there was no method effect impacting the results. At the individual level, in short, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the Chinese and American respondents' self-reports of anxiety were not significantly different.

When we ran a second three-way ANOVA on international-level anxiety, however, moderate national differences began to emerge. Overall, Chinese participants (M = 3.54) reported higher levels of anxiety after reading the international scenarios than did the American students (M = 3.03). There were main effects of gain/loss, material/symbolic, and nation (all ps < .001), with effect sizes of η² = .18, .15, and .03, respectively. All the interactions were significant as well, although the effect sizes were small. Figure 4.1 reveals that although the overall average size, η² = .02, of the three-way domain by frame by nation interaction, F (1, 492) = 11.78, p = .001, was on the small side, the Chinese participants (M = 3.87) reported much more anxiety in the international symbolic-loss condition than the U.S. participants (M = 3.43).

A three-way ANOVA on individual-level pride revealed the main effects of gain (M = 4.74) over loss (M = 1.91), F (1, 499) = 63.08, p < .001, η² = .26, symbolic (M = 5.64) over material (M = 3.01), F (1, 499) = 32.49, p < .001, η² = .06, and nation, F (1, 499) = 3.95, p = .047, although the effect

* Partial eta-square (η²) provides a global index of the size of observed differences in means. Small and medium effects are represented by values around .01 and .06, respectively. Large effects are represented by values around .14 or greater.
size for the latter, $\eta^2_p = .02$, was very small. The only statistically significant interaction was gain/loss and material/symbolic, $F(1, 439) = 25.88, p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .05$. Both American and Chinese students reported significantly more pride in personal symbolic gains ($M = 5.39$) than in material gains ($M = 4.12$), with symbolic losses ($M = 2.94$) and material losses ($M = 1.88$) virtually indistinguishable.

A three-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on international-level pride revealed the main effects of both gain/loss, $F(1, 437) = 275.65, p < .001$, and material/symbolic, $F(1, 497) = 12.73, p < .001$, although the effect size of the latter, $\eta^2_p = .03$, was dwarfed by that of the former, $\eta^2_p = .56$. Although there was no main effect of nation, there was a statistically significant interaction, $F(1, 497) = 41.83, p < .001$, between nation and gain/loss, with a medium effect size, $\eta^2_p = .08$. As displayed in Figure 4.2, compared to the Americans, the Chinese reported both higher levels of pride with national gains ($China M = 5.28$; U.S. $M = 4.18$), and lower levels of pride with national losses ($China M = 1.99$; U.S. $M = 2.78$). Indeed, subtracting the losses scores from the gains scores reveals that the Chinese participants (3.19 difference) were over twice as impacted by national gains and losses as the American participants (1.4 difference).

Discussion

Are Chinese more sensitive to symbolic gains and losses than Americans, and Americans more sensitive to material gains and losses than Chinese? The evidence from our experiment is mixed, but revealing. At the individual level, American and Chinese students were virtually indistinguishable when it came to their self-reports of anxiety and pride in response to symbolic and material gain and loss scenarios. For instance, both Chinese and American students took more pride in symbolic gains than in material gains. This suggests that scholars should be wary of Orientalist and Occidentalist notions of deep-rooted cultural differences, such as the idea that Chinese have an inordinate cultural sensitivity to issues of “face.”

National differences did emerge, however, when we shifted from individual to international scenarios. As Figure 4.1 reveals, Americans reported much lower levels of anxiety in response to national symbolic losses than did the Chinese participants. And as Figure 4.2 shows, Chinese were over twice as sensitive to gain/loss as Americans when it came to national pride.

Two questions arise from these international-level findings. First, were the Chinese levels of national pride and anxiety high or were the American levels low? In other words, is this finding evidence of a Chinese oversensitivity to the plight of their nation, an excessive concern with China's national “face”? Or is it evident that Americans can more easily disassociate themselves from the fate of their nation, or that they can kid themselves into believing that they don’t care? Further experimental work is needed to clarify this issue.

