

A "China Threat"?

POWER AND PASSION IN CHINESE "FACE NATIONALISM"

By **PETER HAYS GRIES**

Last May, television images of angry Chinese hurling rocks at the U.S. embassy in Beijing again raised a series of provocative questions: What are the ultimate goals of China's nationalists? Do they want to integrate China into the extant world system? Or do they seek to construct a separate, China-centered Asian order from which to eventually challenge the West? In short, Is there a "China threat"?

China watchers in the West are busily arguing these questions. The debate largely began with two 1997 *Foreign Affairs* articles: Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro's "The Coming Conflict with China" and Robert Ross's "Beijing as a Conservative Power." Bernstein and Munro, journalists formerly stationed in Beijing, argued that China is militarizing with expansionist aims. Joined by a curious alliance of military hawks and human rights watchers on Capitol Hill, they have been loudly warning that China seeks to restore its traditional position of hegemony in East Asia.¹ Conservative international relations commentators, such as the Cato Institute's Ted Carpenter, have noted the historical tendency for rising powers and declining hegemony to go to war. He thus similarly warns that we should "fear the panda."² Political scientist Robert Ross argues that Bernstein and Munro overstate China's militarization, and he has been joined by most academic China watchers in arguing that the "China threat" has been mistakenly inflated.³

Rather than sit on the sidelines and wager on whether Chinese nationalism is benign or malevolent, Westerners must recognize that they have more than just a stake in the outcome. Nationalism is about the identity of nations, and identity does not develop in isolation. Chinese nationalism will evolve in dynamic relationship with the West. If the West's China policy is inconsistent,

driven back and forth by arguments over the existence of a "China threat," we may well push Chinese nationalism in a malevolent direction. If Chinese popular opinion perceives China's leaders to be successfully maintaining China's "national face" on the world stage, however, I believe that most Chinese will seek to further integrate China into the existing world order. For this to happen, China must be allowed to play leading roles in the current state system and be presented positively in the Western media.

In this essay I present the concept of "face nationalism" as an alternative approach to Chinese nationalism. Face nationalism has more to offer than other concepts because it is culturally specific: it helps Westerners understand what Chinese consider as success or failure in their effort to maintain China's "national face." "Face nationalism" captures both the emotional and instrumental motivations of China's nationalists, and the elite-mass legitimacy dynamic that is central to Chinese nationalist politics, focusing attention on the very important arena of domestic Chinese politics and how it is linked to China's external relations. If the West is to successfully engage China, we must include Chinese elites as equal players on the world stage, allowing them to maintain national face in the eyes of domestic audiences.

"OPTIMISTS" AND "PESSIMISTS"

In a recent *Orbis* article, Thomas Metzger and Ramon Myers argue that China watchers and policymakers in the West can be divided into two opposing camps. "Optimists" believe that the Chinese elite today "put priority on joining the world system." "Pessimists" point to the traditional Chinese tribute system, in which neighboring Asian states brought gifts to the Chinese court to acknowledge their subordinate status, to argue that Beijing seeks "the restoration of China's historic position in Asia."

Peter Hays Gries is a political scientist at the Merston Center for International Securities Studies at Ohio State University. He wishes to thank Kevin O'Brien, Matthew Rudolf, Elizabeth Rudd, Greg Noble, and Jonathan Mercer for their comments on earlier drafts of this essay.

Although they concede that Chinese are uncomfortable with the leading position of the United States in world affairs, Metzger and Myers, like most academic China watchers, side with the optimists. In their view, Confucian universalism, which holds that all peoples can become Chinese through accepting their civilization, mitigates against parochial Chinese nationalism. Pessimists, furthermore, have misunderstood China's "historical baggage." Chinese, Metzger and Myers argue, "have long accepted as normal a global situation in which the balance of power was tilted against China." As evidence they present the Liao, Chin, Yuan, and Qing Dynasties, during which "barbarians" from the north ruled parts or all of China, and a 1689 treaty that accepted the principle of Chinese and Russian equality.⁴

Is Metzger's and Myers's optimism warranted? They do not provide much evidence for their assertion that Confucian universalism "thins out," as they put it, Chinese nationalism. Counter-examples, furthermore, readily come to mind. Kang Youwei, author of *The Great Unity* and one of China's last great Confucians, advocated eugenics at the turn of the century as an instrument of narrowly national renewal. Liang Qichao, Kang's most famous disciple, believed that as the initiators of civilization and descendants of the Yellow Emperor, the Chinese had both the ability and responsibility to subjugate the "white race" and rule the world. "Confucian universalism" thus coexisted with Han chauvinism. As historian Prasenjit Duara argues, "Confucian nationalism" is *not* an oxymoron: Confucianism contains the potential to harden boundaries when barbarians do not accept Chinese values. The "universal" *tianxia* ("all under heaven") can and often has become a closed political community.⁵

Pride in the superiority of Confucian civilization is actually the very stuff of contemporary Chinese nationalism. In 1994, Xiao Gongqing, an outspoken neoconservative intellectual, advocated the use of a nationalism derived from Confucianism to fill the ideological void left with the collapse of communism.⁶ Popular nationalism also evinces pride in China's Confucian civilization. The cover of a 1997 *Beijing Youth Weekly*, for instance, has "Chinese Defeat Kasparov!" splashed across a picture of the downcast Grandmaster. Two of the six members of the IBM research group that programmed "Deep Blue," it turns out, were Chinese-Americans. "It was the genius of these two Chinese," one article asserts, "that allowed

'Deep Blue' to defeat Mr. Kasparov." Entitled "We Have the Best Brains," the article concludes, "We should be proud of the legacy of '5,000 years of civilization' that our ancestors have left for us."⁷ The Communist Party elite seem to concur. In 1995, for example, Vice Chair of the National People's Congress Tian Jiyun declared, "The IQs of the Chinese ethnicity, the descendants of the Yellow Emperor, are very high."⁸ Confucianism, it seems, does not necessarily "thin out" nationalism, but can instead constitute the very basis of Chinese racism. Historian Lei Yi, of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has recently used the phrase "'Sinocentric' cultural nationalism" (*Huaxia zhongxin' wenhua minzu zhuyi*) to describe such views. The Confucian world was not "one big happy family" (*tianxia yi jia*), but, rather, extremely Sinocentric, involving a "fierce racism, rejection of other cultures, . . . and cultural superiority."⁹

