‘Red China,’ ‘Free Asia,’ and the ‘Yellow Peril’:
How Ideology Divides American Liberals and Conservatives over East Asia

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“The plight of the people of Tibet is a challenge to the conscience of the world. The United States must be prepared to confront the Chinese government when they violate the human rights of their people.”

– Democratic Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, March 12, 2008

“It is time to hold the Chinese government accountable for failing to match its peaceful rhetoric with its robust military spending and belligerent behavior, manipulating currency, violating the human rights of its own people, sending our citizens toxic drywall, and standing in the way of peaceful solutions on a range of issues from growing tension in Iran to violence in Syria.”

– Republican Congressman Randy Forbes, February 13, 2012

Both the Democratic and Republican Parties are internally divided on China. On the left, some Democrats argue for a pro-China policy of engagement to better integrate China into the global economic, political, and security orders. Other Democrats, concerned about Chinese human rights abuses, advocate for tougher China policies. For instance, California Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, cited above, has been a frequent critic of Chinese human rights abuses. Yet other Democrats on Capitol Hill, many representing heavily blue collar districts, join Big Labor in condemning unfair Chinese trade practices and advocating tougher U.S. trade policies towards China.

On the right, Republicans in Washington are equally divided on China policy. Business conservatives have historically promoted a friendlier China policy conducive to increased trade, investment, and profits. For instance, the U.S.-China Business Council and AmCham China, which lobby on behalf of U.S. companies doing business with China, have worked closely with many Republicans on the Hill to support pro-China and block anti-China legislation. Military hawks and Christian conservatives, however, usually argue for tougher China policies. Congressman Randy Forbes of Virginia, cited in the epigraph above, serves on the House Armed Services Committee and co-Chairs its China Caucus, frequently promoting tougher positions on China. New Jersey Congressman Christopher Smith, who has held dozens of hearings on Capitol Hill to deplore China’s lack of religious freedoms, has also advocated a tougher U.S. China policy, but for very different reasons. “China’s continued repression of religion is among the most despotic in the world,” Smith (2006), a Christian conservative who founded the House Pro-Life Caucus, argues. “Today, numerous underground Roman Catholic priests and bishops and Protestant pastors languish in the infamous concentration camps of China for simply proclaiming the Gospel of Jesus Christ.”
If Democratic and Republican Party elites are internally divided on China, are Main Street Americans also conflicted, so that there are no overall liberal-conservative differences over China? The predominant argument among political scientists and pollsters today is that partisanship and ideology do not shape American public opinion towards China. In their 2010 Living with the Dragon: How the American Public Views the Rise of China, Benjamin Page and Tao Xie (2010: 37, 57, 66, 103) specifically and repeatedly claim, based on their reading of existing survey data, that ideology has “little impact” on the China attitudes of the American public. This claim is consistent with Page’s his earlier argument that ideology does not shape the international attitudes of the American people in general (Page with Bouton 2006: 95-96). More recently, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2012: 4, 44) has similarly declared that the media’s focus on popular polarization is “exaggerated”: “Republicans and Democrats rarely disagree on key foreign policy issues.”

This paper argues that these political scientists and pollsters have misinterpreted the public opinion data: whether on Capitol Hill or on Main Street, American liberals and conservatives today are remarkably divided in their views of China and East Asia.

Measurement Matters

We hired the Palo Alto, California survey research company YouGov to implement a national U.S. Internet survey in spring 2011. They used a “sample matching” methodology to generate a representative national sample, first matching respondents on gender, age, race, education, party identification, ideology, and political interest, and then weighing the final dataset to match the full U.S. general population on age, gender, race, education, and religion.¹

There are two major reasons why a new survey was needed. First, to our knowledge, existing national surveys have largely explored either ideology or international attitudes/China attitudes. The General Social Survey (GSS) and American National Election Surveys (ANES) have measured American ideology for decades, but rarely ask questions about international affairs. By contrast, the Chicago Council, Pew, and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) have been asking questions about international affairs for years, but rarely ask many questions about ideology. Similarly, the Committee of 100 has been surveying American attitudes towards China for years, but does not ask many questions about ideology. By combining these two types of questions within a single survey, our dataset provides new leverage to explore how ideology shapes American attitudes towards China and East Asia.

