ABSTRACT  What is the nature of Chinese patriotism and nationalism, how does it differ from American patriotism and nationalism, and what impact do they have on Chinese foreign policy attitudes? To explore the structure and consequences of Chinese national identity, three surveys were conducted in China and the U.S. in the spring and summer of 2009. While patriotism and nationalism were empirically similar in the U.S., they were highly distinct in China, with patriotism aligning with a benign internationalism, and nationalism with a more malign blind patriotism. Chinese patriotism/internationalism, furthermore, had no impact on perceived U.S. threats or U.S. policy preferences, while nationalism did. The role of nationalist historical beliefs in structures of Chinese national identity was also explored, as well as the consequences of historical beliefs for the perception of U.S. military and humiliation threats.

From the Beijing Olympics to the 60th National Day parade, 2008-2009 witnessed a series of Chinese patriotic and nationalist spectacles that have again raised the issue of China’s global intentions. Is China a status quo power seeking to peacefully integrate itself into the extant international system? Or is China a revisionist power seeking to overturn the global order?

On March 10, 2008, the 59th anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising, hundreds of Buddhist monks began a series of protests in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities that were met with state repression. Sympathetic towards the plight of the monks, the Western media roundly condemned the PRC government. The Olympic torch relay then became an occasion for major protests and counter protests. In London and Paris on April 6 and 7, pro-Tibetan protestors were roughed up by Chinese security details; Chinese observers, for their part, were horrified by the failure of the host countries to fully protect the torch bearers.

Many Chinese were particularly upset with France, perhaps because of the image of a pro-Tibetan protestor seeking to grab the Olympic torch from wheelchair-bound Chinese para-Olympian Jin Jing during the Paris torch relay, or perhaps because French President Nikolas Sarkozy had met with the Dalai Lama and was threatening to snub the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics. In April, nationalist protestors gathered outside of
Carrefour supermarkets in over a dozen Chinese cities, waving banners and shouting slogans about opposing Tibetan independence and boycotting French goods. Over ten thousand protestors converged on one Carrefour in Hefei. In Qingdao, one man held up a sign comparing the events of 2008 to the events of almost 150 years earlier:

对家乐福说 NO!!!  
Say NO to Carrefour!!!

对法国帝国主义说 NO!!!  
Say NO to French Imperialism!!!

强烈抗议 1860 年英法侵略中国  
Strongly protest the 1860 Anglo-French invasion of China

强烈抗议 2008 诋毁我国奥运¹  
Strongly protest the 2008 slander of Our Olympics

Protestors in Xi’an demanded a boycott of “Carre-f***!” in even more impassioned terms.

Although discourse about “our Olympics” (我国奥运) was frequently quite nationalistic, the summer Olympics themselves seemed to exhibit a more positive inward looking patriotism than the hostile anti-foreign nationalism of the spring. Chinese displayed an understandable patriotic pride in a spectacular opening ceremony, China’s impressive gold medal tally, and the hosting of a memorable Games.

The October 1, 2009 National Day parade in Tiananmen Square was a spectacle of even greater scale than the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics. While dancers and spaceships evoked a patriotic pride in traditional Chinese culture and China’s recent technological accomplishments, there were also plenty of more nationalistic themes. An impressive display of military armaments bespoke China’s ability to dominate its neighbors, and Mao’s nationalistic declaration of 1949 that “China has stood up” was invoked both visually in the parade and highlighted in Hu Jintao’s keynote address.²

These events raise a number of questions. What is the nature of Chinese national identity? Love of or attachment to country, patriotism (爱国主义), and the belief in the superiority of one’s country over other countries, nationalism (民族主义), are both conceptually and normatively distinct.³ But are they empirically distinct? In other words, are Chinese who are more patriotic also likely to be more nationalistic? Or do they vary independently, such that a Chinese who is highly patriotic is just as likely not to be nationalistic as to be highly nationalistic?