Metzger and Myers also refute the pessimists by arguing that the tribute system is a myth. Their evidence does not, however, support their conclusion that Chinese accept their current international status as "normal." The vital issue is not what China's international status actually was, but rather what contemporary Chinese *think it was* and how they *feel* about it. Like historians everywhere, Chinese historians often render complex pasts into teleological histories that serve contemporary nationalist ends. Most educated Chinese today are painfully aware of the "unequal" treaties signed with the British at Nanking in 1844 and the Japanese at Shimone-seki in 1895. Unilateral concessions forced on the Chinese, such as extraterritoriality and foreign settlements in the treaty ports, are still perceived as a humiliating loss of sovereignty. I doubt many Chinese know, however, of the treaty of 1689, cited by Metzger and Myers, which declared Chinese and Russians "equal." Young Chinese nationalists actually appear to hold a Sinocentric view of the Asia that existed prior to the arrival of the West: "our ancient neighbors [Japan, Korea, and so forth] . . . found glory in drawing close to China . . . Chinese Civilization inspired wave upon wave of sinicization in East Asia."¹⁰

Whether or not the tribute system can be demonstrated to have existed historically is, in any case, irrelevant to its power as a motivating myth. To get at the goals of contemporary Chinese nationalists, their feelings are more important than historical evidence. Nationalist discourse and behavior reveal that most parochial

nationalists feel humiliated and angry. The unequal treaties with the West, writes one Chinese historian, "codified China's humiliation." Past invaders, Guo Weidong explains, were always assimilated into the superior Chinese civilization. Compared to the Western assault, the northern barbarians that Metzger and Myers highlight inflicted only "flesh wounds."¹¹ In the eyes of contemporary Chinese such as Guo, Westerners are very different from earlier barbarians because they challenged Chinese views of a China-centered civilization.

For many of today's young Chinese nationalists, this humiliation at the hands of the West has turned to anger. The main theme of the 1993 TV series *A Beijinger in New York*, for instance, was "Screw you, America!" Protagonist Wang Qiming at one point yells: "F—them! They were still monkeys up in the trees while we were already human beings. Look at how hairy they are, they're not as evolved as us."¹² The series was a hit.

Metzger and Myers also argue against the pessimists by claiming that Chinese long ago came to terms with a world order tilted against China. Do China's angry nationalists accept the current balance of power? Chinese discourse on Sino-Japanese relations reveals that nationalists do not consider China's relationship with Japan "normal," to use Metzger and Myers's term, and suggest that China is superior to Japan. Chinese nationalist writings about the U.S.-dominated world system also reveal a strong desire to reorder world hierarchies.

Because China and Japan share elements of common culture, Sino-Japanese relations contain a subtlety not present in either country's dealings with the West. Chinese today often use the metaphors of teacher-student and older brother-younger brother to describe Sino-Japanese relations. In his 1997 diatribe *Why Japan Won't Settle Accounts*, nationalist Li Zhengtang argued that for hundreds of years China was Japan's "benevolent teacher." In 1895, however, "China lost to her 'student' . . . and was looked down upon as . . . the 'sick man of East Asia.'" He then asks, "How can we sons and grandsons of the Yan and Huang Emperors (*YanHuang zisun*) forget for a moment this great racial insult?"¹³ Li himself has not forgotten. The righteous anger expressed throughout his book suggests that Li believes the "student" should be put back in his proper place. In a cultural context in which it is more acceptable for a higher status person to show anger to a lower-status person than *vice versa*, Li's anger seeks

to reconstruct the correct teacher-student hierarchy, with China in the superior position.¹⁴

In a more dispassionate, academic account by Jiang Lifeng and a few of his colleagues at the Institute for Japanese Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, the older brother-younger brother metaphor is used to the same ends. China and Japan may fight, but they are still brothers who share the "same culture and blood" (*tong wen tong zhong*). At issue is their "relative position."

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During the ancient period, the Chinese were superior and relations were "harmonious." In the early modern period, however, the Japanese became superior and a "competitive" politics harmed Sino-Japanese relations. Although Jiang and co-authors decline to state directly what the brothers' current relative positions are or should be, their view is revealed indirectly. Writing about attitudes toward history, for instance, they argue that the Japanese "seek psychological equality" by evading responsibility for World War II. This implies Chinese superiority. They are also angered by the "high posture" they believe Japan has taken toward China since the mid-1990s, contending that Japanese are seeking to establish a "superior position."¹⁵

Duke historian Arif Dirlik is right that when Chinese speak of "two thousand years of Sino-Japanese friendship" they often seek to remind the Japanese of Japan's cultural indebtedness to China.¹⁶ The same is true when Chinese claim that China and Japan are neighbors separated by "a mere belt of water" (*yi yi dai shui*). The proverb refers to proximity as a claim for Chinese paternalism and thus hegemony over Japan.¹⁷ I question, however, Dirlik's claim that "For the Chinese . . . history (as culture) represents a means of bringing symmetry to . . . an 'asymmetric' relationship."¹⁸ "Symmetry" suggests equality. The prevalence of the teacher-student, older brother-younger brother, and father-son metaphors in Chinese discussions of

Sino-Japanese relations suggests that many Chinese see themselves as the moral superior in a hierarchical relationship with Japan, not as Japan's equal.

Discussions of the American-dominated world system also reveal the prevalence of hierarchical thinking among China's young nationalists. In "Rewriting China's Rules of the Game," for example, Li Fang argues that if China "plays by Western rules, we will always be judged by them. . . . We must . . . begin con-

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structing our own rules of the game while we play by theirs."¹⁹ The article appears in a special issue of *Writer's World* entitled "How China Should Say No." A quotation from Deng Xiaoping adorns the back cover: "Refrain from showing off, hide one's capacities, and bide one's time." The author of another article explains: China is not yet strong enough to "go it alone against the U.S." Deng, the author interprets, meant that China should "buy time" by maintaining a "low profile." His "take a lift" strategy required using Western know-how and markets to foster the development of China. China should slowly cultivate allies in Asia, developing a "continental consciousness." China's future leadership of Asia is implied, as is China's future ability to "take on" the United States.²⁰ Ironically, the proverb "hide one's capacities, and bide one's time" is popular among China's young nationalists. Deng used the phrase in the early 1990s to argue that China should keep a low international profile and concentrate on economic development.²¹ China's young nationalists, however, are no longer so patient. Like Mao Zedong, they prefer to loudly say "No!" to the West, jeopardizing China's economic development.