Second, improving the internal and external validity of our survey is necessary to allow the full extent of the relationships among our variables to fully emerge. When psychologists limit themselves to university student samples, range restriction can reduce the size of the observed associations among variables. Political science surveys, for their part, often suffer from high measurement error, leading to type II errors, or false negatives. Single item measures with few response categories fail to capture the nuances of complex attitudes. Measures of low internal reliability and insufficient variability have often produced low or inconsistent associations between ideology and Asia attitudes in existing political science surveys.
By combining the best of political science (sampling) and psychological (measurement) survey methods, we hope to overcome these problems, providing a more accurate picture of the relationship between ideology and American views of China and East Asia.

**Liberals, Conservatives, and East Asia**

In our 2011 YouGov survey, the average American felt cool (35°) towards China, but the average conservative (22°) felt a full 18° cooler towards China than the average liberal (40°) did, a large difference statistically.\(^2\) By contrast, Americans felt substantially warmer towards the East Asian democracies of Taiwan (49°), South Korea (50°), and Japan (60°), with conservatives feeling just 6°, 6°, and 8° cooler than liberals did towards each.\(^3\) These results are largely consistent with those from the Chicago Council’s 2010 global views survey, Pew’s 2010 global attitudes survey, and a 2011 CNN poll.\(^4\)

What’s more, the ideological cleavage over feelings towards China shapes policy preferences. In addition to the “China” item in a 1-7 “much friendlier” to “much tougher” rating scale of foreign policy preferences towards 15 countries, we included two additional 1-7 “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” items in our 2011 survey:

- *The best way to deal with China is to build up our military to counter Chinese power.*
- *The U.S. government should pursue a tougher China policy.*

The resulting three item scale revealed that, on average, American conservatives desired a great deal tougher China policy than liberals did.\(^5\)

This article seeks to understand the sources of these substantial and consistent ideological differences. It begins with a brief review of the history of America’s encounter with the Orient and Orientals, both at home and abroad. It then disaggregates “China” into the “Chinese people” and the “Chinese government,” exploring two distinct pathways to China policy preferences. Conservatives desire a tougher Chinese policy than liberals do in small part because, on average, they maintain more prejudicial attitudes towards Asians in general and the Chinese people in particular. Conservatives also, however, desire a tougher China policy than liberals do in larger part because, on average, they maintain much more negative attitudes towards communist countries in general and the Chinese government in particular. We then turn to a closer examination of how four dimensions of American ideology—cultural, socio-racial, economic, and political—each contribute to ideological polarization over Communism and China. For instance, cultural conservatives and libertarians may disagree over what they most dislike about China, but they can agree that they dislike China more than liberals do.

The article then turns to a brief comparative exploration of how ideology shapes American feelings towards the East Asian democracies of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. As was the case with China, greater prejudice against “Orientals” contributes to greater conservative than liberal coolness towards these East Asian democracies. But their greater libertarianism leads conservatives to feel warmer than liberals do towards these fellow democracies in “Free Asia.” Social and political ideologies, in other words, counteract each other, reducing overall liberal-conservative differences in feelings towards them.

We conclude by returning from Main Street back to Capitol Hill, speculating on the policy implications of ideologically divided public opinion over China. Following the Global Financial
Crisis, China has become more assertive on both economic and security affairs, and U.S. Big Business is no longer as united in support of China. Greater conservative coolness towards China on Main Street may, therefore, begin to be more clearly expressed in the domestic politics of U.S. China policy.

‘Chinks’ and ‘Japs’: ‘Orientals’ at Home and Abroad

“Christian Civilization will bring to China a truer conception of the nature of man, a better understanding of his relations and his duties, of his dignity and his destiny.”
– Presbyterian missionary to China D.Z. Sheffield, 1900 (McClellan 1971: 223)

“Once a Jap, always a Jap! You can’t any more regenerate a Jap then you can reverse the laws of nature.”
– Democratic Congressman John Rankin of Mississippi, 1942 (Dower 1986: 81)

18th century Americans first encountered Asia indirectly via European writings about China. To extol the virtues of Liberty, Enlightenment thinkers like Montesquieu constructed the foil of “Oriental despotism.” China was both an ancient civilization with cultural achievements worthy of admiration—and a land of tyranny to be despised.