And there is the issue of the comparative context of Chinese nationalism.⁴ Can the structure of Chinese national identity be usefully compared to that of other countries, such as
American national identity? For instance, are Chinese and American patriotisms and nationalisms similar in terms of their positions in broader structures of Chinese and American national identity? Do they have similar implications for foreign policy attitudes?

Our Qingdao protestor raises the related issue of the role of historical beliefs in Chinese structures of national identity. Ten years ago John Fitzgerald argued that the desire many Chinese express for dignity has its origins in feelings of humiliation stemming from China’s early modern encounter with Western and Japanese imperialisms. William Callahan later argued that “humiliation has been an integral part of the construction of Chinese nationalism.” Peter Gries maintained that evolving Chinese histories of their “Century of Humiliation” and Chinese national identities in the present are mutually constituted: “Chinese visions of the ‘Century’ have shaped their sense of self, and these changes to Chinese identity have altered their views of the ‘Century’.” Most recently, in a 2009 issue of China Quarterly, Geremie Barmé argued that the “aggrieved nationalism” of China today has its origins in “state-supervised mythologies” of “dynastic greatness” and victimization at the hands of Western colonialism. In studies of international relations, scholars like John Garver, Andrew Nathan, Bob Ross, and Deng Yong have similarly argued for the importance of dignity and humiliation as drivers of Chinese foreign policies. Are these scholars right? Do Chinese beliefs about their past encounters with Western imperialism have any relevance for understanding Chinese national identity today?

And what are the consequences of Chinese national identity? Do Chinese who are more patriotic or nationalistic perceive other countries like the United States differently from those Chinese who are less patriotic or nationalistic? For instance, are they likely to perceive differing levels of U.S. threat to China? If so, what kinds of threat? Military threat, or the humiliation threat to Chinese national self-esteem so often discussed among popular Chinese nationalists?

Neil Diamant dismisses the urban youth who have been at the forefront of the last decade of popular nationalist protests in China as inconsequential “caffè latte” nationalists who take to the streets or cyberspace to protest one day, but then apply for U.S. visas the next. Is he right that popular Chinese nationalism today is largely inconsequential? Or do variations in Chinese nationalism have an impact on the Chinese people’s U.S. policy preferences?
Although there is a substantial qualitative literature addressing many of these questions, there is remarkably little quantitative research on the structures and consequences of Chinese national identity. Allen Carlson has lamented the lack of rigorous measurement in studies of Chinese national identity. We agree. In this paper, therefore, we present and analyze the results of three original surveys conducted in China and the U.S. in 2009. Utilizing this survey data, we seek both to understand the structure of Chinese national identity in a comparative context, and to explore some of the potential consequences of those structures. Specifically, we are interested in whether variations in Chinese patriotism, nationalism, and nationalist historical beliefs have an impact on perceptions of U.S. threats and even U.S. policy preferences.

**Participants and Procedures**

719 Chinese and American University students completed surveys in the spring and summer of 2009. 161 Peking and Renmin University undergraduate students filled out a three page hardcopy survey in February. 202 Zhongshan University undergraduate students completed a two page hardcopy survey in Guangzhou in April. Finally, 357 undergraduate students at the University of Oklahoma took an online survey in August. All three surveys began with the explanation that the survey was about the relationship between personality and international relations, and that the data collected would be kept confidential. The ethical standards of the American Political Science and American Psychological Associations (APSA and APA) were strictly followed during data collection and analysis.

The Beijing sample included slightly more women (N=89) than men (N=69), and more students from the “masses” (群众) (N=95) than CCP party members (党员) (N=61). Due to a clerical error, age was not requested, but a survey of the same classes the previous semester revealed a median age of 20. 44 students claimed to have grown up in the countryside, while 114 claimed an urban upbringing. Students listed 36 different provinces or major cities as their birthplaces, with Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangxi, Shandong, Zhejiang, and Hunan leading the way.

The Guangzhou sample included slightly more women (N=76) than men (N=74) (52 did not report their gender), and many more students from the “masses” (N=139) than CCP party members (N=38) (25 did not report their political status). The mean age was 20.44
90 students claimed to have grown up in the countryside, while 96 claimed an urban upbringing (16 did not report). 47% reported being from Guangzhou. No other province or city surpassed 5% of the total sample.

