## CONTENTS

Figures and Tables
Foreword, by David L. Boren: Partisanship and the U.S. National Interest
Introduction: Ideology and American Foreign Policy

### PART I: CONCEPTS

1. Liberals, Conservatives, and Foreign Affairs
2. Beyond Red and Blue: Four Dimensions of American Ideology
3. The Moral Foundations of Ideology and International Attitudes
4. The Foreign Policy Orientations of Liberals and Conservatives: Internationalism, Realism/Idealism, and Nationalism

### PART II: CASES

6. Latin America: Liberal and Conservative Moralities of Immigration and Foreign Aid
7. Europe: Socialist France, Mother England, Brother Germany, and the E.U. Antichrist
8. The Middle East: Christian Zionism, the Israel Lobby, and the Holy Land
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>East Asia: Red China, Free Asia, and the Yellow Peril</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>International Organizations and Treaties: Blue Helmets, Black Helicopters, and Satanic Serpents</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion: Ideology—Why Politics Does Not End at the Water’s Edge</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statistical Glossary</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>References</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Index</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Foreword: Partisanship and the U.S. National Interest

David L. Boren

Our dysfunctional political system is a national embarrassment. Whether the issue is the budget, gun control, health care, or immigration, the executive and legislative branches are unable to work together to solve the nation’s problems. Partisan posturing has pushed out bipartisanship and compromise. Cooperation between liberals and conservatives is becoming a quaint memory.

U.S. foreign policy is increasingly hamstrung by partisan politics as well. From Europe to the Middle East to China, Democrats and Republicans not only cannot agree; they are disinclined to work together to promote the national interest. Tom Brokaw’s “Greatest Generation” was comprised of men and women who risked their lives to advance the national interest. Where is that spirit now? Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a conservative who was the champion of bipartisanship during World War II, laid the foundations for the Marshall Plan and a bipartisan foreign policy. Where are his successors today?

When I chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee in the 1980s and 1990s, I was able to work with my Republican colleagues on bipartisan solutions to our nation’s security challenges. Intelligence Committee voting was usually unanimous. In fact, we never divided along strict party lines in any of our rare roll call votes.

Those days are long gone. Voting in most congressional committees today divides along partisan lines. The wise agreement that “politics should stop at the water’s edge” has become a relic of the past.

David L. Boren is the president of the University of Oklahoma. He has also served Oklahoma as governor (1975–79) and U.S. senator (1979–94). He was the longest-serving chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
During my fifteen years in the Senate, I learned that partisan divisions over foreign policy have consequences. They complicate pursuit of the national interest. They distress our foreign allies and friends. They present to the world a distorted picture of America. At their most damaging, they turn friends into foes and make more difficult the task of advancing our national interest. When foreign policy becomes partisan, the national interest suffers.

In 2008, I wrote in *A Letter to America* that “partisanship clearly becomes destructive when partisan advantage is elevated above the national interest.” Examples abound of partisan politics disrupting orderly governance. During the winter of 2012–13, the “fiscal cliff,” sequestration, and the debt ceiling dominated political debate. Liberals and conservatives representing the extreme wings of their parties refused to compromise, allowing ideological purity to trump the national interest. During that same period, partisan disputes marred the confirmation hearings for President Obama’s national security team. The incoming secretary of defense, former senator Chuck Hagel, received more “no” votes in the Senate than any previous candidate for that office, while confirmation of the new CIA director was held up for weeks by partisan wrangling.

For eleven years, some on the right in the Senate have blocked passage of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, despite support for passage from the business community, the military, and the public. More recently, a group of senators rejected the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, even though the convention mirrored the much admired Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which passed the Senate with bipartisan support twenty-three years ago. In both cases, those in opposition held that the conventions ceded a piece of American sovereignty to the United Nations, an international body that conservatives love to hate.

The American people tolerate partisanship in foreign policy in part because they have little interest in foreign affairs—until something goes wrong. Nor do our citizens show much interest in American history. Despite the fact that we are a practical, problem-solving people, we are cynical towards government and doubtful that Washington will ever accomplish anything that directly affects us. Such cynicism is no surprise given that the picture that emerges in our media is of a people in decline, of special interest groups dominating politics, of vast sums of money lubricating our political system, of declining participation in civic organizations and activities.

But as I wrote in *A Letter to America*, “In all the ways that matter, we Americans have so many reasons to believe that our future can be even greater than our past.” We prize a culture that is dynamic, pragmatic, and innovative. We prize our openness to change, which has long been America’s default position. And we have surmounted obstacles in the past. In this instance, we can start by
trying to understand why and how hyper-partisanship has come to dominate our political discourse.

In *The Politics of American Foreign Policy*, Peter Gries analyzes partisanship—affecting both domestic and foreign policy—and finds its origins in the deeply embedded ideologies that are changing our electoral landscape. Ideological self-sorting, aided by the gerrymandering that once again took place after the 2010 census, is dividing America into warring political camps. The majority of congressional districts have now become hyper-partisan—so red or blue that general elections are often mere formalities. Instead, a majority of the members of Congress face their stiffest competition in the primaries, where the 10 to 20 percent of eligible voters who do vote usually represent the extreme wings of their parties. “For the most part,” Professor Gries writes, “politicians today are not elected by the median voters in their districts. Their job security, instead, depends upon a small minority within their parties.” In these circumstances, candidates for office must cater to the ideological extremes, setting the stage for a partisan approach to governing and a bias against—even a fear of—compromise.

Professor Gries argues that while partisanship and ideology tend to go together, ideology is the more fundamental driver of political attitudes and behavior. *The Politics of American Foreign Policy* explores the nuances of American ideology, including its complex of values, beliefs, and motivations. While partisanship can be fluid, ideology appears more stable, frequently passed from generation to generation. For instance, the once solidly Democratic South is now the solidly Republican South. The partisan alignment has flipped, but the underlying ideologies have changed only marginally.

Since ideological positions are strongly held and change only slowly, does this mean that our dysfunctional political system will be with us for years to come? The very red and very blue congressional districts that dot the political landscape today are unlikely to change much—at least until the 2020 census, when redistricting and the gerrymandering that will inevitably follow it might partially reshape the electoral landscape, giving median voters a louder voice and reducing the clout of the extreme wings of both political parties.

For this to happen, the ideologies that undergird partisanship will have to change too. Internationalists in both parties must unite to oppose isolationists. Put another way, liberals and conservatives should try to move towards the middle, which is the only place where a bipartisan foreign policy can take root.

As I wrote in *A Letter to America*, “The history of our nation is one of almost unbroken progress. While there have been temporary ups and downs, each generation has been able to say that it has left America better in most ways than it found it.” Despite our broken political system, I still believe that state-
ment is correct. Our pragmatism, our determination, and our free and creative society will help us find ways to right the political ship and steer towards the goals we all share. As Peter Gries explains, the roots of hyper-partisanship have flourished in the extreme ideologies cultivated by the far left and far right of both our political parties. We understand the problem. The task for Americans now is to promote dialogue, cooperation, and compromise between liberals and conservatives, to bring our two great parties together in a joint effort to solve the problems facing us. We have done it in the past. We can do it now.
Introduction:
Ideology and American Foreign Policy

“Vietnam . . . cleaves us still. But . . . a new breeze is blowing, and the old bipartisanship must be made new again.”
—Republican President George H.W. Bush, 1989

“I do hope that the new Congress respects the time-honored tradition of leaving politics at the water’s edge.”
—Democratic Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, 2010

Foreign policy has been a partisan issue ever since the United States of America won its independence. In his “Farewell Address,” President George Washington counseled a foreign economic policy of free trade but a diplomatic policy of nonintervention: “Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?” Against Washington and the Hamiltonian Federalists, Thomas Jefferson and his Republicans cautioned against even economic internationalism. Instead, they advocated greater isolationism in jealous defense of America’s hard won and fragile democracy at home.

And yet it was under the Republicans that the United States first fought against the Barbary pirates in Tripoli (1801–5) under Jefferson, and then declared war against Britain in 1812 under James Madison. After four days of heated debate, the House of Representatives voted 79 to 49 and the Senate 19 to 13 in favor of war, the first and closest vote to formally declare war in U.S. history. All thirty-nine of the Federalists in Congress voted against war.

Nearly a century later, American foreign policy was at the heart of the 1900 presidential contest between Republican president William McKinley and his Democratic challenger William Jennings Bryan. The United States had won Cuba from Spain during the 1898 Spanish-American War, and the Philippine-American War (1899–1902) was underway. McKinley and his vice presidential running mate, Theodore Roosevelt, a war hero, claimed that the United States had liberated Cuba from Spanish tyranny. Bryan countered that American rule over Cuba and the Philippines was no less cruel and imperialist than Spanish rule had been.

The debate over the U.S. annexation of Cuba, the Philippines, and Hawaii played out in the popular press as well. “We do not intend to free, but to sub-
jugate the people of the Philippines. We have gone there to conquer, not to redeem,” Mark Twain argued in the *New York Herald*. “And so I am an anti-imperialist. I am opposed to having the eagle put its talons on any other land.”4 Twain later became vice president of the Anti-Imperialist League.

The debate over imperialism is captured visually in an editorial cartoon from an 1899 edition of the *Washington Post* (Figure 0.1). Clifford Berryman depicts President McKinley as a rotund Uncle Sam, contentedly smoking a cigar after having completed a three-course meal. An “Expansionist Menu” discarded on the floor describes the feast as one of “Hawaiian Soup,” “Porto Rican Rum,” and “Philippine Pudding.” Bryan and a group of “anti-expansionists” watch from the door in dismay.

But McKinley had his popular supporters as well. Figure 0.2, from a 1900 issue of *Judge* magazine, depicts President McKinley in a patriotic light, raising the U.S. flag over the Philippines. “Old Glory” is already flying over Cuba and
Puerto Rico in the background. A treasonous Bryan, meanwhile, seeks to chop the flagpole down. Uncle Sam, back on American soil, convinces an American voter to support McKinley over Bryan in the 1900 presidential election: McKinley, Victor Gillam writes, will uphold American “dignity,” while Bryan will “make us the laughing-stock of the world.” McKinley won reelection in a landslide.

Pearl Harbor, in the words of Republican senator Arthur Vandenberg, “ended isolationism,” and the first two decades of the Cold War are often remembered for having a bipartisan foreign policy. What bipartisanship there was, however, largely dissipated with the Vietnam War. The 1972 presidential campaign witnessed liberals decrying Vietnam as “Nixon’s War,” while conser-
tives lambasted the Democratic challenger, George McGovern, as soft on defense and communism.6 During the Watergate scandal the next year, a majority Democratic Congress passed the War Powers Resolution, overriding President Nixon’s veto. The resolution required congressional approval of American military involvements overseas.

Over a quarter century later, during a January 2012 Republican presidential primary debate in South Carolina, the conservative audience became animated during an exchange between Newt Gingrich and Ron Paul over foreign policy. After Paul decried American militarism, Gingrich declared, “Andrew Jackson had a pretty clear-cut idea about America’s enemies: Kill them.” The audience exploded in cheers. Ron Paul responded on a more sober note: “Maybe we ought to consider a golden rule in foreign policy. Don’t do to other nations what we don’t want to have them do to us.” The audience interrupted Paul with boos and jeers. But he was later applauded when he decried “warmongering” against Iran: “This country doesn’t need another war. We need to quit the ones we’re in. We need to save the money and bring our troops home.”7

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, meanwhile, was seeing her 2010 hopes for a bipartisan foreign policy, cited in the epigraph, dashed. Politics was not left at water’s edge during her May 2012 push for the U.S. Senate to finally ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which she argued was necessary to protect U.S. security and advance American economic interests. She lamented that “I am well aware that this treaty does have determined ... vociferous ... opposition based in ideology and mythology, not in facts, evidence, or the consequences of our continuing failure to accede to the treaty.”8 Indeed, Republican senator Jim Inhofe of Oklahoma, in a letter cosigned by twenty-six of his Senate Republican colleagues, wrote to Democratic majority leader Harry Reid that “We are particularly concerned that United States sovereignty could be subjugated in many areas to a supranational government.”9 Despite the support of Big Oil and many business and security conservatives, thirty-four Republican senators successfully blocked UNCLOS ratification.

THE ENIGMA OF PARTISANSHIP IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

What best explains this persistent pattern of partisan discord over American foreign policy?

Foreign policy partisanship may sometimes be the product of clashing material interests, with American political parties representing distinct interest groups. For instance, the highly partisan debate over the War of 1812 was driven in part by opposing regional economic interests. Based in a New England whose economy was more dependent upon international trade, Federalists opposed a
war against Britain; Republican “War Hawks,” for their part, may have viewed war as an opportunity to annex Canadian territory from Britain. Similarly, as the Democratic Party came to represent Big Labor, and the Republican Party, Big Business, these opposed economic interests were later reflected in partisan disagreements over foreign policy issues like international trade.

Another explanation focuses on pure partisanship itself: politicians want their team to win the next election, so they attack both the domestic and foreign policies of their party rivals—regardless of substance or consequences. In October 2010, Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell (R–Kentucky) famously declared that “The single most important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term president.” By refusing to cooperate with the president and causing gridlock, Republicans could later blame the Democrats for failing to accomplish anything. For instance, Republican opposition to UNCLOS in 2012 could be seen as part of a partisan strategy of obstructionism.

These arguments are not wrong. Conflicting interest groups do shape American foreign policy. And politicians do often act out of pure partisanship, motivated by the simple desire that one’s own party wins and the other loses.

This book argues, however, that purely material explanations for foreign policy partisanship are incomplete, and that arguments based on partisan gamesmanship alone usually only touch the surface of the issue. Instead, partisanship over American domestic and foreign policy alike usually has its deeper roots in disparate American ideologies—widely shared and systematic beliefs about how the world does and should work. For instance, when thirty-four Republican senators voted against UNCLOS in 2012, they were expressing a deeply held conservative distrust of international institutions, one widely shared by the Republican primary voters who elected them. Based primarily upon an April 2011 survey of a representative national sample of one thousand American adults, this study argues that liberals and conservatives feel and think about foreign countries and American foreign policy in consistently different ways, and explores the psychological sources and foreign policy consequences of these ideological differences.

A number of recent books explore what Americans should think about the world. For instance, Charles Kupchan argues that America should stop seeking to export Western values and accommodate itself to working with the Chinese model of state capitalism.10 Thomas Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum argue that Americans should view the rise of China and the other BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India) as a wakeup call to inspire national renewal.11 By contrast, this book explores what Americans actually think about the world. More descriptive than prescriptive, it explores what and how American liberals and conservatives really feel and think about foreign countries and global affairs.
Our survey asked all participants to rate a list of seventeen countries and three international organizations on a $0^\circ$ (“very cold, unfavorable”) to $100^\circ$ (“very warm, favorable”) feeling thermometer. Figure 0.3 displays the average score for each country and international organization for the full U.S. sample. As might be expected, Americans felt the warmest towards the United States ($83^\circ$) itself, followed by its closest allies, England ($69^\circ$), Japan ($60^\circ$), Israel ($58^\circ$), and Germany ($57^\circ$). They felt the coolest towards North Korea ($19^\circ$) and Iran ($20^\circ$), followed by Pakistan ($29^\circ$) and China ($34^\circ$).

These findings are consistent with other national surveys. Our sequence exactly replicates that of four-point “favorable” to “unfavorable” and “ally” to “enemy” assessments on nine of these same countries in a CNN telephone poll conducted in May 2011, less than a month after our own survey. England and Israel were CNN’s top two (it did not include Japan), and Iran and North Korea tied at the bottom, as they did in our survey. Our sequence also replicates that of a Chicago Council for Global Affairs Internet survey conducted less than a year earlier in June 2010. Replication across independent samples using different survey methods increases confidence in the generalizability of findings from our survey.

Averages can be deceiving when they hide differences among significant
subgroups within a population. Figure 0.4 displays the gap between liberal and conservative feelings for each country or international organization within our sample. Remarkably, there were statistically significant ideological differences on all seventeen countries and all three international organizations measured. These differences were small for England (5°), South Korea (6°), and Taiwan (6°), but large for Russia (20°), China (21°), Haiti (22°), Brazil (22°), the World Bank (24°), and Israel (–25°), and truly massive for the United Nations (49°), European Union (37°), Mexico (30°), and France (27°). 15 Note that other than the United States itself, Israel is the only country that conservatives feel more warmly towards than liberals do, topics we will take up in Chapters 4 and 9. Figure 0.4 thus reveals a consistent and substantial pattern of ideological differences in the international attitudes of the American people. This pattern of ideological differences, furthermore, is again replicated in other contemporaneous surveys, such as the 2010 Chicago Council survey,16 and the U.S. data from the Pew Research Center’s 2010 Global Attitudes Project.17

The predominant argument among public opinion researchers today, however, is that partisanship and ideology do not shape the international attitudes of the American people. The Chicago Council claimed in 2012 that “Democrats
and Republicans are very similar in their views on foreign policy.” Political scientist Benjamin Page and pollster Andrew Kohut have similarly dismissed the influence of partisanship and ideology in separate 2006 books based upon earlier Chicago Council and Pew surveys, the two major sources of representative national survey data on the global views of the American people. Writing in 2012 for Foreign Affairs, a group of younger political scientists went so far as to declare in their title that “American Foreign Policy Is Already Post-Partisan: Why Politics Does Stop at the Water’s Edge.”

These public opinion scholars and pollsters have misinterpreted the existing survey data. For instance, to explore the impact of partisanship on foreign policy preferences, the Chicago Council first sorted all of its 2012 survey respondents by whether they lived in majority red or blue House districts. Statistical analysis, it reports, revealed that the two groups differed on “only four of the eighty-five” policy questions in its survey. It therefore concludes that the foreign policy views of Democrats and Republicans are “remarkably similar.”

Whether one lives in a red or blue House district, however, is an extremely indirect and poor proxy for partisanship. A majority of Americans are either Democrats or independents living in districts represented by a Republican, or Republicans or independents living in districts represented by a Democrat. Little wonder there were few differences between these two groups in their international attitudes.

The Chicago Council’s decision to create an indirect proxy measure for partisanship is particularly galling given that its 2012 survey included a direct measure of partisanship: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?” Responses to this question allow for a straightforward comparison of the over 1,200 self-identified Democrats and Republicans in their 2012 sample, revealing substantial partisan differences over foreign affairs. For instance, the survey asked all respondents to assess whether nine possible “threats to the vital interests of the United States” were “critical,” “important but not critical,” or “not an important threat.” Self-identified Democrats and Republicans differed on all nine items, an extremely large overall difference. The survey also asked participants to assess whether they thought eleven listed “U.S. foreign policy goals” were “very,” “somewhat,” or “not” important. Democrats and Republicans differed on nine of the eleven goals. This was again an extremely large overall partisan difference.

To claim that partisanship does not shape American foreign policy preferences is a consequential mistake. What do foreign policy makers like Hillary Clinton think when they read assertions that American foreign policy is “post-partisan”? When political scientists and pollsters make claims that do not pass a reality check, they marginalize themselves from the policy world.
More importantly, because the United States is a democracy, the polarizing impact of ideology on the international attitudes of the American people shapes American foreign policy. Given that the United States is a superpower whose foreign policy will have a major impact on the prospects for war and peace in the twenty-first century, a better understanding of the polarizing role of ideology on its foreign policy is urgently needed.

**BOOK OVERVIEW**

This book proceeds in ten chapters. The first explores the nature of American ideology and its impact on American attitudes towards international affairs. It begins by suggesting that all Americans share a “big L” Liberalism that contributes to a cherishing of their individual freedoms and a wariness towards perceived foreign tyrannies. This helps explain why, on average, Americans feel the warmest towards fellow democracies like England and Japan, and the coolest towards authoritarian regimes like North Korea and Iran, as Figure 0.3 revealed.

Within the broad parameters of a shared Liberalism, however, American “small l” liberals and conservatives differ systematically and substantially, both psychologically and in their domestic and foreign policy preferences. Psychologically, liberal and conservative ideologies have their roots in differing motivational needs. Social psychologists have shown that conservatives consistently score higher than liberals on measures of epistemic needs for certainty, existential needs for security, and relational needs for solidarity. These psychological differences are the product of both nature and nurture, as parental and peer socialization shape gene expression. They are also associated with physiological differences. For instance, compared to liberals, conservatives possess both a stronger startle reflex, reflecting greater sensitivity to threat, and a larger right amygdala, a region of the brain directly involved in threat response.

Ideological differences have implications for both domestic and international attitudes. On the domestic front, the American culture wars are not a “myth,” as prominent Stanford political scientist Morris Fiorina has claimed. There are consistent and substantial differences between liberals and conservatives on concrete policy issues like abortion and gay marriage. On international attitudes, with the sole exception of Israel mentioned above, liberals consistently feel warmer towards foreign countries than conservatives do. Ideology also shapes foreign policy preferences; conservatives usually desire tougher U.S. foreign policies than liberals do. The impact of ideology on foreign policy preferences, Chapter 1 further argues, is mediated by gut feelings towards foreign countries, which act as “affect heuristics” or mental shortcuts that help Americans assess a foreign country’s intentions, thereby shaping their foreign policy preferences.