Second, why did our nation variable produce these international-level differences? Are they a product of the distinction between individualist and collectivist cultures, such that Chinese have more of their psychological well-being invested in the good of their groups? Alternatively, could these differences have historical origins, with the Chinese experience of victimization at the hands of Western imperialism during the “Century of Humiliation” making them more sensitive to their international status? Or are they simply the product of the current balance of material power, such that Americans have less to worry about or to take pride in, confident in U.S. global preeminence. Chinese, by contrast, may be more anxious simply because they are confronting the reality of an American military superpower that is ambivalent about China’s rise. Although the use of an experimental design allows us to

![Figure 4.1](image1.png)

**Figure 4.1.** International anxiety as a function of nation, domain, and frame, 2006 samples.

![Figure 4.2](image2.png)

**Figure 4.2.** International pride as a function of nation and frame, 2006 samples. Numbers in chart = means; number in parenthesis = standard deviations.
confidently state that nation “caused” these differences in our international anxiety and pride scores, further research is needed to uncover the mechanism of causation.

STRUCTURES AND CONSEQUENCES OF CHINESE NATIONAL IDENTITY: PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASURES AND METHODS

What is the nature of Chinese patriotism and nationalism? How do they differ from American patriotism and nationalism? And what impact do they have on Chinese foreign policy attitudes? To explore the structure and consequences of Chinese national identity, two surveys were conducted in the United States and China in spring 2009 (see Gries, Zhang, Crowson, and Cai, 2010). Using psychological measures, exploratory factor analysis, and path analysis, we found that although American patriotism and nationalism were empirically similar, they were highly distinct in China, with patriotism aligning with a benign internationalism, and nationalism with a more malign blind patriotism. Chinese patriotism, furthermore, had no impact on the perception of U.S. threats or U.S. policy preferences, whereas nationalism did. The role of nationalist historical beliefs in structures of Chinese national identity was also explored, as well as the consequences of historical beliefs for the perception of U.S. threats. Selected methods, results, and discussion are presented below to demonstrate the utility of psychological measures and methods to the study of Chinese foreign policy.

Participants and Procedures

The surveys were completed by 512 Chinese and Americans in spring 2009, among whom 161 Peking University undergraduate students in international relations filled out a three-page hard-copy survey in February, and 351 American adults from around the country took an online survey in March. Both surveys began with an explanation that the survey was about the relationship between personality and international relations, and that the data collected would remain confidential.

The Beijing sample included slightly more women (N = 89) than men (N = 69), and more students from the “masses” (群众) (N = 95) than CCP party members (党员) (N = 62). Due to a clerical error, age was not requested, but a survey of the same Peking University class the previous semester revealed a median age of 20. Of these students, 44 claimed to have grown up in the countryside and 114 claimed an urban upbringing.

The national American Internet sample was very well balanced, with slightly more men (N = 177) than women (N = 174), and slightly more Democrats (N = 190) than Republicans (N = 121) and Independents (N = 100). Ages ranged from 18 to 69, with a mean age of 33.54 (SD = 14.20). In terms of ethnicity, the sample was 81.2 percent white, 3.7 percent African American, 2.3 percent non-Chinese Asian American, 2.3 percent Latino/a, 4.3 percent Native American, and 6.3 percent “other.”

Measures

Unless otherwise noted, the questions that composed the following scales were on seven-point Likert-type scales, ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Both samples responded to the national identity items. The Americans were not asked the nationalist history, U.S. threat perception, and U.S. policy preferences items.

National Identities. Twelve items were utilized to tap four distinct types of national identities discussed in the literature on patriotism and nationalism. Higher values on these scales indicate greater patriotism, blind patriotism, nationalism, or internationalism. The Chinese language versions of these national identity items are listed in the note to Table 4.2.

Patriotism. Three items adapted from Luhmanen and Crocker’s (1992) collective self-esteem scale were used to tap the positive love of one’s own country. They were “I’m glad to be Chinese/American,” “I often regret that I am Chinese/American” (reverse coded), and “Being Chinese/American is an important reflection of who I am.”

Blind patriotism. Shatz, Staub, and Levine (1999) distinguish “blind” from “constructive” patriotism, arguing that the former represents an unquestioning allegiance and intolerance of criticism. We adapted three items: “China/ America is virtually always right,” “Chinese/American foreign policies are almost always morally correct,” and “I support my country whether its policies are right or wrong.”