The University of Oklahoma sample was well balanced, with slightly more men (N=184) than women (N=173), and more Republicans (N=163) than Democrats (N=100) and Independents (N=94). Ages ranged from 17 to 60 with a mean age of 21.21 (SD=5.24). In terms of ethnicity, the sample was 75.9% white, 5.9% African-American, 4.5% non-Chinese Asian-American, 4.5% Latino/a, 6.4% Native American, and 2.8% “other.”

All three of these student samples were younger, more urban, better educated, and more knowledgeable about the outside world than the broader Chinese and American mass publics. We therefore make no claims about the absolute levels of opinion revealed in our surveys. Our interest, instead, lies primarily in comparing different latent variables in relationship to each other. To provide more effective tests of such relationships, we opted to greatly increase the number of questions about each, sacrificing a small degree of external validity for greater internal validity.

Measures

Unless otherwise noted, the questions that composed the following scales were on seven-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). All three samples responded to the national identity items. The Americans were not asked the Chinese nationalist history, U.S. threat perception, and U.S. policy preferences items.

National identities. Ten items were utilized to tap four distinct types of national identities discussed in the academic literature on patriotism and nationalism. The major advantage to adapting preexisting scales from the extant literature is that they have been tested in a variety of samples and contexts, lending greater support to their use as valid indicators of their respective constructs. It also allows us to compare our findings with those of other scholars. However, by utilizing preexisting scales, we adopt the definitions advanced by particular scholars that may not always travel well. For instance, the construct “internationalism” measured by Kosterman and Feshbach below is quite different from the idea of proletarian “internationalism” (国际主义) in the Chinese context. So the reader must be careful not to equate references to “internationalism” in this paper with the Chinese 国际
Higher values on the scales described below indicate greater levels of patriotism, blind patriotism, nationalism, or internationalism. The Chinese language versions of these national identity items are listed in the note to table 1.

**Patriotism.** Three items adapted from Rita Luhtanen and Jennifer Crocker’s collective self-esteem (CSE) scale were used to tap the love of one’s own country. They were “I’m glad to be Chinese/American,” “I often regret that I am Chinese/American” (reverse coded), and “Being Chinese/American is an important reflection of who I am.”

** Blind patriotism.** Robert Shatz, Ervin Staub, and Howard Levine distinguished “blind” from “constructive” patriotism, arguing that the former represents an unquestioning allegiance and intolerance of criticism. We adapted three items: “China/America is virtually always right,” “Chinese/American foreign policies are almost always morally correct,” and “I support my country whether its policies are right or wrong.”

**Nationalism.** Kosterman and Feshbach argue that nationalism goes beyond a love of one’s own country (patriotism) to a belief in the superiority of one’s own country over others. We adapted two items, “China/America is the best country in the world,” and “In view of China’s lengthy history and glorious civilization/America’s history and democracy, it is only natural that China lead East Asia/the U.S. lead the world.”

**Internationalism.** Kosterman and Feshbach further distinguished nationalism from internationalism, which they treated as a humanist concern for “global welfare” or the wellbeing of peoples from all nations. As noted above, this definition is distinct from the meaning of the Chinese 国际主义. We adapted two items: “The alleviation of poverty in very poor countries like Haiti is their problem, not ours” (reverse coded), and “Our children should be taught to support the welfare of all of humanity.”

**Chinese nationalist history.** Beliefs about the nature of China’s past encounters with the outside world may impact the nature of Chinese national identity, as well as perceptions of external threat in the present. We therefore included four items tapping beliefs about two distinct Chinese historical encounters with the outside world of relevance to Chinese views of the U.S. today: 1) the “Century of Humiliation” and 2) the Korean War. The two “Century” items were taken directly from the series preface to the multivolume “Never Forget the National Humiliation” (勿忘国耻) history book series: “China’s early modern encounter with Western imperial powers was a history of humiliation in which the
motherland was subjected to the insult of being beaten because we were backwards” (中国近代与西方帝国主义列强的历史就是祖国蒙受奇耻大辱落后挨打的惨痛史) and “China’s early modern encounter with Western imperial powers was a heroic struggle by the Chinese people against imperialism” (中国近代与西方帝国主义列强的历史就是中国人民不甘屈服于帝国主义及其附属的英雄斗争史). Note that these two items highlight heroism and humiliation respectively. The two Korean War items were “China won the War to Resist America and Aid Korea” (中国在抗美援朝中得胜了) and “The War to Resist America and Aid Korea was a heroic moment in Chinese history” (抗美援朝是中国历史上的英雄时刻).