As we saw in the 2012 Republican presidential primary exchange between
Newt Gingrich and Ron Paul, not all conservatives share the same views on foreign affairs. The same can be said of Hillary Clinton and other liberals. There are different kinds of liberals and conservatives. Chapter 2 explores the idea that four dimensions of American ideology might differentially shape attitudes towards foreign affairs. Specifically, American ideology is examined across its cultural, social, economic, and political dimensions. Cultural liberals and conservatives differ in their orientation towards traditional values, disagreeing over such topics as sex, drugs, feminism, and homosexuality. Social ideology is conceptualized as beliefs about the proper relations among social and racial groups; social conservatives hold a greater preference for social hierarchies, while social liberals prefer a greater equality. Economic ideology is operationalized as orientations towards income redistribution, with liberals more in favor and conservatives more opposed. Finally, political ideology is conceptualized as one’s position on the issue of individual rights versus the broader public good. On average, conservatives tend towards the libertarian side, while liberals lean more towards the communitarian, although we will see that Christian conservatives can be quite communitarian.

These four dimensions of American ideology can help us better understand not just patterns of attitudes towards domestic issues like God, guns, and gays, but also why different types of liberals and conservatives usually converge but sometimes diverge in their international attitudes. For instance, the massive difference between liberals and conservatives in their feelings towards the United Nations is in part due to these four dimensions of ideology converging in the same direction. As we shall see in Chapter 10, cultural conservatives decry the United Nations as an affront to God’s rule; social conservatives remain wary of a “colored U.N.,” economic conservatives lament its role in North-South income redistribution; and political conservatives (libertarians) condemn it as “World Government.” Meanwhile, cultural, social, economic, and political liberals share more favorable—if distinct—attitudes towards the United Nations. This consistent pattern of ideological differences contributes to the massive overall gap between liberal and conservative views of the United Nations. By contrast, as we shall see in Chapters 2 and 7, on a few issues, like free trade among nations and attitudes towards countries like Germany, different kinds of liberals and conservatives disagree amongst themselves, diluting the overall ideological divide.

Why do American ideologies shape international attitudes? Chapter 3 explores the idea that liberals and conservatives weigh five different moral values—fairness, compassion, loyalty, authority, and purity—in distinct ways, and that these value differences help account for the impact of ideology on international attitudes. Liberals prize the “individualizing” values of fairness and compassion more than conservatives do, contributing to liberals’ greater warmth
towards foreign countries in general, and especially towards the poor of the developing world. By contrast, conservatives esteem the “binding” moral values of *loyalty*, *authority*, and *purity* more than liberals do. For instance, greater loyalty to America contributes to a greater conservative coolness towards foreign countries. And the greater value that conservatives place on authority helps account for the greater average conservative than liberal desire for tougher foreign policies.

In Chapter 4 we turn to the broad foreign policy orientations of liberals and conservatives. Liberals are more “internationalist” than conservatives in three conceptually and empirically distinct ways: liberals are greater supporters of international engagement, multilateralism, and diplomacy, while conservatives are more likely to support isolationism, unilateralism, and the use of military force. We then explore three foreign policy “idealisms”—humanitarian, religious, and political—often juxtaposed against “realism.” Ideology, it turns out, has the largest impact on the former: liberals are much more supportive of humanitarian interventions and foreign aid than are conservatives. Ideology also shapes nationalism, which moves beyond the love of country that is patriotism to a belief in American superiority over other countries. Conservatives, our data reveals, are both more patriotic and more nationalistic than American liberals are. This difference, furthermore, shapes the international attitudes and foreign policy preferences of liberals and conservatives.

The final section of Chapter 4 explores the interrelationships among these many foreign policy orientations, identifying distinct clusters of Democratic and Republican foreign policy preferences. For instance, Obama and the Clintons fit a “forceful idealist” Democratic foreign policy profile, supporting both multilateralism and the use of military force in the pursuit of humanitarian and other idealistic foreign policy goals. And while all Republicans are nationalists, two-thirds are “cautious idealists” supportive of idealism in U.S. foreign policy; the other third are hardcore “isolationist skeptics,” realists highly skeptical of multilateralism. Our electoral system, however, has come to amplify the political influence of this vocal minority of Republican anti-internationalists.

The mainstream view in political science is that in the absence of much popular knowledge about the world, political elites and the media determine the international attitudes of the American people. Chapter 5 argues that while it is true that Americans are not very knowledgeable about the world, it is ideology more than the media or even partisanship that fills in the gaps, allowing Americans to maintain consistent—if consistently different—global views.

But ideology is not destiny. Our ideological predispositions *interact* with demographic variables like gender and race, and situational variables like media exposure, to shape our international attitudes. For instance, we will see that
cultural ideology moderates the impact of foreign travel and international contacts on American nationalism. For cultural liberals, as international contacts increase, nationalism decreases. But for cultural conservatives, greater contact is associated with an increase in nationalism. In short, our international attitudes are the product of both psychological predispositions and environmental factors like the media.

The second part of the book applies the concepts developed in Part I to five empirical case studies. The first four address major geographic regions central to U.S. foreign policy. Chapter 6 looks south of the border, exploring how ideology shapes American attitudes towards Latin America and the Caribbean. On average, conservatives feel substantially cooler than liberals feel towards Mexico, Haiti, and Brazil; they also oppose aid to countries like Haiti more and desire a much tougher Mexican border policy than liberals do. This ideological divide, the chapter further argues, is driven by all four of the dimensions of American ideology that we measured in our 2011 survey. Libertarians and economic conservatives oppose foreign aid to places like Haiti out of a belief in the Protestant ethic of self-help and out of opposition to income redistribution. And cultural conservatives fear the impact of Mexican immigration on Christian values and America’s WASP identity more than cultural liberals do. But it is social ideology that has the most pervasive influence on American attitudes towards Latin America. Relative to social liberals, greater social conservative desires for order and the maintenance of racial hierarchies cool their feelings towards the colored countries of Central America, South America, and the Caribbean.

Chapter 7 turns our attention east and across the Atlantic. Overall, our survey reveals that American views of the Old World are marked by a projection of domestic ideologies onto a European looking glass. Different kinds of American liberals and conservatives view different European countries in distinct ways. For instance, greater cultural conservatism is associated with desires for friendlier policies towards “Mother” England but with coolness towards secular France and Germany. Beliefs in prophesy even lead some on the religious right to view the European Union as the Antichrist. Economic conservatism is associated with warmth towards fiscally austere Germany but coolness towards “socialist” France. Economic liberals, by contrast, are more enamored of the French social welfare state. Greater conservative nationalism is associated with warmth towards a WASP England, but desires for tougher policies towards “Gaullist” France. To Americans of different ideological stripes, in short, Europe is decidedly not of a piece.

Chapter 8 explores how ideology polarizes American feelings and policy preferences towards the Middle East. Conservatives feel warmer than liberals towards Israel but cooler towards Iran, the Palestinians, and Muslims. The
chapter argues that the same religious and culture wars that divide Americans on abortion, gay marriage, and prayer in public schools also divide them on Israel, Iran, and the Palestinians. Similarly, the same racial politics that divides Americans at home also divides liberals and conservatives in their feelings towards Arabs. Conservatives tend to view Arabs as threats, while liberals have a greater tendency to view their plight in the West Bank and Gaza as analogous to segregation or even apartheid, triggering liberal values of compassion and social justice. And the same nationalism that divides Americans on flag burning and defense spending also divides them on policy towards Iran. The role of the “Israel lobby” in the making of U.S. Middle East policy, the chapter argues, is best understood in the context of divided American public opinion towards the Middle East.

Chapter 9 turns to East Asia, with a focus on “Red China” and the divide between liberal Panda-huggers and conservative Dragon-slayers. While conservatives feel somewhat cooler towards the East Asian democracies than liberals do, they feel much cooler towards China. Greater average conservative prejudice does linger, shaping attitudes towards the “Yellow Peril” from all Asian countries. But communism is an even larger source of ideological differences on China. For cultural, economic, and political reasons, conservatives feel cooler than liberals do towards communist countries in general, and the Chinese government in particular. By contrast, conservatives’ greater average libertarianism warms them towards Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, mitigating the overall ideological divide on Asian democracies.

Ideology has the largest influence on American views of international organizations and treaties. Chapter 10 explores why liberals like the United Nations while conservatives dislike it. Cultural liberals and conservatives differ on the United Nations in large part because they differ over biblical literalism. Many premillennial dispensationalists, who believe that Christ will return before establishing his millennial kingdom, believe that the United Nations will join Satan’s forces against Christ. Conservative Christians are also more likely than mainline Christians or nonreligious Americans to view the United Nations as a secular affront to God’s rule on earth. Some cultural conservatives may also fear that interacting with pagans in the United Nations may dilute Christian purity. Although the effect size was small, racial thinking continues to divide Americans in their views of the “colored U.N.” The impact of differences in economic ideology is larger; conservatives are more anxious than liberals that the United Nations seeks global income redistribution. Finally, greater anticommunism and jealousy of national sovereignty contribute to greater libertarian than communitarian paranoia about “blue helmets” and “black helicopters.”
This book is an exercise in applied political psychology. As such, it differs from existing scholarship in five major ways.

*Applied, not theory driven.* First, mainstream political science and psychology are both largely deductive and theory driven. The goal is to derive and test hypotheses to develop better theory. In psychology, there are a few applied journals, but they are widely dismissed as second tier. “Applied political science,” for its part, is largely an oxymoron, and is mostly confined to “area studies” journals, which are similarly disparaged.

Hypothesis testing, however, can lead to a variety of problems, such as when data that contradicts hypotheses is suppressed, or worse yet, when data is fabricated to support theory.25 As a result, theories can be built upon very shaky empirical foundations. Theory-driven research is also often divorced from real-world issues, contributing to the vast chasm between the “ivory tower” and policy making.

This book is unapologetically “applied.” It asks an empirical question: How does ideology shape American attitudes towards international affairs, and why? Rather than deductively testing hypotheses to build theory, it will *inductively* explore what existing and new survey data can teach us about public opinion and American foreign policy.

This book also seeks to be accessible to a broad audience. Although the statistical analysis of quantitative survey data is its primary methodology, statistical results are not presented in opaque regression tables of numbers, as is common in quantitative political science. Instead, this book presents its findings in figures that seek to be clear and visually engaging, such as bar, line, pie, and flow charts. It thus follows the example of Robert Putnam and David Campbell’s *American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us*, which also asks an applied empirical question and presents its survey findings visually, seeking to speak to a broad audience.

Like *American Grace*, this book also seeks to integrate quantitative and qualitative evidence. Statistical figures are complemented by political cartoons which are meant to illustrate the arguments and provide historical background. Although our survey was fielded in 2011, the ideological divisions over foreign affairs that it reveals have deep historical roots. Mixing figures of statistical data with editorial cartoons also makes a methodological point: the deep divide between qualitative and quantitative political science that plagues the discipline today is highly problematic. Statistical results, certainly, must be interpreted,
and that process requires both historical knowledge and qualitative analysis. As much as possible, the historical background, the survey questions themselves, and the statistical results are presented as clearly as possible so that readers can judge my interpretations for themselves.

**Foreign policy attitudes: bottom-up, not just top-down.** Second, as political psychology, this book differs from the existing scholarship conceptually. Political science research on public opinion and foreign policy largely treats the American public as an empty vessel or bottle which political elites or the media fill with specific beliefs about foreign affairs. Scholarly debate largely centers upon whether the American people are passive bottles filled with whatever elites or the media feed them, or active bottles that engage in rational cost-benefit analysis of what they learn.

In the interwar and early postwar periods, Walter Lippmann, Gabriel Almond, and Phillip Converse disparaged the lack of structured or stable foreign policy attitudes among what they viewed as a largely uninterested and uninformed American public.26 The “Almond-Lippmann consensus” on the public’s “non-attitudes” was first empirically challenged in the 1970s.27 By the 1980s, political scientists were arguing that the American public does indeed have structured and stable foreign policy attitudes.28 Utilizing Chicago Council survey data, Eugene Wittkopf argued that the public’s foreign policy beliefs were not only stable but structured around the two dimensions of “cooperative internationalism” and “militant internationalism.”29 Gathering their own surveys in their Foreign Policy Leadership Project, Ole Holsti and James Rosenau maintained that the same two dimensions structured elite foreign policy beliefs as well.30

Political scientists were divided, however, over where the public’s foreign policy attitudes came from. One group has depicted the American public as responding rationally to objective news about wars and foreign affairs. In the early 1970s, John Mueller first argued that the American public responded sensibly to body-bag counts with reduced support for the Vietnam War.31 Some scholars further developed this “casualty aversion” approach, while others made refinements, focusing instead on mission objectives or mission success.32 The public, for these scholars, rationally responds to information about international events. Political scientists Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, and Jason Reifler recently put this rationalist approach succinctly: "the public weighs the costs of a war against the expected benefits."33

Following the influential work of John Zaller on the impact of elite cues on public opinion more broadly, a second group of scholars has focused instead on the role that political elites and the media play in molding the public’s international attitudes.34 Some focus on elite partisan rhetoric as a direct source
of public attitudes. Adam Berinsky, for example, argues against the rationalist approach: “the public appears ‘rational’ only because it takes cues from elites” who mediate reality for them. Others focus on the media’s independent role. For instance, Matthew Baum and Tim Groeling have recently developed a “strategic bias theory” in which reporters, pursuing their own interests, add their own spin to both news events and elite cues.

This book challenges the shared assumption of these two camps that because the American public is not very knowledgeable about international affairs, it must be an empty vessel that either partisan elites or the media fill with international attitudes. Instead, as political psychology, it will advance the idea that the American people already possess ideological predispositions that fill in the gaps left by a lack of much international knowledge. The American people are not empty vessels. Preexisting ideologies allow them to maintain consistent, if often consistently different, attitudes towards international affairs.

The book does not claim, however, that political elites and the media have no impact on individual attitudes. It suggests instead that the influence of ideological predispositions on the international attitudes of the American people is generally larger than the impact of situational variables like media exposure and cues from political elites. The bottle is already largely full of preexisting beliefs and values, so it will not be easily swayed. Chapter 5 will also explore, however, how the media and other situational factors interact with ideological predispositions to shape the international attitudes of the American people.

Bottom-up ideology, not just top-down partisanship. Third and more broadly, by focusing on ideology and not partisanship—the degree of attachment to or identification with a political party—this study differs from over fifty years of scholarship on American politics.

Following the publication of The American Voter in 1960, the “Michigan Model” of voting behavior, with its focus on partisanship, has dominated the study of American elections. Ideology, by contrast, has been treated more skeptically if at all. For instance, the thirty-eight-chapter 2010 edition of the authoritative and comprehensive Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior does not even include entries for “ideology,” “liberalism,” or “conservatism” in its subject index, let alone chapters on them. The subject index entry for “party identification,” by contrast, merits sixteen subheadings. In 2012, political scientist Marc Hetherington even declared partisanship to be the “most important” variable shaping not just voting but “a person’s political behaviors, positions on issues, or feelings about groups.”

Partisanship does not explain everything. Hetherington and other students of American politics have elevated partisanship too far at ideology’s expense. While partisanship may do a better job than ideology in accounting for highly
partisan attitude objects like Obama or “Obamacare,” and overtly political behaviors like voting, the more psychologically fundamental ideology is usually the more powerful driver of our deeper sociopolitical attitudes and policy preferences. Partisanship is rooted in ideology, which is the real source of many seemingly partisan attitudes.

With the ongoing sorting of liberals into the Democratic Party and conservatives into the Republican Party, partisanship and ideology are increasingly intercorrelated. From 1972 to 2004, American National Election Surveys revealed a fourfold increase in their overlap, from 10 percent ($r = .32$) to 40 percent ($r = .63$). In our 2011 survey, they overlapped a remarkable 53 percent ($r = .73$), perhaps reflecting further sorting over time or, more likely, more accurate survey measurement, to be discussed in the next section. Ideology and partisanship today, in short, appear to share as much as half of their variance.

When they are pitted against each other to explain domestic or international policy preferences, however, ideology is usually the stronger predictor. For instance, our survey included five questions tapping domestic policy preferences on (1) prayer in public schools, (2) the death penalty, (3) abortion, (4) gay marriage, and (5) gun control. A series of regression analyses revealed that on four of the five, ideology was by far the stronger predictor, with partisanship only approaching ideology in predicting positions on gun control. When these five domestic policy issues were averaged together into a single “culture wars” scale, ideology accounted for 38 percent of its unique variance, while partisanship accounted for just 3 percent. Similarly, only ideology and not partisanship predicted average feelings and foreign policy preferences towards the foreign countries discussed above (and listed in Figures 0.3 and 0.4).

Ideology generally has a greater impact than partisanship on sociopolitical attitudes and policy preferences because it is more psychologically fundamental. William Jacoby describes partisanship as a “group influence” on individual behavior: political parties act as “sources of guidance” or “reference groups” shaping the individual. Marc Hetherington agrees, suggesting that party identification is like “rooting for a sports team”: “Once someone has decided that he roots for the Red Sox and not the Yankees, he does not usually change sides.”

Hetherington is right that we do not easily switch our team loyalties. But we can engage in what social psychologists call “social mobility” or “exit” from a particular social identity. When the Red Sox win, Boston sports fans can “bask in their reflected glory” (BIRG) by wearing their Red Sox caps. But when they lose, fans can “cut off reflected failure” (CORF) by wearing their Celtics jerseys instead. Similarly, when the Republican Party lost the presidential election in 2008, many conservative Americans likely “cut off reflected failure” by switching the focus of their political identification from the GOP to other political groups, like the Tea Party.
In short, while group identities like partisanship are powerful top-down drivers of our attitudes and behaviors, especially towards clearly partisan attitude objects like Obamacare, they are multiple and fluid. Our ideologies, by contrast, are deeper and more stable bottom-up drivers of our attitudes.50 “The once solidly Democratic South is now the solidly Republican South,” David Boren writes in the Foreword. “The partisan alignment has flipped, but the underlying ideologies have changed only marginally.” American National Election Surveys data confirm Boren’s argument: between 1972 and 2008, the U.S. South became more Republican but did not change ideologically.51

Chapters 1 through 3 will argue that our ideologies are multidimensional and complex, grounded in a deep web of motivations, beliefs, and values. So although they are highly intercorrelated, such that differences between liberals and conservatives are generally mirrored by differences between Democrats and Republicans, it is ideology and not partisanship that will be the focus of this book.

Measurement matters. Fourth, survey research in political science and psychology is marked by complementary strengths and weaknesses. Political science surveys are better at representative sampling than at measurement. Psychological surveys are the opposite, better at measurement than sampling. This book will adopt a combined political psychology approach to survey design, embracing the strengths of each discipline while seeking to avoid their weaknesses.

Improving both sampling and measurement is necessary to allow the full extent of the relationships among our variables to fully emerge. When psychologists limit themselves to university student samples, range restriction can reduce the size of the observed associations among variables. For example, because most university students are about the same age and education level, it is difficult to ascertain the true extent of any associations between age or education and any other variable using a student sample.

Political science surveys, for their part, often suffer from high measurement error, leading to type II errors, or false negatives. Public opinion surveys too often rely upon single questions with limited response options. While single, dichotomous questions are fine for some substantive opinions—“Do you plan to vote for Barack Obama or Mitt Romney?”—they are insufficient to capture more complex ideologies and (international) attitudes. Single-item measures can decrease the observed associations among variables as more error and less “true score” variation is captured and correlated.52 Furthermore, binary response categories, such as forcing a choice between “engaging” and “containing” China, fail to capture the nuances of complex attitudes. They also limit the variation necessary to ensure that the full extent of the associations among variables can become apparent. In short, measures of low internal reliability and insufficient variability have often produced low or inconsistent associations between ideol-
ogy and international attitudes in existing public opinion surveys, contributing to the many false negatives in existing scholarship.

Poor question wording also plagues many public opinion surveys, distorting our understanding of key concepts. For instance, for decades the American National Election Surveys (ANES) and the General Social Survey have measured ideology by asking respondents to place themselves on a seven-point scale from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative.” To be “extreme” is not normatively desirable, however. This has pushed respondents away from the edges of the distribution. In 2010 ANES substituted “very” for “extreme,” while also reporting the results from Knowledge Networks’ public profile ideology question, which retained the “extreme” wording. While only 7.4 percent of respondents were willing to describe themselves as “extremely” liberal or conservative, 18.4 percent of the very same respondents were willing to describe themselves as “very” liberal or conservative. “Extreme” even swelled the numbers of respondents choosing the neutral (4) position, from 30.9 percent to 38.1 percent, likely because of a negative exemplar effect: some people may associate “extremely liberal” and “extremely conservative” with people they find distasteful, like Bill Maher or Rush Limbaugh, so distance themselves from any ideology. In short, a poor choice of diction—“extremely”—has contributed to producing an artificially moderate picture of the American ideological landscape for decades.

