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On December 4, 2012, thirty-eight Republican senators voted against a United Nations treaty on the rights of the disabled, leaving it five votes short of the two-thirds majority required for ratification. The international treaty is modeled on the Americans with Disabilities Act, which Republican president George H.W. Bush signed into law on July 26, 1990, with broad bipartisan congressional support. Former senator and 1996 presidential candidate Bob Dole, a disabled veteran, appeared on the Senate floor to appeal to his fellow Republicans to support the treaty—to no avail.

Although the treaty lacks enforcement powers, merely suggesting that the disabled not be discriminated against, Republican senators claimed it would infringe upon American sovereignty. “I do not support the cumbersome regulations and potentially overzealous international organizations with anti-American biases that infringe upon American society,” Senator Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma declared on the Senate floor. Senator Mike Lee of Utah went further, claiming that the nonbinding treaty would nonetheless lead to “the constant looming threat of state interference” in home schooling—and a rise in abortions.3

Democrats were dumbstruck. “I ask [my] colleagues to do for the world what they’ve done for America,” Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts implored his colleagues. “Raise your voice and vote for millions who are voiceless in their own lands. Stand up for those who cannot stand up for themselves.”4 After the vote, majority leader Harry Reid of Nevada wrote, “It is a sad day when we cannot pass a treaty that simply brings the world up to the American standard for
protecting people with disabilities because the Republican Party is in thrall to extremists and ideologues.”

Do the sharply opposed views of these Democratic and Republican senators reflect the views of their constituents? Is Main Street as divided over international organizations and treaties as Capitol Hill is?

Scholars of American public opinion have generally argued that unlike American elites, the American public is not divided: it is united in support of multilateral institutions. In his 2006 *The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want from Our Leaders but Don’t Get*, Benjamin Page argues that “Again and again over the years, large majorities of Americans—often in contrast to government officials—have expressed a high level of regard for the U.N.” In 2012, Joshua Busby and Jonathan Monten argued that Republican elites like Jesse Helms and John Bolton have attacked multilateralism despite “mass public support for the U.N.”

Pollsters largely agree. On the basis of its 2012 survey, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs declared that “U.S. participation in multilateral treaties receives majority support” among Democrats and Republicans. The media’s focus on popular polarization, it claims, is “exaggerated.”

This chapter argues that these political scientists and pollsters have misinterpreted the public opinion data: whether on Capitol Hill or on Main Street, American liberals and conservatives today are strikingly divided in their views of international organizations and treaties. In our 2011 survey, liberals (66°) felt a remarkable 48° warmer towards the United Nations than conservatives (18°) did, a truly massive difference statistically. Liberals (42°) also felt 21° warmer towards the World Bank than conservatives (21°) did, a very large difference. This ideological gap is not new but may be growing. For instance, liberals (68°) felt 23° warmer towards the United Nations than conservatives (45°) did in the Chicago Council’s 2004 survey, a large difference statistically.

These feelings, moreover, had policy consequences. As noted in Chapter 4, our survey included two items assessing the importance of “strengthening international organizations” and “supporting the United Nations” that cohered well. Liberals scored massively higher than conservatives on the resulting “support for multilateralism” scale. These findings are consistent with data from the Chicago Council. In its 2010 survey, liberals scored much higher than conservatives did on a three-point (“not” to “somewhat” to “very” important) assessment of “strengthening the United Nations” as a U.S. foreign policy goal. It also asked half of its respondents whether seven “international institutions” (WTO, ICC, WHO, IMF, WB, U.N., and IAEA) “need to be strengthened or not.” Liberals scored vastly higher than conservatives on overall support for strengthening these international institutions. Similarly, in a 2013 Gallup
landline and cell phone poll, 87 percent of liberals agreed that the United Nations played a “necessary role” in the world today, while only 56 percent of conservatives did—a substantial 31 percent difference. And whereas a large majority (67%) of conservatives felt the United Nations was doing a “poor job,” a small majority of liberals (56%) felt it was doing a “good job.”

There is also substantial polarization in popular American attitudes towards international treaties. In our 2011 survey, conservatives scored immensely higher than liberals on an “opposition to international treaties” scale consisting of two items:

- **International treaties cannot be trusted to safeguard U.S. national security.**
- **International treaties are one of the best ways to maintain America’s national security.** (reverse coded)

The massive ideological difference on these items provides powerful support for Brian Rathbun’s recent argument that ideology can serve as a proxy for generalized trust, and that “multilateralism is the expression of trust.” Data from a 2007 Program on International Policy Attitudes survey similarly reveals Republicans to have been 15 percent, 28 percent, and 24 percent more likely than Democrats to oppose treaties (1) prohibiting attacks against satellites, (2) implementing a nuclear test ban, and (3) bilaterally (with Russia) reducing nuclear stockpiles.

This chapter further argues that these deep disagreements over international organizations and treaties have their origins in many of the same values and beliefs that divide liberal and conservative Americans over domestic issues like God and gun control. Cultural conservatives view international organizations like the United Nations as part of a secular humanist agenda to replace reliance upon God with reliance upon man. Cultural liberals, by contrast, tend to view international organizations as a means to spread a progressive vision of mankind’s common humanity. Domestic disagreements over racial politics also shape attitudes towards the United Nations. For their part, economic conservatives and libertarians view international organizations as a threat to property and individual liberty. Economic liberals and communitarians, by contrast, view international organizations as a means to promote social justice and the equality of men.

Different kinds of liberals and conservatives may therefore disagree amongst themselves about why they like or dislike the United Nations, but they can largely agree in their basic normative position. This synergy of views contributes to the formation of a deep ideological divide: liberals like the United Nations; conservatives truly dislike it.

This chapter begins with a brief review of the history of America’s dealings with international organizations and treaties. It then explores cultural politics
in some depth, arguing that debates over American involvement in international organizations have been part of the broader battle between religious fundamentalists and modernists for much of the past century. Next it briefly examines the surprising persistence of race as a factor in American views of international organizations. It then turns to economic ideology and the idea of the United Nations as a “global social welfare state.” This is followed by an exploration of the political dimensions of ideological debate over the United Nations, focusing on libertarian objections to the United Nations’ “Agenda 21” and the perceived threat of “blue helmets” and “black helicopters.” A final section briefly examines how ideology interacts with gender, education, and partisan media exposure to shape attitudes towards the United Nations. The concluding section addresses the implications of divided American opinion on multilateral treaties and institutions for U.S. foreign policy.

FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

“A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. ”

—Democratic President Woodrow Wilson, 1918

“We have abstained from joining the League of Nations mainly for the purpose of avoiding political entanglements and committing ourselves to the assumption of the obligations of others . . . in which we have no direct interest.”

—Republican President Calvin Coolidge, 1923

As noted in the first paragraph of the Introduction, in his 1796 “Farewell Address” President George Washington cautioned against foreign entanglements. By that point, however, the young United States had already signed bilateral treaties with France, the Dutch Republic, Sweden, Britain, Prussia, Morocco, Algeria, Spain, and Tripoli.

American diplomacy in the nineteenth century would continue to be marked by a series of mostly bilateral treaties. For instance, in Chapter 9 we saw that the 1868 Burlingame Treaty promoted U.S. trade with China and opened U.S. borders to Chinese immigration. In Chapter 4 we also saw how, following the Civil War, a war-weary President Ulysses S. Grant and his secretary of state Hamilton Fish relied upon vigorous diplomacy to avoid another war with Britain, settling the Alabama Claims and signing the 1871 Treaty of Washington.

As U.S. power grew in the twentieth century, so did its involvement in bilateral treaty making. In 1906 President Theodore Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize for brokering an end to the Russo-Japanese War. Clifford Berryman celebrated Roosevelt’s efforts in a pair of editorial cartoons for the Washington Post in the summer of 1905 (Figure 10.1). The cartoon on the left depicts Roosevelt as
a smiling Uncle Sam holding out two small chairs for Japan and Russia, depicted as diminutive children. Russia is bearded and beaten up. A peace dove with an olive branch in its beak sits overhead as Uncle Sam smiles, “The pleasure is all mine, gentlemen.” “Naming the Baby,” at right, depicts a wholesome woman labeled “Portsmouth” carrying a healthy baby labeled “Treaty.” Roosevelt and Uncle Sam look on as two other men debate what to name their offspring. Both cartoons radiate paternalistic pride in America’s accomplishment.

American involvement in multilateral treaties and institutions also increased in the twentieth century. Following World War I, Democratic president Woodrow Wilson played a major role at the Paris Peace Conference, which drafted the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations. As his 1918 “Fourteen Points” speech, quoted in the epigraph, suggests, Wilson was a strong advocate of a powerful league that would ensure a postwar peace. He was awarded the 1919 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.

Wilson failed, however, to win Senate ratification of the covenant, and the United States never joined his League of Nations. Senate majority leader and Foreign Relations Committee chairman Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts led the Republican opposition and appealed to isolationism and American sovereignty. “Are you ready to put your soldiers at the disposition of other na-
240 CASES

ALL DRESSED UP AND NOWHERE TO GO


Lodge asked the president.21 On November 19, 1919, the final day of Senate debate over the league, Republican William E. Borah of Idaho gave one of the Senate’s most famous speeches, making an eloquent case against ratification. Like Lodge, Borah highlighted the threat to American sovereignty, arguing that “This treaty . . . imperils . . . the right of our people to govern themselves free from all restraint, legal or moral, of foreign powers.”22

On Easter Sunday, 1920, Washington, D.C., was hit by rains that forced a cancellation of the annual Easter festivities on the White House lawn. Clifford Berryman thought the disappointment of the children matched the disappointment of liberal internationalists who had hoped that the United States would join Wilson’s League of Nations. In “All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Go,” Berryman depicts President Wilson as a youthful Uncle Sam ready to play with the “Peace Plans” he had carefully prepared in his Easter egg basket (Figure 10.2). Buffeted by the “Anti-Treaty Storm,” however, Uncle Sam stands forlorn, unable to play. Berryman’s trademark teddy bear stands in solidarity with Wilson in the rain, making plain Berryman’s sympathy for the president.