Nationalism. Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) argue that nationalism goes beyond a positive love of one’s own country (patriotism) to a belief in the superiority of one’s own country over others. We adapted three items, “China/ America is the best country in the world,” “It is NOT important for China/ America to win international sports competitions” (reverse coded), and “In view of Chinese history and democracy, it is only natural that China lead East Asia/the U.S. lead the world.”

Internationalism. Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) further distinguish nationalism from internationalism. We adapted three items: “The alleviation of poverty in very poor countries like Haiti is their problem, not ours” (reverse coded), “Our children should be taught to support the welfare of all of humanity,” and “Our foreign policies should pursue the greatest good internationally, and not just pursue the Chinese/American national interest.”

Nationalist History. Beliefs about the nature of China’s past encounters with the outside world may impact the nature of Chinese national identity (Gries, 2004) as well as beliefs about the intentions of other countries in the present. We therefore included four items tapping beliefs about two distinct Chinese historical encounters with the outside world: (1) the “Century
of Humiliation,” and (2) the Korean War. The two “Century” items were taken directly from the series preface to the multivolume “Never Forget the National Humiliation” (中国近代史) history book series (1992): “China’s early modern encounter with Western imperial powers was a history of humiliation in which the motherland was subjected to the insult of being beaten because we were backwards” (中国近代与西方帝国主义列强的历史就是祖国蒙受奇耻大辱后挨打的屈辱史) and, “China’s early modern encounter with Western imperial powers was a heroic struggle by the Chinese people against imperialism” (中国近代与西方帝国主义列强的历史就是中国人民不屈服于帝国主义及其附属的英雄斗争史). The two Koreas War items were “China won the War to Resist America and Aid Korea” (中国在抗美援朝中得了) and “The War to Resist America and Aid Korea was a heroic moment in Chinese history” (抗美援朝是中国历史上的英雄时刻).

Threat Perception. Perception of the threat that the United States poses to China was tapped with four items, composed of two possible subscales. Two addressed military threat: “A growing American military is bad for China” (美国军队的发展对中国无益) and “The recent increase in U.S. defense spending undermines Chinese security” (美国军费开支的增长威胁中国安全). Two addressed humiliation threat: “American criticisms of Chinese ‘human rights’ are really just attempts to humiliate China” (美国政府批评中国“人权问题”实际上是想伤害中国) and “American support of Taiwan and Tibet is really about insulting the Chinese people” (美国支持台藏和西藏是在侮辱中国人民).

U.S. Policy Preferences. Three items were developed to tap respondents’ preferred U.S. policies. They were “The Chinese government should adopt tougher foreign policies toward the U.S.” (中国政府应该采取更强硬的外交政策) and “The best way to deal with the U.S. is to build up our military and seek to contain U.S. influence throughout the world” (应美国的最好方式是增强我国的军备，削弱美国在世界范围的影响) and “If the U.S. threatens China, we should use military force against them” (如果美国威胁中国，我们应该用军事力量对美国进行反击). Higher values indicate desires for tougher Chinese policies toward the United States.

RESULTS: STRUCTURES OF CHINESE AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY
To compare the structures of Chinese and American national identities, we first conducted exploratory factor analysis on our American and Beijing samples. Principal axis factoring (PAF) was conducted on both samples, followed by Promax rotation with Kaiser normalization to aid in the interpretation of the factors. Table 4.1 displays the results and includes all loadings greater than 0.35.