The way that ANES has measured partisanship, by contrast, suffers from the opposite problem, with a branching question format pushing respondents away from the center and towards the extremes of the distribution. Respondents are first asked if they think of themselves as a Republican, Democrat, independent, another party, or have no preference. If they choose one of the two major parties, they are then asked whether they would call themselves a “strong” or “not very strong” Republican or Democrat. Since being “strong” is the normatively preferable choice, partisans are pushed to the far edges of the scale. Meanwhile, those who choose independent, “another party,” or “no preference” are further asked whether they think of themselves as “closer to” the Republican or Democratic Parties. Because people generally wish to please their interlocutors by providing new information, this follow-up question pushes people away from their original neutral position into one of the partisan camps. For instance, in the 2010 ANES, over 42 percent of respondents chose independent, no preference, or another party in response to the first question. But after the second “closer to” question, less than 3 percent of respondents remained in the neutral position. Combined with the “strong” effect (a remarkable 32 percent of the 2010 ANES sample are in the 1 and 7 tails), which also pushed respondents away from the center of a normal bell curve, the derived PID variable suffers from a distribution so non-normal that it is of questionable value for statistical analysis.
By combining the best of political science surveys (sampling) and psychological surveys (measurement), we hope to overcome these problems and provide a more accurate picture of the relationship between ideology and the international attitudes of the American people. For sampling, our Internet survey was fielded by the Palo Alto, California, survey research company YouGov. They used a “sample matching” methodology to generate a representative national sample, first matching respondents on gender, age, race, education, party identification, ideology, and political interest, and then weighing the final dataset to match the full U.S. general population on age, gender, race, education, and religion.\textsuperscript{57}

For measurement, the majority of our variables were assessed with at least three questions, increasing the internal reliability of the underlying constructs. Question wording was refined over several years of pretests using large local and national convenience samples.\textsuperscript{58} To minimize measurement error, we assessed the reliability of our constructs using Cronbach’s alpha ($\alpha$), which ranges from 0 to 1, where higher scores indicate greater internal consistency.\textsuperscript{59} For instance, although we measured each survey participant’s self-identified liberal-conservative ideology at two separate points in time, using completely different response scales and formats, together they formed a two-item scale of extremely high internal reliability, $\alpha = .93$.\textsuperscript{60}

We chose to implement our survey on the Internet to decrease measurement error. First, completing a survey in the privacy of one’s home on a personal computer reduces the self-presentation effects more likely in face-to-face and even telephone interviews. This is particularly important when surveys like ours touch on sensitive subjects like prejudice, where respondents are more likely to adjust their responses depending upon how they wish to be seen by others and even themselves. Second, the computer interface allows for easier use of rating scales affording more response options. These are much more difficult to use over the telephone or even in person than on the Internet. That is one reason why telephone surveys so often use “yes/no” or “support/oppose” questions, producing binary “variables” (which barely vary) of limited use for correlational research. The majority of our questions, by contrast, were measured on seven-point “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” rating scales, although there were numerous eleven-point rating scales and even 101-point “placement rulers” in which respondents marked a position along an anchored but unnumbered ruler. Our goal was to create variables that vary—as much as possible. By using the Internet and boosting the variability of our variables, we were able to reduce measurement error and increase the likelihood that the true associations among our ideological and attitudinal variables would become apparent.

Finally, to our knowledge, our 2011 survey is the first to combine extensive questions about ideology with extensive questions about international atti-
tudes within a single, national representative sample. To date, existing national surveys have largely explored one or the other. The General Social Survey and the American National Election Surveys have measured American ideology for decades, but rarely ask questions about international affairs. By contrast, the Chicago Council, Pew, and the Program on International Policy Attitudes have been asking questions about international affairs for years, but rarely ask many questions about ideology. By combining these two types of questions within a single survey, our dataset provides new leverage to explore how ideology shapes the international attitudes of the American people.

Size matters too. Fifth and finally, effect sizes—not significance tests—will be the focus of our statistical analysis. We thus follow a trend that began about a decade ago in the psychological sciences, and hope to help start a new trend in political science.

Political science remains, regrettably, a largely “sizeless” science, fixated on the “yes or no” whether question of statistical significance testing, rather than the more consequential real-world questions of how much or who cares (meaningfulness). “Statistical significance should be a tiny part of an inquiry concerned with the size and importance of relationships,” Stephen Ziliak and Dierdre McCloskey rightly argue in The Cult of Statistical Significance. “Unhappily it has become the central and standard error of many sciences.”61 Jacob Cohen made the same criticism in the title of a 1994 article for American Psychologist, “The Earth Is Round (p < .05).”62

This book engages in inferential statistics, generalizing about the full U.S. population based upon representative samples of usually around one thousand Americans. To do so, a \( p \) (probability) value is calculated. Convention dictates that \( p < .05 \) is “statistically significant.” This book adopts a tougher standard: if a \( p \) value is not reported, the reader should assume it to be less than .001. In other words, the likelihood that the observed relationship is actually due to chance is less than 1 in 1,000.

With a large enough sample size even tiny correlations can be statistically significant. Statistical significance testing, therefore, should only be the very first step of analysis. To interpret the meaning of our statistical findings, we must focus on the size of observed associations or differences. When dealing with continuous variables, this book treats zero-order correlations (Pearson’s \( r \)) between variables and the partial coefficients (standardized \( \beta \)) from multiple regression analyses of .10 as small, .30 as medium, and .50 as large.63 These numbers can be squared and multiplied by 100 to calculate the amount of shared variance (\( R^2 \)) in percentage terms. In other words, in the social sciences sharing 1 percent of variance is considered small; 9 percent, medium; and 25 percent, large.

When comparing differences between subgroups within a population, such
as men against women, or liberals against conservatives, we usually rely upon an effect size statistic called “partial eta squared,” or $\eta^2_p$. Following statistical convention, a $\eta^2_p$ of .01 is considered small, .06 medium, and .14 large. For instance, when we wrote above that the overall differences between Democrats and Republicans on the 2012 Chicago Council’s “threats to the vital interests of the United States” rating scale and importance as “U.S. foreign policy goals” rating scale were both “extremely large,” that choice of diction was deliberate, based upon effect size statistics (both $\eta^2_p = .27$).

Readers are therefore encouraged to focus on the effect size statistics ($r$, $\beta$, $R^2$, $\eta^2$, etc.) reported in this book to interpret how meaningful (not merely statistically significant) differences or relationships are. They should bear in mind, however, that the causes of human behavior are usually multiple and complex, so the associations among psychological and attitudinal variables are usually much smaller than those found in the natural sciences, where the relationships among physical phenomena, such as the motion of the planets, are extremely regular and strong. Statistics are reported in the endnotes and online at SUP.org. Readers can also consult the Statistical Glossary at the back of the book as needed.

PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN DEMOCRACIES

“I have no hesitation in saying that in the control of society’s foreign affairs, democratic governments do appear decidedly inferior to others.”

—Alexis de Tocqueville, 1835

“In the conduct of their foreign relations, democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to other governments.”

—Democratic Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 1951

Does public opinion influence American foreign policy? And if so, does it matter if American opinion on international affairs is divided along ideological lines?

While popular opinion is certainly not the only factor shaping American foreign policy, the predominant argument today is that it is an important one. Since the United States is a democracy, and elected officials desire reelection, they usually make the foreign policy that the public wants. In a comprehensive review of this “electoral connection” argument, Duke political scientist John Aldrich concludes that “The potential impact of foreign policy views on electoral outcomes is the critical mechanism linking public attitudes to elite behavior.”

There is considerable empirical support for this “political responsiveness” view. In a longitudinal analysis of survey data, Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro found that changes in public opinion on international events regularly preceded eventual changes in U.S. foreign policy. Given that the most basic re-
quirement of causality is that cause precedes effect, this is an important quan-
titative finding.

There is ample anecdotal evidence for the “electoral connection” as well. Politicians often say that they pay attention to public opinion when making foreign policy. For instance, President Bill Clinton’s 1998 “National Security Strategy” declared that “The American people rightfully play a central role in how the United States wields its power abroad. The United States cannot long sustain a commitment without the support of the public.”69

As the epigraphs from Alexis de Tocqueville and Dean Acheson reveal, pundits and policy makers alike have long lamented the impact of public opinion on foreign policy making in democracies. Authoritarian governments, by contrast, are seen as free of domestic constraints and thus at a diplomatic advantage over democracies.

Popular opinion in democracies is seen as compelling both aggression and nonaggression—against the will of leaders. “The Maine” and “Munich” frequently serve as shorthand for these twin arguments. Popular anger over

---

**A SOLUTION TO THE MAINE EXPLOSION**

“The court of inquiry made its report but could not fix the responsibility. This picture fixes the responsibility to the satisfaction of the American people.”

**Fig. 0.5.** “Remember the Maine! To hell with Spain!” Militarist opinion pressures President McKinley into launching the Spanish-American War, 1898.

the February 1898 explosion and sinking of the _USS Maine_ in Havana Harbor, resulting in the deaths of 166 American sailors, is often blamed for forcing President McKinley to launch the Spanish-American War, “a war which he did not want,” according to historian Ernest May, “for a cause in which he did not believe.”70 American public opinion was already decrying the brutal Spanish response to the Cuban rebellion, and when the _Maine_ exploded in Havana there was a major popular outcry. Although the U.S. government’s official inquiry was inconclusive (it now seems likely that the explosion was an accident that had nothing to do with the Spanish), the American public remained indignant. The rallying cry in the popular press became, “Remember the _Maine_! To hell with Spain!” Figure 0.5 is a detail from an 1898 engraving depicting two men in Spanish clothing secretly plotting to blow up the _Maine_ with a rigged underwater mine. A caption declares, “The court of inquiry made its report but could not fix the responsibility. This picture fixes the responsibility to the satisfaction of the American people.” In April 1898 the U.S. Congress, responsive to public opinion, adopted a Joint Resolution for War with Spain.

“Munich” is shorthand for the danger of pacifist publics compelling democratic governments to adopt foreign policies of appeasement. Pacifist British and French publics are frequently blamed for Prime Ministers Chamberlain and Daladier’s 1938 acquiescence to Hitler’s annexation of Czechoslovakia. The belated U.S. entry into World War I is an earlier example of the impact of pacifist public opinion on foreign policy making. As visually depicted in Figure 0.6, in 1915 the American public watched the events unfolding across the Atlantic.
with great interest but, according to *The Evening Mail*’s John McCutcheon, with an overwhelmingly isolationist impulse of anti-interventionism: “I hope we keep out of it.” As we shall see in Chapter 7, some Americans blamed German immigrants and spies for promoting a pacifism that kept the United States out of the Great War for too long.

**A FOREIGN POLICY DISCONNECT?**

A small group of scholars has contested the idea that political elites are responsive to public opinion, arguing that there is a “disconnect” plaguing American politics. Stanford’s Morris Fiorina has made the broadest argument, claiming in his 2009 *Disconnect* that there has been a breakdown of representation, as political elites have become more polarized than the American people.71 On foreign affairs, Steven Kull and I. M. Destler argued in their 1999 *Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism* that the foreign policy elite had become more isolationist than the general public.72 And in their 2006 *The Foreign Policy Disconnect*, Benjamin Page and Marshall Bouton used Chicago Council surveys to similarly argue that “U.S. foreign policy has often diverged markedly from what the public wants.”73

*Disconnect*, *Misreading the Public*, and *The Foreign Policy Disconnect* should be commended for advocating a more “democratic” policy-making process in which elites are more responsive to the will of the American people. However, by treating “the public” as a “uniform whole,” as Page and Bouton put it, these books misrepresent the nature of the “electoral connection” between voting and policy making.74 For the most part, politicians today are no longer elected by the “median voters” in their districts.75 Their job security, instead, depends upon a small minority within their own parties: primary voters. The logic of the electoral connection today is that elected politicians are responsive to the views of those who elect them: not “the public” as a uniform whole but a small group of the most liberal and conservative Americans who are motivated to vote in party primaries. Fiorina is right that “incumbents act strategically to preclude primary challenges.”76 While he may also be correct that elites are disconnected from the average American voter, that does not mean that they are disconnected from the primary voters who actually elect them. Instead, Emory’s Alan Abramowitz is right that “Democratic and Republican candidates and officeholders are polarized precisely because they are highly responsive to their parties’ electoral bases.”77 Whether the issue is domestic or international, the federal budget or a U.N. treaty, most politicians in Congress today have little incentive to compromise and every reason to cater to the views of primary voters. In short, it is not the average American’s views on international affairs that influences the typical elected official, but those of the primary voters on the ideological extremes.
This is a new development. The vast majority of congressional districts today have become noncompetitive, solidly blue or red districts. Voters increasingly choose where to live based on their politics: liberals choose the two coasts and urban areas, while conservatives choose the heartland and suburban or rural areas. Americans cluster into communities of the like-minded. This ideological self-sorting is exacerbated by gerrymandering, as the two parties manipulate district boundaries following each U.S. Census. Analyzing the fall 2012 elections, statistician Nate Silver estimates that just 8 percent of House districts today are competitive, while a remarkable 56 percent are “landslide districts” in which the presidential vote margin differed from the national result by over 20 percentage points. “Most members of the House now come from hyperpartisan districts where they face essentially no threat of losing their seat to the other party.” Deep blue and deep red are in; purple has become passé.

To keep their jobs, therefore, most U.S. politicians today no longer have to cater to the “median voter” in their districts, let alone voters from the other party. Instead, their main job is to curry favor with the primary voters most likely to remove them from office—the most conservative and liberal slices of the American public. U.S. congressmen understand this situation very well. “To avoid a party primary,” as former Democratic congressman John Tanner from Tennessee put it, “these guys are gonna be responsive to the people that elected them . . . not their district or their country.” The views of “the median voter” are becoming irrelevant.

The same is true in the Senate. For instance, more than a Democratic challenger, most Republican senators today fear becoming the next Bob Bennett of Utah or Richard Lugar of Indiana, longtime Republican senators rejected in favor of Tea Party challengers during Republican primaries. Republican primary voters are a small group of very conservative people. For instance, approximately 10 percent of the Indiana population participated in its 2012 Republican primary. Richard Mourdock required the votes of just 6 percent of Indianaans—the most conservative—to oust Lugar. The fear of being “primaried” can help explain why, as mentioned above, the vast majority of Republican senators voted against UNCLOS in 2012. As we will see in Chapter 10, Tea Party antipathy towards the United Nations is intense, and appears to outweigh other interest groups in the minds of most Republican senators when they vote on international treaties.

Blue states appear little different. Republicans have moved more to the right than Democrats have moved to the left. And political scientist Gary Jacobson has shown that compared to the average Democrat or Republican, it is Republican primary voters who are more ideologically extreme. But senators from deep blue states have cause to fear being “primaried” as well. For instance, dur-
ing his reelection bid in 2006, Joe Lieberman, who had served Connecticut in the U.S. Senate for almost two decades, lost the Democratic primary election to Ned Lamont. Left-wing groups like the National Organization for Women and MoveOn.org rallied against Lieberman, who was seen as too supportive of Bush administration policies such as the war in Iraq. Lamont won the Democratic primary with under 150,000 votes, less than 5 percent of the population of blue Connecticut.

The triumph of the ideological extremes may not be as true at the presidential level, where winning over independent voters still matters during general elections. But presidential primary campaigns are following the same trend. Moderate Republican Jon Huntsman, whose 2012 primary campaign never gained traction, later complained to the New York Times Magazine that people who “work for a living” don’t turn out for primaries—“those who do turn out are professional activists.” Huntsman did not stand a chance in the Tea Party–dominated 2012 GOP primaries.

Public divisions over foreign policy issues can influence presidential general elections as well. Against the view that the public does not care about foreign policy—that campaigning on foreign policy is as silly as “Waltzing before a blind audience”—John Aldrich argued over two decades ago that during presidential races in which a foreign policy issue is salient, such as during Vietnam, foreign policy divides do shape voting behavior. As we will see in Chapter 8, Middle East policy was a major issue in the 2012 elections. During the GOP primaries, Mitt Romney had tough talk for Iran, appealing to pro-Israel GOP primary voters. But after winning the GOP nomination, during the third presidential debate he tacked back to the center on Iran policy, fearing that Obama would successfully depict him as a warmonger.

IDEOLOGY, ELITES, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

In democracies, therefore, ideology has an indirect impact on foreign policy via public opinion: self-interested politicians, attuned to the “electoral connection,” are responsive to the views of those Americans—often primary voters on the ideological extremes—who elect them. But ideology also has a direct effect on foreign policy via foreign policy elites themselves. As Thomas Knecht succinctly put it, “politicians are Americans too.” Politicians do not just respond to their constituents in a self-interested manner; they also represent them in the sense of sharing their attitudes and policy preferences. Therefore, a better grasp of how ideology shapes international attitudes should help us understand not just American public opinion, but also the ways that American elites themselves view the world, framing and constraining the foreign policy options that they pursue.
For instance, President Woodrow Wilson was a devout Presbyterian, with many ministers on both sides of his family. As we shall see in Chapter 10, the idealism of his Fourteen Points and vision for a postwar League of Nations was not primarily the result of the lobbying of religious groups but because of his own progressive Christianity. Historian Andrew Preston puts it well:

“Wilson . . . was so thoroughly steeped in mainline Protestant theology, so familiar with the premises of the Social Gospel, that it would have been surprising had his foreign policy resembled anything else. Wilsonianism was essentially an expression of Christian reformism, of the global application of progressive Christianity, not because of a conscious vision but simply because Wilson could not escape who he was.”

Wilsonianism cannot be understood apart from the Social Gospel, not because of public opinion or the lobbying of religious special interest groups, but because progressive Christianity was central to Wilson’s very identity.

Similarly, George W. Bush’s aggressive reaction to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks is difficult to understand apart from his personal belief system. Bush was a born-again Christian who believed in evil and the necessity to combat it with force. As conservative commentator George Will noted, Bush didn’t “pander to the religious right” because “Bush is the religious right.”

President Barack Obama has also pursued a foreign policy that has very much reflected his own ideology. Like Wilson, Obama rejects absolutist political views, embracing the philosophical pragmatism of William James and John Dewey. For instance, Obama views the Constitution as a conversation. Obama’s pragmatic view of democracy as deliberation, intellectual historian James Kloppenberg has thoughtfully argued, leads him to embrace compromise, not out of weakness but out of a conviction that in a pluralist society the common good can only emerge through the reconciliation of competing views.

Yet Obama also recognizes that Christian love alone will not bring about social justice. As a Christian realist, he embraces a mantra he claims to have learned from Martin Luther King Jr.: “Love without power is mere sentimentality. Power without love is dangerous. Love plus power equals justice.” Obama’s philosophic pragmatism and Christian realism very much inform his foreign policy decision making. “Make no mistake: Evil does exist in the world,” Obama declared in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech. “A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda’s leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism—it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason.” Like Reinhold Niebuhr, John Foster Dulles, and other progressive Christians before him, Obama’s Christian realism
did not abandon Christian love and the Social Gospel but adapted them to a hostile world.

More modest about American military dominance than his predecessor, Obama has nonetheless proven willing to deploy American power when humanitarian considerations demanded it. To prevent a massacre in Benghazi in 2011, Obama went beyond British and French calls for a no-fly zone over Libya to authorize U.S. military attacks on Muammar Gaddafi’s advancing troops. “By virtually all accounts, the dominant influence on the Obama administration’s foreign policy was the president himself,” journalist James Mann writes in *The Obamians*. “It was Obama’s own ideas . . . that have determined America’s role in the world.”

Similar arguments could be made about all American foreign policy makers: the kind of Americans they are—their ideological profiles—shapes their foreign policy decision making. Political science has long disparaged the study of leaders in favor of the study of impersonal institutions and structural forces. If we are to “bring the statesman back” into the study of foreign policy, as Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack have rightly urged, this book contends that ideology must be central to that project.
“BIG I” IDEOLOGY: AMERICAN LIBERALISM AGAINST FOREIGN TYRANNY

What are ideologies? Broadly, they are sets of widely held beliefs or theories about how the world works. Economist Thomas Sowell describes ideology as “an almost intuitive sense of what things are and how they work.” Like all theories, ideologies simplify. “Ideologies elucidate complex realities and reduce them to understandable and manageable terms,” writes historian Michael Hunt. Examples of “big I” ideologies that are the most ambitious in terms of the scope of the world that they explain are Liberalism, Communism, and Fascism.

“Big L” Liberalism seeks to maximize individual freedom. A comprehensive theory of the social world, it celebrates the individual across the major domains of human life: the democratic citizen (politics), the capitalist entrepreneur (economics), and the Protestant believer (religion) with his direct relationship with God. Liberalism emerged during the English, American, and French Revolutions, when the “bourgeois” middle classes rebelled against the aristocracy. In The Liberal Tradition in America, Louis Hartz argued that because the colonies lacked a feudal past, American Liberalism was particularly consensual, lacking the divisive ideologies and class conflict of the Old World.

“Big L” Liberalism sets the boundaries of the thinkable in American foreign policy. All Americans cherish their individual liberties, and will be suspicious of tyrannies of either the right or the left. In a 1917 edition of the Washington Evening Star, Clifford Berryman drew a direct link between World War I and the War of Independence (Figure 1.1). Entitled “Same Old Spirit of ’76,” the drawing depicts Uncle Sam, rifle in hand, proud to fight with our allies against the Central Powers. A flag reading “Liberty Forever” leaves no doubt about Uncle Sam’s purpose: defending Liberty against Dictatorship.
Fifty years later, Herbert Block (hereafter “Herblock”) made a similar point in the *Washington Post*. In August 1968 the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia, bringing an abrupt end to the Prague Spring. Over one hundred Czechs and Slovaks were killed. Herblock’s drawing (Figure 1.2), sarcastically entitled “She Might Have Invaded Russia,” depicts Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and a henchman holding smoking machine guns over the dead body of a young woman. Leaving no doubt about his (“big L”) Liberal message, Herblock labels the woman “Freedom.”