The situation was dramatically different thirty-five years later at the conclusion of World War II. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had first described
the allied powers as the “United Nations” in 1941, and negotiations over the shape of a postwar international organization by that name began in 1944 at the Dumbarton Oaks estate in Georgetown, continuing at the Yalta Conference in early 1945. On June 26, 1945, fifty nations signed the Charter of the United Nations in San Francisco. Just one month later, on July 28, the U.S. Senate ratified the charter by an overwhelming vote of 89 to 2. “The action of the Senate,” Democratic president Harry S. Truman rejoiced, “substantially advances the cause of world peace.”

But the United Nations, like the League of Nations that preceded it, proved to be a contentious political issue. For instance, Republican senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina used his position as chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1995 to 2001 to block the payment of U.S. dues to the United Nations. His jealousy of U.S. sovereignty echoed that of Senator Lodge and the other Republican “Irreconcilables,” who had opposed the League of Nations eighty years earlier. “The United Nations is being transformed from an institution of sovereign nations into a quasi-sovereign entity in itself,” Helms lamented in a 1996 Foreign Affairs. “The United Nations has moved from facilitating diplomacy among nation-states to supplanting them altogether.”

John Bolton, a President George W. Bush recess appointment as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from August 2005 until December 2006, was also an outspoken critic. In 1994 he joked that “The Secretariat Building [of the U.N.] in New York has 38 stories. If you lost ten stories today, it wouldn’t make a bit of difference.” Senate Democrats successfully filibustered Bolton’s confirmation as U.N. ambassador.

“THIS SATANIC SERPENT”:
**GOD’S RULE AND THE RULE OF MAN**

“Christianity should be used to set things right here. It should be used to purify the world. We should rectify it by social actions.”

—Governor Woodrow Wilson (Democrat–New Jersey), 1911

“The League of Nations is doomed to signal failure for the simple reason that there has been a most conspicuous ignoring of the fact of God on the part of any, and all, of the men at the peace table.”

—Presbyterian of the South magazine, September 3, 1919

Why are Main Street liberals and conservatives today so divided over international treaties and institutions? Figure 10.3 reveals that all four of the dimensions of American ideology that we measured in our 2011 national survey were unique predictors of warmth towards the United Nations. Together with the standard demographic covariates, these four ideological predispositions accounted for a remarkable 35 percent of the variance in American feelings
towards the United Nations. By contrast, the situational variables that we measured were weak predictors of feelings towards the United Nations. For instance, when exposure to and interest in international news, and direct foreign contacts, friends, and travel were added to the regression, they contributed just 1 percent of additional variance.

This section explores the top path in Figure 10.3: why cultural liberals and conservatives differ in their feelings towards the United Nations. The next sections will turn to the other three paths in the figure, exploring why social, economic, and political liberals and conservatives differ over the United Nations.

The serial mediation model in Figure 10.4 reveals that cultural conservatives felt cooler towards the United Nations than cultural liberals did, in large part because of their greater biblical literalism, which is partially accounted for by the greater value they placed on a morality of purity.

How should this statistical finding be interpreted?

Historian Markku Ruotsila has advanced the provocative argument that over the past century, Christian anti-internationalism has been part of a wider fundamentalist reaction against the Social Gospel, modernist theology, and even secular humanism more broadly. The League of Nations controversy was the pivotal starting point. Religious conservatives and modernists had mostly confined themselves to debating theological issues prior to World War I. Following the league debates, however, they began publicly contesting domestic political issues. For instance, in Chapter 2 we discussed William Jennings Bryan and the 1925 Scopes Trial, which upheld a Tennessee law prohibiting the teaching of evolution and was central to the broader fundamentalist/modernist con-
This section argues that our mediation analysis lends empirical support to Ruotsila’s contention. Religious differences on international organizations persist in our 2011 survey data: in Figure 10.4, the inclusion of biblical literalism and the moral value of purity as mediators accounts for over three-quarters of the direct relationship between traditionalism and feelings towards the United Nations.28

Progressive Christians were strong supporters of the League of Nations. At the turn of the century, “Kingdom Theology” promoted the postmillennial pursuit of a perfect world. “No visible return of Christ to earth is to be expected, but rather the long and steady advance of the spiritual kingdom,” wrote William Newton Clarke, member of the New York chapter of the Brotherhood of the Kingdom.29 The Social Gospel promoted a liberal, universalistic view of the brotherhood of all peoples, regardless of race or religion. In his seminal 1917 A Theology for the Social Gospel, Walter Rauschenbusch declared that “Before the war the social gospel dealt with social classes; today it is being translated into . . . a Christianizing of international relations.”30

The religious underpinnings of liberal internationalism have been embodied in the persons of numerous American statesmen over the past century. As the epigraph suggests, President Woodrow Wilson viewed progressive Christianity as a redemptive force that could be used to “purify the world.” Wilson was a devout Presbyterian thoroughly steeped in the Social Gospel tradition. Indeed, historian Andrew Preston argues that Wilsonianism was a “global application of progressive Christianity.”31

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**FIG. 10.4.** Cultural conservatives feel cooler towards the United Nations than cultural liberals do, in part due to their greater biblical literalism, which is in part accounted for by the greater value they place on purity.

*Note: A serial mediation model. Indirect path via purity only was not statistically significant; the other two indirect effects were. Statistics are online at SUP.org. Seven demographic covariates are not shown. Data source: OU Institute for US-China Issues, 2011.*
While modernist Protestants lost the League of Nations ratification fight, they were successful advocates of the United Nations system created after World War II. John Foster Dulles, who would go on to become secretary of state under President Dwight D. Eisenhower in the 1950s, ran the Federal Council of Churches’ influential Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, and he helped draft the preamble to the United Nations Charter in the 1940s. Like Wilson before him, Dulles was a liberal Presbyterian who endorsed the Social Gospel view of the brotherhood of man. Americans, he argued, should “use our power, not to perpetuate itself, but to create, support, and eventually give way to international institutions drawing their vitality from the whole family of nations.”

The internationalism of President Barack Obama is also best understood in light of his religious beliefs. As argued in the Introduction and in Chapter 4, Obama is no liberal dove. Instead, he has embraced the fighting Christianity of the Social Gospel. Like Dulles before him, Obama has not abandoned Christian love but has transformed it into a Christian realism suitable to action within an imperfect world.

Over the past century, the conservative Christian response to the progressive Christian embrace of liberal internationalism has been marked by three interweaving themes. The first views international organizations through the lens of premillennial dispensationalism, depicting them as the work of the Antichrist. For the most part, this appears to have been a minority fundamentalist view. A second and more widely embraced conservative perspective portrays international organizations as a secular humanist challenge to God’s rule. A third view condemns international organizations out of opposition to the mixing of Christian and non-Christian peoples. Appealing to popular prejudices, this view of international organizations may extend beyond conservative Christians to a broader Christian public.

_Satan and the Second Coming._ Our five-item biblical literalism scale included one item specifically tapping belief in the Devil: “The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly & ferociously fighting against God.” One reason that our biblical literalism scale helped account for greater cultural conservative coolness towards the United Nations may be that some fundamentalists view the United Nations as the work of the Antichrist.

With the rapid social change that accompanied industrialization at the turn of the century, the United States was ripe for fundamentalism. Biblical prophecy, Ruotsila argues, brought “order, predictability, and clear causality to modern chaos.” As noted in the Chapter 7 discussion of the European Union, premillennial dispensationalists preached that in the last seven years before the Second Coming, an anti-Christian world empire would attempt the purification
and perfection of the world through secular human effort. Republican senator Warren Harding of Ohio, who would go on to succeed Wilson as president, was a Baptist who objected to the League of Nations’ presumption to achieve goals that could only be reached on “the millennial day that marks the beginning of heaven on earth.” During the League of Nations ratification fight, the World Christian Fundamentals Association was among the most passionate of the naysayers.

The premillennial dispensationalist view of international organizations did not die with the League of Nations. “Scripture does prophesy” the establishment of world government, Iowa fundamentalist preacher M. G. Hatcher declared in 1943, “mak[ing] possible for the World Dictator, the Anti-Christ, to take over control.” Dispensationalist animus was directed at the United Nations during and after the Cold War. Fundamentalist televangelist Pat Robertson, who competed for the 1988 Republican presidential nomination, was well known for his prophesy beliefs. In his 1991 bestseller The New World Order, Robertson asserted that international organizations like the United Nations were actually seeking the creation of “a new order for the human race under the domination of Lucifer and his followers.”

Robertson is not alone. In their wildly successful Left Behind series of fictional prophecy novels, evangelist Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins tell the story of Armageddon, in the style of Tom Clancy. Their books depict the U.N. secretary general as the Antichrist. He is seen as marshaling the evil forces of world government against the followers of Jesus Christ. Seven of the sixteen novels in the Left Behind series reached number one on national best-seller lists, and over 65 million total copies have been sold. There have also been three film adaptations as well as several video games.

In Chapter 8 we explored how premillennial dispensationalism contributes to conservative Christian warmth towards Israel. Warmth towards Israel appears to contribute to conservative Christian hostility towards the United Nations as well. In 1986 Pat Robertson described the United Nations as “a sounding board for anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Israel propaganda.” In his 2006 Jerusalem Countdown, pastor John Hagee of Christians United for Israel wrote that “The U.N. has labeled Zionism as racism, which means it has a longstanding documented hatred for Israel.” In 2012, pastor Mark Hitchcock of Faith Bible Church in Edmond, Oklahoma, similarly described the United Nations as an “Israel-despising body.”