In the 19th century, direct American missionary contacts with both China and the Chinese people increased. “In the early nineteenth century the image of a China distant, refined, and exotic began to give ground to that of a China repulsive, reactionary, and heathen as… missionaries broadcast their impressions back home,” writes historian Michael Hunt (2009: 69). For instance, to demonstrate the defects of the “Chinese racial character” and justify his Christian civilizing mission, Connecticut missionary Arthur Smith (1894) wrote home about Orientals as “two-faced” and duplicitous.

By the late 19th century, immigration led to unprecedented direct American contacts with Chinese workers on American soil. Part of a Republican strategy to gain access to the China market and hold down domestic wages following the slaughter of the Civil War, the 1868 Burlingame Treaty allowed unrestricted Chinese immigration. This gave rise to a nativist backlash that Democrats sought to capitalize on. They could play to the prejudices of their party base—white racism in both the South and among Catholics in northern cities—and appeal to new swing voters in the West, where party loyalties remained weak. In 1879 the Democratic-controlled House and Senate passed the “Fifteen Passenger Bill,” barring vessels from transporting more than 15 Chinese at a time. Republicans then sought to neutralize the political issue with equally anti-Chinese rhetoric (Trubowitz and Seo 2012: 194-7).

Some progressives objected to the growing anti-Chinese sentiment. Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, antislavery advocate both during and after the Civil War, championed the rights not just of blacks but of Chinese immigrants as well. In 1868 and 1869 Sumner introduced bills to remove the word “white” from naturalization laws. Neither bill came to a vote. “Senators undertake to disturb us... by reminding us of the possibility of large numbers swarming from
China,” Sumner lamented in 1870. “But… the Chinese… are peaceful and industrious; how can
t heir citizenship be the occasion of solicitude?” (Daniels 2004: 13-14)

[figure 1 here]

James Wales captured the late 19th century politics of anti-Chinese prejudice for an 1880
Puck (see figure 1). His cartoon depicts the two presidential candidates, James Garfield and
Winfield Hancock, nailing a Chinese man between two large “Anti-Chinese” boards labeled
“Republican Plank” and “Democratic Plank.” The caption reads, “Where Both Platforms Agree—
No Vote—No Use to Either Party.” Both parties sought to capitalize upon popular anti-Chinese
prejudices, giving little advantage to either.

Garfield won the election, but was assassinated just 200 days after taking office. His
running mate Chester Arthur became president in 1881, and signed the Chinese Exclusion Act the
following year. But neither anti-Chinese sentiment nor its political use diminished. In 1888,
Democratic President Grover Cleveland declared Chinese immigrants “dangerous to our peace and
welfare.” His Republican challenger Benjamin Harrison, not to be outdone, claimed that the
assimilation of such an “alien” race was “neither possible nor desirable” (Hunt 2009: 70).

By the Turn of the 20th Century, historian Christopher Jesperson (1996: 9, 1-2) argues,
American attitudes towards China were driven by “two powerful but contradictory impulses.” On
the one hand, “God and Mammon” conspired to draw American missionaries and merchants to
China, to save the Chinese from hell and to capture profits from the “China market.” “Hardly a
town in our land was without its society to collect funds and clothing for Chinese missions,”
Secretary of State Dean Acheson later wrote about the early 1900s, “to educate the minds and heal
the bodies as well as save the souls of the heathen Chinese.” On the other hand, Jesperson writes, a
“virulent racism” and “fear of a Yellow Peril” persisted. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was
only repealed in 1943.

The Japanese were the second group of “Orientals” to find a place in the American
imagination. In 1854, Commodore Matthew Perry of Newport, Rhode Island forced Japan open at
cannon point. Japan’s successful Westernization during the Meiji Restoration then evoked much
paternalistic American pride. But increased Japanese immigration in the early 20th century led to
an anti-Japanese backlash on the same West coast soils where anti-Chinese nativism had
flourished just decades earlier. “As had happened with other foreign peoples, the closer the contact
and the larger the numbers,” historian Michael Hunt (2009: 70) maintains, “the more elaborate and
negative the American appraisal.”