American Liberalism ensures that Americans will always be wary of tyrannies of any guise, whether fascisms and dictatorships of the right or communisms of the left. This sets broad constraints or parameters within which Americans understand the world. It is not surprising, therefore, that surveys have consistently revealed that Americans feel the coolest towards communist countries like North Korea and China and dictatorships like Iran, and the warmest towards fellow democracies like England, Japan, and Germany (see Figure 0.3).

This book, however, will focus on how the “small i” ideologies of American
Liberals and conservatives contribute to *differences* in their worldviews. Within the overall constraints of a shared “big *L*” Liberalism, American liberals and conservatives maintain consistently different international attitudes and foreign policy preferences. As such, this book differs from a long line of largely historical scholarship emphasizing the influence of *shared* ideologies on American foreign policy. Against an earlier generation of historians like Charles Beard, who focused on conflicts between different groups of Americans, Richard Hofstadter argued in the early postwar period for a consensus view of American history: “Above and beyond temporary and local conflicts there has been a common ground, a unity of cultural and political tradition, upon which American civilization has stood. That culture has been intensely nationalistic and for the most part isolationist; it has been fiercely individualistic and capitalistic.”

Michael Hunt’s pioneering 1987 *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* followed in Hofstadter’s “consensus history” tradition, arguing that three core ideas have persisted through the years, shaping U.S. foreign policy: nationalism, racism,
and a reactionary fear of revolution in defense of property. Subsequent historians have also followed in this “consensus history” tradition, arguing, for example, that a shared ideology of “manifest destiny” or the “warfare state” undergirds American imperialism and militarism. Political scientist Michael Desch has also joined this tradition, arguing in his provocative “America’s Liberal Il-liberalism” that a “big L” Liberalism at home promotes illiberal foreign policies, such as the George W. Bush administration’s pursuit of global hegemony.

Hunt is right that inadequate attention has been placed upon the impact of ideology on American foreign policy. Unlike Hunt’s focus on shared ideologies, however, this book highlights the foreign policy consequences of ideological differences among Americans.

THE SOURCES OF IDEOLOGY: THE MAKING OF LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES

How do Americans differ ideologically? Figure 1.3 displays how seven major demographic characteristics of the American people relate to ideology. In our 2011 survey, being older, male, wealthier, or from the South was correlated with being more conservative, while greater education or being Hispanic or black was associated with being more liberal. While their individual effects were small, each characteristic was statistically significant, together accounting for 8 percent of the variance in an American’s liberal-conservative ideology.

This pattern is consistent with that found in the fall 2010 American National Election Surveys (ANES) data, providing further confirmation that our 2011 YouGov sample is representative of all Americans. It is also consistent with
previous scholarship on demographics and ideology in America. For instance, the gender gap in ideology first became evident in the 1970s as men became more conservative while women split into two groups, one group becoming more conservative and another more liberal.10 Similarly, a long line of scholarship has explored how and why black Americans are more likely to self-identify as liberals.11 Other scholars have repeatedly shown that greater income is associated with greater conservatism.12 It is also noteworthy that while education and income level were strongly and positively correlated with each other in both our 2011 sample and the 2010 ANES sample (both at exactly $r = .45$), they correlated with ideology in the opposite directions: greater education was associated with being more liberal, while greater income correlated with being more conservative.

To ensure that the relationships between ideology and the other variables that we examine throughout this book are not the spurious products of these seven demographic variables, we include them as standard covariates or “control variables” in most of our statistical analyses. For instance, when we find in Chapter 4 that liberals enjoy soccer more than conservatives do ($\beta = -0.15$), we can be confident that it’s not just because Hispanics ($\beta = 0.13$) like soccer more than non-Hispanics and tend to be more liberal, or that older people, who tend to be more conservative, like soccer less ($\beta = -0.09$, $p = .004$).

These demographic correlates of ideology, of course, only represent broad tendencies. So what makes some Americans liberals and others conservatives? Social psychologist John Jost has developed a complex functionalist account of the motivational underpinnings of ideology. Specifically, he argues that liberals and conservatives vary systematically in their (1) epistemic needs for certainty, (2) existential needs for security, and (3) relational needs for solidarity.13 Specific psychological predispositions, in other words, lead certain types of people to be drawn to particular types of ideologies.

First, conservatives tend to be less tolerant of ambiguity than liberals, scoring higher on psychological scales measuring the Need for Closure, which taps desires for simplicity and certainty.14 Interestingly, when liberals are put in situations where they are forced to think in more simple ways, such as when they are under cognitive load or even drunk, they tend to become more conservative.15 Liberals also score higher on psychological measures such as the Need for Cognition, which taps the enjoyment of thinking.16

Of the “Big 5” personality traits or domains that psychologists use to describe personality, “openness to new experience” has been the most consistently and strongly associated with ideology: liberals are more open to new experiences while conservatives tend to be more conventional.17 Liberal openness may be tied to their greater need for cognition, while greater conservative
Conventionalism may be tied to their greater need for closure and certainty. Borrowing from the Ten-Item Personality Inventory, we included two items, “I see myself as open to new experiences, complex” and “I see myself as conventional, uncreative,” in our survey. After reverse-coding the latter, they were averaged together to create an “openness” scale, which correlated positively ($r = .22$) with liberal ideology, replicating earlier work. In a creative study, psychologist Dana Carney and her colleagues made inventories of bedrooms and office spaces, and found that liberals were more likely than conservatives to possess items related to openness, such as a greater number and variety of music CDs, books, maps, and art supplies.

Second, a large body of scholarship has emerged in psychology demonstrating that conservatives are more fearful and sensitive to threat, attesting to greater existential needs for security. Some lab experiments have revealed that priming thoughts of death (“mortality salience”) temporarily heightens conservatism. Similarly, a natural or “real world” experiment revealed that survivors of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York experienced a “conservative shift” in the eighteen months following the event.

Remarkably, the new field of political neuroscience has found that the brains of liberals and conservatives differ systematically in ways that reflect their differing needs for security. For example, the volume of the right amygdala, which is directly involved in threat response, is larger in conservatives than in liberals. There are also ideological differences in the physiological sensitivity to threat. Conservatives score higher than liberals on measures of skin conductance in response to threatening images (due to greater sweating caused by fear), and on eye blink responses to loud and unexpected bursts of sound. Conservatives thus appear to be physiologically primed to be more fearful and sensitive to threat than liberals. To alleviate this sense of threat, conservatives turn to their in-group and cultural traditions for security.

Third and finally, Jost argues that conservatives possess greater relational needs for solidarity, belonging, and a shared reality with salient others than liberals do. This is consistent with earlier work arguing that conservatives prefer group conformity more than liberals, who prefer autonomy and self-direction. As we shall see in our discussion of moral values in Chapter 3, conservatives value loyalty to the in-group considerably more than liberals do, supporting Jost’s argument that conservatives possess greater relational needs to belong.

These psychological predispositions interact with the social environment in producing liberals and conservatives. Our ideologies are the product of both nature and nurture. In their seminal 1981 *Generations and Politics*, Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi argued that ideological beliefs are transmitted from
parents to their children. Thirty years later, our survey supports their argument. We asked respondents to place not just themselves but also their mother and father on separate placement rulers anchored on the left and right by “very liberal” and “very conservative.” We created a “parents’ ideology” scale ($\alpha = .76$) by averaging together the scores for both parents. Controlling for the standard demographics, parents’ ideology alone accounted for a full 22 percent of the variance in a respondent’s ideology. To what extent this large impact is due to genetics or to socialization is unclear.

We also found that parental socialization patterns differed by party identification. When we pitted one parent’s ideology against the other’s to predict a respondent’s ideology, we found diametrically opposite patterns for Democrats and Republicans. As displayed in Figure 1.4, for the average Democrat the mother’s but not the father’s ideology was associated with the respondent’s ideology. For the average Republican it was exactly the opposite: the father’s, not the mother’s ideology correlated with the person’s ideology. Cognitive linguist George Lakoff has argued, on the basis of qualitative discourse analysis, that liberal and conservative political discourse is notable for the underlying “nurturing parent” (read mother) and “strict father” metaphors respectively.

That our Democrats’ ideology could be predicted only by their mother’s ideology while our Republicans’ ideology could be predicted only by their father’s ideology lends quantitative support to Lakoff’s argument.

Liberal-conservative ideological differences seem to crystallize around two foundational sets of beliefs about human nature. Liberals tend to view human nature as basically good, and therefore maintain that mankind has the
capacity to perfect the world through collective action. “Nothing can be more gentle than [man] in his primitive state,” philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau declared in the eighteenth century. “Men are not naturally enemies.” Thomas Sowell calls this the “unconstrained” vision of human nature; psychologist Steven Pinker calls it the “Utopian Vision.” It is the liberal vision of progressive Christianity. “Social Gospelers based their reform efforts on the conviction that people were not inherently evil or depraved but were conditioned by their surrounding environment,” historian Andrew Preston writes. “Improve the environment, and you improve the person, which in turn would open the way to Christ.”

Conservatives, by contrast, view human nature as essentially flawed, and therefore view laws and traditions as essential safeguards against our inherent selfishness. Sowell calls this the “constrained” vision, which he traces back to Hobbes’s *Leviathan*. It argues that man’s natural state is not gentle, as Rousseau claimed, but “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” Conservatives believe that “human nature . . . is relatively fixed and imperfect,” writes political scientist Colin Dueck. They “believe that human self-interest renders perfectionist political visions not only unattainable but downright dangerous.” Pinker calls this the “Tragic Vision” of human nature. With their focus on original sin, fundamentalist Christians generally dismiss human efforts at worldly improvement as futile, putting their faith instead in religious salvation.

These ideological differences over human nature manifest themselves in systematic differences in the willingness to trust others. Trusting liberals are more inclined towards cooperation; wary conservatives, by contrast, are predisposed towards competitive interpersonal and intergroup relations. Political scientist Brian Rathbun has convincingly tied these ideological differences in trust to elite partisanship over international organizations in twentieth-century America. As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 10, Main Street liberals and conservatives are also dramatically divided over the possibility and desirability of multilateralism.

**THE CONSEQUENCES OFIDEOLOGY: POLICY DIFFERENCES**

I ideological differences thus have their origins in a combination of nature and nurture, as the social context (family, peers, the media) shapes gene expression. As individuals develop distinct personalities and motivational needs for certainty, security, and solidarity, they are naturally drawn to liberal or conservative ideologies.

But are there real-world policy consequences of these ideological differences?

Morris Fiorina argues that there are not. In his *Culture War? The Myth of a*
Polarized America, which is now in its third edition, Fiorina claims that “The simple truth is that there is no culture war in the United States... Elections are close, but voters are not deeply or bitterly divided.” On domestic politics, he asserts that “there is little evidence that the country is polarized even on ‘hot button’ issues like abortion.” On foreign policy, Fiorina claims that “Red and blue state voters have similar views on diplomacy vs. force in international affairs.”

The survey evidence suggests otherwise. On domestic politics, Alan Abramowitz is right that Americans are polarized in the culture wars. In Chapter 2 we will see that Fiorina misrepresents existing General Social Survey data on abortion. Here we note that in comparing individuals by whether they live in red or blue states—a very poor proxy measure for ideology—Fiorina ends up committing a type II error, claiming that there are no ideological differences over foreign affairs when in fact there are. As we shall see in Chapter 4, direct measures of ideology reveal that conservatives score much higher than liberals do on support for the use of military force.

Ideology shapes spending priorities as well. Half of the respondents to the Chicago Council’s 2010 survey were asked how much they supported spending on a list of federal programs. Comparing self-reported liberals and conservatives revealed very large differences (Figure 1.5). Liberals were much more supportive of spending on social welfare programs (“social security,” “health care,” and “aid to education”) than conservatives, while conservatives were much more supportive of spending on national security programs (“defense spending,” “homeland security,” and “gathering intelligence infor-
42 CONCEPTS

This is consistent with existing quantitative research using ANES survey data that found conservatives and Republicans to be more supportive of military spending than liberals and Democrats. For most conservatives, security trumps even fiscal austerity. As Ronald Reagan put it: “Defense is not a budget issue. You spend what you need.”

Close observers of Beltway politics have also observed how ideology shapes spending priorities. Herblock, witness to many budget battles during his fifty-five years at the Washington Post, was repeatedly outraged by military spending at the expense of domestic social programs. Figure 1.6 displays two of his editorial cartoons on the subject. In 1969’s “The Mini-and-Maxi Era,” a warmly dressed and well-accessorized woman labeled “Military Spending” walks past a shabbily dressed woman freezing in the cold, labeled “Domestic Needs.” In 1982’s “Survival of the Fattest” the gender changes but not the theme: a rotund and warmly dressed man labeled “Pentagon Spending” looks on as several thin men, labeled “Domestic Programs,” go literally belly up in the snow. Both cartoons reveal a liberal compassion for the dispossessed, which will be discussed further in Chapter 3.
How do liberal and conservative ideologies shape the foreign policy preferences of the American people?

This book contends that in the absence of much knowledge about the world, gut feelings towards foreign countries serve as a vital mediator between ideological predispositions on the one hand, and specific foreign policy preferences on the other. As such, it joins the recent revival of interest in emotion in both psychology and political science after a long period of its neglect during the behavioral revolution.

On average, Americans are not very knowledgeable about world politics. As we will see in Chapter 5, the average score on the five-item world knowledge quiz in our spring 2011 survey was 63 percent. Similarly, Pew’s fall 2011 “news IQ” quiz included eight questions on world politics, for which the average score was 60 percent. Yet Americans respond to specific (and hence difficult) foreign policy questions like “Should we strengthen international organizations?” or “Should we pursue a friendlier or tougher foreign policy towards Russia?” in consistent, if often consistently different ways. If Americans are scoring a “D–” on world knowledge, how can they maintain such consistent foreign policy preferences?

Psychologist and Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman suggests that we frequently answer complex questions by substituting simpler ones: “Heuristic questions provide an off-the-shelf answer to . . . difficult . . . target questions.” As an example, Kahneman suggests that a difficult question like “How should financial advisors who prey on the elderly be punished?” is actually answered by substituting an easier question about feelings, “How much anger do I feel when I think of financial predators?”43 Psychologist Paul Slovic calls this particular type of heuristic an “affect heuristic,” a mental shortcut by which people let their gut likes and dislikes determine their beliefs and preferences.44 Political scientists Henry Brady and Paul Sniderman similarly call this judgmental shortcut the “likability heuristic.”45

Following Kahneman and Slovic, and Brady and Sniderman, this book suggests that when asked difficult foreign policy questions like “Should the U.S. pursue a friendlier or tougher foreign policy towards North Korea?” Americans resort to the simpler affect heuristic, “How do I feel about North Korea?” Our ideologies then become a major source of our gut feelings towards North Korea.

Furthermore, just as the “halo effect” has been shown to lead people to overgeneralize from limited initial information to broader judgments about other people’s overall characters, we likely use similar mental shortcuts with foreign
countries, making guesses about unknown domains based upon what we do know. For instance, respondents may not be able to locate North Korea on a map, but if they know that North Korea is a communist country, gut feelings about communism may exert a “halo effect” on their overall feelings towards North Korea, subsequently shaping their foreign policy preferences towards North Korea through the “affect heuristic.”

Our survey data supports these ideas. In a serial mediation model (Figure 1.7) controlling for the standard demographics, feelings towards “communist countries” and “North Korea” accounted for over two-thirds of the direct relationship between ideology and North Korea policy preferences. (Note the relative thickness of the arrows in the top indirect path compared to the thinness of the direct path below.) Mediation analyses are utilized to test whether one or more variables “transmit” variation from a predictor to a criterion variable, answering the how question of the mechanism(s) or pathway(s) through which two variables relate to one another. Two of the three indirect pathways from ideology to North Korea policy preferences were statistically significant, with both running through broader feelings towards “communist countries.” In other words, greater conservative than liberal coolness towards “communist countries” accounted for the bulk of conservatives’ greater desire for a tougher North Korea policy. Halo effects and the affect heuristic thus both appear to be involved in a difficult judgment about a specific foreign policy preference.

The North Korea case is not unique. Of the fifteen countries that we measured feelings and foreign policy preferences towards, their mean correlation

**FIG. 1.7.** The “halo effect” and the “affect heuristic”: Conservatives desire a tougher policy towards North Korea than liberals do in large part because they feel cooler towards communist countries and hence North Korea.

*Note:* A serial mediation model. Both indirect paths running through “communist countries” were significant, but the one only via warmth towards North Korea was not. Indirect effect statistics are online at SUP.org. To reduce clutter, demographic covariates are not shown. In this and all subsequent mediation models, the standardized $\beta$ coefficient above the line (0.19) represents the direct relationship without the mediators; the $\beta$ below the line (0.11) is the coefficient after the mediators are included. Line thickness reflects the $\beta$ coefficient after the mediators are included.

was $r = -0.46$. Feelings thus accounted for a very substantial 21 percent ($-0.46^2$) of the variation in policy preferences towards the average foreign country. This is very strong evidence that the affect heuristic plays a central role in allowing Americans to maintain consistent foreign policy preferences in the absence of much knowledge about foreign countries.

**POWER AND AFFECT**

The idea that gut feelings may shape our foreign policy preferences runs counter to mainstream international relations theory, which focuses on the role of relative power. Realist international relations theorists like Kenneth Waltz argue that states balance against military power. Whether through internal balancing (arming themselves) or external balancing (developing alliances), states act on the basis of the objective distribution of power in the international system. Given that states are aggregates of individuals, from this realist perspective feelings towards foreign countries should be overwhelmed by rational assessments of relative military power in determining our individual foreign policy preferences.

The survey evidence suggests otherwise. In addition to the two rating scales measuring feelings and foreign policy preferences towards fifteen foreign countries, our survey also included a third rating scale assessing the perceived military power of those same fifteen countries. Three different statistical approaches to analyzing the resulting 4,500 data points (three variables for each of fifteen countries at one thousand respondents each) all point to the same conclusion: feelings towards foreign countries are much better predictors of foreign policy preferences than are assessments of their military strength.

Each dot in the two scatterplots at the top of Figure 1.8 represents mean scores for each of the fifteen countries for the full weighted sample. As the flat fit line on the left reveals, there was no relationship between mean judgments of the perceived military power of each of the fifteen foreign countries and the type of foreign policy desired towards them. Mean judgments of warmth towards each country, by contrast, were powerful predictors of foreign policy preferences, as the steep line to the right reveals: greater warmth was strongly associated with desires for friendlier foreign policies (a lower number on the y-axis). Respondents felt the coolest and desired the toughest foreign policies towards Iran and North Korea, while feeling the warmest and desiring the friendliest foreign policy towards England.

While this group-level data allows us to examine American views of each of fifteen foreign countries separately, it runs the risk of the “ecological fallacy”—making improper inferences about individuals based solely upon analyses of the groups to which they belong. The partial regression plots at the bottom
of Figure 1.8 therefore turn to an individual-level analysis of three scales of good internal reliability created by averaging the scores each participant gave for each of the fifteen countries on military power ($\alpha = .83$), warmth ($\alpha = .88$), and foreign policy preferences ($\alpha = .83$). Each dot in the two plots at the bottom represents an individual respondent’s scores on two of the three scales. As can be seen from the flat plot line at left, perceived military power did not predict aggregate foreign policy preferences at the individual level. Warmth towards
the fifteen foreign countries, however, substantially predicted an individual’s foreign policy preferences towards them, as shown at bottom right.

Of course, we asked all three questions for only fifteen countries. While we tried to achieve a balance of friends and foes and countries from different continents, it could be argued that these results are influenced by a country selection bias. We therefore conducted individual regression analyses for each of the fifteen countries separately, with feelings, perceived military power, and the standard demographics predicting foreign policy preferences for each country. In every case, feelings were a stronger predictor of foreign policy preferences than were assessments of a country’s military power (see regression table online at SUP.org). Indeed, the average coefficient for feelings was a substantial $\beta = .42$, while that for military power was statistically insignificant at just $\beta = .05$.

Together, these three statistical analyses provide strong support for the role of the “affect heuristic.” Confronted with difficult questions about what foreign policy to adopt towards specific foreign countries we may not know much about, we instead substitute the easier question of how we feel about specific countries. Assessments of the military power of foreign countries, by contrast, have less impact on our foreign policy preferences towards them.

**IDEOLOGY, AFFECT, AND FOREIGN POLICY PREFERENCES**

Figure 1.9 reveals the powerful role that our gut feelings towards foreign countries play in mediating the relationship between our preexisting ideologies and our foreign policy preferences, accounting for over 80 percent of the direct relationship.\(^ {50} \) As the dashed arrow indicates, perceived power had no direct effect on foreign policy preferences.

\[ R^2 = .21 \]

**FIG. 1.9.** The “affect heuristic” revisited: The impact of ideology and perceived power on overall foreign policy preferences is largely mediated through warmth towards foreign countries.