This linkage of feelings towards Israel and feelings towards the United Nations is not confined to Evangelical pastors. In a 2008 address to the Knesset in Jerusalem, President George W. Bush declared that “We consider it a source of shame that the United Nations routinely passes more human rights resolutions against the freest democracy in the Middle East than any other nation in the world.” As
noted in the epigraph to this chapter, the “2012 Republican Platform” explicitly links American support for the United Nations to its treatment of Israel.

The Israel-U.N. link extends beyond religious and political elites to broader American public opinion. In our 2011 survey, warmth towards Israel was a substantial predictor ($\beta = -.26$) of opposition to “strengthening international organizations” and “supporting the United Nations.” Perhaps even more indicative of the continuing influence of End of Days prophesy belief on American attitudes towards the United Nations today, a mediation analysis revealed that only the item “God gave Palestine (today’s Israel) to the Jewish people” and not a four-item measure of biblical literalism (tapping belief in God, Satan, the Bible, and the Bible’s superiority to science) mediated the relationship between cultural traditionalism and warmth towards the United Nations.40 The Israel-U.N. link clearly runs deep.

Satan and secular humanism. Central to conservative Christian anti-internationalism is the more widespread belief that international organizations represent a secular challenge to God’s rule on earth. Following World War I, many conservative Protestants were outraged that neither the Treaty of Versailles nor the Covenant of the League of Nations contained the words “God” or “Deity.” Baptist J. C. Massee depicted the league as “a deliberate effort to dethrone God in the earth.” Like the Tower of Babel, it sought to “make the judgment of the crowd a moral law.” Cortland Myers, also a Baptist, went considerably further, at least rhetorically, denouncing the league covenant as “the most atheistic, infidel document that was ever printed in this world.” Although most Methodists then were proud advocates of progressive Christianity and the league, conservative Eugene Thwing used the league issue to resist the modernist turn in his denomination. In his 1919 The League of Nations as a Moral Issue, Thwing decried the league as an anti-Christian “device of man’s contrivance, which was built without recognition of God’s governing hand in the affairs of men.”41 For conservative Protestants like Massee, Myers, and Thwing, fighting the league was an international front in the domestic battle against progressive Christianity and the Social Gospel.

Chapter 1 suggested that liberals and conservatives differ in their intuitive feelings about human nature. Liberals tend to view mankind as basically good, and the world as therefore perfectible through human effort, while conservatives generally view man as born in sin, and therefore reliant upon God for salvation. This cleavage has implications for liberal and conservative attitudes towards both national and international governance. “Conservatives tend to take a pessimistic stance regarding the possibilities for transforming the international system,” writes Colin Dueck in Hard Line. “Their view of human na-
ture leads them to skepticism regarding schemes for permanent peace through international organizations, treaties, or political reform.”

Christian conservatives often based their opposition to the League of Nations on mankind’s selfish and sinful nature. “Universal domain and perfect peace are beyond the reach of man,” Presbyterian magazine declared in January 1919. “They will never be accomplished save by the power and personal presence of him who has the right to reign.” In his The League of Nations in the Light of the Bible, dispensationalist Arno Gaebelien similarly mocked the “great delusion that man, by his power . . . will succeed in making the world better.” Only Christ can save the world.

These hostile views of the League of Nations were echoed in conservative religious criticisms of the United Nations during the Cold War. In 1950, evangelist Louis Bauman condemned the United Nations as “Man’s supreme attempt to bring ‘on earth peace, good will among men’ without the partnership of Him whom Almighty God has ordained as ‘The Prince of Peace.’” Early Cold War dispensationalist Wilbur Smith referred to the United Nations as “this satanic serpent” for a false humanitarianism that actually seeks to “mock God and deify man.” In his 1970 best seller The Late Great Planet Earth, evangelist Hal Lindsey condemned the United Nations because “Jesus has been excluded from the premises.” To Christian nationalist Rousas John Rushdoony, writing in 1978, the United Nations had developed a new “religion of humanity” involving a “faith in humanity as such, not in a transcendental moral or spiritual order.”

The United Nations, Rushdoony argued, was fundamentally a religious issue.

Does this conservative Christian view of international organizations like the United Nations persist today? Our biblical literalism scale included the item “I have no doubt at all that God exists.” One likely reason our biblical literalism scale accounted for over three-quarters of the relationship between cultural ideology and feelings towards the United Nations (see Figure 10.4) is that for some Americans at least, belief in God’s rule and belief in secular governing bodies can be zero-sum.

A group of social psychologists led by Aaron Kay at Duke University have recently conducted research that lends support to this interpretation. Earlier psychologists had demonstrated that feelings of personal control over one’s destiny are associated with mental health, while the loss of personal control is associated with feelings of helplessness and depression. Kay and colleagues first demonstrated that when feelings of personal control diminish, people are more likely to turn to external sources of control in a process they call “compensatory control.” They later argued that just as internal and external sources of control are substitutable, two different sources of external control—God and government—are also interchangeable. In a remarkable series of experiments,
Kay and his colleagues were able to manipulate beliefs in government stability, leading subjects to temporarily increase or decrease their belief in God’s controlling hand. The process, furthermore, is bidirectional: another experiment manipulated beliefs in a divine hand in the operation of the universe, altering levels of support for government. Beliefs in the controlling hand of God and government, in other words, exist in “hydraulic” relationship: as one increases, the other tends to decrease.47

Our survey data suggests that Kay’s work on God and national governments as external sources of control may extend to the “World Government” that is the United Nations. The mediating role of biblical literalism in Figure 10.4 could reflect cultural traditionalists’ greater reliance on God as an external source of control in the world, compared to “human” institutions like “world government.” By contrast, cultural liberals may rely more on national and international governments (such as the United Nations) as sources of external control.

*Pagans and Christians.* “Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers, for what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness?” reads 2 Corinthians 6:14. “And what communion hath light with darkness?” A third theme of Christian anti-internationalism condemns international organizations out of opposition to the mixing of Christians and pagans. Condemning the “Yoke fellowship” is one way that Christian anti-internationalists have appealed to desires for Christian purity among the fundamentalist faithful, as well as popular prejudices within the broader Christian public.

Advocates of the League of Nations appealed to the brotherhood of man central to the Social Gospel. “My dream,” President Woodrow Wilson declared on July 4, 1914, “is that America will come into the full light of day when her flag is the flag not only of America, but also of humanity.”48 The inclusive nature of the league would realize that dream.

Christian conservatives viewed Wilson’s universalism as apostasy. “How can God bless these nations, who continue in idolatries, who defy His laws?” asked Arno Gaebelein. “Can He bless professing Christian nations, banded together in pact with heathen nations?” Cooperating with non-Christians was a threat to Christian purity. “If this nation is to be Christian,” Baptist minister Russell H. Conwell of Philadelphia roared in a sermon, “we will build a Christian navy, and we will have a Christian army . . . that shall ever set its face against the infidels and against the heathen, and never, never, permit them to weaken us.”49

The conservative Protestant aversion to a “mixed world” could extend beyond contacts with non-Christians to contacts with other, less “pure” Christians as well. A significant subtheme in arguments against the league was that it would be dominated by Catholic countries and become an instrument
of the Pope. For instance, Weert Janssen, a Lutheran pastor from Missouri, warned that the league would become a “society of nations under control of the Pope, that is the aim and hope of the Catholic Church today.” Anti-Catholic sentiment undergirded many criticisms of the league. The Pope and Rome were depicted as the Antichrist, and the League of Nations as its demonic institution.50

The aversion to “Yoke fellowship” continued as a source of Cold War Christian antipathy towards the United Nations. “The majority vote in the U.N. is now being cast by heathen peoples from Asia and Africa,” lamented Pentecostal R. A. Kerby in 1963. Together with mainline Protestants and secular liberals, Kerby claimed, these heathens worshiped the United Nations as a false idol.51

Our 2011 survey data suggests that desires to defend Christian purity continue to shape cultural conservative coolness towards the United Nations today. The moral value of purity accounted for three-quarters of the direct relationship between cultural ideology and biblical literalism (Figure 10.4, top left), which then shaped feelings towards the United Nations.52 “While the notion of compromise is central to the U.N.’s mission, it is for the most part incompatible with Christian conservatism,” historian Andrew Preston argues. “Indeed, the very bases of evangelicalism and fundamentalism are ideological, theological, and cultural purity grounded in a refusal to compromise with the irreligious and immoral forces of liberalism.”53

“A COLORED LEAGUE OF NATIONS”:
RACE AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

“The majority of the nations composing the League do not belong to the white race of men. On the contrary, they are a conglomerate of black, yellow, brown, and red races, frequently so intermingled and commingled as to constitute an unclassifiable mongrel breed.”54

—Senator James Reed (Democrat–Missouri), 1919

“The American people have rejoiced to see the people of the old colonial empires attain their independence. This movement is in our tradition. It fulfills on a grand scale that prophetic phrase in our Declaration of Independence that all men—not just Americans—are created equal and have unalienable rights. . . . Our posture in the United Nations is based on the belief, so amply justified year after year, that the interests which we hold in common with the great majority of nations—regardless of size, power, population, race or region—are so much stronger than the interests which divide us.”55


Social dominance orientation, the belief that “Inferior groups should stay in their place,” was also a small but statistically significant predictor of feelings towards the United Nations (see Figure 10.3). “Undoubtedly, the least researched,
understood, or discussed factor in the evolution of American attitudes towards international institutions is race, “ argues Edward Luck, former president of the United Nations Association of the USA. Though small, the influence of race on feelings towards the United Nations merits closer consideration.