**U.S. threat perception.** Perception of the threat that the U.S. poses to China was tapped with four items, composed of two possible subscales. Two addressed military threat: “A growing American military is bad for China” (美国军队的发展对中国无益) and “The recent increase in U.S. defense spending undermines Chinese security” (最近美国国防开支的增长威胁中国安全). Two addressed humiliation threat: “American criticisms of Chinese ‘human rights’ are really just attempts to humiliate China” (美国政府批评中国“人权问题”实际上是在羞辱中国) and “American support of Taiwan and Tibet is really about insulting the Chinese people” (美国支持台湾和西藏是在羞辱中国人民).

**U.S. policy preferences.** Three items were developed to tap respondents’ preferred policies toward the U.S. They were “The Chinese government should adopt tougher foreign policies towards the U.S.” (中国政府应该对美国采取更强硬的外交政策), “The best way to deal with the U.S. is to build up our military and seek to contain U.S. influence throughout the world” (应对美国的最好方式是增强我国的军备，削弱美国在世界范围的影响), and “If the U.S. threatens China, we should use military force against them” (如果美国威胁中国，我们应该用军事力量对美国进行反击).

**Structures of Chinese and American National Identity**

To compare the structures of Chinese and American national identities, we first conducted exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on our Chinese and American samples. EFA is a statistical technique that is used to discover the latent dimensions or unobserved variables
(i.e., “factors”) that undergird a larger number of observed variables (e.g., our survey items). Principal axis factoring (PAF), a type of EFA, with Promax rotation was conducted on all three samples. Table 1 displays the results, and includes all factor loadings greater than |0.35|. The numbers in the table represent how strongly each item correlates with the factor and is generally used in factor analytic research to “name” factors. The higher the number, the greater the loading onto the factor.

PAF on the Beijing sample produced two factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1 (3.26 and 2.28 respectively). Eigenvalues represent the amount of variance in the original set of variables accounted for by a factor. Both factors were clearly interpretable with items exhibiting low cross loadings. (See the first two columns of table 1.) All three patriotism and the first two internationalism items loaded on factor one, labeled “patriotism/internationalism.” All three blind patriotism and the two nationalism items loaded on the second factor, labeled “nationalism/blind patriotism.” The two factors intercorrelated at just $r = .27$, indicating that these two dimensions of Chinese national identity were intercorrelated at a fairly modest level, suggesting that they were largely independent of one another.

Replication is a fundamental principle of the scientific method. We therefore ran the same PAF on our Guangzhou data as well. Three factors emerged with Eigenvalues greater than one, but the third was just 1.01, and the scree plot revealed a clear break after the second factor. We therefore re-ran the PAF as a two factor solution, and found that all the blind patriotism and nationalism items loaded cleanly on the first factor with an Eigenvalue of 3.14, and all the patriotism and internationalism items loaded cleanly on the second factor with an Eigenvalue of 1.87 (see the third and fourth columns of table 1). The two factors only intercorrelated at $r = .36$, again suggesting factor independence. The Guangzhou data thus replicated the factor structure of the Beijing data, providing powerful evidence that patriotism and nationalism in China are not just conceptually and normatively but also empirically distinct.