*Note:* A serial mediation model. Both indirect paths running through warmth were significant, but the one via military power only was not. Indirect effect statistics are online at SUP.org. *Data source:* OU Institute for US-China Issues, 2011.
Why would liberals and conservatives differ in their assessments of the objective military power of foreign countries ($\beta = -0.20$, Figure 1.9 top left)? We do not perceive the world as it is, but instead actively construct our worlds. And our factual beliefs can be distorted by motivated reasoning. “If you are a hawk in your attitude toward other nations, you probably think they are relatively weak and likely to submit to your country’s will,” Daniel Kahneman suggests. “If you are a dove, you probably think they are strong and will not be easily coerced.” As we will see in Chapter 4, conservatives are more likely than liberals to be foreign policy hawks. Ideologically driven differences in hawkishness/dovishness appear to shape how militarily powerful we perceive foreign countries to be. Inclined more towards the use of military force, conservatives see a world that is weak and malleable; inclined more towards diplomacy, liberals see a stronger and less submissive world. In other words, although liberals and conservatives inhabit the same world with the same objective distribution of military power, their different psychological predispositions lead them to perceive very different distributions of military power. Perception is reality.

Perceived military power, Figure 1.9 also reveals, does not have a direct impact on foreign policy preferences. Instead, its effect is mediated through feelings towards foreign countries. This provides support for international relations theorist Stephen Walt’s argument that states balance against threat (perceived malign intentions), and not against objective power itself.

The most important lesson found in Figure 1.9, however, is that our feelings of warmth towards foreign countries, which act as gut intuitions about their intentions towards us, powerfully shape our foreign policy preferences ($\beta = -0.39$). Those gut feelings, furthermore, are powerfully shaped by our preexisting ideologies ($\beta = -0.27$). Affect mediates the impact of ideology on foreign policy preferences.
Beyond Red and Blue: Four Dimensions of American Ideology

“Free trade is no free lunch . . . It . . . deepens the division between rich and poor . . . And American sovereignty is being eroded . . . We must start looking out for America first.”
—Republican presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan, 1992, 1996

“Prosperity comes not just from economic freedom at home, but also from the freedom to trade abroad.”

Patrick Buchanan and Ron Paul are very different kinds of conservatives. Similarly, Dennis Kucinich and Hillary Clinton, both presidential primary candidates in 2008, are very different kinds of liberals. Are these differences among liberal and conservative political elites reflected on Main Street? Our survey data suggests that they are: Main Street liberals and conservatives are not all the same, and their differences matter for their international attitudes.

On the issue of free trade, a first glance at our survey data suggests that ideology does not shape American attitudes. We asked participants how they felt about “free trade between nations.” Their responses did not correlate with their liberal-conservative self-placement \( r = -.02, p = .49 \), or whether they self-identified as Democrats or Republicans.³

We also, however, measured four distinct dimensions of American ideology with thirteen additional questions, and it turns out that three of the four were significant predictors of feelings about free trade. As Figure 2.1 reveals, while social conservatism \( \beta = -.10 \) was associated with negative feelings towards free trade, both economic \( \beta = .11 \) and political \( \beta = .09 \) conservatism correlated with positive feelings towards free trade. These predictors appear to have canceled each other out at the aggregate level, so that there was no overall ideological or partisan difference.

The difference, instead, was between different types of liberals and conservatives. As the epigraphs reveal, different kinds of Republicans can hold very different attitudes towards free trade. Ron Paul is far from the first free-trade conservative. Louis Dalrymple’s 1901 editorial cartoon in Puck magazine makes
the argument for free trade visually (Figure 2.2). Uncle Sam, wearing an apron labeled “Trade Balance,” proudly carries a tray brimming with American agricultural exports to a large table. Men representing the nations of the world are seated, all hungry for American products. England’s John Bull sits prominently at the head of the table, holding a long list of American goods he desires. To reinforce the point, Dalrymple hangs a sign on the wall that reads, “Cafe Yankee. If you don’t see what you want call for it.” In this view, free trade is good for America and for Americans.

But not all conservatives agree. The protectionism that Pat Buchanan championed has roots in the old social Darwinist belief that the world is a competitive place in which trade is more often zero-sum than positive-sum. In this view, there are winners and losers in international trade, and the United States must fight to maintain its position of social dominance at the top of the international pecking order. Grant E. Hamilton’s “Quarantined,” from an 1892 Judge magazine, illustrates the debate over protectionism at that time (Figure 2.3). A laden boat approaches a pier, but a health officer declares, “No, gentlemen, you cannot land here; you have a bad attack of the free-trade plague, and it will take several years to fumigate you properly!” The news was Republican president Benjamin Harrison’s executive order that, following a recent outbreak of

---

**FIG. 2.1.** Does ideology shape American feelings about free trade between nations? Only if disaggregated into its social, economic, and political dimensions, which offset one another

*Note:* Regression analyses. ** *p < .01, * = not significant, all other *s < .001. Data source: OU Institute for US-China Issues, 2011.*
beyond red and blue 51

cholera brought by foreign ships entering New York Harbor, foreign vessels arriving at American ports were to be quarantined. But Hamilton’s point is less about cholera than the “free-trade plague,” a reference to the heated debate over protectionism that divided the political parties at the time. The sailors at the front of the boat include the Democratic presidential and vice presidential candidates Grover Cleveland and Adlai Stevenson I. Cleveland was a pro-business Democrat who supported free trade; Republican president Harrison was a protectionist who had presided over the passing of the 1890 McKinley Tariff, which raised average import duties to almost 50 percent. After winning his second (but nonconsecutive) term as president in 1892, Cleveland orchestrated the replacement of the McKinley Tariff with the much less onerous Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894.

Of course, liberals can and do disagree over free trade as well. For example, in 1993 organized labor and its Democratic Party supporters in Congress opposed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), arguing that globalization harms American workers. The Clinton administration was able to secure NAFTA’s passage in Congress only by relying upon the support of free-trade Republicans in both the House and Senate.

**Fig. 2.2.** Economic conservatives and libertarians have long promoted free trade, 1901. Source: Louis Dalrymple, *Puck*, August 21, 1901. Image courtesy of the Library of Congress. LC-DIG-ppmsca-25557.
Chapter 1 suggested that all Americans share a “big L” Liberalism that contributes to a jealousy of our individual freedoms against perceived foreign tyrannies. It then argued that within the broadly shared parameters of Liberalism, American “small l” liberals and conservatives differ systematically and substantially in their international attitudes and foreign policy preferences. These ideological differences, furthermore, are reflected in their gut feelings towards foreign countries, subsequently shaping their specific foreign policy preferences.

This chapter takes the argument a step further. Not all liberals and conservatives are alike, and different kinds of American liberals and conservatives hold systematically different foreign policy attitudes. Specifically, it contends that four dimensions of American ideology—cultural, social, economic, and political—have potentially disparate effects on international attitudes and foreign policy preferences. As in the case of free trade discussed above, the different

**QUARANTINED**

United States Health-Officer—“No, gentlemen, you cannot land here; you have a bad attack of the free-trade plague, and it will take several years to fumigate you properly!”

**FIG. 2.3.** Social conservatives view free trade and immigration as contaminating, 1892. Source: Grant E. Hamilton, *Judge*, October 1, 1892. Image courtesy of the University of Oklahoma Libraries, Nichols Collection.

**BEYOND LEFT AND RIGHT**

Chapter 1 suggested that all Americans share a “big L” Liberalism that contributes to a jealousy of our individual freedoms against perceived foreign tyrannies. It then argued that within the broadly shared parameters of Liberalism, American “small l” liberals and conservatives differ systematically and substantially in their international attitudes and foreign policy preferences. These ideological differences, furthermore, are reflected in their gut feelings towards foreign countries, subsequently shaping their specific foreign policy preferences.

This chapter takes the argument a step further. Not all liberals and conservatives are alike, and different kinds of American liberals and conservatives hold systematically different foreign policy attitudes. Specifically, it contends that four dimensions of American ideology—cultural, social, economic, and political—have potentially disparate effects on international attitudes and foreign policy preferences. As in the case of free trade discussed above, the different
dimensions of ideology will work occasionally against one another, *attenuating* the overall liberal-conservative divide. In most cases, however, these dimensions of ideology work together, *increasing* overall liberal-conservative differences. For instance, in Chapters 4 and 10 we will see that all four dimensions of ideology synergize when it comes to the United Nations, pitting powerful coalitions of different kinds of liberals against coalitions of disparate conservatives, resulting in massive differences on multilateralism at the aggregate liberal-conservative level.

The unidimensional view of ideology has a lengthy history. Christian symbolism in Europe has long associated the left with a preference for equality, and the right with the defense of social and religious hierarchies. During the French Revolution, defenders of the status quo sat on the right side of the National Assembly, and its opponents sat on the left. “Attachment to one’s privileges and to the hierarchical order is on the right; the desire to bring order down is on the left,” Jean Laponce writes. “The existing hierarchical structure . . . promotes security on the right, but oppresses on the left.”

The idea that there is a single dimension of ideology traveled to the New World, where it thrived. The diction changed, however. Although American political discourse today includes “left wing” and “right wing,” the dominant language is of “liberals” and “conservatives.” As noted in the Introduction, American national opinion polls have long used a single liberal-to-conservative self-placement question to measure ideology. John Jost finds it “difficult to think of another survey question in the entire social and behavioral sciences that is as useful and parsimonious as the liberalism-conservatism self-placement item.”

Jost is certainly right that the unidimensional ideology scale is an extremely valuable tool for understanding systematic variation in personality, attitudes, and policy preferences. A multidimensional approach to ideology also has its merits, however. On the basis of ANES survey data, political scientists Stanley Feldman and Chris Johnston argue that distinct cultural and economic dimensions of American ideology are not captured by the traditional unidimensional self-placement item. “Parsimony is a desirable goal in science,” they argue. “However, this must be balanced against the need for an accurate description of social phenomena. A unidimensional model of ideology . . . does not do justice to the ways in which people actually organize their political beliefs.”

Also working with ANES data, political scientists Shawn Treier and D. Sunshine Hillygus similarly argue that “the belief systems of the mass public are multidimensional.” Many Americans, especially self-identified moderates and those who either refuse to answer the standard ideology question or respond “don’t know,” are “ideologically cross-pressured,” holding liberal views on some issues and conservative views on others.
These political scientists are right that while the unidimensional model is parsimonious, it fails to capture the full complexity of lived American ideologies. Indeed, this book contends that American ideology can usefully be understood across not just two dimensions but four: cultural, social, economic, and political. As displayed in Figure 2.4, each of these four dimensions contributes unique variance in a regression predicting the standard unidimensional measure of ideology, together accounting for about half of its variation.8

This analytic approach is consistent with commonsense understandings of the main issues that divide liberals and conservatives in America today. For instance, in a review of scholarship on postwar American conservatism, Kim Phillips-Fein argues that most historians believe that “its central concerns included anti-communism, a laissez-faire approach to economics, opposition to the civil rights movement, and commitment to traditional sexual norms.”9 In our terms, these refer precisely to the political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of ideology, respectively. And liberal ideologies can be usefully understood to lie on the opposite end of each of these conservative positions. On politics, liberals tend to counter libertarian individualism and anti-communism with a greater communitarian concern for the public good. On economics, liberals favor more regulation of the market and redistribution of income than do conservatives. On social issues, liberals decry racism and support integration, affirmative action, and the civil rights movement. And on cultural issues, liberals oppose a return to traditional sexual and religious values in favor of a more modern and tolerant approach to morality.

While each of these four dimensions of ideology contributes unique variance to the unidimensional approach, it is also clear from Figure 2.4 that two dimen-
sions, cultural and economic, do the majority of the work. This is empirically consistent with Feldman and Johnston’s inductive analysis of the ANES survey data, which revealed two primary dimensions of American ideology, focusing on the culture wars and economics. At a theoretic level, our data is also consistent with separate arguments made by psychologists John Jost and John Duckitt that the two major components of conservatism are resistance to change (in the form of traditional cultural values) and opposition to equality (which, in our sample, appears to be more about economic than social inequality).

While cultural and economic ideologies seem to matter the most, we shall see that all four dimensions of ideology are useful for understanding the international attitudes of the American people. Socio-racial ideology will be important when we examine American attitudes towards nonwhite countries like those of Latin America, the Middle East, and East Asia, to be discussed in Chapters 6, 8, and 9. And political ideology (communitarianism/libertarianism) will have a big influence on attitudes towards communist countries and international organizations like the United Nations, to be explored in Chapters 9 and 10. We therefore introduce each dimension of ideology in turn.

**CULTURAL IDEOLOGY: GOD, GAYS, AND . . . FOREIGN COUNTRIES?**

“There is sin and evil in the world, and we’re enjoined by Scripture and the Lord Jesus to oppose it with all our might. . . . Communis[ts] . . . are the focus of evil in the modern world.”

—Republican President Ronald Reagan, 1983

“North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. . . . States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.”

—Republican President George W. Bush, 2002

William Jennings Bryan was the “perpetual candidate.” He was the Democratic nominee for president in 1896, 1900, and 1908, losing all three elections. A devout Presbyterian, his faith informed his domestic and international politics. As noted in the Introduction, he stood and lost with the anti-imperialists in 1900 as President McKinley rode a wave of patriotic pride to reelection following the victorious Spanish–American War and the annexation of Cuba and the Philippines. A pacifist, Bryan later served as secretary of state for President Woodrow Wilson, but resigned in 1915 after Wilson took a tough stand on the German sinking of the British ocean liner *Lusitania*, which killed over one thousand people.
Bryan is better known, however, for his fundamentalist positions on domestic issues. His national campaigning helped Congress pass the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1918, ushering in Prohibition. He later opposed the theory of evolution and social Darwinism, which he blamed for inciting the Germans to war. Bryan is perhaps best known for defeating Clarence Darrow in the Scopes Trial, in which the court upheld a Tennessee law prohibiting the teaching of evolution.

The fundamentalists lost the culture wars of the 1920s, however, as Prohibition was repealed and evolution entered school textbooks. They then retreated from the public sphere. Following the emergence of the sexual revolution, feminism, abortion, pornography, and gay rights in the 1960s and 1970s, however, they returned to political activism. Historian Daniel Williams argues that fundamentalists were reunited by a “belief that America was rapidly losing its Christian moorings and needed to repent . . . they were committed to the idea of a Christian nation with a Protestant-based moral code—and they turned to politics in order to realize that vision.” The earlier Protestant focus on opposing Catholics like Democrats Al Smith in 1924 and John F. Kennedy in 1960 was abandoned in favor of a broader agenda that would include Catholics, namely, protecting a Christian nation against the forces of secularism. By 1980 Evangelical Protestants had hitched their wagon to one candidate and one political party: Ronald Reagan and the Republicans. In his 1983 “Evil Empire” speech given to the National Association of Evangelicals, cited in the first epigraph, President Reagan equated the fight against communism and the Soviet Union with the fight against “evil.”

The rhetoric of evil returned twenty years later when, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush declared in his 2002 State of the Union address that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, together with their terrorist allies, formed an “axis of evil.” Unlike Reagan, Bush was a born-again Christian and a true believer. As noted in the Introduction, Bush didn’t need to pander to the religious right, because he was the religious right. Many liberals were alarmed. In a 2003 New Yorker, Lee Lorenz depicts the Devil’s secretary reporting to his boss that he has sent cards to North Korea, Iran, and Iraq on the anniversary of the president’s “Axis of Evil” speech (Figure 2.5). While poking fun of Bush, the cartoon also speaks to the discomfort that many liberals feel when religion shapes public policy.

The role of religion in American political life only appears to be increasing, as the culture wars thrive. In a December 2011 Iowa campaign ad run during the Republican presidential primaries, Texas governor Rick Perry declared, “I’m not ashamed to admit that I’m a Christian. But you don’t need to be in the pew every Sunday to know that there’s something wrong in this country when gays
can serve openly in the military, but our kids can’t openly celebrate Christmas or pray in school. As president, I’ll end Obama’s war on religion.”

Then, in the spring of 2012, liberals accused conservatives of waging a “war on women” by restricting access to contraception and abortion, opposing legislation that would mandate equal pay for women and end workplace discrimination, and opposing the Violence Against Women Act. In a fundraising e-mail, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi urged donations “to send a clear message that we will not tolerate or stand by while Republicans wage war on women’s rights.”

Survey evidence suggests that Reagan, Bush, Perry, and Pelosi were not disconnected from the American public. As noted in Chapter 1, the survey data supports Alan Abramowitz and not Morris Fiorina: the culture wars are real. Americans are divided over cultural and religious values, and those differences shape their policy preferences. On the specific issue of the relationship between religiosity and abortion attitudes, which he depicts as a crucial case, Fiorina’s assertion that “the churched and unchurched differ less on abortion than stereotypes suggest” is particularly galling. It is based upon his eyeball interpretation of General Social Survey (GSS) data on six specific conditions under which a woman should be allowed to have an abortion: “the difference . . . is
... about two circumstances—not exactly a religious war.” Remarkably, no statistical evidence is presented to support his interpretation; further, statistical analysis of the 2004 GSS data Fiorina presents actually reveals a very large difference between his “churched” and “unchurched” groups in their attitudes towards abortion. Fiorina’s argument, therefore, is contradicted by the very survey evidence he presents.

Other surveys also point to a culture war. On the basis of their 2006 Faith Matters Survey, Putnam and Campbell argue in American Grace that the most and least religious Americans differ substantially on issues like abortion and homosexuality.20 Our own 2011 survey included three items that cohered well as a scale of religiosity ($\alpha = .86$):

- Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?
- Outside of attending religious services, how often do you pray?
- How important is religion in your life?21

Following Putnam and Campbell, we defined the most and least religious Americans as the top and bottom quintiles on this scale.22 Supporting their argument, in our survey the two groups disagreed massively on policy preferences towards abortion and gay marriage.23 There were also massive differences between them on the issue of prayer in public schools, and moderate differences on gun control and the death penalty.24

Of course, frequency of religious practice is not the only way to measure religiosity. We also measured religious beliefs with a “biblical literalism” scale composed of five items that cohered very well ($\alpha = .89$):

- The Bible is literally true, from Genesis to Revelation, from Adam and Eve to Armageddon.
- I have no doubt at all that God exists.25
- Whenever science and scripture conflict, science is right. (reverse coded)
- The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly & ferociously fighting against God.
- God gave Palestine (today’s Israel) to the Jewish people.26

Biblical literalism, it turns out, is an even stronger predictor of policy preferences in the culture wars than religious practice is.27

Pew’s Andrew Kohut maintains that “With the exception of policy towards Israel, religion has little bearing on how [the American people] think about international affairs.”28 The 2011 survey data paints the opposite picture: both religious beliefs (biblical literalism) and practices (religiosity) consistently and strongly correlate with attitudes towards international affairs. For instance,
bibilical literalism alone accounts for 16 percent of the variation in Israel policy preferences, 13 percent of Mexican border policy preferences, and 13 percent of China policy preferences. As we shall see in Chapters 6, 8, and 9, however, the direction of biblical literalism’s impact varies, as greater biblical literalism is associated with desires for a friendlier Israel policy but tougher Mexico and China policies. And as we will see in Chapters 4 and 10, biblical literalism is also strongly associated with skepticism towards international treaties and opposition to multilateralism. Similar patterns are found when substituting religiosity for biblical literalism.

There are statistically significant regional differences in biblical literalism. As shown in Figure 2.6, Southerners score the highest on biblical literalism, while Americans from the West coast and the Northeast score the lowest. These regional differences in biblical literalism are a major reason why we include region as a demographic covariate in most of the statistical analyses in this book. For instance, in a regression with the six other demographic covariates, Southerners are slightly less likely than other Americans ($\beta = -0.06, p = 0.048$) to desire a tougher Israel policy. But when biblical literalism is added into the regression, the effect of being from the South drops to statistical insignificance ($\beta = -0.01, p = 0.67$).

In this book, however, cultural ideology is conceptualized as broader than either religious practices or beliefs. The nonreligious can also subscribe to tradi-
tional cultural values. We draw three items from scales of what psychologist Robert Altemeyer calls “conventionalism,” and John Duckitt calls “traditionalism”\textsuperscript{31}:

- \textit{There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.} (reverse coded)
- \textit{This country will flourish if young people stop experimenting with drugs, alcohol, and sex, and focus on family values.}
- \textit{There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.} (reverse coded)

The resulting scale ($\alpha = .77$) is called “cultural traditionalism,” with higher values indicating greater adherence to “traditional” values and lifestyles, and lower scores indicating a preference for “modern” or secular values and lifestyles. Cultural traditionalism, it turns out, is almost as powerful a predictor of culture war preferences as biblical literalism is.\textsuperscript{32}

Cultural traditionalism influences foreign policy preferences as well. The topic of this book was inspired in part by the surprise discovery several years ago that policy preferences towards China could be predicted not just from positions on culture war issues like abortion, which can be linked to China’s much publicized one-child policy, but even from attitudes towards gay marriage and prayer in public schools, which would seem to have nothing to do with China.\textsuperscript{33} Remarkably, this book will show that cultural traditionalism predicts not just desires for friendlier policies towards Israel and tougher policies towards China, but also tougher policies towards Mexico and France. As we shall see in Chapter 6, Americans who score high on cultural traditionalism are more likely to view Mexico—a major source of illegal immigrants into the United States—as a threat to America’s Christian values and WASP identity. And as we will see in Chapter 7, cultural traditionalism also divides Americans in their attitudes towards France: liberal Francophiles are drawn to French culture, while conservative Francophobes are repelled by its perceived “libertine” and secular ways.