PAF on the American sample produced two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 (5.28 and 1.52, respectively). As Table 4.1 reveals, both were clearly

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4. *Eigenvalues represent the weight of the loadings on a factor. Generally, an eigenvalue of at least one is seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for viewing a factor as independent.*

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### Table 4.1: Structures of national identity: Pattern matrix loadings for principal axis factor analysis with Promax rotation for American and Chinese samples, 2009

| Factors | American | | | Chinese | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Factor 1: Patriotic/ Nationalism | Factor 2: Internationalism | Factor 1: Patriotic/ Nationalism | Factor 2: Blind/ Patriotism |
| | | | | | |
| Patriotism 1 | .908 | | .466 | |
| Patriotism 2 | .839 | | .812 | |
| Patriotism 3 | .797 | | .966 | |
| Blind Patriotism 1 | .498 | | .546 | |
| Blind Patriotism 2 | .552 | | .669 | |
| Blind Patriotism 3 | .627 | | .624 | |
| Nationalism 1 | .455 | | .782 | |
| Nationalism 2 | .390 | | .664 | |
| Nationalism 3 | .780 | | .798 | |
| Internationalism 1 | | | .673 | |
| Internationalism 2 | | | .639 | |
| Internationalism 3 | | | .690 | |
| Eigenvalues | 5.18 | | 3.45 | |
| Factor intercorrelation | .578 | | .619 | |
| Scale α (N) | .88 (9) | | .66 (5) | |
| Mean (SD) | 4.43 (1.26) | | 5.27 (1.11) | |
| | 5.13 (1.18) | | 5.92 (1.27) | |

Note: Factor coefficients are shown only if > 0.35. Reverse coded items denoted with an “x” and italicized. Differences in American/Chinese versions are underlined.

**Patriotism**
1. “I am glad to be American/Chinese.”
2. “I often regret that I am American/Chinese.”
3. “I am American/Chinese is an important reflection of who I am.”

**Blind Patriotism**
1. “American/Chinese foreign policies are almost always morally correct.”

**Nationalism**
1. “America/China is virtually always right.”
2. “I support my country whether its policies are right or wrong.”
3. “I am American/Chinese is an important reflection of who I am.”

**Internationalism**
1. “The alleviation of poverty in very poor countries like Haiti is our problem, not ours.”
2. “If it is not important for America/China to win international sporting competitions.”
3. “In view of America/China’s history and democracy, it is only natural that the U.S. lead the world/China lead East Asia.”

*Notes: All items are on a seven-point scale.*

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*Note: All items are on a seven-point scale.*

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5. “Our foreign policies should pursue the greatest good internationally, and not just pursue the American/Chinese national interest.”
interpretable. All nine patriotism, blind patriotism, and nationalism items loaded most strongly on the first factor, which has been labeled "patriotism/nationalism." The three internationalism items loaded on the second factor, labeled "internationalism." The two factors intercorrelated quite highly at \( r = .56 \) and the internationalism items all loaded negatively. Along with our second eigenvalue of just 1.52, this suggests that our two factor solution was close to being a single factor solution. In short, although patriotism, blind patriotism, and nationalism are conceptually distinct, our data suggest that empirically American patriotism and nationalism go together and even approach being part of a single dimension set against internationalism.

PAF on the Beijing sample also produced two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 (3.26 and 2.28, respectively). Table 4.1 reveals that both were clearly interpretable with no cross loadings. All three patriotism and the first two internationalism items loaded on factor one, labeled "patriotism/nationalism." All three blind patriotism and two of the nationalism items loaded on factor two, labeled "nationalism/blind patriotism." The two factors intercorrelated at just \( r = .27 \), indicating that these two dimensions of Chinese national identity are largely orthogonal or independent of one another.

The differing structures of American and Chinese national identities revealed in Table 4.1 are truly striking. Where patriotism – love of country – and nationalism – belief in the superiority of one's country over other countries – go together in the American sample, they do not go together in the Chinese sample. Instead, patriotism in China is associated with internationalism and should thus be understood to be more benign than American patriotism. In other words, the more patriotic an American is, the more nationalistic she or he also tends to be. In China, however, patriotism and nationalism do not necessarily go together, such that a highly patriotic Chinese is just as likely to be low on nationalism, and a very nationalistic Chinese to be low on patriotism.