This yearning for a reordering of world hierarchies is not, indeed, very well concealed. In 1996, Beijing University's Guan Shijie wrote in the English language *China Daily* that "the time has come for the West to learn from the East. The West should switch positions and the

teacher should become a student."²² This desire seems widespread, often revealed indirectly in safely "apolitical" discussions of the Chinese and English languages. A 1997 psycho-autobiography of the "Fourth Generation" of thirtysomething Chinese nationalists, *Dragon History*, contains a section entitled, "Whitie, please study Chinese." The author tells of an experience he had reading a Chinese language textbook written for foreigners. One sentence read, "I'm determined to study English well. If I don't learn it well, I won't be able to find a spouse." It made the Chinese author feel "suffocated and resentful." The author's resolution to his angst is revealing: "The sentence would clearly be much more enchanting if you just replaced the word 'English' with the word 'Chinese.'" He thus desires an inversion of hierarchies: "I'm determined to study Chinese well. If I don't learn it well, I won't be able to find a spouse." He also believes that this will happen, arguing that "as China's international status continues to rise, the Chinese language will become glorious again."²³ Published in 1997, *Hong Kong's Return and 21st Century China* has a section that argues that Chinese characters, unlike alphabetical languages prone to division, are the most suitable for the computer revolution and the best for unifying the world.²⁴

We should not be surprised by the existence of such desires to reorder extant hierarchies. They are not unique to Chinese but are common throughout the Third World. Psychiatrist and anticolonialist Franz Fanon has analyzed the native's "impulse to take the settler's place." "The native," he writes, "is an oppressed person whose permanent dream is to become the persecutor." His "minimum de-mand," Fanon argues, is that "the last shall be first and the first last."²⁵

The question is not the existence of anger and desire for superiority, but the *intensity* of these sentiments. Intensity is related to whether or not anger is acted upon. Recent history reveals that Chinese anger has at times been strong enough to lead to action. In spring 1996, for instance, language-related resentment was strong enough that legislation was proposed that would eliminate the "poison" of foreign words from the Chinese language.²⁶ In the fall, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs suspended English interpreting at its press conferences, thereby demanding that all foreign journalists learn Chinese.

The case of People's Liberation Army exercises in the Taiwan Straits in 1995 and again in

1996 is much more alarming. Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui's 1995 insistence on equality at cross-straits talks infuriated Beijing, which assumes superiority in the mainland-Taiwan relationship. Beijing's elites were angry enough to escalate their 1996 military exercises, bullying Lee and risking military confrontation with the United States.

Analysis of writings and events such as these should provoke a strong skepticism regarding Metzger and Myers's unqualified optimism. An optimists-vs.-pessimists framework is more useful for categorizing the philosophies of China watchers than for predicting the future direction of Chinese nationalism. And it certainly fails to provide a useful guide for Western China policy.

"Optimists" and "pessimists" actually share a common view of the nature of current Chinese nationalism: it has been constructed by the party-state as a tool to legitimize its rule. With the crisis of communism, it is thought, nationalism fills the void. As Cornell's Thomas Christensen writes in *Foreign Affairs*, "Since the Chinese Communist Party is no longer communist, it must be even more Chinese."²⁷

Where optimists and pessimists differ is on the consequences of the Communist Party's use of Chinese nationalism. Following in the rationalist tradition of thinkers such as Hegel, optimists have faith that reason will triumph over the passions: the party will be able to control nationalist sentiments and pursue China's national interest. Metzger and Myers, for example, conclude their *Orbis* article by citing Kant's "spirit of hopeful determination to make the best of history."²⁸

Following in the irrationalist tradition of Hobbes and Hume, pessimists lament that reason is impotent when confronted by the passions: the party is playing with fire. Chinese nationalism could erupt into a blaze at any moment. In a 1997 *World Affairs* article, for instance, Barry Sautman warns that the Chinese state's "racial nationalist project" is "politically perilous."²⁹

Arguments about optimism and pessimism thus often tell us more about their Western advocates than about China. More important, by treating Chinese nationalism as something independent from the international system, the ongoing debate between optimists and pessimists fails to recognize that Chinese nationalism evolves in relationship with the West. A more dynamic understanding of Chinese nationalism is needed.

CHINESE "FACE NATIONALISM"

A useful conceptualization of Chinese nationalism must allow us to grasp both elite and mass sources of nationalism, both affective and instrumental motivations for nationalist claims and actions, and must provide us with a guide to the meanings of nationalist display. The concept of "face nationalism" seeks to do this, providing the basis to construct sensible China policies and helping to prevent a malevolent turn in Chinese nationalism.

"Face" is the figurative self shown to others. It is neither mere pretense, nor unique to "Oriental" cultures; face is a cultural universal. It is also, however, culturally specific: Chinese "*mianzi* culture," like a "code of honor," can be analyzed to reveal how face is lost or gained.

Defining "nationalism" for China is more difficult. The Eurocentric idea of nationalism as nations seeking to become states does not fit China very well.³⁰ Sinologist John Fitzgerald, as I will discuss, even suggests that twentieth-century China has undergone just the *opposite* process.³¹ "Nation" is equally problematic. Does the idea of the nation as a uniquely modern institution fit China? China has four millennia of documented history and has had two millennia of centralized rule. Did it become a "nation" only in the twentieth century? Following nationalism theorist Liah Greenfeld, "nationalism" is used loosely, as an umbrella term covering national identity, national consciousness, and national ideologies.³²

"Face nationalism" is a commitment to a collective vision of the "national face" and its proper international status as presented to other nations. "Face nationalism" provides both a window into the motivations of China's nationalists and a way to understand the constraints that nationalist politics places on China's elites.

"Face" helps in understanding the complex motivations of China's nationalists. As noted above, liberal thinkers have long juxtaposed reason to sentiment, often lamenting that the former is hostage to the latter. The literature on nationalism is also marked by the opposition of instrumentality and the passions. Early theorists, following Emile Durkheim's work on the rise of "anomie" with industrialization, focused on nationalism's emotional content.³³ As late as 1960, Carlton Hayes argued that nationalism "appeals to man's 'religious sense.' It offers a substitute for, or supplement to, historic supernatural religion."³⁴ Most scholars today, however, view nationalism as an instrument deployed

by rational actors to achieve a variety of ends. In a 1998 *Foreign Policy* essay, for instance, Yahya Sadowski argued that most genocides are better described as "politicides" than as "ethnicides." Nationalists, he asserts, are motivated not so much by hatred (read: emotions) as by political (read: instrumental) conflict over limited resources.³⁵

The concept of face can help us overcome this liberal juxtaposition of reason to the passions. There are both affective and instrumental sides to the "self shown to others." People become emotionally attached to the self-image they present to the world. If a person's face is assaulted, their feelings are often hurt. But face is also an issue of authority. One who "loses face" loses status and the "social credit" necessary to pursue instrumental interests.