**SOCIAL IDEOLOGY: RACE AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY**

“Our country calls not for the life of ease but for the life of strenuous endeavor. The twentieth century looms before us big with the fate of many nations. If . . . we shrink from the hard contests where men must win at hazard of their lives and at the risk of all they hold dear, then the bolder and stronger peoples will pass us by, and win for themselves the domination of the world.”\textsuperscript{34} —Republican Theodore Roosevelt, 1899

“Those who would have this nation enter upon a career of empire must consider not only the effect of imperialism on the Filipinos but they must also calculate its effects upon our own nation. We cannot repudiate the principle of self-government in the Philippines without weakening that principle here.”\textsuperscript{35} —Democrat William Jennings Bryan, 1900
Theodore Roosevelt, war hero from his 1898 exploits with the Rough Riders in Cuba, was Republican president William McKinley’s running mate in 1900. When McKinley was assassinated in 1901, Roosevelt became president at the age of forty-two, serving until 1909. His slogan “Speak softly and carry a big stick” captured a foreign policy that combined elements of both diplomacy and force. Roosevelt negotiated an end to the Russo-Japanese War in the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth, earning himself a Nobel Peace Prize. But he also built the “Great White Fleet” of sixteen battleships and sent them on a circumnavigation of the globe in 1907–9 to parade American naval power.

Underlying Roosevelt’s international activism was the dog-eat-dog view of international politics common at the turn of the century. The social Darwinist ideas that arrived in America in the late nineteenth century provided a rationale for Americans with imperial ambitions. As historian Richard Hofstadter writes, “Imperialists, calling upon Darwinism in defense of the subjugation of weaker races, could point to The Origin of Species, which had referred in its subtitle to The Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life. Darwin had been talking about pigeons, but the imperialists saw no reason why his theories should not apply to men.”36 In an excellent chapter on “The Hierarchy of Race,” Michael Hunt similarly argues that “Darwinian notions served to reinforce pre-existing ideas of Anglo-Saxon superiority. . . . Lesser races, awed and grateful, could follow the lead of the Anglo-Saxon—or drop to the bottom of the heap to meet their fate, ultimate extinction.”37

Hunt is right that racial thinking and racism have been a persistent theme in U.S. foreign policy. Where he emphasizes racism as a commonality among all Americans, however, this book follows Rogers Smith in emphasizing a very long tradition of differences among Americans over racial politics. “Inegalitarian ideologies,” Smith writes, “have shaped . . . American politics just as deeply” as egalitarian ideals.38 For instance, we saw in the Introduction that differences over race divided Americans even during the height of American imperial pride at the turn of the last century. Anti-expansionists like Mark Twain and William Jennings Bryan objected to the subjugation of other races, arguing that colored peoples like the Filipinos, for example, were endowed with an equal right to self-determination. McKinley and Roosevelt disagreed.

Immigration and slavery, of course, conspired to make race a contentious issue in American politics from its very beginnings. By the nineteenth century Americans were heatedly debating immigration and fought a civil war in part over slavery. One 1860s lithograph, entitled “The Great Fear of the Period: That Uncle Sam May Be Swallowed by Foreigners,” depicts Uncle Sam being devoured from both ends at once, with an Irish man swallowing his head and a Chinese man eating from his feet (Figure 2.7). Irish and Chinese immigrants, of
course, were busy laying America’s transcontinental railroad system, displayed underfoot.

But this midnineteenth-century view of an Irish and Chinese racial menace did not go unchallenged. In an 1869 Harper’s Weekly, Thomas Nast portrays “Uncle Sam’s Thanksgiving Dinner” (Figure 2.8). The Civil War was over, and the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified, granting equal rights and citizenship to all Americans. The peoples of the world, of every race, gather at the banquet table of “self-government” and “universal suffrage.” Uncle Sam carves the turkey while Columbia sits between an African and a Chinese, engaging in polite conversation. It is a welcoming, multiracial vision of harmony and equality. Nast also makes his point explicitly, writing, “Come One, Come All” and “Free and Equal.”

Americans continue, of course, to debate race today. Neither the Civil War nor the civil rights movement put an end to racism. Indeed, racial desegregation was a big part of what motivated the conservative backlash to the Great Society of the 1960s, contributing to Ronald Reagan’s victory in 1980.

Much psychological research on racism today follows from the pioneering work of Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto on “social dominance orientation” (SDO), a generalized preference for social hierarchy and desire to dominate out-groups. Following the separate work of psychologists John Jost, Mathew Kugler, and Arnold Ho, this book distinguishes between two facets of SDO—“group-based dominance” and “opposition to equality”—and utilizes the former. Group-based dominance (SDO-D) is associated with greater perceived
intergroup competition, desires that “inferior” groups be actively subjugated, and “old fashioned” prejudice—the belief that some groups are inherently superior or more worthy than others. As James Baldwin writes in *Nobody Knows My Name*, “The Negro tells us where the bottom is: because he is there, and where he is, beneath us, we know where the limits are and how far we must not fall.”

We measure the group dominance facet of SDO with three items:

- **Inferior groups should stay in their place.**
- **It’s probably a BAD thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.** (reverse coded)
- **Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.**

Note that none of these statements explicitly mentions race; “groups” is left ambiguous. Nonetheless, a large literature has overwhelmingly demonstrated that SDO consistently predicts prejudice against “colored” groups like Latinos, blacks, Asians, and Arabs, as well as opposition to social welfare and affirmative action policies. Our 2011 survey data replicates these findings. In a series of multiple regressions pitting all four dimensions of American ideology against one another, and controlling for the standard demographics, social dominance was the strongest predictor of prejudice against “the Chinese people” ($\beta = .21$), and coolness towards “Asians” ($\beta = -.15$) and “Muslims” ($\beta = -.21$).
On average, conservatives scored much higher on social dominance orientation than liberals did. This finding supports Donald Kinder and Cindy Kam’s argument, in *Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion*, that “Americans who think of themselves as conservative are a bit more ethnocentric, on average, than are those who think of themselves as liberal.”

Our data also supports Sidanius and Pratto’s speculation that “Whatever social dominance values one has developed about intergroup relations of one type (e.g., between races) are likely to be applied to intergroup relations of other types (e.g. between nations).” Again pitting our four dimensions of American ideology against one another, and controlling for the standard demographics, social dominance orientation was the strongest predictor of warmth towards the nonwhite countries of Haiti ($\beta = -.20$), India ($\beta = -.14$), Taiwan ($\beta = -.11$), South Korea and Japan (both $\beta = -.10$, $p = .002$), but it did not predict feelings towards fellow Caucasian countries England ($p = .93$), Russia ($p = .62$), and Germany ($p = .32$). As we will see in our case study chapters on Latin America (Chapter 6), the Middle East (Chapter 8), East Asia (Chapter 9), and even the United Nations (Chapter 10), the international attitudes of the American people are not color-blind; they are tied to the same ideological divisions that animate racial politics at home.

**ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY: INCOME REDISTRIBUTION AND THE SOCIALIST MENACE**

“High inequality, which has turned us into a nation with a much weakened middle class, has a corrosive effect on social relations and politics, one that has become ever more apparent as America has moved deeper into a new Gilded Age.” —Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman, 2007

“There is income inequality in America, there always has been, and hopefully there always will be.” —Republican presidential candidate Rick Santorum, 2012

American liberals and conservatives are divided over inequality. “Liberals are not satisfied when only some people—members of an aristocratic class here, representatives of a business elite there—have the chance to determine how they will live,” writes political scientist Alan Wolfe. “Any society that closes off opportunities for people to achieve their full human capacities, or allows persistent inequalities . . . would not be a liberal one.” The conservative view is different. “There is no principle more basic in the conservative philosophy than that of the inherent and absolute incompatibility between liberty and equality,” writes sociologist Robert Nisbet. “The abiding purpose of liberty is its protection of . . . property. . . . The inherent objective of equality, on the other hand, is that of . . . redistribution.”
This disagreement has a long history. In an ambitious chapter of *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* on the “Perils of Revolution,” Michael Hunt argues that from the very founding, Americans have been united by a “political culture inimical to revolutionary upheaval and especially to the violation of property rights.” He cites Alexis de Tocqueville, who claimed that “In no country in the world is love of property more active and more anxious than in the United States.” This “dominant national attitude,” Hunt maintains, has powerfully shaped American attitudes towards international affairs, from the French Revolution to the Mexican, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions.

Our survey data proves Hunt right: attitudes towards property and its proper distribution do shape the international attitudes of the American people. It also, however, reveals that differences among Americans in their economic ideologies are associated with variation in their international attitudes. Indeed, although Hunt argues the “consensus history” view, his narrative often highlights disagreements. For instance, Hunt opens the “Perils of Revolution” with a thoughtful discussion of how the second and third U.S. presidents differed over the French Revolution. John Adams was a Federalist, wary of threats to property. Anxious about popular cries for economic leveling, he attacked the French Revolution for “chasing after the phantom of equality of persons and property.” Thomas Jefferson, by contrast, was less alarmed by redistribution and more optimistic about the potential of revolution to bring liberty to France.

Immigration and economic development in the nineteenth century only further polarized American views of foreign upheavals. Hunt notes that the 1871 Paris Commune “touched sensitive political nerves at home,” as European immigrants had “swelled the ranks of labor . . . [and] had begun to challenge property rights and foment class conflict.” Indeed, Hunt recognizes that both class and ethnicity later divided Americans over the early twentieth-century revolutions in Mexico, China, and Russia: “Revolutions . . . held few terrors for an American underclass. . . . On the other hand, the Adamsian [Federalist] view appealed most to the wealthy and socially prominent who identified culturally with England. They feared the radical potential of all revolutions and the implicit challenge they posed to . . . the sanctity of property at home.”

American debates over economic inequality only intensified with the 1890s Gilded Age of staggering income inequality, followed by the Great Depression and the New Deal of the 1930s. Economic disaster shattered the credibility of classical laissez-faire economics, and John Maynard Keynes provided a theoretical rationale for an active role for the state in the economy. Democratic president Franklin D. Roosevelt put it bluntly: “We have always known that heedless self-interest was bad morals; now we know that it is bad economics.” First during the New Deal and then during World War II, progressive
income taxes, the expansion of unions, the 1935 Social Security Act, and massive government investment in infrastructure and the war effort combined to reduce the income gap between the rich and the working classes, producing what economic historians Claudia Goldin and Robert Margo have called the “Great Compression.”

After the war, “modern Republicans” like Dwight D. Eisenhower and his labor secretary Arthur Larson joined Democrats in embracing labor and an active role for the government in the economy. As Larson put it in *A Republican Looks at His Party*, “1896 was against labor; 1936 was against business; this administration is against neither, but is for both.” Rapid economic expansion in the 1950s and 1960s under conditions of relatively low income inequality, Paul Krugman argues, created the U.S. middle class. This period culminated in Democratic president Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society initiative, which included not only the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but also the 1965 creation of Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the poor.

The rise of modern conservatism and Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980 is often attributed to “white backlash” against the sexual revolution, the civil rights movement, and the anti-Vietnam protests of the 1960s and 1970s. In other words, it is largely viewed in cultural and socio-racial terms. In *Invisible Hands*, however, historian Kim Phillips-Fein traces the economic origins of modern conservatism all the way back to the New Deal itself. Rejecting the “Keynesian consensus” from its very inception, wealthy businessmen fought labor unions, federal social welfare programs, and government regulation of the economy. Phillips-Fein cites Irénée du Pont of DuPont Chemicals, who wrote in 1935 that “the so called ‘New Deal’ advocated by the [Roosevelt] administration is nothing more or less than the Socialistic doctrine called by another name.” Later, in the 1950s, wealthy businessmen disparaged “modern Republicans” like President Eisenhower as “collectivists,” and sought to roll back the New Deal through the financing of new think tanks, radio stations, and magazines devoted to the struggle against labor unions and the welfare state.

Although Republican senator Barry Goldwater lost the presidential election of 1964 to Lyndon B. Johnson in a landslide, his 1960 *The Conscience of a Conservative* became a bible for a generation of economic conservatives. Short and passionately written, it railed against the redistribution of income through taxation and social welfare services: “collectivists . . . have learned that socialism can be achieved through Welfarism quite as well as through Nationalization. They understand that private property can be confiscated as effectively by taxation as by appropriating it.” Like Edmund Burke and the classical conservatives who preceded him, Goldwater grounded his defense of inequality in human nature: “We are all equal in the eyes of God but we are equal in no other respect.
Artificial devices [like the graduated income tax] for enforcing equality among unequal men must be rejected . . . [to] honor . . . the laws of nature.”

This conservative hostility towards economic equality is experiencing a revival. The rhetoric of class conflict heated up during the 2012 presidential contest. “We believe in free people and free enterprise, not redistribution,” Mitt Romney stated in a September 18, 2012, interview with Fox News. “The right course for America is to create growth, create wealth, not to redistribute wealth.”

The last three decades of conservative ascendance has led, according to Paul Krugman, to a “Great Divergence,” as income inequality has returned to levels not seen since the Gilded Age. The inflation of the Carter years discredited Keynesian economics, and Milton Friedman and other conservative economists advocated a return to laissez-faire. Taxes, government regulation of the economy, and social welfare spending came under renewed attack. As quoted in the epigraph, Krugman argues that we now live in a “second Gilded Age,” where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Where Rick Santorum, also cited in the epigraph, embraces the new inequality as desirable, Krugman passionately opposes it: “I believe in a relatively equal society, supported by institutions that limit extremes of wealth and poverty. . . . That makes me a liberal, and I’m proud of it.”

Do these opposed liberal and conservative economic views shape the international attitudes of the American people? To find out, we developed a “support for income inequality” scale composed of three items that cohered very well:

- Differences between high and low incomes should remain as they are.
- The government should decrease income differences. (reverse coded)
- Class differences should be smaller than they are today. (reverse coded)

On average, conservatives scored vastly higher on this support for income inequality scale than liberals did. This is consistent with the U.S. data from the 2006 World Values Survey, implemented online by Knowledge Networks, in which self-identified Republicans (N = 390) scored much higher than Democrats (N = 502) on a ten-point scale from “Incomes should be made more equal” to “We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort.” A regression with our scale further revealed that support for income inequality was greatest among the wealthy (β = .14) and lowest among blacks (β = −.15). The elderly (β = .08) and men (β = .06, p = .056) were slightly more supportive of income inequality, while greater education was marginally associated with opposition to income inequality (β = −.06, p = .08).

Our support for income inequality scale, unsurprisingly, predicts coolness
towards communist and former communist countries like North Korea ($\beta = -0.10, p = 0.005$), China ($\beta = -0.10, p = 0.005$), and Russia ($\beta = -0.09, p = 0.016$) in regressions controlling for the three other dimensions of ideology and the seven standard demographics. It also shapes feelings towards developing-world countries in Latin America. As we will see in Chapter 6, economic ideology ($\beta = -0.18$) is the strongest predictor of feelings towards Mexico, followed by cultural ($\beta = -0.14$) and socio-racial ($\beta = -0.10, p = 0.002$) ideologies. Similarly, feelings towards Brazil are shaped by cultural ($\beta = -0.18$) and economic ($\beta = -0.14$) ideologies, but not by social or political ideologies.

Bill Mauldin captured how economic ideology shapes liberal views of the developing world in a 1963 editorial cartoon for the Chicago Sun-Times (Figure 2.9). Entitled “High Sierra,” it uses a sombrero labeled “Latin America” to depict the mountain of income inequality that separates two aloof representatives of “the very rich,” seated on the top of the mountain, from the countless “very poor,” seemingly drowning far below. Compassion for the plight of the poor, we will see in Chapter 3, is a major reason why liberals tend to feel warmer towards developing-world countries than conservatives do.

Non-findings can often be as informative as findings. Pitted against the oth-
er three ideological dimensions, economic ideology is not associated with feelings towards European capitalist countries like Germany ($\beta = .003, p = .94$) and England ($\beta = -.06, p = .11$). But support for economic inequality does predict coolness towards both “Europeans” ($\beta = -.09, p = .015$) in general and France ($\beta = -.24$) in particular. As we will see in Chapter 7, while many conservatives view France coolly as a “socialist” European state, liberals like Eric Alterman view France and the European social welfare states warmly, as models of “what liberals want.” The economic conservatism of Margaret Thatcher and Angela Merkel may explain why Americans do not appear to view England and Germany as typically “European” social welfare states.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: COMMUNITARIANS, LIBERTARIANS, AND THE WORLD

“The Conservative’s first concern will always be: Are we maximizing freedom?”
—Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, 1964

“Republicans celebrate the individual. But they forget the importance of community and generosity.”
—Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern, 1972

Former Texas congressman Ron Paul is not your typical Republican. We have already seen that he challenged Newt Gingrich’s “warmongering” during a 2012 presidential primary debate, and that he disagrees with protectionists like Pat Buchanan over free trade. Paul first ran for president as a libertarian in 1988 and later ran twice as a Republican, in 2008 and 2012. With financial support from the billionaire Koch brothers, but also from abundant, small online donations, Paul was a very serious player in Republican politics.

The communitarian-libertarian divide represents a fourth and final, political dimension of American ideology. The core of libertarianism is the idea that individuals are sovereign and self-governing, and should be free to do anything they want as long as they don’t aggress against others. From this perspective, taxation is theft and the government is basically a legalized mafia. Indeed, “anarchist libertarians” or “anarcho-capitalists,” like Murray Rothbard, completely reject government, arguing that “Capitalism is the fullest expression of anarchism, and anarchism is the fullest expression of capitalism.” By contrast, Ron Paul and the majority of American libertarians today are “miniarchists,” who acknowledge a limited role for a very small government in providing for common defense, police, and courts. The government, in this view, is little more than a “referee” between sovereign individuals, or a “night watchman” in their service.

Libertarians often trace their ideology to classical liberals like John Locke,
whose views on natural rights and the social contract are seen as celebrating individual liberty. Jacob Huebert declares that “Libertarians were the original liberals.” They also look to the U.S. Declaration of Independence, with its focus on the “inalienable rights” of the people, as “in its essence a libertarian document.”

But libertarianism today has its more proximate origins in the Cold War. Ayn Rand’s novels *The Fountainhead* (1943) and *Atlas Shrugged* (1957), the “gateway drugs” for many Americans into libertarianism, are best understood in the context of the early Cold War conflation of communisms of the left and fascisms of the right. Rand, like “totalitarianism” theorists Hannah Arendt and Zbigniew Brzezinski, was an émigré from Europe. “Rand’s defense of individualism, celebration of capitalism, and controversial morality of selfishness . . . all sprang from her early life experiences in Communist Russia,” historian Jennifer Burns writes in her biography, *Goddess of the Market: Ayn Rand and the American Right*. “Her indictment of altruism, social welfare, and service to others sprang from her belief that these ideals underlay Communism [and] Nazism.”

Libertarians today are often described as economic conservatives but cultural liberals, siding with the right in opposition to government regulations and social welfare programs, and with the left in opposing laws regulating private life, such as on homosexuality or drug use. On the basis of a very large convenience sample of 11,994 self-identified American libertarians, a group of social psychologists has recently demonstrated that, compared to liberals and conservatives, self-described libertarians do indeed value liberty more. Their intellectual style is more coolly cognitive, and they display more antisocial tendencies, scoring lower on interdependence and social relatedness. The Cato Institute claimed that in 2010 about 14 percent of Americans were libertarians.

A communitarian critique of radical libertarianism emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. “The defense of negative freedom, of civil rights and liberties, while ignoring massive injustice, poverty, and despair will be self-defeating,” sociologist Robert Bellah wrote in his 1975 *The Broken Covenant*. “Negative freedom only defends the individual against incursions, whereas positive freedom actually creates the conditions for the full participation of all.” Bellah passionately argued that the self-interest at the heart of American individualism had always been balanced by a Protestant republicanism, the “covenant” between God and man and among men themselves. In early New England political thought, “Calvinist ‘individualism’ only made sense within the collective context. Individual action outside the bounds of religious and moral norms was seen in Augustinian terms as the very archetype of sin.”

Michael Sandel then published *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* in 1982,
and Bellah’s coauthored *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* was released three years later. Both books deplored the consequences of excessive individualism on American society. As communitarian Amitai Etzioni later argued, developments from the 1960s to the 1980s contributed to a “grand loss of commitment to the common good.” In the 1960s, the left dismissed social obligations in favor of “finding themselves” and pursuing their innermost desires. Then in the 1980s, the right’s “instrumental individualism added insult to injury as Reagan, like Thatcher, made a virtue out of watching out for oneself.”

In 2012, twenty years after *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, Sandel published *What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets*, decrying the emergence of a “market society” in America. “A market economy is a tool—a valuable and effective tool—for organizing productive activity,” Sandel acknowledged. But “a market society is a way of life in which market values seep into every aspect of human endeavor. It’s a place where social relations are made over in the image of the market.” The commodification of the social realm, Sandel worries, has political implications: “Democracy does not require perfect equality, but it does require that citizens share in a common life. . . . For this is how we learn to negotiate and abide our differences, and how we come to care for the common good.”