Why would social dominance orientation shape feelings towards the United Nations? As displayed in Figure 10.5, of the five moral values that we measured in our 2011 survey, three were statistically significant mediators of the relationship. Americans higher on social dominance orientation felt cooler towards the United Nations than those lower on it, in part because they valued compassion less, and loyalty and purity more. Together, moral values accounted for over 80 percent of the direct relationship.

These conflicting moral values have been enduring themes in American debates over international organizations. As noted in the discussion of Haiti in Chapter 6, race was central to the Senate debate over the League of Nations. Speaking on the Senate floor, conservative Democrat James Reed of Missouri argued against joining “a colored League of Nations.” As the epigraph reveals, Reed appealed to racial purity, warning against the dangers of contact with a “mongrel breed.”

Republican Henry Cabot Lodge, who led the Senate opposition to joining the league, also appealed to racism. Invoking in-group loyalty, he warned that signing the covenant would lead to a flood of immigration: “Are we ready to leave it to other nations to determine whether we shall admit to the United

FIG. 10.5. Americans higher on social dominance feel cooler towards the United Nations than those lower on it, in part because they value compassion less, and loyalty and purity more.

*Note:* A simultaneous mediation model. All three indirect paths shown here were statistically significant. Fairness and authority were not and are not displayed. Indirect effect statistics are online at SUP.org. Seven demographic covariates are not shown. *Data source:* OU Institute for US-China Issues, 2011.
States a flood of Japanese, Chinese, and Hindi labor?” Lodge further claimed that immigration was an issue not just of labor but also of the need to “maintain the purity of our race.”

As noted in Chapter 6, race became a foreign policy issue during the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Segregationists “argued that decolonization gave control of the U.N. to Third World nations with an ingrained hatred of whites,” historian Thomas Noer writes. African countries, segregationists claimed, were “obsessed with revenge against Caucasians.” In 1963, Republican congressman James B. Utt of Orange County, California, claimed that “a large contingent of barefooted Africans” was training in Georgia as part of a United Nations military exercise to take over the United States. In 1971, conservative Democrat John Rarick of Louisiana objected to the U.N.’s “aggressive program . . . to mobilize the people of the world to combat racism.”

In 1962 Republican senator John Tower of Texas warned against the Kennedy administration’s support for anticolonial independence movements in Africa, for “no importance is given to the primitive state of millions of tribesmen, or their age-old feuds which will erupt as the Afro-Europeans are driven out.” As the epigraph reveals, Adlai Stevenson, Kennedy’s ambassador to the United Nations, defended the administration’s position by appealing to a common humanity—regardless of race. Stevenson was advocating compassion for the Africans and downplaying the value of a narrow in-group loyalty. In 1965 Secretary of State Dean Rusk similarly claimed that “This is the last nation on the face of the earth to shun diversity, or to reject the open forum, or to fear the growth of democratic processes.”

Figure 10.3 also reveals that blacks in our 2011 survey felt slightly warmer ($\beta = .06, p < .05$) towards the United Nations than nonblacks did. Looking instead at whites and controlling for age, gender, education, income, and being from the South, whites ($43^\circ$) felt $6^\circ$ cooler towards the United Nations than nonwhites ($49^\circ$) did, a small but statistically significant difference. When it comes to the United Nations, in short, both race and racism matter.

**A “GLOBAL SOCIAL WELFARE STATE”: THE UNITED NATIONS AND NORTH-SOUTH REDISTRIBUTION**

“Like a shipwrecked, exhausted Gulliver on the beach of Lilliput, America is to be tied down with threads, strand by strand, until it cannot move when it wakens . . . our sovereignty is being surrendered . . . America has ensnared itself in a web that restricts its freedom of action, diminishes its liberty, and siphons off its wealth.”

—Republican Pat Buchanan, 1998

Fundamentalist Protestants and racial segregationists are not the only conservatives who take issue with international organizations. Figure 10.3 reveals
that economic and political ideology were also unique predictors of feelings towards the United Nations. Economic ideology divides Americans over the United Nations: economic conservatives oppose international organizations for their perceived efforts to redistribute income. These organizations seek American wealth, Pat Buchanan claimed in 1998: “the transfer of money, prestige, power and sovereignty from America to a new class of parasite-mandarins.”

Conservatives have long feared that international organizations seek to milk American riches. In a 1927 book on the League of Nations, A. Cressy Morrison, the president of the New York Academy of Sciences, lamented that among foreigners “There is a united sentiment that anything which can be done to distribute our prosperity throughout the world, and advance other nations by tapping our sources of income is a perfectly normal and proper thing to do.”

This fear intensified with rapid decolonization in Africa and Asia following World War II. “Under the control of the numerous Third World nations, the U.N. has been actively promoting a comprehensive and totalitarian system of global management,” the Cato Institute’s Doug Bandow warned in 1985. “If the Group of 77 gets its way, such resource transfers will be carried out as a matter of right by U.N. institutions controlled by a Third World majority.”

While the Cato Institute’s rhetoric was alarmist and overblown, there is little denying that with decolonization and the doubling of U.N. membership by 1960, the U.N. General Assembly came to be dominated by developing nations sharing a common postcolonial ideology. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations under President Gerald R. Ford, argued in a discerning 1975 article for the neoconservative Commentary magazine, these new U.N. member states inherited the progressive welfare state philosophy of the British left. Ideas about class conflict within nations were internationalized, with the global “North” seen as exploiting the global “South.” In this view, helping the developing world, in the words of the Indian food minister, was “not . . . charity but deferred compensation” for past exploitation. Moynihan called for a frontal U.S. assault on the “tyranny of the U.N.’s ‘new majority,’” with its “redistributionist bias.”

Congressman Ron Paul agrees with Moynihan’s diagnosis of the redistributionist disease, but not his prescription: rather than confront the U.N. majority, the United States should instead quit the United Nations. “There is no way that you can have the concept of private property rights” under the United Nations, Paul argued in a 1998 John Birch Society video. “They believe in welfare redistribution, socialist redistribution—everybody owns everything—and they would take from the wealthy and give to the poor to get an equal balance.”

Paul first introduced his “American Sovereignty Restoration Act” in 1997 to withdraw the United States from the United Nations and to remove the U.N.
headquarters building from New York City. He resubmitted the bill in every subsequent Congress until his retirement in 2013.

**BLUE HELMETS AND BLACKHELICOPTERS:**

**WORLD GOVERNMENT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY**

“Just a generation ago, this place was called America. Now, after the worldwide implementation of a U.N.-led program called Agenda 21, it’s simply known as ‘the Republic.’ There is no president. No Congress. No Supreme Court. No freedom. There are only the Authorities.”

—Glenn Beck and Harriet Parke, 2012

Like the wildly successful *Hunger Games* trilogy, *Agenda 21* is a dystopian novel starring a teenage heroine and set in the police state that America will soon become. Unlike *Hunger Games*, however, *Agenda 21* includes a number of far-right conspiracy theories about radical environmentalism, such as the privileging of animal rights over human rights. In the first chapter, a man is sentenced to death for running over a snake. And in his afterword (the novel itself is written by Harriet Parke), Glenn Beck declares the U.N.’s real Agenda 21 as “evil,” “anti-free market,” and “anti-American.”

What is Agenda 21? It is a nonbinding U.N. resolution from the 1992 Rio “Earth” Summit that advocates smart, sustainable growth for the twenty-first century. Many libertarians, however, interpret “sustainable” to mean “socialist,” and the U.N.’s Agenda 21 as part of a broader conspiracy to create a communist world government. In a 2012 video, the John Birch Society argues that Agenda 21 will involve, among other things, the “seizure of private property” and “relocating people from rural areas to cities.” It urges Americans to “Choose Freedom” by opposing Agenda 21 locally. Many Tea Party activists have done so, disrupting county and city urban planning meetings across the country.

Beck’s fiction has been matched by mass market nonfiction. In 2012, HarperCollins published Fox News analyst Dick Morris’s *Here Come the Black Helicopters! U.N. Global Governance and the Loss of Freedom*. The front flap declares in full-caps, “Warning: Our National Sovereignty and Our Freedom Are in Grave Danger.” The copy then explains that “Stealthily advancing, the globalists and socialists at the United Nations, and in the United States itself, are trying to dilute our national sovereignty, undermine our democratic values, and mandate massive transfers of our wealth and technology to third world countries.” The back flap concludes, “They call it ‘global governance.’ We call it the end of freedom. . . . The day when the virtual black helicopters land.”

This was not the first time that far-right conspiracy theories about the United Nations entered mainstream popular culture. In February 1987, ABC aired a prime-time television miniseries called *Amerika* set ten years after a Soviet
conquest. The “United Nations Special Service Unit” acts as “peacekeepers” policing a demoralized America. Composed primarily of Eastern Europeans, this U.N. “Special Service” (SS) is reminiscent of the Nazi Schutzstaffel (SS).

*Amerika* aired at a time when the Reagan administration was getting tough on the United Nations. In 1982, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick derided the U.N.’s regulatory philosophy as “global socialism.” In 1984 President Reagan withdrew the United States from participation in UNESCO, claiming that it was hostile to the “basic institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press.” And following the airing of *Amerika* in February 1987, Alan Keyes, the ranking State Department official in charge of U.N. affairs, told a House subcommittee that the miniseries was only “probably going too far” in “portray[ing] the United Nations as the rubric under which the liberties of this country are finally subverted and destroyed.” Nonetheless, “those tendencies exist.”