The commitment to "national face"—the national self presented to other nations—is no different: emotions and interests are intertwined. Agreeing with Russell Hardin that Mancur Olson's "collective action problem" can be overcome—the individual *can* benefit from group membership—I apply Hardin's logic to the national group.³⁶ Maintaining "national face" can be in the interest of the individual because his or her social credit *in international contexts* depends upon it. Nationalist behavior is often simultaneously emotional and instrumental.

Affect and instrumentality are also the two sides of the coin of specifically Chinese *mianzi*. In an early discussion of *mianzi*, Martin Yang characterized it as a "psychological satisfaction": "when we say that a man wants face, we mean that he wants to be given honor, prestige, praise, flattery, or concession, whether or not these are merited."³⁷ As Ambrose King has more recently noted, however, *mianzi* is not merely a "psychological satisfaction": "the social aspect of *mianzi* . . . is like a credit card. Having *mianzi* is like having good credit, so that one has a lot of purchasing power."³⁸ The Chinese apology *duibuqi*—"I'm sorry"—is a good example of the two sides of the coin of *mianzi*. A literal translation of *duibuqi* would be "I am 'unable to face' you." "I'm sorry" thus has great implications for a person's power: without face one is unable to act, unable to be a subject capable of initiating social interaction. Thus a father's apology to a son, for instance, is no mere emotional matter: it threatens the hierarchy that is the basis of instrumental action, and indeed the Chinese social order.

Affect and instrumentality are also inter-

twined in China's "national *mianzi*." To the individualistic Westerner, overseas Chinese often seem overly emotional about China's national dignity. Chinese student e-mail networks in 1996 America, for instance, were filled with passionate denunciations of Bob Costas for his comments, during NBC's coverage of the Opening Ceremonies at the Atlanta Olympics, about Chinese swimmers' steroid use.³⁹ Even Berkeley's Lydia Liu, a respected academic, recently appeared highly irrational in labeling *New York Times* journalist Sheryl WuDunn a "racist" worse than nineteenth century missionaries for failing to "help" China.⁴⁰ Perhaps the most emotional of 1997's anti-American best sellers was *The Plot to Demolish China*. Filled with numerous *ad hominem* attacks on Americans seen as "enemies of China," it argues that the American media are conspiring with big business to make China look bad before the American people.⁴¹

It is no coincidence that the target of these highly emotional outpourings is the Western press. The logic runs as follows: The press shapes Western popular opinion, and Western opinion judges China's performances on the international stage. The Western press is thus central to China's national *mianzi*. In his eloquent *Studying in the USA*, Qian Ning, former *People's Daily* journalist and son of Chinese foreign policy chief Qian Qichen, writes, "Life abroad naturally fosters a patriotism that is always deeper than that cultivated by domestic 'patriotic' thought education. . . . The reason is simple: the position of overseas Chinese abroad is intimately connected to China's image in the world."⁴² Nationalism is not just about passion but also about position and power.

China's political elites have an additional motive for maintaining national *mianzi*: their social credit at home depends on it. In addition to shedding light on nationalists' complex motivations, "face" also helps analysts gain a better understanding of the constraints that nationalist politics places on China's policy-making elites.

The Western literature on nationalism is plagued by the opposition of approaches depicting nationalism as "popular," or arising from the "masses," on the one hand, and concepts of nationalism as "official," or constructed by the "state," on the other. Early sociological and psychological accounts lay closer to the masses pole, but the constructionist turn of the last twenty years has changed the focus to the elite production of nationalist discourse.⁴³

This "elite" against the "masses" juxtaposition in the nationalism literature is highly problematic. Like all political movements, nationalism involves *both* leaders and followers. A dynamic sense of how elites and masses interact is required. "Face theater" describes this legitimacy dynamic. Face theater involves elites on the political stage vying for legitimacy before audiences of popular opinion. Face as theater reveals how elites and masses interact in nationalist politics.

The metaphor of theater highlights the fact that while regimes and their competitors are actors on the political stage vying for face, it is audiences of popular opinion that watch and evaluate the performances. This helps resolve the "elite" versus "masses" dualism: both actors and audiences participate in face theater. I write "audiences" in the plural intentionally. There is no single audience of popular opinion that watches all political performances but rather a multiplicity of "issue audiences."⁴⁴ Different political issues attract different audiences.

Nationalism is one such issue. Because it involves both power and the passions, nationalism is a particularly potent genre of face theater. The idea of nationalism as face theater stresses that political elites on international stages perform for domestic audiences. Regime legitimacy is at stake. If a member of the governing elite fails to build or at least maintain "national face" during an international encounter, he will both undermine the authority of his nation in the international realm, and jeopardize personal authority and regime legitimacy at home.

Like nationalism theory in general, accounts of Chinese nationalism tend to characterize it as either "mass" or "elite." Communist histories of the Chinese Revolution tell a story of mass nationalism, albeit "under the leadership of the Communist Party."⁴⁵ Viewing China as a country in which the state dominates society, most Western observers favor "state" or "official" accounts of Chinese nationalism. John Fitzgerald has presented the "state nationalism" view of China the most eloquently, arguing that unlike the European nation in search of a state, Chinese nationalism has involved various states (republican and Communist) searching for nations: "the Chinese nation has been created and recreated in the struggle for state power, and it has ultimately been defined by the state as a reward of victory."⁴⁶ Lucian Pye and others apply this "state" view to contemporary Chinese nationalism when they argue that the Communist elite is using nationalism to "fill the

void" created by the demise of communist ideology to maintain the party's legitimacy.⁴⁷

Neither mass nor elite descriptions of Chinese nationalism are complete. The metaphor of "face theater" overcomes this mass-state dichotomy, allowing for a better understanding of the dynamic role that nationalism plays in Chinese politics. Western observers have tended to treat "Chinese popular opinion" as an oxymoron. I believe that popular opinion, understood as the issue audiences of face the-

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ater, *does* matter in China. It is, as Shih Chih-yu notes, a politically significant constraint on Chinese decision makers: "once the curtain goes up on a drama, [China's] leaders are obliged to play their roles, whether they want to or not. Their control of the drama is incomplete at best."⁴⁸ If Sinologists continue to dismiss Chinese popular opinion, they will fail to grasp an essential component of Chinese politics.