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1 An Eigenvalue of at least one is often used by factor analysts as a criteria for judging how many factors best represent the data.
PAF on the University of Oklahoma sample produced two factors with Eigenvalues greater than one (2.88 and 1.44 respectively). As the last two columns in table 1 reveal, both factors were clearly interpretable. All six patriotism, blind patriotism, and nationalism items loaded strongly onto the first factor, which we labeled “patriotism/nationalism.” The two internationalism items loaded on the second factor, labeled “internationalism.” The two factors intercorrelated at just \( r = .20 \) and the internationalism items both loaded negatively. In short, while patriotism, blind patriotism, and nationalism are conceptually distinct, our data suggests that empirically American patriotism and nationalism go together.

The differing structures of American and Chinese national identities revealed in table 1 are truly striking. Whereas patriotism – love of country – and nationalism – belief in the superiority of one’s country over other countries – go together in the American sample, they did not go together in the Chinese sample. Instead, patriotism in China was associated with internationalism, and should thus be understood as more benign than American patriotism. In other words, the more patriotic an American is, the more nationalistic s/he also tends to be. In China, however, patriotism and nationalism do not necessarily go together, such that a highly patriotic Chinese may or may not be high on nationalism.

**Descriptive Statistics: Chinese Identities and Attitudes towards America**

Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the Beijing and Guangzhou samples. The Cronbach’s alphas ranged from fair (\( \alpha = .71 \)) to good (\( \alpha = .82 \)) for the Beijing sample. Cronbach’s alphas range from zero to one, with higher scores indicating greater internal reliability (i.e., consistency) of the measure. Alphas tend to be higher for longer scales, so our alphas of .71 and .73 for scales of just two and three items are actually quite good.

Of particular note was our pairs of “Century of Humiliation” and Korean War items, which cohered into a single internally reliable four item scale. Recall that, following the official PRC historiography, our two Century survey items treated the period as both
“heroic” (英雄) and “humiliating” (奇耻大辱) respectively. While these items may appear contradictory, they were not, intercorrelating strongly and positively, \( r = .47 \) and \( r = .44 \) for the Beijing and Guangzhou student samples respectively. Cross-cultural psychologists have demonstrated that Chinese are more likely than Americans to engage in dialectical thinking, simultaneously embracing seemingly contradictory positions.\(^{18}\) Along with an educational system that inculcates this view, a facility with dialectical thinking may help explain the consistency of our Chinese university students in responding to statements about the Century as both heroic and humiliating.

The means and standard deviations for all six of our scales are also listed in Table 2. Both samples reported much higher levels of patriotism/internationalism than nationalism/blind patriotism.\(^{19}\) Given a scale midpoint of four, we can say that overall, both samples were very patriotic but quite balanced in terms of nationalism. The means for nationalist historical beliefs, military threat, and humiliation threat were just above the scale midpoint of four, while U.S. policy preferences were just below the scale midpoint.

Did demographic characteristics have any impact on our six variables? We ran a series of multiple analyses of variance (MANOVA) to find out. Neither gender nor rural/urban upbringing had statistically significant impacts on any of our variables in either the Beijing or Guangzhou samples. Political status did have a pair of small but statistically significant impacts, however. Among our Beijing students, members of the “masses” (\( M=4.18, SD=1.35 \)) preferred a slightly tougher U.S. policy than did party members (\( M=3.65, SD=1.28 \)), \( F(1,154)=6.00, p=.015 \). Perhaps party members were more likely to defer to their government’s U.S. policy. The effect size of the difference, \( \eta_p^2=.038 \), was small.\(^{20}\) Finally, among our Guangzhou students, the masses (\( M=5.04, SD=1.27 \)) held slightly more nationalistic historical beliefs than did party members (\( M=4.64, SD=1.28 \)), \( F(1,173)=2.85, p=.09 \). The effect size for the mean difference was very small, \( \eta_p^2=.016 \), however. Given the small size of our samples, further research is needed to see if the national identities and foreign policy orientations of student CCP members differ significantly from their non-party classmates.

Finally, Table 2 also reports the zero-order correlations and significance levels among our six scales. For the Beijing sample, with the exception of the lack of a relationship between patriotism and U.S. policy, all of the correlations were statistically significant and
positive. And with the exception of the relationships between patriotism and nationalism, and patriotism and military threat, which correlated at just $p < .05$, the remaining correlations were highly significant ($p < .01$) and substantial in size, ranging from $r = .29$ to $r = .44$. The pattern of zero-order correlations among the variables in the Guangzhou sample was comparable.