**RESULTS: CONSEQUENCES OF CHINESE PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM**

To explore the consequences of Chinese patriotism and nationalism we first constructed scales for each, as well as for the history, threat, and policy variables. The scale reliabilities and NS are reported in the last two columns of Table 4.2, which reports the descriptive statistics for the Beijing sample. The Cronbach's alphas ranged from fair (\( \alpha = .72 \)) to good (\( \alpha = .82 \)) internal reliabilities, giving us confidence that the specific survey items composing each scale tapped the same underlying construct.

\[ \text{Cronbach's \ alpha \ range \ from \ zero \ to \ one, \ with \ higher \ scores \ indicating \ greater \ internal \ reliability \ of \ the \ measure.} \]

\[ \text{.60 \ is \ generally \ seen \ as \ the \ minimal \ acceptable \ alpha. \ Alphas \ tend \ to \ be \ higher \ for \ longer \ scales, \ so \ our \ alphas \ of \ .71 \ and \ .73 \ for \ scales \ of \ just \ two \ and \ three \ items \ might \ actually \ be \ interpreted \ as \ quite \ good.} \]

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**Experimental Methods and Psychological Measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>( \alpha )</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Patriotism/</td>
<td>.79*</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nationalism/</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blind Patriotism</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nationalist History</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Military Threat</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Humiliation</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. U.S. Policy</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

- **Correlation** is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
- **Correlation** is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

The means and standard deviations for all six of our scales are also listed in Table 4.2. The Beijing sample reported much more patriotism/internationalism (\( M = 5.63 \)) than nationalism/blind patriotism (\( M = 3.92 \)).\(^4\)

Given a scale midpoint of 4, we can say that, overall, the Beijing sample was very patriotic but quite balanced in terms of nationalism. The means for nationalist historical beliefs (\( M = 4.71 \)), military threat (\( M = 4.29 \)), and humiliation threat (\( M = 4.31 \)) were just above the scale midpoint of four, whereas U.S. policy preferences were just below the scale midpoint (\( M = 3.82 \)), suggesting a good balance on all of our scales.

Finally, Table 4.2 also reports the zero-order correlations among our six scales. With the exception of the lack of a relationship between patriotism and U.S. policy, all of the correlations were statistically significant and positive. And with the exception of the relationships between patriotism and nationalism, and patriotism and military threat, which correlated at just \( p < .05 \), the remaining correlations were highly significant (\( p < .01 \)) and substantial in size, ranging from \( r = .29 \) to \( r = .44 \).

Given that the zero-order correlations do not account for collinearity, we decided to use path analysis to better understand the precise relationships among our variables. Path analysis has a number of advantages over multiple regression, such as the ability to model mediated relationships among variables, as well as the ability to evaluate the global fit of a model containing those mediated relationships. We used AMOS 17.0 with full information.

\(^4\) An independent sample t-test revealed the difference between the means to be both statistically significant and very large, \( t (\#60) = 15.24, p < .001 \).
maximum likelihood estimation to first test a fully saturated model in which patriotism, nationalism, and nationalist historical beliefs were treated as co-varying exogenous variables predicting U.S. military and humiliation threat, which in turn predicted policy preferences. After removing the statistically insignificant paths, the model displayed in Figure 4.3 emerged as the best fit for the Beijing data.

We examined the fit of our path model based on the $\chi^2$ test, the $\chi^2$/degrees of freedom ratio, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), the Normed Fit Index (NFI), and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). Nonsignificant $\chi^2$ values and $\chi^2$/df ratios $< 2$ or $3$ are considered reasonable indicators of a close model fit. Conventional cutoffs for a close model fit are CFI, TLI, and NFI values greater than .95 and RMSEA values less than .06 (see Kline, 2005; Schumacker and Lomax, 2004). Our final model in Figure 4.3 was a very good fit for the Beijing data, with a nonsignificant $\chi^2$ value of $p = .338$, a $\chi^2$/df ratio of $x = 1.355$, a CFI of $997$, a TLI of $983$, a NFI of $976$, and an RMSEA of $0.29$.

The most striking aspect of our Beijing path model is that when controlling for nationalism and nationalist history, patriotism had no impact on perceptions of U.S. military or humiliation threat or U.S. policy preferences. Nationalism, by contrast, had a strong impact on U.S. policy preferences, both directly and mediated through perceptions of U.S. military and humiliation threats. Indeed, these three paths combined to account for a full 25 percent of the variance in U.S. policy preferences. From a foreign policy perspective, therefore, Chinese patriotism appears decidedly benign, whereas Chinese nationalism appears potentially malign in its consequences.