The legitimacy of China's rulers is dependent on successful performances on the international stage. The Chinese political elite are responsible for maintaining China's "national *mianzi*" in their dealings with other nations. Because face is located in others' minds, however, it cannot be manipulated easily. Chinese attempts to coerce face for China—through pompous assertions of China's "greatness" (*weida*) or the bullying of its smaller neighbors—are ultimately self-defeating. A great irony of Chinese foreign policy is that the strong desire for international affirmation often leads China's elites to present a very bad face to the world. In trying to hide China's blemishes and maintain "national *mianzi*," Chinese bureaucrats have tirelessly harassed foreign journalists, their families, and friends.⁴⁹ That only creates animosity, leading to bad press, the exact opposite of the Chinese bureaucrats' intentions. The *New York Times*'s Nicholas Kristof writes, "Most oppressive governments have the good sense to try to show their better side to foreign reporters. China's regime, by contrast, has the worst public rela-

tions sense of any major government in the world."⁵⁰ Given the importance of third party audiences in *mianzi* culture, whether positive or negative, Chinese are very sensitive to the international gaze.

Both party and popular elites perform in the face theater of Chinese foreign policy. Domestic issue audiences tend to view diplomacy as a contest between individuals who embody the nations they represent. Hu Hsien-chin, for example, claims that Chamberlain lost face for the British by appeasing Hitler, failing to honor Britain's treaty obligations with weaker nations.⁵¹ The zero-sum nature of face and China's history of victimization at the hands of the West combine to make many Chinese view diplomacy as a fierce competition, a tendency that is clearly revealed in popular discourse on foreign policy. In a special 1996 edition of *Today's Elite* on the "Secrets of China's Diplomats," for example, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen Jie appears on the "diplomatic stage" (*waijiao wutai*) to battle the evil "warlords" (*qunxiang*) (read: foreign reporters).⁵² Foreign Trade Minister Wu Yi, a caption in another article exults, "is great at taking care of arrogant Americans."⁵³ In 1997, Chinese nationalists were fond of retelling the story of how Margaret Thatcher emerged from a 1982 negotiation with Deng Xiaoping over Hong Kong without a smile, lost her balance going down the stairs of the Great Hall of the People, and fell to her knees.⁵⁴ Deng and China had defeated Thatcher and Britain. The British, furthermore, must kneel down and apologize to their betters. For most Chinese nationalists, the Hong Kong handover on 1 July 1997 was pay-back time. And they won that psychological victory through their leaders.

Party elites, however, are not the only Chinese actors performing in international face theater. Flying to the United States in November 1996, for example, a Chinese interpreter named Yang Qiuli requested a second meal. He claims that a Northwest stewardess retorted, "You Chinese always get hungry!" Yang has been seeking a public apology and monetary compensation from Northwest ever since. According to an April 1997 *Beijing Youth Daily* article, he had met with Northwest's director of Pacific operations and was planning to go to court if he did not hear back from him soon.⁵⁵

From a Western perspective, such behavior seems almost pathological. Why let a single remark from an insensitive individual consume one's life? Surely Yang must be psychological-

ly unbalanced to have such a chip on his shoulder. No and yes: Yang's behavior is not so much pathological as it is revealing of a Chinese sensitivity toward race stemming from the "one hundred years of national humiliation." Yang fears that he has lost national *mianzi* for China and so feels the responsibility—especially strong as an intellectual—to regain it through winning an apology from the "whities."

The thirtysomething "Fourth Generation" producers of popular Chinese nationalist discourse may support or challenge the state's foreign policies. The 1997 diatribe *The Plot to Demonize China*, for instance, clearly sought to support the party. Penn State's Liu Kang, one of its authors, is said to have political ties with Jiang Zemin and other top party leaders. The 1996 anti-American hit *China Can Say No* also upheld the party and was backed by the government.

Other products of popular nationalism, however, challenge the party's legitimacy, claiming that it has failed to maintain China's national *mianzi*. In an open letter sent to the party leadership in February 1998, for instance, Chinese dissident Lin Xinsu argued that Li Peng not be given Qiao Shi's job as chairman of the National People's Congress. Lin's argument, significantly, was not just Li's incompetence, but also that Li, tainted by his role in the Tiananmen massacre, would be a blight on "China's image in the world."⁵⁶

The party both suppresses and accommodates such assaults on its *mianzi*. An example of suppression occurred during the summer 1996 Diaoyu Islands dispute, when students used the national university e-mail network to spread news not officially released in China. The students held that the party was not tough enough on Japan. The party responded to the challenge with crude but effective censorship: students were denied Web access for ten days, and a prominent online activist was banished to the remote northwest.⁵⁷ In a fall 1996 follow-up to *China Can Say No*, entitled *China Can Still Say No*, Song Qiang and his coauthors were more critical of the Foreign Ministry's handling of America and Japan policy. The book was quickly banned.⁵⁸

But the story does not end there. The party also accommodates such claims of popular nationalism. The Xinhua News Agency, for example, recently announced an official Web site that will promote China's cultural image abroad; it will "introduce China's 5,000-year-old culture on the Internet, promoting commer-

cial performances and exhibitions. . . . Cultural activities that might degrade the country's dignity, however, will be banned."⁵⁹ By plugging Chinese culture and upholding China's dignity, the party is making a claim to having gained national *mianzi* for China.

"Face nationalism" thus enables analysts to move beyond the extremes of passion versus power, and elite versus mass views of nationalism. Nationalism is rarely purely popular passion or a purely instrumental construct used by elites to legitimate their rule. "Face nationalism" accounts both for the complex motivations of Chinese nationalists and for the elite-mass legitimacy dynamic central to China's nationalist politics. It thus pushes analysis beyond the dangerous debate over the existence of a "China threat."

CHINESE NATIONALISM AND THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (DIS)ORDER

As China opens up to the world, the concept of equality has already begun to challenge traditional hierarchical views, and it will continue to do so. Furthermore, as China develops economically, feelings of inferiority and desires for anti-Western revenge may dissipate. These forces of change bode well in the long run.