In the fall of 2011 a video of Elizabeth Warren, a Democrat running for the U.S. Senate in Massachusetts, went viral on the Internet. Speaking at a campaign event, she argued passionately against the libertarian view of taxation: “There is nobody in this country who got rich on his own. NOBODY! You built a factory out there—good for you! But I want to be clear, you moved your goods to market on the roads the rest of us paid for. You hired workers—the rest of us paid to educate—you were safe in your factory because of police forces and fire forces that the rest of us paid for.” A former Harvard Law professor and advocate for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Warren became a symbol of a growing communitarian opposition to radical antitax libertarianism.

But it is President Barack Obama who has harnessed communitarian rhetoric the most forcefully. “What makes America exceptional are the bonds that hold together the most diverse nation on earth. The belief that our destiny is shared; that this country only works when we accept certain obligations to one another and to future generations,” he declared in his Chicago reelection victory speech in the early morning hours of November 7, 2012. “The freedom which so many Americans have fought for and died for comes with responsibilities as well as rights. And among those are love and charity and duty and patriotism. That’s what makes America great.”
Does this political dimension of American ideology shape the international attitudes of the American people? To find out, we created a four-item “communitarianism-libertarianism” scale:

- *American society has swung too far towards individual rights at the expense of social responsibilities.* (reverse coded)
- *Individual rights are more important than the good of the group.*
- *Individuals should be free to follow their own dreams in their own ways, without interference from government.*
- *Government must limit our individual freedoms so as to prevent unchecked selfishness, greed, and immorality.* (reverse coded)

Note that while the first pair of items set the individual against society, the second pair pit the individual against the government.82

There were no effects of age, education, income, region, or ethnicity on our communitarianism-libertarianism scale. But men were more libertarian than women \((\beta = .12)\), who were more communitarian; and blacks were less libertarian \((\beta = -.12)\) than nonblacks.

Political ideology, we will see, predicts a variety of international attitudes. Libertarianism is associated with greater opposition to humanitarian idealism in general (Chapter 4), and humanitarian aid for Haiti in particular (Chapter 6). In Chapter 9, on East Asia, we will see that libertarianism predicts coolness towards “red” countries like China and North Korea but warmth towards the “free” East Asian democracies of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. And we will see in Chapter 10 that libertarianism is a powerful predictor of feelings towards international organizations like the United Nations. Libertarians do not like the American government, let alone “world government.”

**AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL PROFILES**

How do these four dimensions of American ideology relate to one another?

The zero-order correlations among our four dimensions of ideology vary substantially. Economic ideology correlates strongly with both cultural \((r = .39)\) and social \((r = .39)\) ideology, and substantially with political ideology \((r = .29)\). But libertarian ideology correlates only weakly with social dominance \((r = .09, p = .006)\), and not at all with cultural traditionalism \((r = .01, p = .79)\).

We can explore the ideological profiles of the American people using cluster analysis, a statistical technique that classifies individuals into groups on the basis of their scores on a set of variables—in this case our four ideological dimensions. Cluster members exhibit high levels of similarity on these variables within their cluster, and high levels of dissimilarity to those in other clusters.83

We first ran our four dimensions of ideology in a series of two-step clus-
beyond red and blue 73
ter analyses on the full U.S. sample and found that a two-cluster solution fit the data best. The first cluster was larger (61% of the full sample) and more conservative than the second cluster (39%) across all four dimensions, with massive differences on economic and cultural ideologies, a large difference on social dominance, and a small but statistically significant difference on political ideology. Unsurprisingly, Americans are most divided on the culture wars and capitalism, and more Americans self-identify as conservative.

To explore the ideological profiles of Democrats and Republicans, we ran a series of cluster analyses on each subsample separately. Among self-identified Democrats, a two-cluster solution fit the data best. As can be seen on the left side of Figure 2.10, the two clusters were of approximately equal size, with the second cluster substantially more liberal than the first on all but political ideology, for which the difference between the two groups was quite small. The biggest difference between “liberal” and “moderate” Democrats was on social dominance, followed by cultural and economic ideologies. The “liberal Democrats” in our survey appear to be the civil rights activists of old and the defenders of social welfare, homosexual rights, and women’s rights of the present.

Among Republicans, a three-cluster solution fit the data best. As can be seen on the right side of Figure 2.10, each cluster was approximately the same size, representing about a third of Republicans, or 10 percent of all Americans, each (29% of our sample were self-identified Republicans). There were no differences between the three groups on social dominance orientation; all three
groups scored slightly under the scale midpoint of four. The biggest differences between the three groups of Republicans were on political and cultural ideologies, followed by economic ideology.

The first group of Republicans scored highest on both political and economic ideologies, and high on cultural ideology as well. Following journalist David Brody, I have labeled them “Teavangelicals.” Brody argues that Evangelicals are “breaking bread” with the libertarian Tea Party: “Evangelicals can actually walk and chew gum at the same time. They can be a hundred percent engaged on the issues of life and traditional marriage and at the same time be a hundred percent engaged in fiscal matters. . . . Conservative evangelicals see fiscal issues as moral issues.” Our data suggests that there are about 31 million Americans who fit this “Teavangelical” Republican profile.

Not all Evangelical Christians appear to want to walk and chew gum at the same time, however. Our third cluster, which is equally large, scores the highest among the three groups on traditionalism, but the lowest on libertarianism. Where the Teavangelicals score extremely high on libertarianism ($M = 6.13$), these “cultural Republicans” are actually slightly communitarian ($M = 3.82$), a truly massive difference statistically. Remarkably, Figure 2.10 suggests and statistical analysis demonstrates that cultural Republicans are even more communitarian than the average Democrat. This may explain why, despite the presence of a large group of Teavangelicals, there was no overall zero-order correlation between political and cultural ideology. The cultural Republicans are perhaps best described as “pure” Christian conservatives, scoring the highest of the three Republican groups on biblical literalism and religiosity.

These pure cultural Republicans may be those who, unlike the Teavangelicals, don’t care to carry a copy of the Declaration of Independence along with their Bibles, and are willing to impose their values on other people if they think it best for the community. The photo in Figure 2.11 was taken on the campus of the University of Oklahoma, Norman, on July 14, 2012. In February of that year, Republican governor Mary Fallin signed an executive order prohibiting smoking on all state properties effective July 1. State law had already banned smoking in indoor workplaces, but she argued in her State of the State address that something further needed to be done.

Some Oklahomans protested on libertarian grounds, arguing that as long as smokers were outdoors in designated areas, there was no secondhand smoke danger to other people. The editorial board of the campus newspaper, The Oklahoma Daily, argued that “The state is playing the mother here, making decisions for citizens based on what Fallin thinks is best for them . . . the purpose of this ban is to coerce tobacco users to quit their habit.” The Daily’s liberal editorial board was taking a relatively libertarian position. As a member of the
Christian right, Fallin took the more communitarian position. Not all conservatives are libertarians, and not all liberals are communitarians.

Harvard sociologist Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson have described the Tea Party as a mix of religious and secular conservatives, the former being usually more outspoken and dominant than the latter. “Some Tea Partiers are social conservatives focused on moral and cultural issues ranging from pro-life concerns to worries about the impact of recent immigrants on the cultural coherence of American life,” they concluded in 2012. “Others are much more secular minded libertarians, who stress individual choice on cultural matters and want the Tea Party as a whole to give absolute priority to fiscal issues.” The cultural conservatives, they add, are more often from the South, while the secular libertarians tend to hail from the West and Northeast.\(^9\)

Our 2011 survey included a one-hundred-degree feeling thermometer towards the “Tea Party.” Our moderate (34°) and especially liberal (10°) Democrats felt downright frigid towards the Tea Party. By contrast, among our three groups of Republicans, Teavangelicals (86°) felt the warmest, followed by cultural (79°) and moderate (63°) Republicans.\(^9\) This suggests that Teavangelicals, combining economic, political, and cultural conservatism, were the most likely Tea Party participants. Cultural Republicans likely felt slightly cooler towards the Tea Party because of their greater communitarianism.

While Paul Ryan and the libertarian right may have appeared ascendant in the Republican Party in 2012–13, not all Republicans appear comfortable with
radical individualism. No major group of pure libertarians emerged from our Republican cluster analysis. Many on both the left and right have dismissed President George W. Bush's “compassionate conservatism” as a failure. But our 2011 data suggests that a deep communitarian strain remains within the Republican Party. “We are a nation of rugged individualists,” Bush declared in his “The Duty of Hope” speech in 1999. “But we are also the country of the second chance, tied together by bonds of friendship and community and solidarity.”

Remarkably, Barack Obama would run on a similarly communitarian plank in both 2008 and 2012.

AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES AND THE WORLD

This chapter has argued that not all liberals and conservatives are alike. Our 2011 representative sample of Americans varied meaningfully across cultural (traditional vs. modern values), socio-racial (group dominance vs. equality), economic (income inequality vs. redistribution), and political (libertarianism vs. communitarianism) dimensions of ideology. While each American varies across each of these four dimensions in a unique way, we identified distinct clusters of moderate and liberal Democrats, and Teaevangelical, moderate, and cultural Republicans.

In the rest of this book we will explore how these four dimensions of ideology, and clusters of different kinds of Democrats and Republicans, differ in their international attitudes and foreign policy preferences. First, however, we turn to the moral underpinnings of these ideological divides.
The Moral Foundations of Ideology and International Attitudes

“Our society holds dear Judeo-Christian values that have stood the test of time: love your neighbor, give an honest day’s work for an honest day’s wages. Tell the truth and be honest. Don’t cheat or steal. Respect others, respect their property and respect their opinions. And always remember: you are responsible for the decisions you make. And that is the hope for my generation’s legacy: that we usher in the responsibility era. We can change today’s culture from ‘if it feels good, do it.’”

—Governor (Republican–Texas) George W. Bush, April 6, 1998

“The Democratic Party has always stood for giving everyone an equal chance, despite the circumstances of their birth. My story is emblematic of that. I want to affirm those values.”

—Senator (Democrat–Illinois) Barack Obama, July 27, 2004

Why do the disparate ideologies of the American people polarize their international attitudes?

Terry Deibel of the National War College has suggested that during the Clinton administration, “The parties split over foreign policy because their core values on governance, the beliefs that make people become Democrats or Republicans, have foreign policy implications.” This chapter provides both conceptual and empirical support for Deibel’s view: the same differences in moral values that divide liberals and conservatives on domestic policy also divide them on foreign policy. It first mines moral psychology to better understand the values that divide American liberals and conservatives. It then uses our survey data to demonstrate how value differences undergird liberal-conservative ideological divides. Finally, it shows how moral values mediate the relationship between ideology on the one hand, and both broad feelings towards foreign countries and generalized foreign policy preferences on the other.

THE MORAL VALUES OF LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES

Economists tend to view human beings as rational actors seeking to maximize their self-interest. Homo economicus is seen to weigh the costs and benefits
of different options, coolly choosing the solution that maximizes benefits and minimizes costs. Originally developed in microeconomics, “rational choice” theory has now been widely applied in the social sciences.4

Psychologists generally disagree, arguing that Homo sapiens, like other mammals, evolved moral values beyond self-interest, allowing him to meet the challenges of collective social life. He cannot therefore be reduced to Homo economicus. Early developmental and moral psychologists like Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg focused on the moral value of fairness.5 Carol Gilligan then argued for a separate “ethic of care,” focusing on compassion for the suffering of others.6

These two moral values are consistent with work in sociobiology. Moralities of fairness/justice have their evolutionary roots in what Robert Trivers has called “reciprocal altruism,” which requires that individuals closely monitor the fairness of the actions of others in their communities.7 Similarly, in The Selfish Gene Richard Dawkins popularized the idea that moralities of compassion have their evolutionary origins in a “kin altruism” that promotes attention to the welfare of one’s children and close family.8

Building on the work of anthropologist Richard Shweder, Jonathan Haidt and colleagues have recently argued that the study of moral psychology should not be limited to the two “individualizing” moralities of fairness and compassion.9 Three additional moralities, they argue, work to “bind” individuals into communities. The morality of loyalty evolved to foster preferences for those who sacrifice for the good of the group, but also wariness towards traitors who might betray it. The morality of authority evolved to allow mankind to more easily cooperate within social hierarchies, reducing the need, common among primates, to resort to force to maintain status distinctions.10 Finally, the morality of sanctity or purity has its origins in our physical nature as omnivores, who, like other primates, developed a keen sense of disgust to avoid disease. But purity has evolved to govern our social world as well, leading us to not just shun the “unclean” but also aspire to transcend the carnal world of the body in pursuit of sanctity and God.

Haidt and colleagues have further argued that liberals and conservatives rely upon different constellations of moral values. Based on a very large convenience dataset of survey responses gathered online at YourMorals.org, they found that while liberals tend to esteem the “individualizing” values of fairness and compassion more than conservatives, conservatives tend to prize the “binding” values of loyalty, authority, and purity more than liberals. Conservatives, they argue, value all five moral values roughly equally, whereas liberals only really value fairness and compassion. This survey finding, furthermore, was supported by a quantitative discourse analysis of sermons from liberal (Universalist-
Unitarian) and conservative (Southern Baptist) Christian churches. Sermons from the former tended to emphasize individualizing values, while sermons from the latter tended to emphasize binding values.\footnote{11}

Working independently in the field of cognitive linguistics, George Lakoff has similarly argued that “conservative and progressive modes of thought start from very different perspectives on what constitutes morality.” He views empathy (read: compassion) and authority as the core of each morality. “Behind every progressive policy lies a single moral value,” Lakoff argues. “Empathy, together with the responsibility and strength to act on that empathy.” By contrast, “Conservative thought . . . begins with the notion that morality is obedience to an authority . . . who is inherently good, knows right from wrong, functions to protect us from evil in the world, and has both the right and duty to use force to command obedience and fight evil.”\footnote{12}

Our 2011 survey included ten items borrowed from Haidt’s moral foundations questionnaire. One five-item rating scale asked participants, “When you decide whether something is right or wrong, how relevant are the following to your moral judgments?”

- Whether or not someone acted unfairly or was unjust.
- Whether or not someone was harmed or suffered.
- Whether or not someone was disloyal.
- Whether or not someone disrespected authority.
- Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency.

A second five-item rating scale asked, “Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about moral values?”

- When the government makes laws, it must ensure that everyone is treated fairly and with justice.
- Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue.
- People should always be loyal and dutiful.
- Children need to obey authority.
- Chastity is an important and valuable virtue.

For both rating scales, the sequence of items was randomized. Averaging each pair of items together allowed us to create individualized scores for each of the five moral foundations: fairness, compassion, loyalty, authority, and purity.

Although Haidt and his colleagues used a convenience sample in their research, our 2011 representative national sample almost exactly replicates their finding of ideological differences in moral value profiles.\footnote{13} The downward slopes of the top two lines in Figure 3.1 reveal that liberals score slightly higher than conservatives on the “individualizing” values of fairness and compassion.
The more dramatic upward slopes of the bottom three lines, however, reveal that conservatives score higher than liberals on the “binding” values of loyalty, authority, and especially purity.14

These survey findings suggest that liberals and conservatives are socialized into distinct moral communities that differ systematically in their judgments of which values matter in which situations. For instance, the popular response to the 2011 Penn State child sex abuse scandal was notable for how ideology polarized moral outrage. Liberals, compassionate towards the eight underage boys molested by assistant football coach Jerry Sandusky, called for a tough response. Conservatives, by contrast, were likely both disgusted by Sandusky’s behavior and outraged by the disloyalty of the school’s administration for firing head football coach Joe Paterno. Note the contrasting framing: conservatives

**Fig. 3.1.** The moral foundations of American ideology: Liberals care less than conservatives about purity, authority, and loyalty, but slightly more about injustice and suffering.

*Note: Overall ideological differences were substantial, Wilks’ Lambda: $F(20, 3443) = 22.40, p < .001, \eta^2 = .10$, including seven standard demographic controls. Data source: OU Institute for US-China Issues, 2011.*
highlight the Penn State in-group and advocate loyalty towards their coach, while liberals focus more on compassion towards defenseless minors—even if they are not Nittany Lions. Our moral values, Haidt and other psychologists have argued, are often involved in post-hoc moral reasoning that serves to justify preexisting intuitions after the fact.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{THE MORAL SUBSTRUCTURES OF THE DIMENSIONS OF AMERICAN IDEOLOGY}

Can we extend Haidt’s work, which treats ideology as unidimensional, to explore whether moral values can also help account for liberal-conservative differences on our four dimensions of American ideology? We ran four multiple mediation models to find out. As we shall see below, cultural, social, and economic ideologies all worked well.\textsuperscript{16}

Establishing causal mediation is extremely difficult. First, it is nearly impossible to anticipate and measure all possible mediators of a relationship, so one cannot be fully confident that the mediators tested are the true drivers of an indirect relationship. Second, with correlational data like ours, one can never be sure of the exact causal sequence. For instance, it is always possible that the proposed mediator is actually the independent variable, and vice-versa. It may be best, therefore, to think of our mediation models as demonstrating syndromes—in this chapter, patterns of ideologies and moral values that go together—rather than as strong claims about which comes first. “Just as it took more than a century to discover why limes cure scurvy” (answer: vitamin C), political scientists Donald Green, Shang Ha, and John Bullock have written thoughtfully about the challenges of establishing mediation, “it may take decades to figure out the mechanisms that account for the causal relationships observed in social science.”\textsuperscript{17} Following Haidt’s work, this chapter suggests that moral values are to many political judgments what vitamin C is to scurvy, but further research will be needed to demonstrate causation.\textsuperscript{18}

\textit{Cultural traditionalism.} As Figure 3.2 visually displays, two of the five moral foundations—purity and fairness—mediated the relationship between ideology and cultural traditionalism, together accounting for over 80 percent of the direct relationship.\textsuperscript{19}

As the very thick arrows at the top of the figure reveal, purity was by far the stronger mediator. Conservatives tend towards greater cultural traditionalism than liberals do, in largest part because they value purity and sanctity more. Support for purity, it seems, contributes to support for a culture that is unsoiled by “dirty” activities like smoking, drug use, and sex. This finding is consistent with a remarkable experiment conducted by social psycholo-
gists Erik Helzer and David Pizarro, who found that simply asking research participants to sanitize their hands temporarily increased their self-reported conservatism. More broadly, conservatives are more sensitive to disgust than liberals are, and are more likely to rely on this emotion in their moral judgments.

Two editorial cartoons from the turn of the last century illustrate the centrality of purity to the Christian civilizing mission. The image to the left of Figure 3.3, a detail from an 1899 Judge magazine cover, depicts President McKinley scrubbing a dark-skinned baby. Entitled “The Filipino’s First Bath,” it suggests an American duty to purify America’s new colony in the Philippines. Indeed, the scene brings to mind a baptism, with McKinley standing in a pool of water labeled “Civilization.” America’s paternalistic role is clear as McKinley reproaches the Filipino, “Oh, you dirty boy!”

A very similar message was conveyed in a Literary Digest cartoon just two years later (Figure 3.3, right). It depicts General Leonard Wood, a physician who was serving as military governor, scrubbing a black child representing Cuba. Wood’s job is not easy: he is surrounded by “disinfectant,” “lye,” “corrosive sublimate,” and “pure soap.” Cuba is crying, but Wood is doing his paternalistic duty.

Today’s culture wars focus on the sexual politics of homosexuality and abortion. Purity is at the center of the debate. Cultural traditionalists tend to depict sodomy as sin, and abstinence-only education as the best way to reduce heterosexual sex for purposes other than procreation. Robert Bellah traces this attitude all the way back to the Puritans, who were indeed puritanical: “The body and especially sex were dangerous because they had the power to pull
man away from his dependence on God and make him find his principle in himself. . . . Blinded by our lusts we fail to see the divine plan for our own salvation, and so, blinded, we go to our eternal doom.”

Today’s liberals, by contrast, are less concerned with chastity. They are more accepting of same-sex marriage and abortion, which they view as issues of fairness and justice, not purity.

Indeed, the bottom path of Figure 3.2 reveals that fairness also partially mediates the relationship between ideology and cultural traditionalism; liberals value fairness more, contributing to their greater opposition to cultural traditionalism. It may be that liberals are responding to the perceived injustice of the imposition of traditional values on oppressed groups like the colored peoples of America’s past empire, or the homosexuals of America today. As noted above, our survey included a culture war item on gay marriage. Using it instead of cultural traditionalism as our dependent variable, we ran another multiple mediation model with a very similar result. The largest indirect pathway in opposition to gay marriage was through purity, and the largest indirect pathway in favor of gay marriage was through fairness. Liberals appear to object to the injustice of a cultural traditionalism that imposes Christian values like purity onto minority groups like gays.

THE FILIPINO’S FIRST BATH
McKinley—“Oh, you dirty boy!”

“If General Wood Is Unpopular in Cuba, We Can Guess the Reason.”