It is also noteworthy that nationalist historical beliefs covariated strongly with both patriotism ($r = .77$) and nationalism ($r = .44$), providing strong support for the argument that beliefs about the national past and national identities in the present are mutually constituted. Nationalist historical beliefs also strongly predicted both perceptions of U.S. military ($r = .32$) and humiliation ($r = .39$) threat.

Finally, Figure 4.3 reveals that perceptions of a humiliation threat had a much greater impact on U.S. policy preferences than did perceptions of a military threat. Indeed, squaring the partial coefficients reveals that whereas perceptions of a U.S. humiliation threat accounted for a full 9.6 percent of the variance in U.S. policy preferences, perceptions of a military threat accounted for just 3.2 percent of that variation. Those interested in the determinants of China’s U.S. policy, therefore, would be wise to consider not just the objective balance of military power but also the subjective realm of identity and affect.

### Discussion

Allen Carlson (2009) has lamented the lack of rigorous measurement in studies of Chinese national identity and the failure of scholars to place Chinese nationalism in a broader comparative framework. I agree. This case study should demonstrate that the rigorous measurement of constructs like patriotism and nationalism is not only possible but that such constructs can be part of an explanatory social science.

Neil Diamant (2009: 18–23; this volume, Chapter 2) has argued that there is a “threshold problem” in studies of popular nationalism such as my own (Gries, 2004): the patriotism of the self-styled “fourth generation” of urban Chinese does not entail sufficient sacrifice or commitment to rise to the level of true patriotism. Compared to the veterans he studies who have genuine “patriotic standing,” Diamant dismisses the urban youth who have been at the forefront of the last decade of popular nationalist protests as inconsequential “café latte” nationalists. Those like myself who have studied the rise of this popular nationalism, furthermore, foster “China threat” discourse.

Diamant’s “threshold” approach to patriotism/nationalism is both conceptually and empirically problematic. Conceptually, where should one draw the line? What level of “sacrifice” is sufficient to be included in his “patriot” category? (Or what level of late drinking is sufficient to be dismissed as an unpatriotic “elite”?) Empirically, reducing concepts like patriotism or nationalism to an either/or binary does violence to the complexity and variability of the concepts. For patriotism or nationalism to be useful in a social science that seeks to be explanatory, we should seek to maximize rather than minimize the variation that is empirically measured. Variables should vary – as much as possible. For instance, without the variability of each of our survey items, whose responses were on 1–7 Likert-type scales, and without five items
tapping both patriotism and nationalism, increasing each scale’s internal reliability, it is unlikely that we would have been able to empirically distinguish between Chinese patriotism and nationalism or to uncover the unique consequences of each.

Diamant is also misguided to dismiss the nationalism expressed by China’s young netizens (网民) and street demonstrators as inconsequential. This study has shown that individual differences in “trait” or enduring levels of nationalism impact both perceptions of U.S. threat and preferred U.S. policies. It is likely that temporary or “state” levels of nationalism have similar consequences. Thus when incidents like the 1999 Belgrade bombing or the 2001 Hainan Island plane collision temporarily inflamed anti-American nationalist sentiments, Chinese perceptions of U.S. threat likely increase, along with Chinese desires for tougher U.S. policies. During such crises, therefore, inflated Chinese nationalism could have very serious consequences for Chinese foreign policy, even if temporarily inflated levels of nationalism dissipate later, as Diamant rightly notes. In short, variations in Chinese nationalism, whether between individuals or across time, appear to be related to variations in both threat perception and even foreign policy preferences, thus warranting further research rather than dismissal.

Diamant’s most serious charge is that studies of popular Chinese nationalism, like my own, foster “China threat” discourse. His logic is one of guilt through association: “China threat” proponents frequently refer to the rise of Chinese nationalism to support their arguments; therefore, those who study Chinese nationalism are complicit in the “China threat” project. This logic is problematic: once scholarship has been published, no scholar can completely control its use or misuse. Diamant’s charge could also have a chilling effect on scholars, who too often cede the public sphere to sensitive political topics to nonexperts. I would argue that we need to encourage more, not less, academic work and policy outreach on highly consequential topics like Chinese nationalism.