In the short run, however, Chinese nationalism could take *either* benign or malignant form. Much—but not all—depends on how the West interacts with China. The standard Western view of Chinese nationalism as something Communist elites use to legitimize their rule is more than just an oversimplification of a complex reality: it dangerously trivializes the role of Chinese popular sentiment. Chinese experience their early modern history as one of national humiliation at the hands of the West. This "loss of national face" continues to haunt contemporary Chinese, who seek to restore China's dignity in the international community. In a recent *China Quarterly* article, Yong Deng reviews Chinese views of the national interest, concluding that "a realpolitik perspective will prevail as long as China's international identity is defined in terms of a nationalistic view of modern Chinese history, in which China was brutally victimized in a hostile and threatening world." Realpolitik's state-centrism, however, is increasingly problematic in the 1990s: "The growing legitimacy of transnational issues in the age of globalization has generated a powerful 'compliance pull,' undermining the validity of Chinese realpolitik views and putting them on the defen-

sive."⁶⁰ Extending Deng's metaphor, Chinese nationalism might be thought of as a "noncompliance drag." As the recent popularity of Chinese writings "saying no" to the West attests, a dangerous dynamic is at play: the greater the pull of the West, the greater the drag of Chinese nationalism will become. Parochial nationalists eagerly seize upon "China threat" arguments, for instance, to assert that the West has affronted China's "national *mianzi*" and angrily insist

Excluding or "containing" China will only lead Chinese nationalists to reject the West and pursue a separate, China-centered Asian order.

on Chinese resistance. Although all Chinese are concerned with issues of national face, the difference between parochial nationalists and most Chinese is that they are hypersensitive to perceived insults.

Treating China as an equal—neither as an inferior to be bossed about nor as a superior to be kowtowed to—is the best Western China policy. Greater Chinese involvement in international institutions will give China a greater stake in the current world order. Excluding or "containing" China will only lead Chinese nationalists to reject the West and pursue a separate, China-centered Asian order. China must be treated as an equal and allowed to play leadership roles in international institutions. The Cato Institute's Ted Carpenter is wrong to criticize President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright for calling China a "partner."⁶¹ Such language will reduce Chinese nationalists' fears of being treated as a second-class world citizen. When Chinese political elites successfully guide international institutions, or broker international accords, and the Western media commends Chinese for their accomplishments, the Chinese people will feel that China has gained face in international society. That will foster both a healthy Chinese nationalism and a commitment to international norms and institutions.

Western ideologues must therefore stop using the foil of Chinese tyranny to construct their "liberal myth."⁶² The Dan Rathers, Newt Gingriches, and Richard Geres of the West

repeatedly depict China as the last bastion of despotism to flatter themselves as freedom fighters. Rey Chow has delightfully satirized a "King Kong syndrome" among the U.S. media, which frequently construct China as a primitive monster that the West must discipline.⁶³ This must end. We should not arrogantly assume that the West can mold China as it pleases. If China is not accorded the respect it deserves, China's nationalists will only respond with a knee-jerk "No!"

Until Chinese and Americans learn to interact more harmoniously on the world stage, their common interest in a stable Asia-Pacific will not ensure peace in the twenty-first century.

President Clinton was right to call China a partner but should be criticized for calling Jiang Zemin "a visionary leader . . . the right leadership at the right time."⁶⁴ Because such praise went unreciprocated—Jiang even made a fool of Clinton by cracking down on dissidents immediately after his departure—parochial Chinese nationalists will only disdain Clinton's words as foreign fawning, reinforcing their "Central Kingdom complex" and inhibiting the spread of egalitarian norms.

It is the Chinese, however, who must ultimately decide what attitude they wish to take toward the outside world. If those with a deep psychological need to defy the West are ascendant, Chinese nationalism will become malevolent, no matter what Clinton and other Westerners say or do.

Chinese contains a rich popular vocabulary for criticizing those who are too thick- or thin-skinned. Individuals with "thick skin" (*lianpi hou*) are resistant to popular censure. The more serious accusation that an individual "doesn't want face" (*buyaolian*) condemns individual profit seeking as a selfish lack of concern about society. The charge that an individual "has no face" (*meiyoulian*) is even more severe: without a conscience, the individual has lost his or her humanity.⁶⁵ The "thin skinned," by contrast, have an excessive concern for social approbation. "*Si yao mianzi huo shouzu*" refers contemptuously to an irrational willingness to suffer to maintain or gain face. Efforts to "put on

airs" (*yao mianzi* or *zhuang menmianr*) are ridiculed as "hitting your cheeks to appear healthy/fat" (*da zhonglian yun pangzi*) and as "ringing hollow" (*diqu buzu*).

China's leaders are often too thin-skinned before domestic audiences and too thick-skinned before foreigners. They have been intolerant of domestic criticism, suppressing it brutally. The Tiananmen massacre is but one example of such thin-skinned behavior. On the other hand, Beijing's elite often appears to disdain international opinion by lying before foreigners. PLA chief Chi Haotian's 1996 claim, "I can tell you in a responsible and serious manner that not a single person lost his life in Tiananmen Square," for instance, is an example of thick-skinned behavior before international audiences, who, Chi surely realizes, witnessed the massacre on their own television sets.⁶⁶ Sociologist Charles Cooley noted close to one hundred years ago that "few have any compunctions in deceiving . . . persons towards whom they feel no obligation."⁶⁷ That the commander of the world's largest army feels no obligation toward the West undermines mutual trust and is a cause for legitimate Western concern.

The more common dynamic in Sino-American relations, however, is a thick-skinned Washington and a thin-skinned Beijing. Unilateral American policies are often insufficiently attentive to Chinese opinion. Chinese, for their part, are often over sensitive about Chinese face, demanding that America petition China for approval before setting its Asia policies. That dynamic can even upset bilateral relations when American and Chinese interests and goals are congruent. Then assistant secretary of state John Holdridge has recently related, for example, how he received a tongue-lashing from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs during a 1982 trip to Beijing. Although he had come personally to announce a unilateral U.S. concession—giving in on F-5 jet sales to Taiwan—"they were upset because China had not been a major player in the sequence of events leading up to my visit."⁶⁸ Process matters. Until Chinese and Americans learn to interact more harmoniously on the world stage, their common interest in a stable Asia-Pacific will not ensure peace in the twenty-first century.

A (sexist) Confucian saying holds, "Women and small-minded people are irascible. If you draw close to them they are contemptuous of you. But if you are distant from them, they bitterly complain" (*wei nuzi yu xiaoren wei nan yang ye, jinzhi ze buxun, yuanzhi ze nu*).