But libertarian fears of the United Nations are having a greater impact on state and national politics today. The 2012 Texas GOP Platform declares that “We support the withdrawal of the United States from the United Nations and the removal of U.N. headquarters from U.S. soil. We oppose implementation of the U.N. Agenda 21 Program.” In June 2012 Alabama governor Robert Bentley signed State Bill 477 prohibiting the state from implementing any policy recommendations “originating in, or traceable to ‘Agenda 21,’ adopted by the United Nations.” The Alabama House and Senate had both approved the bill unanimously. In April 2013, the Republican majority House and Senate in Missouri passed a similar measure.

Libertarian fears of Agenda 21 are increasingly influencing national politics as well. The national “2012 Republican Platform” states, “We strongly reject the U.N. Agenda 21 as erosive of American sovereignty, and we oppose any form of U.N. Global Tax.”

Why are libertarians today so much more hostile towards the United Nations than are communitarians? Two themes dominate libertarian rhetoric about the United Nations: the futility and danger of contact with communist countries, and the threat that the United Nations poses to U.S. sovereignty, self-defense, and “freedom of action.” Our survey included a measure of warmth towards “Communist countries,” but it did not include any direct measures of attitudes towards sovereignty or self-defense. It did, however, include measures of the Protestant ethic of self-help, and of attitudes towards gun control that can serve as proxies for sovereignty and self-defense. Figure 10.6 reveals that each of these variables acted as unique mediators of the relationship between political ideology and feelings towards the United Nations. Together, they accounted for three-quarters of the direct relationship.
Anticommunism. Anticommunism has long been central to libertarianism in the United States; it has also been central to libertarian critiques of international organizations. During the debate over the League of Nations in 1919, David Jayne Hill of the Independence League decried both the proposed League of Nations and International Labor Organization as part of a “Socialized State” that would threaten individual liberty. A former assistant secretary of state, Hill warned that these new international organizations would seek “absolutism under omnipotent government control.”

Libertarian fears of communism and international organizations intensified with the onset of the Cold War. “Hardcore anticommunists,” Edward Luck argues, “came to see the U.N. as a modern day Trojan horse, offering a means for spies and subversives to infiltrate American soil.” The United Nations was implicated in the “McCarthyism” of the first half of the 1950s. In 1952, the U.S. Senate held hearings on “Activities of U.S. Citizens Employed by the U.N.,” seeking to expose American communists at the United Nations. Alger Hiss, later charged with giving state secrets to the Soviet Union, had represented the State Department at the 1945 San Francisco conference founding the United Nations.

For some on the libertarian right, the U.N.’s communist member states made it contaminating. “The United Nations,” Senator Barry Goldwater wrote in his 1960 The Conscience of a Conservative, “is in part a Communist organization.” After the United Nations admitted Red China in 1971, expelling Taiwan, Goldwater declared that “The time has come, for us to cut off all financial help,
withdraw as a member, and ask the United Nations to find a headquarters location outside the United States that is more in keeping with the philosophy of the majority of voting members, someplace like Moscow or Peking.\textsuperscript{81} Goldwater’s views were not confined to the political elite. “Militant anticommunism contributed to fears of the United Nations,” argues historian Lisa McGirr about grassroots conservatives in the 1960s. “After all, since the Right opposed diplomatic overtures with the Soviet Union, summit talks, and treaties, it logically followed that it would oppose an organization in which . . . socialist nations had membership.”\textsuperscript{82} Many elite and popular libertarians, in other words, were \textit{in principle} opposed to a secular “Yoke fellowship” between the democratic and communist worlds. “The United Nations does not represent people,” Kirkpatrick rightly noted in 1996 Senate testimony, “and it cannot be said to represent people until all the governments present there are representative democracies.”\textsuperscript{83}

There was also a \textit{practical} libertarian objection: communists were using the United Nations as a bullhorn. “By recognizing the right of Communist regimes to participate in the U.N. as equals,” Goldwater argued, “we grant Communist propaganda a presumption of reasonableness it otherwise would not have.”\textsuperscript{84} Republican Robert Taft of Ohio agreed, arguing in 1975 that the United Nations was “a propaganda forum for the Communist powers.”\textsuperscript{85}

Libertarian fears of the U.N.’s propaganda value to communist tyrants have not dissipated with the end of the Cold War. On December 22, 2011, the U.N. General Assembly observed a moment of silence to mark the passing of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. U.N. offices later lowered their flags to half-mast to mark Kim’s funeral. Many American conservatives were outraged. “In dipping its flag to half mast, the U.N. is effectively delivering a message of encouragement to a North Korean regime which sustains itself by way of repression, murder and nuclear proliferation,” former \textit{Wall Street Journal} editorial writer Claudia Rosett wrote on her blog. “A U.N. flag that is lowered to half-mast for Kim Jong Il is a flag [that] does not deserve to fly at all.”\textsuperscript{86} By memorializing Kim, the United Nations had revealed itself to be a morally bankrupt organization, a body which could be used as a megaphone for communist tyrants, undermining the cause of liberty.

\textit{Sovereignty and self-defense.} Figure 10.6 also reveals that belief in the Protestant ethic of self-help and positions on gun control also mediate the relationship between political ideology and feelings towards the United Nations. As noted in Chapters 4 (see Figure 4.4) and 6, our survey measured endorsement of the Protestant ethic with two items: “People are responsible for their own situation in life” and “People should not count on others to solve their problems.” Respondents
also located their position on a “gun control” placement ruler anchored by “strongly oppose” and “strongly support.” Our mediation analysis suggests that these items act as proxies for sovereignty/liberty and the right to self-defense.

Debates over the United Nations have long echoed domestic debates over the proper balance between individual liberty and the greater good. “American ambivalence towards government at home is paralleled,” Edward Luck rightly notes, “in American attitudes towards global governance and intergovernmental institutions.” Libertarians, jealous of their individual liberties at home, are equally jealous of U.S. national sovereignty abroad. Communitarians, by contrast, see government as playing a greater role in providing collective goods like security, and so view both individual liberty and national sovereignty as less absolute.

The core libertarian fear is one of loss of control, whether of the individual to the U.S. government, or of the United States to a world government. In 1962, Congressman Utt introduced one of many bills to revoke U.S. membership in the United Nations, claiming, “This nation cannot survive as a Republic as long as we are shackled to an organization by a treaty which supersedes the Constitution.” In 1971, conservative Democrat John R. Rarick of Louisiana proposed legislation to “remove the United States from the U.N. and the U.N. from the United States, thus freeing our people from the ever tightening yoke of international controls and the erosion of national sovereignty and constitutional government.” Note that “shackled” and “yoke” are both metaphors of control.

Americans, from the libertarian perspective, should not cede their sovereignty but embrace the Protestant ethic of self-help. “International organizations—whether the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, or any others—will not protect American interests. Only America can do that,” Republican senator Bob Dole declared in 1995. “U.S. sovereignty must be defended, not delegated.” Dole could not have been too surprised when Senate Republicans voted down the U.N. disability treaty he later championed in 2012.

The National Rifle Association (NRA) has been one of the American right’s most vociferous critics of the United Nations. The NRA’s Wayne LaPierre dedicated his 2006 The Global War on Your Guns: Inside the U.N. Plan to Destroy the Bill of Rights to fellow NRA members who “have thus far safeguarded American freedom from the global offensive of the United Nations.” The book’s description invokes the menace of “an armed U.N. platoon of blue helmets [that] can knock on your door to take your guns.” During a 2007 book tour, LaPierre told the Liberty Sentinel of Florida that “Our freedom and the Bill of Rights are what make our country the greatest in the world, and the last thing Americans want is to let the U.N. succeed in taking that away.” More recently, on July 26, 2012, Republican senator Jerry Moran of Kansas sent a letter cosigned by fifty other
senators to President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton warning of the
danger that the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty poses to the Second Amendment: “Our
country’s sovereignty and the constitutional protection of these individual
freedoms must not be infringed.”

Supporters of international organizations have tended to view U.S. sover-
eignty in less zero-sum terms. “When we ratify the San Francisco charter and
become a member of the international organization, we lose no American
rights, we surrender no American sovereignty, and invite no interference or
meddling with American domestic affairs,” Democrat Joseph Hill of Alabama
claimed during the U.S. Senate ratification of the U.N. Charter in 1945. “We
continue [to be] the master of our own household.”

Underlying the more communitarian view of international organizations is
a greater recognition of interdependence—that in a nuclear world U.S. security
is bound up with the security of other nations. “Only the creation of a world
government can prevent the impending self-destruction of mankind,” Albert
Einstein warned in 1952. “The science of weapons and war has made us all,
far more than eighteen years ago in San Francisco, one world and one human
race with one common destiny,” President John F. Kennedy similarly declared
in 1963. “In such a world, absolute sovereignty no longer assures us of absolute
security.”

From a communitarian perspective, some restrictions on liberty actually
serve the cause of liberty, whether at the domestic or international level. “We
are every day, in one sense, accepting limitations upon our complete freedom
of action,” Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted thoughtfully in testimony before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1965. “Law is a process by which we
increase our range of freedom . . . by being able to predict what others are going
to do.” Rusk was talking about the United Nations and U.S. national sover-
eignty, but he could have been making a communitarian case for gun control.

A DOG THAT BARKED, AND ONE THAT DIDN’T

We have already seen that in our 2011 survey blacks felt warmer towards the
United Nations than whites did. Two other demographic variables in Figure
10.3 also merit closer examination.