**Structural Equation Models**

We decided to use structural equation modeling (SEM) to better understand the precise relationships among our six variables. SEM has a number of advantages over multiple regression, such as the ability to model both prediction and measurement error, mediated relationships among variables, as well as the ability to evaluate the global fit of a model containing those mediated relationships. Using the Beijing data as a model development sample, we used AMOS 17.0 with full information maximum likelihood estimation to first test a measurement model whereby all six of the latent variables in the model were allowed to co-vary. We then tested a (near) fully saturated structural model in which patriotism, nationalism, and nationalist historical beliefs were treated as co-varying exogenous variables predicting U.S. military and humiliation threat, which in turn predicted policy preferences. After removing statistically non-significant paths, the model displayed in Figure 2 emerged as the best fit to the Beijing data.

[insert Figure 2 around here]

Table 3 lists the model fit statistics for all of the models in this study.\(^{21}\) The figures reported in the first two rows reveal that our fit indicators were just above or below the “close fit” conventions, indicating that our final model in figure 2 was a reasonable fit to the Beijing data.

[insert Table 3 around here]

The most striking aspect of our final Beijing SEM is that when controlling for nationalism and nationalist history, patriotism/internationalism had no impact on perceptions of U.S. military or humiliation threat or U.S. policy preferences. Nationalism, by contrast, did impact U.S. policy preferences, with its effects being mediated through perceptions of both U.S. military and humiliation threats. From a foreign policy perspective, therefore,
Chinese patriotism appears decidedly benign, while Chinese nationalism appears potentially malign in its consequences, heightening threat perception.

It is also noteworthy that nationalist historical beliefs covaried strongly with both patriotism \( (r = .37) \) and nationalism \( (r = .44) \), providing strong support for the argument that beliefs about the national past and national identities in the present are mutually constituted. Furthermore, nationalist historical beliefs were the strongest predictor of both perceptions of U.S. military \( (\beta = .44) \) and humiliation \( (\beta = .45) \) threat.

Finally, Figure 2 reveals that perceptions of humiliation threat \( (\beta = .50) \) had a much greater impact on U.S. policy preferences than did perceptions of military threat \( (\beta = .20) \). Together, these two forms of threat perception accounted for a remarkable 38% of the variance in U.S. policy preferences. Those interested in the determinants of China’s U.S. policy, therefore, would be wise to consider not just the objective balance of military power, but also the subjective realm of identity, affect, and threat perception.

As noted above, replication is fundamental to the scientific method. We therefore ran our final Beijing structural model again using the Guangzhou data. The fit statistics for this Guangzhou replication sample are reported on the third row of Table 3. While not quite as good as the fit statistics for the Beijing development sample, we consider them to be a reasonable replication of our final model. Furthermore, the pattern of path coefficients in the Guangzhou model largely replicated that of the model based on the Beijing sample. The primary difference was that the partial coefficient for the path from nationalist history to military threat reduced from .44 to .25, and the path from military threat to U.S. policy reduced from .20 to .08. As a result, the overall variance in U.S. policy preferences explained decreased from 38% to 28%. However, the path coefficients from nationalist history and nationalism to humiliation threat, and from humiliation threat to U.S. policy remained largely unchanged from those of the Beijing sample. Thus the basic overall finding that the path from nationalist history and nationalism to U.S. policy preferences was much stronger via humiliation threat than military threat was only reinforced.