CONCLUSION: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

In the conclusion to their edited volume New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, Thomas J. Christensen, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Robert S. Ross (2006: 387) rightly note that Chinese foreign policy studies have been a “consumer but not a producer of theory and methods.” I hope this chapter has made the case that experimental methods and psychological measures offer great promise not just for deepening our substantive knowledge of Chinese foreign policy but also for contributing to the theoretic development of the field of foreign policy analysis. Just as cross-cultural psychology was well positioned at the margins to challenge and reshape the universalism of much of mainstream social and cognitive psychology (see Nisbett [2003] for an overview), China scholars are well positioned to challenge and reshape theories inductively derived from the Western experience that do not travel well to China.

Experimental methods and Psychological Measures

Experimental methods, furthermore, are theoretically neutral. Whether you are a structural realist focusing on the balance of material power like Bob Ross, or a constructivist focusing on sociological theory like Iain Johnston, you can benefit from the rigorous causal explanatory power that experiments bring to empirical work.

The same cannot be said for psychological measures. If you agree with rationalists like Bob Ross (2001: 395) that “common arguments about misperceptions in policymaking … do not apply to the U.S.-China conflict,” you will have no need for psychological measures. If, on the other hand, you agree with Robert Jervis (1976) that perception and misperception are central to the relations among nations, psychological measures may well be indispensable for those who wish to move beyond theory to the empirical examination of Chinese foreign policy.

Psychological measures developed in the West, however, do not always travel well to China. Many core concepts in the psychological literature, such as conservatism, are so bound up in the Western liberal tradition that they simply cannot travel to China. For instance, the widely used right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale has idiosyncratic items like “Arrests and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly” that clearly would not resonate with Chinese subjects.

Another problem with using Western psychological measures in China is that the scales tend to be one dimensional, requiring that negative items be reverse-coded. Cross-cultural psychologists have found that due to a greater tendency toward dialectical rather than categorical thinking, Asians are more likely than Westerners to simultaneously hold contradictory attitudes (e.g., Spencer-Readers, Peng, and Wang, 2004). Forcing their responses onto unidimensional scales, therefore, is likely to reduce their reliability. For example, a Chinese respondent to a stereotyping or prejudice scale might simultaneously rate Americans as both highly “friendly” (a positive attribute) and highly “disagreeable” (a negative quality), thus reducing the reliability of a unidimensional scale. Greater multidimensional scaling in such a situation would be needed. Similarly, in our second case study, separate items tapping beliefs that China was a victim and beliefs that China was a victor during the “Century of Humiliation” cohered, despite their apparent contradiction. Such empirical findings point to the importance of a fundamentally inductive orientation toward the data gathered from Chinese surveys.

Another challenge is that psychological constructs like threat perception are notoriously difficult to measure, especially when using hard-copy or Internet surveys that rely on self-reporting. People are not always honest, even with themselves, about their actual views and emotions. Through “impression management” or “self-presentation” techniques, we often seek to orchestrate the images we present to ourselves and the world (Goffman, 1959). With sufficient funding, future research could also use physiological techniques, such as measuring blood pressure and galvanic skin conductance as indicators of anxiety and threat perception. A more affordable approach is
sentence unscrambling tasks and other methods that can reveal subconscious or implicit levels of various attitudes and affect.

At a broader level, all statistical studies confront two challenges: junk-in- junk-out and gold-in-junk-out. First, regardless of the rigor of the statistical analysis, if the original data are poor, the results will be of limited value. This problem has been well documented in the case of the famous “correlates of war” database once widely used in conflict studies. The coding of even basic issues such as distinguishing between interstate and civil wars or the exact onset or termination dates of hostilities was found to be highly problematic. In the case of the type of political psychology conducted here, good internal reliabilities are vital to the discovery of robust patterns of associations among our variables. For instance, had the internal reliabilities of our measures been lower, the fit statistics for our path model would not have been good enough to give us confidence in the pattern of associations depicted in the model.