Gender ($\beta = -.21$) was a dog that barked loudly. Controlling for age, educa-
tion, income, and being black, Hispanic, or from the South, women (53°) still
felt 15° warmer towards the United Nations than men (38°) did. In Chapter 1,
we saw that men are more conservative than women (see Figure 1.3). Adding
ideology as an additional covariate, however, only reduced the gender gap to
12°, still a medium-sized difference. Further research is needed to better un-
derstand the reasons for the gender gap in feelings towards the United Nations.
Education was a dog that did not bark. In Figure 10.3, education level was not a statistically significant predictor of feelings towards the United Nations for the full U.S. population. Averages can be deceiving, however. A moderation analysis revealed that for the self-identified liberal and conservative subpopulations, there were significant correlations between education and feelings towards the United Nations. They were in the opposite directions, however, canceling each other out at the aggregate level (Figure 10.7). Among liberals, greater education was associated with slightly greater warmth towards the United Nations. Among conservatives, by contrast, greater education correlated with greater coolness towards the United Nations. Ideology, in other words, polarized education’s influence on feelings towards the United Nations.

This finding is consistent with research on the relationship between education, partisanship, and attitudes towards global warming. Education is associated with belief in global warming among liberals and Democrats, but not among conservatives and Republicans. Journalist Chris Mooney has labeled this phenomenon a “smart idiot” effect among Republicans. He suggests that greater exposure to right-wing news and opinion may lead more-educated conservatives to better know what other conservatives think on the issue, and...
thus be more motivated to seek out confirmatory evidence while dismissing contrary facts.99

While Mooney’s “smart idiot” jibe is a bit silly, and group polarization effects and the confirmation bias are not limited to the right, his idea is worth exploring in the context of education and partisan feelings towards the United Nations.

As noted in Chapter 5, our 2011 survey included a measure of partisan media exposure: “If you had to watch cable news, would you prefer to watch more MSNBC (e.g. Rachel Maddow) or FOX (Glenn Beck, Bill O’Reilly)?” This item allows us to put Mooney’s idea to a partial test. A pair of mediation analyses revealed that a greater preference for partisan media sources partially accounts for why ideology polarizes the influence of greater education on feelings towards the United Nations. Among conservatives, a greater preference for Fox partially mediated the impact of greater education on coolness toward the United Nations.100 Among liberals, however, a greater preference for MSNBC did not mediate the relationship.101 Perhaps Fox’s conservative antipathy to the United Nations is more infectious than MSNBC’s more positive liberal view. Alternatively, as noted in Chapter 1, psychologist John Jost has argued that conservatives have a greater relational need for belonging than liberals do. Perhaps this makes Fox viewers more susceptible to group polarization effects than MSNBC viewers are.

The influence of partisan media exposure on conservative feelings towards the United Nations is an example of the kind of “person-by-situation” interactions addressed in Chapter 5. While ideological predispositions are powerful predictors of international attitudes, future work can gain further leverage by exploring how the broader social context (like the media) interacts with individual differences variables (like gender, education, and ideology) to shape American attitudes towards not just the United Nations but foreign affairs more broadly.

GOD, GUNS, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

“Why in the name of minimal common sense does our government allow itself to be denounced, vilified and lied about day after day in the halls of the United Nations by a mob of terrorists, savages, revolutionaries, bankrupts, demagogues, voluptuaries, and half-educated opportunists masquerading as representatives of newborn sovereign nations?”

—James Burnham for the National Review, 1965

This chapter has argued that ideology powerfully divides Americans over international organizations and treaties. The survey evidence is overwhelming: liberals like the United Nations; conservatives dislike it.
Writing about the 1960s, historian Lisa McGirr argues that “For conservatives across the spectrum, from religious conservatives to libertarians, the United Nations was potentially dangerous to U.S. interests and sovereignty.”

Our 2011 survey data suggests that the same is true today, half a century later. All four of the dimensions of American ideology that we measured in our 2011 national survey point in the same direction: liberals are warmer towards the United Nations, and conservatives are cooler. Cultural liberals and conservatives differ over the United Nations, in large part because of their differences in biblical literalism (see Figure 10.4). Premillennial dispensationalists believe that the United Nations will join Satan’s forces during Christ’s Second Coming. Conservative Christians are also more likely than liberal Christians or nonreligious Americans to view the United Nations as a secular threat to God’s rule on earth. Some conservatives may also fear that interacting with pagans in the United Nations may dilute Christian purity. Although the effect was small, racial thinking also divides Americans in their views of the United Nations today, as social conservatives are loath to participate in a “colored U.N.” The impact of differences in economic ideology is stronger, for conservatives are more suspicious than liberals that the United Nations seeks to redistribute income on a global scale. Finally, libertarians’ greater anticommunism and jealousy of national sovereignty and individual liberty contributes to greater libertarian than communitarian paranoia about “blue helmets” and “black helicopters.”

These highly polarized popular attitudes have foreign policy consequences. The thirty-eight U.S. senators who blocked ratification of the U.N. disabilities treaty discussed at the beginning of this chapter were not “disconnected” from Main Street voters. Instead, they were hyperattuned to the preferences of their voters: most come from “deep red” hyperpartisan states and so fear being “primaried” more than losing a general election. It is therefore the anti–Agenda 21 fervor of the Tea Party activists who vote in Republican primaries that they dread most.

The rising influence of ideologically extreme primary voters is increasingly alienating mainstream party members. Moderate Republicans like David Brooks understandably felt snubbed by the Republican senators who voted against the disabilities treaty. “It’s an embarrassment for the country. This was a treaty that could have given Afghan vets who have lost limbs the greater ability to go abroad and live with dignity,” Brooks declared on the December 7, 2012, PBS NewsHour. “And to do it for black helicopter reasons, to vote against this, it is an embarrassment.” Liberal Mark Shields concurred: “This was a profile in cowardice. Republicans who are terrified of a primary, of a challenge on their right. Blue-helmeted U.N. soldiers coming into homeschooling parents and ripping their child away, having disembarked from the black helicopters.”
That Republican Brooks and Democrat Shields were lining up together against the thirty-eight Republican senators who voted against the U.N. treaty on the disabled suggests just how narrow a slice of the U.S. electorate the Republican senators were catering to. Brooks is right that the vote was an embarrassment, but from an electoral perspective the Republican senators were acting rationally, currying favor with the “blue helmets” and “black helicopters” crowd on the far Tea Party right of the Republican Party.

Political polarization has contributed to treaty gridlock in the U.S. Senate, and presidents increasingly rely on executive agreements rather than treaties to conduct U.S. foreign policy. Despite Democratic control of the Senate, the two-thirds requirement for treaty passage has led Barack Obama to submit just four treaties to the Senate per year, down from twenty-four per year under the Bush administration. Ideological polarization is thus weakening the Senate’s “advice and consent” function, undermining the system of checks and balances so central to our democracy.
Conclusion: Ideology—Why Politics Does Not End at the Water’s Edge

“Foreign policy should be the policy of the whole nation and not the policy of one party or the other. Partisanship should stop at water’s edge.”

—Democratic President Harry S. Truman, 1948

This book does not advance a theory of American foreign policy, the sources of which are complex and multiple. For instance, special interests and bureaucratic politics at home, and the balance of power abroad, powerfully shape the making of American foreign policy. These topics are beyond the scope of this monograph.

Instead, this book has focused more narrowly on the ideological foundations of partisanship over American foreign policy. While Democrats and Republicans in Washington, D.C. sometimes argue over foreign policy out of petty partisan desires that their party win and the other side lose, their disagreements are more often rooted in deeper ideological differences. Elite partisanship over foreign policy is usually a reflection of the disparate international attitudes of the Main Street liberals and conservatives who elect them.

This book thus disagrees with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, which has been surveying the global views of the American people for decades, and declared in 2012 that “Democrats and Republicans are very similar in their views on foreign policy,” Media claims of “political polarization,” therefore, are “exaggerated.” Pew’s Andrew Kohut agrees, arguing that Americans are “realistic centrists,” and that for the most part “partisan differences are slight.” Neither religion nor nationalism, Kohut further claims, shapes American views on foreign affairs.

Most political scientists agree with these pollsters. For instance, public opinion scholar Benjamin Page, who has worked extensively with the Chicago Council, claims that partisanship and ideology have “limited effects” on foreign policy preferences, making them “quite different from opinions about domestic policy.” Writing for Foreign Affairs in 2012, three international relations scholars even declared in their title that “American Foreign Policy Is Already Post-Partisan: Why Politics Does Stop at the Water’s Edge.”
These arguments are flawed. The idea that there is little partisanship in American foreign policy does not survive a reality check. Americans know from personal experience that their liberal and conservative relatives, colleagues, and neighbors differ over foreign affairs, and even the casual observer can tell that foreign policy is a contentious issue on Capitol Hill. The elites who make foreign policy and experience its intense partisanship firsthand would likely be dumbfounded by the “post-partisan” argument. Little wonder political science has little policy influence: policy makers are rightly skeptical of claims that do not pass the common sense test.

The “post-partisan” argument does not pass the social science test either. The *Foreign Affairs* piece was based upon a nonrepresentative convenience sample of just forty-three foreign policy professionals. The external validity of such a survey is questionable. The more common problem with existing surveys of international attitudes is not generalizability, however, but internal validity or measurement. Problems of question design (such as variables that lack sufficient variation) and wording (such as loaded diction, or answer categories that overlap) contribute to substantial measurement error, attenuating the observed relationships among measures of ideology and international attitudes. Poor measurement has likely contributed to the dominant—but incorrect—view that partisan differences over foreign affairs are slight.

This book presents new survey evidence of divided American public opinion over international affairs, helping explain why politics in the United States does not end at the water’s edge. Combining the strengths of psychological survey methodology (namely, measurement) and political science/sociology survey methodology (namely, sampling), we implemented our own nationally representative U.S. survey in the spring of 2011. While a careful inductive analysis of the existing survey data—Chicago Council, Pew, Program on International Policy Attitudes, CNN, and other surveys—is sufficient to debunk the “post-partisan” argument, our survey was the first to combine extensive questions about ideology and international attitudes within a single sample. This allowed us to explore their interrelationship in greater depth.