Conclusions: Patriotism, Nationalism and China’s U.S. Policy

While further research with independent samples is needed to both replicate and expand upon the findings presented above, a few tentative conclusions are in order.
First, patriotism and nationalism in China are empirically distinct. They are not in the U.S. American analysts would be wise, therefore, not to project American assumptions about the nature and consequences of expressions of national identity onto the Chinese. For instance, following the “9-11” terrorist attacks of 2001, Americans displayed U.S. flags in vast numbers, an act that might be interpreted as a patriotic display of loyalty to one’s country. And yet that flag display occurred at a time when Americans also overwhelmingly supported an invasion of Afghanistan, an act that might be better interpreted as a consequence of a nationalist desire to dominate. Indeed, recent experimental work has shown that exposure to the U.S. flag increases American nationalism but not patriotism.22

How then should Americans understand the flag waving displays of Chinese in the streets of Paris, San Francisco, and Canberra during the Olympic torch relay of spring 2008? Was it a benign expression of patriotic loyalty to China, or a malign expression of a desire to dominate over China’s foreign critics, from CNN to free Tibet activists? Further research is needed to answer such questions, but the research presented here makes it clear that expressions of Chinese patriotism and nationalism should not be assumed to have the same meaning or consequences as expressions of American patriotism/nationalism. The structures of Chinese and American national identities clearly differ, likely due to the differing historical contexts within which they emerged.

Second, nationalist historical beliefs are integral to the structure of Chinese national identity. Historical beliefs covaried with patriotism and nationalism, suggesting that histories of the national past and national identities in the present are mutually constituted. Nationalist historical beliefs, furthermore, powerfully predicted perceptions of U.S. threats, which then powerfully impacted U.S policy preferences. These quantitative findings support the qualitative scholarship of Fitzgerald, Callahan, Gries, and Barmé cited above which has argued that the “Century of Humiliation” is central to Chinese nationalism today. They are also consistent with research that has found that beliefs about the past impact perceptions of mutual threat among the northeast Asian nations of China, Japan, and Korea.23 This research points to the importance of reconciling histories to the confidence building so central to China’s future relations with the U.S. and many of its other neighbors, such as Japan and Korea.24 The historical content of the Patriotic Education Campaign of the early 1990s,25 initiated to shore up the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy following Tiananmen, likely
contributed to an “aggrieved nationalism” among China’s youth, as Barmé has suggested. That popular nationalism, furthermore, may increasingly pressure China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to pursue tougher foreign policies than it might otherwise prefer. Histories of the past, in short, are clearly relevant to many of China’s thorny bilateral relationships today.26

Third, the U.S. threat has distinct military and humiliation dimensions. Garver, Nathan, Ross, Deng Yong, and others are right to focus on dignity, humiliation, and desires for recognition as important determinants of Chinese foreign policy behavior.27 Indeed, perceived humiliation threat had a much stronger impact on U.S. policy preferences than did perceived military threat. A narrow focus on the objective or even perceived balance of military power, therefore, appears insufficient to a complete understanding of how Chinese feel and think about America today.

Fourth and finally, nationalism but not patriotism clearly has an impact on Chinese foreign policy preferences. Diamant is therefore misguided to dismiss China’s young netizens (网民) and street demonstrators as mere “caffè latte” nationalists. This study has shown that individual differences in “trait” or enduring levels of nationalism impact both perceptions of U.S. threat and preferred U.S. policies. It is thus likely that temporary or “state” levels of nationalism would have similar consequences. Therefore, when events like the 1999 Belgrade bombing or the 2001 Hainan Island plane collision incidents temporarily inflame anti-American nationalist sentiments, Chinese perceptions of U.S. threat likely increase, along with desires for tougher U.S. policies. During such crises, therefore, inflamed nationalism can have very serious consequences, even if temporary levels of “state” nationalism dissipate later, as Diamant rightly notes. In short, variations in Chinese nationalism, whether between individuals or across time, appear to be related to variations in both threat perception and foreign policy preferences, so warrant further research.
Table 1: Structures of national identity: Exploratory factor analysis of Beijing, Guangzhou, and Oklahoma samples

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
<td>5.63 (1.08)</td>
<td>3.92 (1.17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Factor coefficients are shown only if > 0.35. Reverse coded items denoted with an “r” and italicized. American versions are in English; Chinese versions are in Chinese.