China's parochial nationalists often act like such "small-minded people." When Westerners are accommodating, they are contemptuous. Nationalist Li Fang, for instance, writes contemptuously in *How China Should Say No* that "every American president comes running obsequiously to China to make his report."⁶⁹ When Westerners are firm with China, however, parochial nationalists angrily denounce the West as a big bully. In another article in the same magazine, for example, Li Fang vehemently denounces Americans as "arrogant, boastful, and showoffs."⁷⁰ Such childishness must end.

Fortunately, most Chinese agree with the *Analects'* dictum, "A superior man is broad-minded, whereas a small-minded person is always resentful." Even Chinese nationalists recognize, as the *Analects* also caution, "Intolerance of minor insults will ruin great projects."⁷¹ If they are secure in the belief that China's national face is respected in the international community, the Chinese people will demand that their leaders behave like superior men.

NOTES

1. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, "The Coming Conflict with China," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 2 (1997): 18-32.
2. Ted Galen Carpenter, "Roiling Asia: U.S. Coziness with China Upsets the Neighbors," *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 6 (1998). 5. On rising and declining powers, see, for example, Paul M. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987).
3. Robert Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 2 (1997): 33-44.
4. Thomas A. Metzger and Ramon H. Myers, "Chinese Nationalism and American Policy," *Orbis* 42, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 21-37.
5. Prasenjit Duara, "Nationalists among Transnationals: Overseas Chinese and the Idea of China," in *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism*, ed. Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini (New York: Routledge, 1997), 45.
6. Xiao Gongqing, "Cong minzuzhuyi zhong jiequ guojia ningjuli de xinziyuan" (Deriving from nationalism a new resource that congeals the state), *Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management)* 4 (1994): 21. Cited in Feng Chen, "Order and Stability in Social Transition: Neoconservative Political Thought in Post-1989 China," *China Quarterly* 151 (September 1997): 593-613.
7. "Women you zui youxiu de rennao" (We have the best brains), *Beijing qingnian zhouban (Beijing Youth Weekly)* 98 (20 May 1997): 30.
8. Barry Sautman, "Racial nationalism and China's external behavior," *World Affairs* 160, no. 2 (1997): 79.
9. Lei Yi, "Xiandai de 'Huaxia zhongxinguan' yu 'minzu zhuyi'" (Modern 'Sinocentrism' and 'nationalism'), in *Zhongguo ruhe miandui Xifang (How China Faces the West)*, ed. Xiao Pang (Hong Kong: Mirror Books, 1997), 49-50.
10. Li Fang, "Chongjian Zhongguo youxi guize," (Rewriting China's rules of the game), *Zhongguo ruhe shuobu (How China Should Say No)*, Special Issue of *Zuojia tiandi (Writer's World)* (1996): 23.
11. Guo Weidong, *Bupingdeng tiaoyue yu jindai Zhongguo (The Unequal Treaties and Early Modern China)* (Hebei: Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1993), 3.
12. Geremie Barme, "To Screw Foreigners Is Patriotic: China's Avante-garde Nationalists," in *Chinese Nationalism*, ed. Jonathan Unger (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 184.
13. Li Zhengtang, *Weishenme Riben bu renzhang: Ribenguo zhanzheng peishang wanglu (Why Japan Won't Settle Accounts: A Record of Japanese War Reparations)* (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1997), 9, 14.
14. Psychologist David Matsumoto, for instance, has argued that in Japan, "it is definitely more acceptable for a higher status person to show anger to a lower-status others than vice versa." I believe the same is true in China. See David Matsumoto, *Unmasking Japan: Myths and Realities about the Emotions of the Japanese* (Stanford, Cal: Stanford University Press, 1996), 149.
15. Jiang Lifeng, *Zhongri guanxi sanlun (Three Essays on Sino-Japanese Relations)* (Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996), 73-75, 215, 221.
16. Arif Dirlik, "'Past Experience, if Not Forgotten. Is a Guide to the Future': Or, What Is in a Text? The Politics of History in Chinese-Japanese Relations," in *Japan in the World*, ed. Miyoshi Masao and H. D. Harootunian (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 71.
17. D. R. Howland, *Borders of Chinese Civilization: Geography and History at Empire's End*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 249-50.
18. Arif Dirlik, "Past Experience, if Not Forgotten, Is a Guide to the Future," 70.
19. Li Fang, "Rewriting China's Rules of the Game," *Zhongguo ruhe shuobu*, 23.
20. "Zhongguo shuobu de xianshi diwei" ("The real basis upon which China says no"), *Zuojia tiandi*, 40-41.
21. See Deng Xiaoping, "With Stable Policies of Reform and Opening to the Outside World, China Can Have Great Hopes for the Future," 4 September 1989, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1982-1992)* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), 305-11.
22. Guan Shijie, "Cultural Collisions Foster Understanding," *China Daily*, 2 September 1996, 4. Cited in Suisheng Zhao, "Chinese Intellectuals' Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writing in the 1990s," *China Quarterly* 152 (December 1997): 725-45. Coming from the director of "International and Intercultural Communications" at Beijing University, the birthplace of liberalism in China, Guan's Sinocentric views are both ironic and disappointing.
23. Xiao Tong and Du Li, *Longli, 1978-1996: Zhuanxingqi Zhongguo baixing xinjilu (Dragon History: The True Feelings of the Chinese People During a Time of Transition, 1978-1996)* (Beijing: Gaige chubanshe, 1997), 287-88.