Utilizing this new survey data, this book has argued that American liberals and conservatives maintain consistent—if consistently different—international attitudes and foreign policy preferences. With the exception of Israel, which conservatives felt much warmer towards, liberals felt warmer towards all of the countries and international organizations that we measured. This included large ideological disparities on countries like Russia, China, Haiti, and Brazil, very large gaps on France and Mexico, and truly massive differences on international organizations like the European Union and especially the United Nations (see Figure 0.4).
The ideological gap in feelings towards foreign countries and international organizations, furthermore, is consequential for the foreign policy preferences of the American people. Feelings towards foreign countries, through the “affect heuristic,” powerfully shape foreign policy preferences (see Figure 1.9). This contributes to large-to-massive differences in liberal and conservative foreign policy preferences towards countries like China (Figure 9.3) and Israel (Figure 8.3), and specific foreign policies like whether to expand our military presence in Afghanistan.

Ideology also divided Americans on broad foreign policy orientations, with liberals very much more supportive of humanitarian idealism (Figure 4.4) and multilateralism, and conservatives much more supportive of uses of military force. Conservatives also scored higher than liberals on patriotism and especially nationalism (Figure 4.9), although liberals scored slightly higher on a “pure” patriotism that controlled for the sense of superiority over other countries which is central to nationalism.

Main Street differences over foreign affairs are matched on Capitol Hill. Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz have argued, primarily on the basis of the analysis of congressional voting patterns, that “‘Red’ and ‘Blue’ America disagree about the nature of U.S. engagement with the world.”6 This book provides public opinion evidence that elite partisanship over foreign affairs is not disconnected from a “centrist” American public, as Kohut puts it; instead, elite partisanship reflects the views of a divided American public.

Ideology’s influence on foreign policy seems similar to its influence on domestic policy. Benjamin Page appears mistaken when he claims that the determinants of domestic and foreign policy opinions are “quite different.”7 Instead, Adam Berinsky is likely right that “public opinion about war is shaped by the same attitudes and orientations that shape domestic politics.”8 Indeed, this book extends Berinsky’s point well beyond war to foreign affairs more broadly: the same ideological cleavages that animate domestic policy debates also animate foreign policy debates.

Although ideology (widely shared and systematic beliefs about how the world works) and partisanship (the degree of party identification and loyalty) are highly intercorrelated, postwar scholarship in American politics has consistently privileged the latter. Following the “Michigan model,” for the past fifty years students of American voting and political behavior have largely dismissed ideology in favor of the study of partisanship.9 In 1964 Phillip Converse claimed that the attitudes of the vast majority of the American people were not constrained by ideology; scholarship in American public opinion since then has largely upheld Converse’s view.10

This book, by contrast, focuses on the ideological underpinnings of parti-
sanship. Ideology is more psychologically and even physiologically fundamental, value laden, and complex than partisanship. Psychologically, liberals and conservatives differ systematically in their fundamental epistemic needs for certainty, existential needs for security, and relational needs for solidarity. As the product of both nature and nurture—for parental and peer socialization impact gene expression—ideological differences are even associated with physiological distinctions. Greater conservative than liberal sensitivity to threat, for example, is reflected in a stronger startle reflex and a larger right amygdala.

Ideologies are also value laden. Liberal and conservative Americans often infuriate each other because of their differing moral values. Righteous anger contributes to extreme rhetoric on issues like abortion, where the demonization of the other side as “baby killers” or as waging a “War on Women” creates enemies with whom compromise becomes impossible. In research using convenience samples, moral psychologists have shown that liberals value the “individualizing” moralities of fairness and compassion more than conservatives do, while conservatives value the “binding” moralities of loyalty, authority, and especially purity more than liberals do. Our nationally representative U.S. sample replicated this finding (see Figure 3.1) and demonstrated that the different moral constellations of liberals and conservatives can help account for their divergent foreign policy preferences. For instance, liberals’ greater compassion for the suffering of strangers contributes to greater liberal than conservative warmth towards foreign countries in general, while conservatives’ greater in-group loyalty contributes to greater conservative coolness towards those same foreign countries (Figure 3.8). And the greater value that conservatives place on authority and obedience helps account for their greater support for tough, “hard-line” foreign policies (Figure 3.11).

Ideologies are also complex. While the common unidimensional liberal-to-conservative measure of ideology is a powerful predictor of a wide variety of political attitudes, we gain even greater leverage on the role of ideology in shaping our attitudes by disaggregating it into its component dimensions. A number of political scientists have advocated a two-dimensional approach to ideology, focused on economics and the culture wars. This book goes a step further, exploring four dimensions—cultural, social, economic, and political—of American ideology (see Figure 2.4). This approach gives us greater leverage to better understand the diverse ways that our ideologies shape our international attitudes.

First, cultural ideology. Morris Fiorina is wrong and Alan Abramowitz is right: the “culture wars” are no myth. Religiosity does divide Americans on issues like abortion. Indeed, differing religious beliefs divide Americans, not just on abortion, gay marriage, and school prayer but on foreign affairs as well.
Cultural conservatives value purity much more than cultural liberals, who value fairness and justice more (see Figure 3.2). Cultural conservatives thus feel cooler towards Mexico and fear Mexican immigration more than cultural liberals do, and are more anxious about threats to authority and America’s WASP identity (Figure 6.4); cultural liberals, for their part, decry the injustice and heartlessness of current U.S. immigration policies. Cultural conservatives also appear to feel cooler than cultural liberals do towards more secular and sexually permissive countries like France (Figure 7.3) and Germany (Figure 7.11). And fundamentalist religious beliefs contribute to conservative hostility towards the European Union (Figure 7.12) and the United Nations (Figure 10.4), both seen by some biblical literalists as serving the Antichrist during the End of Days. A more widespread Christian conservative belief is that the United Nations represents a secular affront to God’s rule on earth. Secular Americans and liberal Christians, by contrast, have greater faith in the ability of the United Nations and other worldly governments to improve mankind’s destiny through human effort. Cultural conservatives also feel substantially warmer towards Israel than cultural liberals do, largely because of their greater biblical literalism (Figure 8.6). And cultural conservatives are wary of “godless” communism (Figure 9.4), contributing to greater conservative than liberal antipathy towards “Red China” (Figure 9.5) and North Korea (Figure 1.7).

Second, social ideology. Both race and racism continue to shape the international attitudes of the American people. Greater average social dominance orientation—the belief that “Inferior groups should stay in their place”—was a major driver of greater conservative coolness towards the “colored” developing world. Social dominance was the only dimension of American ideology to account for greater conservative coolness towards Mexico and Haiti. Greater liberal compassion contributed to their greater opposition to social dominance (Figure 3.4), support for intergroup equality, and desire for more aid to Haiti (Figure 6.7) and a less restrictive Mexican border policy (Figure 6.4). Greater social dominance also contributed to greater conservative than liberal racial prejudice against Chinese (Figure 9.5) and other Asians (Figure 9.10). More surprisingly, greater social dominance had a small but statistically significant impact on conservative antipathy towards the United Nations (Figure 10.5).

Third, economic ideology has a pervasive influence on the international attitudes of the American people. The greater value that liberals place upon fairness and compassion contributes to their greater support for income redistribution at home (Figure 3.6) and humanitarian idealism abroad (Figure 4.4). Economic conservatives, by contrast, are more likely to oppose aid to places like Haiti (Figure 6.7), disdain countries like France that are seen as socialist, and despise communist governments like China’s (Figure 9.5). Economic ideology
even divides Americans on the United Nations (Figure 10.3). Economic conservatives view it as seeking to engage in income redistribution on a global scale, transferring resources from the advanced industrial countries of the North to the developing countries of the South.

Fourth and finally, political ideology was operationalized with a communitarian-to-libertarian scale. Though it was not related to prejudice against different kinds of people, it had a substantial influence on attitudes towards various kinds of governments. Libertarians don’t like the American government, let alone authoritarian governments like China’s (Figure 9.5). They also felt cooler towards communist countries in general (Figure 9.4) and the United Nations and other forms of “world government” (Figure 10.6). However, greater libertarianism was associated with greater warmth towards the “free” Asian democracies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and India (Figure 9.10).

Each American, of course, varies across each of these four dimensions of ideology. In Chapter 2 we saw that Democrats tend to cluster into two broad ideological profiles, “moderates” and “liberals,” with the latter more culturally, socio-racially, and economically liberal (see Figure 2.10). Republicans tend to cluster into three ideological profiles. “Cultural” Republicans score the highest on traditionalism but the lowest on libertarianism. “Teavangelicals” score the highest on libertarianism and support for income inequality. And “moderate” Republicans score the lowest on cultural traditionalism, and near scale midpoints on social and economic ideology. These different types of Democrats and Republicans can differ substantially in their international attitudes. For instance, we saw that Teavangelical Republicans desired a substantially tougher Mexican border policy and felt substantially cooler towards the United Nations than moderate Republicans did. Liberal Democrats, for their part, felt substantially warmer towards the United Nations than moderate Democrats did.

Democrats and Republicans, we saw in Chapter 4, also clustered into distinct foreign policy profiles. Democrats were fairly evenly divided between three groups (see Figure 4.12). The largest was “forceful idealists” like Obama and the Clintons, nationalists willing to deploy force if needed to pursue humanitarian foreign policy goals. The next largest group of Democrats was “global citizens” ready to pursue humanitarian missions through multilateral institutions like the United Nations, but less willing to deploy military force and much less nationalistic. The smallest group of Democrats was the “skeptics,” more ambivalent about international engagement and the pursuit of idealism in U.S. foreign policy. While one third of Republicans might be called “isolationist skeptics,” unwilling to support the United Nations or pursue idealistic foreign policy goals, the other two-thirds were characterized as “cautious idealists,” ambivalent about multilateralism but willing to pursue
humanitarian, political, and religious idealisms as U.S. foreign policy goals (Figure 4.11).