**Patriotism**
1. “I’m glad to be American.” 我很高兴自己是中国人。
2r. “I often regret that I am American.” 我经常遗憾自己是中国人。
3. “Being American is an important reflection of who I am.” 作为中国人对我的自我认同很重要。

**Blind Patriotism**
1. “American foreign policies are almost always morally correct.” 中国的外交政策基本上都是正义的。
2. “America is virtually always right.” 中国的决策几乎都是正确的。
3. “I support my country whether its policies are right or wrong.” 无论我国的政策对错与否，我都予以支持。

**Nationalism**
1. “America/China is the best country in the world” 中国是世界上最好的国家。
3. “In view of America’s history and democracy, it is only natural that the U.S. lead the world.” 鉴于中国具有悠久的历史,光辉的文明,中国自然应该领导东亚。

**Internationalism**
1r. “The alleviation of poverty in very poor countries like Haiti is their problem, not ours.” 诸如海地这样的贫穷国家所面临的问题应该由他们自己解决与我们无关。
2. “Our children should be taught to support the welfare of all of humanity.” 我们应该教育我们的子孙后代不仅为中国而为全人类的福祉做贡献。
Table 2: **Descriptive statistics: Correlations, significance levels, means, standard deviations, and scale alphas and Ns**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Patriotism/Internat.</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>5.63/6.13</td>
<td>1.08/.86</td>
<td>.75/.71</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nationalism/BldPat</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>3.92/3.92</td>
<td>1.17/1.13</td>
<td>.78/.72</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nationalist History</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>4.71/4.95</td>
<td>1.15/1.21</td>
<td>.75/.73</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Military Threat</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.24***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>4.29/4.54</td>
<td>1.21/1.29</td>
<td>.71/.61</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Humiliation Threat</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.40**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>4.31/4.26</td>
<td>1.51/1.47</td>
<td>.82/.69</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. U.S. Policy</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.161*</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.81/3.41</td>
<td>1.26/1.20</td>
<td>.73/.60</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beijing sample (minimum N = 156)

Guangzhou sample (minimum N = 191)

Note. Beijing data is above the diagonal; Guangzhou data is below the diagonal.
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
* . Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

Table 3: **Fitness statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>( \chi^2/df ) ratio</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>TLI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing measurement model</td>
<td>128.54</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>.935</td>
<td>.897</td>
<td>.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing final structural model</td>
<td>131.17</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>.938</td>
<td>.907</td>
<td>.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangzhou replication</td>
<td>145.87</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>.914</td>
<td>.870</td>
<td>.064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Good fit” conventions

Note. \( \chi^2 \) = chi-square; p = significance level; df = degrees of freedom; CFI = comparative fit index; NFI = normed fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation.
Figure 1: “Boycott Carre-f***!” Protestors outside a Carrefour supermarket in Xi’an, April 19, 2008

Source: http://www.daylife.com/photo/03Ad508dqtF7F

Figure 2: Final Beijing Structural Equation Model

Note. *** Significant at $p < .001$; ** Significant at $p < .01$; * Significant at $p = < .1$; $^*$ Not statistically significant.
NOTES


15 Kosterman and Feshbach, p. 264.


19 An independent samples t-test revealed the difference between the means for the Beijing sample to be both statistically significant and very large, $t(160) = 15.14, p < .001$.

20 Partial eta-square ($\eta_p^2$) provides a global index of the size of mean differences. Small and medium effects are represented by values around .01 and .06, respectively. Large effects are represented by values around .14 or greater.

21 We examined the fit of all of our models based on the $\chi^2$ test, the $\chi^2$/degrees of freedom ratio, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). Non-significant $\chi^2$ values and $\chi^2/df$ ratios < 2 or 3 are considered reasonable indicators of close model fit. Conventional cutoffs for close model fit are CFI and TLI values greater than .95 and RMSEA values less than .06. R. B. Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, 2nd Edition (New York: The Guilford Press, 2005); and R. E. Schumacker and R. G. Lomax, A Beginner’ Guide to Structural Equation Modeling, 2nd ed. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004).


27 Garver, Foreign Relations of the PRC; Nathan and Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress; Deng Yong, China’s Struggle for Status.