24. Xu Zhongfu and Lin Shuzeng, *Xianggang huigui yu 21 shiji Zhongguo (Hong Kong's Return and 21st Century China)* (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1997), 263–64.
25. Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1968), 53, 37.
26. "Top Advisors Call for Regulations to Purify Chinese Language." *Xinhua*, 6 March 1996.
27. Thomas Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik." *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 5 (1996): 37.
28. Metzger and Myers, "Chinese Nationalism and American Policy," 21–37.
29. Barry Sautman, "Racial Nationalism and China's External Behavior." *World Affairs* 160, no. 2 (1997): 86–87.
30. See, for example, Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
31. John Fitzgerald, "The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism," in *Chinese Nationalism*, ed. Jonathan Unger (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 56–85.
32. Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 3.
33. Emile Durkheim, *Le Suicide* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1897).
34. Carlton Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 171.
35. Yahya Sadowski, "Ethnic Conflict." *Foreign Policy* 111 (Summer 1998): 12–22.
36. See Russell Hardin, *One For All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Mancur Olson, *The Logic Of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
37. Martin C. Yang, *A Chinese Village* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), 67.
38. Translated in Chang Hui-Ching and G. Richard Holt, "A Chinese Perspective on Face as Inter-Relational Concern," in *The Challenge of Facework: Cross-Cultural and Interpersonal Issues*, ed. Stella Ting-Toomey (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 122.
39. On line, see, for example, the Berkeley Chinese Students and Scholars Association's "Protest against NBC" site at: <http://mechatro2.me.berkeley.edu/BCSSA/NBC/>; in print, see, for example, Peng Qian, Yang Mingjie, and Xu Deren, *Zhongguo weishenme shuo bu? Lengzhanhou Meiguo duiHua zhengce de cuowu (Why Does China Say No? Mistakes in Post-Cold War American China Policy)* (Beijing: Xinshejie chubanshe, 1996), 213–17.
40. Lydia H. Liu, "What's Happened to Ideology? Transnationalism, Postsocialism, and the Study of Global Media Culture," *Asian/Pacific Studies Institute*, Duke University, North Carolina, 1998, 19–20.
41. Liu Kang, Li Xiguang, et. al., *Yaomohua Zhongguo de beihou (The Plot to Demonize China)* (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1996).
42. Qian Ning, *Lixue Meiguo (Studying in the USA)* (Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 1996), 244.
43. The origins of this dualism in the nationalism literature are arguably to be found in liberalism. The liberal stands alone against the forces of both state and society. Specifically, he stands *between* them, fearful of being crushed from either side.
44. I am indebted to Sergio Fabbrini for introducing me to the concept of "issue publics." See his "Popular Opinion and Attentive Citizens in Western Democracies: A Discussion." *Notes et Documents (Italy)* (September–December 1992): 74–89.
45. The party's role in leading the nationalist revolution is accommodated with a mass nationalism view by arguing that the Communist Party was and is a "party of the people."
46. To parallel Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*, Fitzgerald might have entitled his essay "States and Nationalism," rather than his forlorn "The Nationless State." See Fitzgerald, "The Nationless State," in *Chinese Nationalism*, ed. Jonathan Unger, 57.
47. Lucian Pye, "How China's Nationalism Was Shanghai'd." *Chinese Nationalism*, ed. Jonathan Unger, 86.
48. Shih Chih-yu, *China's Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 8.
49. Journalists from the German *Der Spiegel* and the Japanese *Yomiuri Shimbun*, expelled in October and November of 1998, are but the latest of a long line of harassed foreign reporters. See Erik Eckholm, "Beijing to Expel Foreign Reporter, 2nd in a Month." *New York Times*, 19 November 1998, A10.
50. Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn, *China Wakes: The Struggle for the Soul of a Rising Power* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 18.
51. Hu Hsien-chin, "The Chinese Concepts of 'Face,'" *American Anthropologist* 46 (1944): 48.
52. Gao Xiaohui, "Zhongguo wajiaobu fayuanren Chen Jian shezhan qunxiong" (Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Chen Jian Battles the Warlords), *Jinri mingliu (Today's Elite)* 1996, Special issue on "Zhongguo wajiaobu de miwen" (Secrets of China's diplomats), 67–73.
53. Zi Jiang, "Dang you zhengzhi zhihui de nubuzhang—Wu Yi: Zhongguo kaifang de xin xingxiang" (Wu Yi: The New Image of an Open China—A Female Chief with Plenty of Political Wisdom), *Jinri mingliu* 1996, special issue, 21–27.
54. See, for example, Xu Bin et. al., '97 *Xianggang huigui fengyun (Hong Kong's Stormy '97 Return)* (Changchun: Jilin Sheying chubanshe, 1996), 107–12.
55. "Cheng Meihang banji zao bubai chiru: Yang Qiuli wei Zhongguoren zunyan yao shuohua" (Insulted on an American airliner: Yang Qiuli Argues for Chinese Respect), *Beijing Qingnianbao*, 19 April 1997, 3.
56. Wu Fang and Ray Zhang, "Dissident Called the Chinese Premier 'Incompetent,'" *China News Digest*, 13 February 1998.
57. Germie Barme and Sang Ye, "The Great Firewall of China." *Wired* (June 1997): 176.
58. For an English language discussion of these *Say 'No!'* books, see my review in the *China Journal* 37 (Jan. 1997): 180–85.
59. "China Gets Wired as Cultural Blitz Planned." *China News Digest*, 2 February 1998.
60. Yong Deng, "The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations." *China Quarterly* 154 (June 1998): 308–29.

61. Carpenter, "Roiling Asia," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1998), 2. Calling China a "partner" does not imply that Japan and India cannot be America's partners as well.

62. Richard Madsen, *China and the American Dream* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), xi.

63. Chow goes too far, however, when she asserts that "The democracy that the West insists on making China accept is not in essence different from the opium imposed by Britain in the nineteenth century. . . . In both cases, Westerners want cash, and Chinese people get smoke." See Rey Chow, "King Kong in Hong Kong: Watching the 'Handover' from the USA," *Social Text* 16, no. 2 (1998): 94, 100.

64. John M. Broder, "Clinton Optimistic on China's Future as He Heads Home," *New York Times*, 4 July 1998.

65. Hu Hsien-chin, "The Chinese Concepts of 'Face,'" *American Anthropologist* 46 (1944): 50-54.

66. Simon Beck, "No Protester Died in Tianan-

men, Says Chi," *South China Morning Post*, 12 December 1996, 8.

67. Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York: Scribners, 1922), 388.

68. John H. Holdridge, *Crossing the Divide: An Insider's Account of the Normalization of U.S.-China Relations* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 218-21.

69. Li Fang, "Women zheyidaren de Meiguo qingjie" (Our Generation's America Complex), *Zhongguo ruhe shuobu (How China Should Say No)*, *Zuoqia tian-di* 1996 Special Issue, 15.

70. Li Fang, "Chongnianshi de Meiguo xingxiang" ("Childhood images of America"), *Zuoqia tian-di* Special Issue (June 1996): 10.

71. Jin Niu, "Zhongguo ruhe shuobu?" ("How Should China Say No?"), in *Zhongguo ruhe shuobu? (How Should China Say No?)*, Special 1996 edition of *Meiguo daguan (America the Beautiful)* (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Science Institute of American Studies), 8.

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