**FIG. 3.3.** Cultural conservatives value purity, promoting paternalistic attitudes, 1899 and 1901.

*Sources: Judge, June 10, 1899, and Literary Digest, March 30, 1901. Both images courtesy of the University of Oklahoma Libraries.*
Social dominance. Why do American liberals and conservatives differ so much in their attitudes towards racial and gender hierarchies? The multiple mediation model displayed in Figure 3.4 reveals that conservatives are much more likely than liberals to value authority, contributing to a preference for the domination of subordinate social groups. Liberals, for their part, are more likely than conservatives to value fairness and compassion, leading them to oppose social dominance and support the equality of racial groups. Together, these moral values accounted for about 80 percent of ideology’s influence on social dominance.24

Although the Union won the Civil War and slavery was abolished, suffrage, segregation, and the status of blacks in the South has remained an issue to this day. General Ulysses S. Grant, a Union war hero, won the presidency in 1868 with the campaign slogan “Let us have peace.” Although he was an advocate for African American civil rights, his Republican Party split over the issue, with Horace Greeley’s Liberal Republicans championing greater equality. Greeley ran against Grant in 1872. The center-spread from an 1872 edition of Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper depicts Senator Charles Sumner as Moses leading African American slaves, as Israelites, across the Red Sea to freedom (Figure 3.5). The newspaper quotes Sumner: “Thus far, in constant efforts for the colored race, I have sincerely sought the good of all . . . fulfilling the promises of the Declaration of Independence, making all equal in rights.” Indeed, Sumner
advocated an amendment to the U.S. Constitution which would clearly state that “all people are equal before the law.”

The engraving also depicts a cigar-smoking President Grant as the Egyptian Pharaoh. His top hat has blown off as he rides a chariot engulfed in the Red Sea (at center and top-left close-up). His troops are sinking around him. Speaking in favor of Liberal Republican Horace Greeley, depicted at the far right in glasses, Sumner belittles Grant’s position on slavery: “President Grant, except as a soldier summoned by the terrible accident of war, never did anything against Slavery, nor has he at any time shown any sympathy for the colored race.” A century later, the values of justice and compassion similarly motivate liberal champions of African American civil rights.

The same tension between the values of authority on the one hand, and fairness and compassion on the other, was on display when Michele Bachmann and four fellow Republican congresspeople sent a letter to the State Department on June 13, 2012. It accused Huma Abedin, aide to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (and wife of disgraced congressman Anthony Weiner), of being “connected to Muslim Brotherhood operatives” and conspiring to
infiltrate the U.S. government. They warned of a Muslim threat to American law and order.

Liberals decried the injustice and harm of Bachmann’s “witch hunt” against Abedin. The *Daily Beast’s* Caitlin Dickson noted that Bachmann has a long history of attacks, not just against ethnic minorities but also against successful women, from Michelle Obama to Nancy Pelosi to Elena Kagan to Kirsten Gillibrand. Social dominance orientation, psychologists have found, predicts not just racial prejudice but also sexism. In May 2012 Bachmann joined House Republicans in blocking the Paycheck Fairness Act, which promotes equal pay for women; Senate Republicans then blocked it in June. The same moralities of authority, fairness, and compassion that divide many social liberals and conservatives over racism also divide them over sexism.

In November 2011, a video of Texas judge William Adams whipping his teenage daughter with a belt went viral on the Internet. The video, which pitted moralities of parental authority against moralities of compassion, was likely more shocking for liberals than conservatives. Our 2011 survey included two related items, “*Misbehaving children should be spanked*” and “*It’s better to reward children’s positive behaviors than to spank them for bad behavior.*” The latter was reverse-coded, and the two items were averaged together to create a “support for spanking” scale of good reliability (α = .70). Ideology, it turned out, accounted for a full 14 percent of spanking attitudes; conservatives were more in favor of spanking than liberals were. We then ran a serial mediation model to see if biblical literalism and the value of authority would help account for this ideological effect. They did. All three indirect paths were statistically significant, together accounting for nearly two-thirds of the relationship: conservatives endorse spanking more than liberals do, in part because of their greater biblical literalism, in part because they value authority more, and in part because greater biblical literalism is associated with valuing authority more. This suggests that Judge Adams’s behavior would be more acceptable in the Bible Belt than in coastal America. Indeed, in our survey, being male (β = .11), black (β = .11), or from the South (β = .10) predicted support for spanking, while only greater education (β = –.17) predicted opposition to spanking.

**Economic inequality.** Three of the five moral foundations—purity, fairness, and compassion—mediated the relationship between ideology and economic inequality, together accounting for over half of the direct relationship (Figure 3.6).

Liberals often express compassion for the dispossessed. “Living in a community means being interconnected in myriad ways—including by empathy,” Nicholas Kristof wrote in a fall 2012 *New York Times* column about health
To feel undiminished by the deaths of those around us isn’t heroic Ayn Rand individualism. It’s sociopathic. Compassion isn’t a sign of weakness, but of civilization.

Many Democratic politicians claim to share this liberal moral vision. “Above all, being a Democrat means having compassion for others. It means putting government to work to help the people who need it,” writes George McGovern. “We are the party that believes we can’t let the strong kick aside the weak.” In *The Audacity of Hope*, Barack Obama similarly ends up privileging empathy in his chapter on American values. “It is at the heart of my moral code, and it is how I understand the Golden Rule,” Obama writes. “Not simply as a call to sympathy or charity, but as something more demanding, a call to stand in somebody else’s shoes and see through their eyes.” Indeed, Obama blames many of today’s problems on a national “empathy deficit”: “It’s hard to imagine the CEO of a company giving himself a multimillion-dollar bonus while cutting health care coverage for his workers if he thought they were in some sense his equals.”

Many economic conservatives also claim to be empathetic towards the poor. “Everywhere in the world there are gross inequalities in income and wealth. They offend most of us,” Milton and Rose Friedman write in *Free to Choose*. “Few can fail to be moved by the contrast between the luxury enjoyed by some and the grinding poverty suffered by others.” More recently, Republican president George W. Bush has promoted a “compassionate conservatism” of “tough love”: “I think that it is far kinder to help people become independent than it...
is to trap them in a failed system. We must end dependency on government. Any system that undermines the basic values of hard work, self-respect and personal responsibility is wrong.  

Our data lends greater support to the idea of “bleeding-heart liberals” than the idea of “compassionate conservatism.” The social ills and human suffering associated with income inequality, such as poverty, violence, and diminished health care access, appear to bother liberals more than conservatives. This interpretation is consistent with research on ideological differences in self-reported happiness. Social psychologists Jaime Napier and John Jost have mined ANES and World Values Survey data to argue that “liberals may be less happy than conservatives because they are less ideologically prepared to rationalize (or explain away) the degree of inequality in society.” Conservatives are more likely to view the status quo as fair and legitimate, buffering them from the full psychological toll that inequality poses for liberals. Michele Bachmann sleeps well at night; Bill Moyers does not.

Michelle Goldberg has even argued that for Christian nationalists like Newt Gingrich and George W. Bush, “compassionate conservatism” does not actually refer to compassion for the poor. Instead, it is really about a desire to return to the Gilded Age before the New Deal, when the poor had no social welfare safety net and thus no choice but to rely upon churches for charity. There, only those who repented, prayed, and accepted Christ would be given aid. Goldberg views “compassionate conservatism” as part of the Christian nationalist goal of “reconstructionism” or “dominionism”: a complete restructuring of America into a Christian nation. It is a nation in which, Goldberg claims, non-Christians would have no place and receive little sympathy.

The “bleeding hearts” that contribute to liberal compassion for the dispossessed at home also shape liberals’ views of foreign countries. Herblock captures a liberal view of the developing world in a 1962 cartoon for the Washington Post (Figure 3.7). While a woman in a tattered dress works in a hut labeled “Extreme Poverty,” outside a man labeled “Revolution” loads a gun. An onlooker points up a hill at a mansion labeled “Extreme Wealth” and is heard saying to his distressed companion, “—and his father lives up there.” The cartoon reveals not only a liberal compassion for the poor but also a strong sense of injustice. Strong enough, it would seem, to condone violence. Liberals, after all, do not value authority as much as conservatives do; revolutions can be justified.

The values of compassion and justice, indeed, can be a combustible mix. It is when suffering is widely perceived as unjust that revolutions erupt. Barrington Moore writes in his thoughtful Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt that “Anger occurs when the rules of distributive justice are violated . . . when persons doing roughly the same kind of work see that their co-workers
are receiving higher rewards.” Thomas Sowell perceptively notes that there is a connection between harm and injustice in liberal thinking about income inequality: “It [is] not merely that some have little and others have much. Cause and effect are involved: Some have little because others have much . . . the rich have taken from the poor.” As Herblock suggests in his cartoon, the poor have the right to revolt and take it back.

Finally, Figure 3.6 also reveals that some conservatives support the status quo of income inequality more than liberals do because, in part, they value purity more. One interpretation of this finding might be that conservatives are more fearful than liberals that the redistribution of income and the mixing of socioeconomic classes might lead to the “contamination” of their own bodies, values, and norms. Social psychologists have found that conservatives score higher than liberals on “contamination disgust,” which may have evolved
90 CONCEPTS

as part of a “behavioral immune system” to shield individuals from exposure to out-groups like the poor, who might be carriers of novel pathogens. Some conservatives may find the very idea of redistributing wealth to out-groups such as the poor (whether at home or abroad) disgusting.

MORAL VALUES AND INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDES

Can these differing moral values help account for ideological differences in overall feelings towards foreign countries, and overall foreign policy preferences?

Feelings. In a multiple mediation model in which the five moral foundations mediated the relationship between ideology and our measure of average warmth towards fifteen foreign countries, only the indirect paths through loyalty and compassion were statistically significant (Figure 3.8). Together, however, they accounted for half of the direct relationship. Overall, conservatives feel cooler towards foreign countries than liberals do, in part due to the greater value they place on loyalty and the lesser value they place upon compassion. In other words, liberals feel more favorably towards foreign countries than conservatives do, in part because they feel greater compassion towards the plight of foreigners and because they feel less loyalty to America as opposed to human-kind as a whole.

This finding is consistent with the work of psychologist Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, who has argued that liberals and conservatives embrace provide and protect orientations, respectively. “Conservatives focus on protecting the group and emphasize social order,” she writes, “whereas liberals focus on providing for the group and emphasize social justice.” Conservatives are thus motivated to avoid, preventing negative outcomes, while liberals are motivated to approach, advancing positive outcomes. Figure 3.8 suggests that liberals are motivated to approach other nations and provide for them out of compassion, while conservatives are motivated to avoid other nations to protect the U.S. in-group out of a more narrowly focused loyalty.

All humans are loyal to their social groups. Two of the most basic findings in the social psychology of intergroup relations are that human beings (1) identify with social groups and (2) privilege them. First, social identity theory maintains that we associate ourselves with groups that, in effect, become part of our identities. They become represented in the individual’s self-concept—the group’s concerns become the individual’s concerns. Second, we see the groups we associate ourselves with as basically good. Indeed, the mere mention of in-group signifiers like “we,” “us,” and “our” is sufficient to generate positive affect. “In-group positivity” leads us to favor our fellow in-group members
over out-group members, even when the individual has nothing to gain. For instance, social psychologists have found that we consistently favor in-groups over out-groups when making attributions, especially in ambiguous situations. Thus, if an in-group member does something good, we attribute it to his or her good disposition, reflecting well on our own character; however, if he or she does something bad, we write it off to the social situation beyond the person’s control, thereby preserving our collective self-esteem.46

But what social groups are we loyal to? Do we vary in our loyalty to them? In the modern world, we are all defined to varying degrees by our national identities. In the Introduction we saw that while Americans on average feel warmer towards the United States itself (83°; see Figure 0.3) than towards any foreign country, conservatives on average feel 12° warmer towards the United States than liberals do (see Figure 0.4). This suggests that conservatives are more patriotic than conservatives. In the next chapter we will see that this is in fact the case. Greater patriotism and loyalty to the national group appear to be one reason why conservatives generally feel cooler towards foreign countries than liberals do.

Liberals, Figure 3.8 reveals, also feel more warmly towards foreign countries than conservatives do because they value compassion for the suffering of others more. “The Democratic Party’s basic mission, its reason for being, is to help the disadvantaged in society, to relieve human suffering and uplift the downtrodden,” Terry Deibel writes. “When it comes to foreign policy . . . Democrats cannot let go of morality. . . . Democratic idealists are explicit about wanting to . . . relieve foreign suffering.”47
Greater compassion helps account for the greater liberal than conservative aversion to war. Although Franklin D. Roosevelt never served in uniform, as assistant secretary of the navy in the Wilson administration he visited the front lines in France. In 1936, he recalled the experience:

I have seen war. I have seen war on land and sea. I have seen blood running from the wounded. I have seen men coughing out their gassed lungs. I have seen the dead in the mud. I have seen cities destroyed. I have seen 200 limping, exhausted men come out of line—the survivors of a regiment of 1,000 that went forward 48 hours before. I have seen children starving. I have seen the agony of mothers and wives. I hate war.48

These memories of World War I may have restrained Roosevelt from a quick entry into World War II.

Democratic president Barack Obama’s foreign policy is also marked by the value he places upon compassion. “When you read the accounts of women being raped when they are out collecting firewood, when you read just horrendous accounts of entire villages being decimated and children being murdered,” he said in a 2006 podcast on Darfur, “that just breaks your heart.”49

Many conservatives today have little patience for such liberal compassion in foreign affairs. In the Introduction we saw Newt Gingrich draw a sharp line between America and other countries, reflecting a patriotism that privileges loyalty to country over compassion towards foreigners: “Andrew Jackson had a pretty clear-cut idea about America’s enemies: Kill them.” Similarly, in her Treason: Liberal Treachery from the Cold War to the War on Terrorism, Ann Coulter claims that “Whenever the nation is under attack, from within or without, liberals side with the enemy.”50 Sympathy for foreigners is disloyal.

There is a kernel of truth in Coulter’s shrill and overblown critique: liberals do tend to be more sympathetic towards the downtrodden, even when they are America’s enemies. Bill Mauldin, who was a GI in Europe during World War II, wrote, “Italy reminds a guy of a dog hit by an automobile because it ran out and tried to bite the tires. You can’t just leave the critter there to die.”51 Even though the Italians were America’s enemies and fought on the losing side of the war, Mauldin still had compassion for their plight in occupied Italy. Mauldin won a Pulitzer Prize for his wartime cartoons in Stars and Stripes depicting two grunts, Willie and Joe. His work is notable for a gallows humor that belittles the glory of war. The cartoon on the left of Figure 3.9 pokes fun at the cynicism that grunts developed on the front lines: “I need a couple guys what don’t owe me no money for a little routine patrol.” The cartoon on the right makes light of military honors: “Just gimme a couple aspirin. I already got a Purple Heart.”

Mauldin was well aware that some conservatives viewed his work as treasonous. “My stuff has been loaded with politics from the beginning,” he later
recalled. “One of the few men in the Army with the perspicacity to see what I was really up to was General George Patton. When he tried to put a stop to me . . . accus[ing] me of being in the pay of the Germans . . . somebody hol- lered ‘Free Press’ and I was allowed to go on inciting mutiny under the guise of simple soldier jokes.”

The Washington Post’s Herblock would view the war in Vietnam with a similarly liberal moral compass a quarter century later. The 1968 cartoon on the left of Figure 3.10 depicts civilians in South Vietnam fleeing the devastation wrought by U.S. aerial bombardment: “I don’t know if either side is winning, but I know who’s losing.” From the perspective of conservatives like Ann Coulter, this is liberal disloyalty: siding with the Vietnamese against the American military. Herblock’s 1973 cartoon on the right of Figure 3.10 also highlights compassion for the suffering of the Vietnamese people. It depicts a child crying amidst the devastation of a bombing. Several dead people, likely his family, surround him. Entitled “Peace with Horror,” it mocks the idea that there can be an honorable end to a brutal war. For Herblock, like Mauldin, there is little honor in war. From the perspective of a liberal moral value system, war is suffering, even when its victims are not fellow Americans.
Conservatives also care about morality in war and foreign affairs more broadly. In *The Expanding Circle*, moral philosopher Peter Singer argued that human empathy, which evolved so we would favor our kin, has gradually expanded from the family to the village to the nation, and even to all humanity as well as other animals. It may be that liberals expand their circle of empathy more than conservatives do. When asked whether they agree or disagree with “Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue,” conservatives scored lower than liberals, not because they are less compassionate towards fellow in-group members, like their families or fellow Americans, but because “those who are suffering” may have been too diffuse a group for them to identify with. Conservatives may direct their compassion and loyalty towards smaller in-groups. Similarly, when asked their views of “People should always be loyal and dutiful,” liberals may have scored lower than conservatives because they have a wider circle of living beings that they feel loyalty towards.

Social psychologist Sam McFarland’s work on “Identification with all humanity” (IWAH) lends support for this view: his IWAH scale correlates negatively with both social dominance and right-wing authoritarianism, both of which correlate with greater conservatism; and positively with empathy. In
three additional student and adult samples, McFarland found that IWAH correlates with a unidimensional measure of liberal-conservative ideology as well.\textsuperscript{55} So another way to interpret our mediation model (Figure 3.8) is that liberals feel warmer towards the average foreign country than conservatives do because their greater identification with all humanity (and lesser loyalty towards the narrower in-group “America”) expands their circle of empathy beyond the U.S.A. more easily than happens for conservatives.

\textit{Foreign policy preferences.} In another multiple mediation model in which the five moral foundations mediated between ideology and our measure of average foreign policy preferences towards fifteen countries, the two indirect paths via authority and harm were statistically significant.\textsuperscript{56} But the correlation between harm and foreign policy ($\beta = -.07$, $p = .07$) was only marginally significant. So conservatives prefer tougher policies towards the average foreign country than liberals do for the most part because they value authority more than liberals do.

We learned earlier in this chapter that the moral value of authority is associated with desires for social dominance (see Figure 3.4). We therefore decided to explore a serial mediation model in which authority and social dominance acted as sequential mediators of the relationship between liberal-conservative ideology on the one hand, and average foreign policy preference on the other. All three indirect paths in the resulting model (Figure 3.11) were statistically significant, accounting for over two-thirds of the direct relationship.\textsuperscript{57} On average, conservatives prefer tougher foreign policies more than liberals do, in part because they value authority more, in part because they desire to dominate other groups more, and in part because valuing authority more is associated with desires for social dominance.

Note: A sequential mediation model. ** $p < .01$, all other $p$’s $< .001$. All three indirect paths were statistically significant. See SUP.org. Demographic covariates are not shown. Data source: OU Institute for US-China Issues, 2011.
with greater desires to dominate other social groups.

Udo Keppler illustrates the influence of the moral value of authority on American foreign policy in a *Puck* magazine cartoon from August 8, 1900 (Figure 3.12). It depicts a female figure referred to as “Civilization,” but very much resembling Columbia, the female equivalent of Uncle Sam. She holds a spear and wears the helmet of an ancient warrior. Pointing at a dragon labeled “Boxer” hovering in the distance, she scolds a young emperor of China, “That dragon must be killed before our troubles can be adjusted. If you don’t do it I shall have to.” Clouds of smoke labeled “Anarchy,” “Murder,” and “Riot” hang over a city wall in the distance. Keppler is referring to the threat that the Boxer rebels, with imperial approval, were posing to the Americans, Europeans, and
Japanese besieged in Beijing’s International Legation Quarter.

Keppler was prophetic: a military force of the Eight Nation Alliance quickly relieved the siege. The empress dowager and her court fled Beijing on August 15. Columbia will impose authority and her dominance if foreign governments will not.

LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE MORALITIES
AT HOME AND ABROAD

This chapter has argued that a major reason why American liberals and conservatives differ in their domestic and foreign policy preferences is that their moral values differ. Liberals tend to esteem the “individualizing” moral values of compassion and fairness more than conservatives do. Conservatives, by contrast, prize the “binding” moral values of authority, loyalty, and purity more than liberals do. Compassion and justice motivate liberals to approach the world (at home and abroad) to provide for it, while greater contamination disgust and desires for order motivate conservatives to avoid the world and protect a narrower in-group.

To make matters worse, liberals and conservatives have a hard time understanding each other’s moral outlooks. This “moral empathy gap,” psychologists Peter Ditto and Spassena Koleva argue, exacerbates partisan discord. Each side engages in hostile attribution, framing issues exclusively in its own moral terms and demonizing the other’s motives.58

Disparate moral values undergird liberal-conservative differences in the various ideological domains. America’s culture wars are driven to a substantial degree by liberal-conservative differences over the moral value of purity/sanctity. Differences in the social realm, such as on race and gender relations, are driven in part by the greater value that conservatives place on authority, and in part by the greater value that liberals place on fairness and compassion. Economically, our survey data supports the idea of “bleeding-heart liberals” more than that of “compassionate conservatives.” Liberals value fairness and compassion more than conservatives do, contributing to greater desires for income redistribution at home and, as we shall see in the next chapter, greater support for humanitarian idealism in American foreign policy.

Moral values help account for liberal-conservative differences in overall feelings towards foreign countries and in foreign policy preferences. For instance, greater conservative coolness towards foreign countries in general is tied to the greater value they place on a narrow in-group loyalty. Conservatives, we shall see in the next chapter, are more patriotic and more nationalistic than liberals are. Greater liberal warmth towards foreign countries was partly accounted for by the greater value they place on compassion for the suffering of
others, including that of foreigners and even enemies. Liberals are motivated to approach other nations and provide for them out of compassion, while conservatives are motivated out of loyalty to avoid other nations to protect the American in-group. Finally, because they value authority more, conservatives are more willing than liberals to endorse “tough love” policies to restore order and impose dominance—both at home and abroad.