Second, even excellent survey data, if not properly interpreted, yield little of value. Statistics do not speak for themselves. One problem is that political scientists overemphasize statistical significance testing ($p$ values) at the expense of effect sizes ($\eta^2$) and the interpretation of the practical significance and meaning of their statistical results. The focus on statistical significance testing is particularly problematic when political scientists use preexisting datasets, such as the American National Election Survey or the Chicago Council on Global Affairs surveys that generally have very large $N$s. With such datasets, it is rare for variables to be completely uncorrelated; $p$ values are a direct product of sample size. Another problem with statistical significance testing is the systematic failure to report statistically insignificant findings. Empirical falsification, as Karl Popper (2002) has noted, is vital to the accumulation of knowledge. Statistical non-findings can also prove highly instructive, such as the finding reported in the first case study above that American and Chinese students responded similarly to the individual-level scenarios of symbolic and material gains and losses, allowing us to question Orientalist notions of a uniquely Chinese obsession with “face.”

Much statistical work also suffers from a lack of attention to the interpretation of the meaning of statistical results. This is likely due to the limits of correlational data and the challenges of interpretation. Correlational designs cannot yield causal explanations. Even our path model presented in Figure 4.3, although an excellent fit to the data, did not prove a causal relationship. It is always possible that there are other configurations of paths that would fit the data equally well or better. Interpretation can also be challenging even with data resulting from experimental designs. For instance, whereas we can feel confident that nation (American vs. Chinese) was the cause of the differing levels of anxiety displayed in Figure 4.2, the precise mechanism of causation remains unclear. Our interpretation of the results, therefore, must remain tentative. In nascent fields like the political psychology of international relations and Chinese foreign policy studies where so little is yet known, translating even rigorous experimental findings into coherent causal arguments remains a daunting task.

The list of challenges, frankly, is humbling. It is not easy to do this type of research. Mastering psychological and international relations theories, experimental and survey designs, psychometrics, and statistical analysis are just the beginning. Another challenge surrounds data collection. Finding partners in China is the critical first step. It is vital to work with groups of people who trust one another and who share common interests and goals. I prefer the coauthoring and sharing of data to purchasing data, although that is not always possible if one seeks a nationally representative sample. Often more challenging are human subjects review boards at U.S. universities—these are difficult to begin with and frequently have misperceptions about China that hinder project approval. Once approval is secured, the procedural details are numerous but manageable. Hard-copy questionnaires must be stored in secure areas, devoid of any identifying information. Electronic data files must be password-protected on computers to ensure participant confidentiality.

A final challenge for political psychologists is that peer review in political science journals will always be challenging because of an arbitrary preference among most reviewers for the external rather than the internal validity of research designs. This is likely due to the dominance of American politics and Americanists’ focus on voting behavior, where external validity is obviously of paramount importance. Furthermore, most political scientists have a myopic view of external validity: all they can understand is random sampling. Replication is a fundamental principle of the scientific method. Indeed, the entire discipline of psychology is built on the cross-validation of research using independent samples. And yet I have experienced reviewers who refuse to accept results replicated across four or more independent samples. They were trained in random sampling and are dismissive of other approaches to external validity. Clearly scholars need to be careful about generalizing from nonrandom samples, but there are times when the advantages of measurement and internal reliability outweigh the costs to generalization (e.g., Nicholson-Crotty and Meier, 2002). Research design should follow from research goals, not dogma.

In my view, such challenges to using experimental methods and psychological measures must be overcome if we are to better understand the determinants of security and insecurity in U.S.-China relations—and avoid another bilateral conflict. China and the United States fought twice in the latter half of the twentieth century, and the United States could easily be dragged into another conflict involving either Taiwan or China-Japan relations at the onset of the twenty-first century. As Figure 4.3 makes clear, psychological concepts like humiliation have a powerful impact on the foreign policy preferences of individual Chinese. Rationalist approaches to IR, such as neorealism and neoliberalism, therefore, must be supplemented by approaches that take into account the intersection of politics and psychology. The stakes are simply too high to cover our eyes and simply hope for the best.