These cleavages within the Democratic and Republican parties mean that we have to be careful about overly broad generalizations. For instance, while the average conservative is more libertarian than the average liberal, cultural/religious right Republicans appear to be even more communitarian than most Democrats—very different from Teavangelical Republicans, who are much more libertarian. Similarly, while conservatives generally support the use of force more than liberals do, “forceful idealists” within the Democratic Party are willing to deploy force when necessary to achieve humanitarian aims, such as preventing a massacre in Benghazi, Libya, in 2011.

We also have to be careful about overly strong causal claims. As noted in Chapter 3, the mediation models in this book are best understood as revealing syndromes of variables that go together—not definitive causal chains. Further experimental research is still needed to pin down the exact causal mechanisms suggested by our cross-sectional survey data.

**BEYOND THE MEDIAN VOTER:**
**PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY IN A DIVIDED AMERICA**

Public opinion is but one of several drivers of U.S. foreign policy. However, because the United States is a democracy, it is an important one. The “electoral connection” ensures that politicians who want to be reelected will pay careful attention to the international attitudes of their core constituents.

For the most part, however, the views of the average voter no longer matter. The “median voter” is less and less relevant today because the majority of House and Senate districts have become hyperpartisan. The South’s partisan realignment, begun during the civil rights movement, is now largely complete. And Americans are increasingly choosing to live in communities of the like-minded: liberals on the coasts or in big cities, conservatives in the heartland or the suburbs. With this ideological self-sorting and gerrymandering, the majority of congressional districts have become so deeply blue or red that the general election outcome is a foregone conclusion.

The action in American electoral politics today is largely in the primaries. And primary voters, political scientist Gary Jacobson has shown, are more ideologically extreme than general election voters, especially in the Republican Party. To avoid being “primaried,” therefore, politicians today increasingly pander to the ideological extremes of their parties. This exacerbates conflict and gridlock, not just on domestic economic and cultural issues like the budget and abortion but on foreign policy as well.

This has serious implications for the U.S. national interest. As David Boren
wrote in the Foreword, “When foreign policy becomes partisan, the national interest suffers.” There is a reason why Senator Arthur Vandenberg, President Harry Truman, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton all pleaded with their colleagues to leave partisanship “at water’s edge”: discord over foreign policy hurts the United States.

For instance, Teavangelical antipathy towards the United Nations can help explain why, as discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 10, Senate Republicans have consistently and overwhelmingly blocked ratification of U.N. treaties on issues like the law of the sea (UNCLOS) and the rights of the disabled. Such actions appear both irrational and cruel. UNCLOS serves U.S. economic and security interests and has been promoted by both the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Pentagon, groups that Republicans usually support. And the treaty on the rights of the disabled promotes decent treatment of the disabled worldwide—at no material cost to the United States.

These Republican senators, however, were acting consistently with Teavangelical antipathy towards the United Nations. That the American public as a whole—the “median voter”—was neutral towards the United Nations was irrelevant, as was Democratic warmth. To be reelected, these Republican senators do not need to represent the median voter in their district, let alone their Democrats. Instead, they need to mollify the Tea Party activists who they believe show up at Republican primaries.

Our survey data supports these senators’ belief that Republican primary voters are largely Teavangelicals. Harvard’s Theda Skocpol argues that the grassroots Tea Party activists of the Republican Party today are older, white, and very conservative Americans driven by fear of a rapidly changing society. Many are rather communitarian conservative Protestants who would fall into our “cultural” cluster of Republicans discussed in Chapter 2. Others are former Goldwater supporters and John Birch Society members, much higher on libertarianism. While both groups are much more conservative than “moderate” Republicans, it is the more libertarian Teavangelicals who express the greatest interest in “what’s going on in government and public affairs.” The 10 percent of Americans who fell into our “Teavangelical” Republican category appear to be the most likely Republican primary voters.

It is noteworthy, therefore, that Teavangelical Republicans do not just differ massively from Democrats and independents in their international attitudes; they also differ substantially from other Republicans. For instance, Teavangelical Republicans (17°) feel 24° cooler towards the United Nations than moderate Republicans (41°) do; they are also much less supportive of international organizations and substantially less trusting of international treaties. When Republican senators vote against U.N. treaties, they are representing the prefer-
enances of Teavangelical primary voters. They are hyperattuned to, not disconnected from, their core constituents. As we saw in Chapter 10, when it comes to the United Nations, Teavangelical primary voters fear “blue helmets” and “black helicopters.” Republican senators thus have good electoral reasons to oppose international treaties.

The rising political influence of the ideological extremes undermines the national interest. When UNCLOS cannot pass the U.S. Senate, U.S. business and national security interests are harmed. And when international treaties are unlikely to pass the Senate, the U.S. president is forced to utilize executive agreements instead. This sends a clear signal to the world that the United States is internally divided, and that those cleavages can be exploited. It also undermines the system of advice and consent so central to our democracy.

Scholars and policy makers would be wise to acknowledge that real differences on foreign affairs exist between liberals and conservatives, on Capitol Hill and on Main Street. Because of the perverse incentives of the electoral connection today, divided American public opinion on foreign affairs has real foreign policy consequences. Students and practitioners of American foreign policy would be wise too not to dismiss the influence of ideology on the international attitudes of the American people.
9. $F(1, 420) = 411.29, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .50$, controlling for seven standard demographics.
10. $F(1, 420) = 96.87, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .19$, controlling for seven standard demographics.
11. 2004 Chicago Council, Question 335: $F(1, 622) = 106.88, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .15$, controlling for age, gender, income, and education.
12. Scale $\alpha = .81$. $F(1, 420) = 431.91, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .51$, controlling for seven standard demographics.
13. 2010 Chicago Council, Question 7/2: $F(1, 1058) = 166.67, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .14$, controlling for age, gender, education, income, and being from the South.
14. 2010 Chicago Council, Question 220/1-7: $F(1, 467) = 132.95, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .22$, controlling for age, gender, education, income, and being from the South. Scale $\alpha = .85$.
15. $\chi^2(1, N = 588) = 57.63, p < .001, \Phi = .31$; and $\chi^2(1, N = 537) = 28.14, p < .001, \Phi = .23$. Gallup poll, February 25–26, 2013, downloaded from the Roper Center.
16. $F(1, 420) = 431.91, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .51$, controlling for seven demographics. Scale $\alpha = .71$, good for just two items.
18. $\chi^2(1, N = 325) = 17.30, p < .001, \Phi = .23; \chi^2(1, N = 333) = 11.93, p = .001$; and $\chi^2(1, N = 349) = 25.01, p < .001, \Phi = .27$, respectively. November 2007 PIPA Knowledge Networks Internet survey, http://hdl.handle.net/1903/10632.
28. The direct effect was reduced from 10.25 percent (semipartial correlation = –.32) to 2.25 percent (semipartial correlation = –.15).
34. Cited in Ruotsila 2008: 140.
40. Indirect effect statistics are online at SUP.org under “Chapter 10, Satan section. Cultural traditionalism to warmth towards the U.N. (simultaneous).”
42. Dueck 2010: 27.
44. Cited in Ruotsila 2008: 177, 178, 179.
47. Kay et al. 2010. My thanks to Colin Barnes for bringing this remarkable series of experiments to my attention.
48. Cited in Graebner and Bennett 2011: 11.
49. Cited in Ruotsila 2008: 38, 64.
52. The direct effect was reduced from 52 percent (semipartial correlation = .72) to 13 percent (semipartial correlation = .36).
56. Luck 1999: 89.
57. Direct effect reduced from 4.2 percent (semipartial correlation = -.21) to .81 percent (semipartial correlation = -.09).
62. \( F(1, 1047) = 6.96, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = .007, \) controlling for age, gender, education, income, and being from the South.
64. Cited in Luck 1999: 46.
76. GOP 2012: 45.
77. Direct effect reduced from 6.8 percent (semipartial correlation = −0.26) to 1.7 percent (semipartial correlation = −0.13).
78. Cited in Ruotsila 2008: 166.
79. Luck 1999: 84.
85. Cited in Luck 1999: 117
87. Luck 1999: 44.
96. \(F(1, 1046) = 65.91, p < .001, \eta^2 = .06\), controlling for six demographics (not gender).
97. Male = 51°; female = 39°. \(F(1, 1046) = 53.43, p < .001, \eta^2 = .05\), controlling for six demographics (not gender).
100. Indirect effect \(PE = −.3965, 95\% CI \text{from} −1.0917 \text{to} −.0428\), controlling for six demographics (not education).
101. Indirect effect \(PE = −.1083, 95\% CI \text{from} −.7079 \text{to} .5392\), controlling for six demographics (not education).
104. Fiorina 2009; Fiorina and Levendusky 2006; Kull and Destler 1999; Page with Bouton 2006; Busby and Monten 2012.
Conclusion

14. E.g., Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Abramow-

15. See Aldrich et al. 2006.
17. Skocpol and Williamson 2012: 76.
18. $F(2, 302) = 37.72, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .20$; $F(2, 302) = 12.74, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .08$, controlling for seven standard demographics.
19. $F(1, 205) = 38.50, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .16$; $F(1, 205) = 37.05, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .15$; and $F(1, 205) = 21.59, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .10$, respectively, controlling for seven standard demographics.