While both Chinese and Japanese continued to be the objects of American prejudice, the
20th century witnessed an ongoing exchange of Chinese–Japanese, good guy–bad guy roles in the
American imagination. During the Boxer Rebellion at the Turn of the Century, the Chinese acted
the barbarians, while the Japanese joined the good guy Westerners in the Eight-Nation Alliance to
relieve the siege of Beijing. But with the rise of Japanese fascism and Japan’s invasion of China in
the 1930s and 1940s, the “Japs” were dehumanized while Generalissimo and Madame Chiang
Kai-shek and Nationalist China were lionized as Christian redeemers. “It seems that by
juxtaposing these two oriental peoples Americans had found a means of keeping their hopes and
anxieties in equilibrium,” Hunt (2009: 77) surmises. “While oriental villains served as the
lightening rod of American racial fears, more worthy Orientals could be summoned up to keep alive liberal dreams of a prosperous, stable, and democratic East Asia.”

The wartime American press and propaganda machine dehumanized the “Japs” as monkeys, rats, insects, and snakes. “A viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched,” claimed the Los Angeles Times in 1942. “So a Japanese-American, born of Japanese parents, grows up to be a Japanese not an American” (Dower 1986: 80, 91). Such blood-is-destiny racism was used to justify the internment of over 100,000 Japanese-Americans during the war, as the epigraph above from Mississippi Congressman John Rankin suggests. The Manzanar “War Relocation Center,” at the foot of the Sierra Mountains in Central California, was one of ten camps where Japanese-Americans were incarcerated during the war (see figure 2).

In his moving War without Mercy, historian John Dower (1986: 80, 91) argues that the War in the Pacific was more brutal than the War in Europe because both Americans and Japanese dehumanized and even demonized each other. Surrender thus became unthinkable, and the extermination of the vermin enemy a moral obligation. “Louseous Japanicas… inhabits coral atolls in the South Pacific, particularly pill boxes, palm trees, caves, swamps, and jungles,” read the March 1945 Leatherneck, magazine of the U.S. Marines. “Flamethrowers, mortars, grenades and bayonets have proven to be an effective remedy. But before a complete cure may be effected, the origin of the plague, the breeding grounds around the Tokyo area, must be completely annihilated.” These were not empty words. On a single night of firebombing, March 9-10, 100,000 “Louseous Japanicas” were exterminated in Tokyo.

The 1949 establishment of the People’s Republic of China added communism to the mix of factors shaping American views of Asia. The Cold War, Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower declared in 1953, was a “war of light against darkness, freedom against slavery, Godliness against Atheism” (Williams 2010: 26). “Red China” on the mainland was juxtaposed against “Free China” on Taiwan, even though first Chiang Kai-shek and then his son Chiang Ching-kuo maintained authoritarian rule in the Republic of China.

Racial images of the Yellow horde persisted in the form of a “Red Menace.” “The dragon had awakened, and, rather than turning out to be a friendly one predisposed towards the United States, it instead seemed to confirm the anxieties of those who had looked across the Pacific in fear,” Jesperson (1996: 172) writes. The danger was quickly hammered home with the Korean War. “It required an experience as jolting as that in Korea to introduce… new images of the Chinese as warriors, for the contrary images of the Chinese as unaggressive, non-mechanical, and un-martial, are among [our] oldest and most deeply imbedded,” wrote journalist and China hand Harold Isaacs (1957: 10, 11). “The Yellow tide’ in Korea swept up all sorts of ancestral memories… that had lain long in the recesses of time and the mind. The Mongol hordes had reappeared.”

In his thoughtful China and the American Dream, sociologist Richard Madsen (1995: xi) argues that the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 4, 1989 had a profound impact on American views of China, and that changed American attitudes had less to do with events in China than with American national identity itself. For Americans, the moral drama of Tiananmen involved an exercise in navel gazing, of “dreaming their social selves in face of the realities of the other.”
Specifically, Americans had reveled in China’s reform and opening of the 1980s, projecting their Liberal myths onto China and Deng Xiaoping, who was even declared *Time* magazine’s “Man of the Year” in 1985. China’s embrace of the market was seen as affirming American capitalism and democracy. Tiananmen shattered that illusion, as the American image of Deng shifted abruptly from a capitalist “just like us” to that of a “communist tyrant,” the very antithesis of American Liberty.

‘Red China’ and the ‘Yellow Peril’

“The Communists are moving fast towards their goal of world revolution. Perhaps God brought you to the kingdom for such an hour as this—to stop them. In doing so, you could be the man that helped save Christian civilization” (Williams 2010: 79).

– Reverend Billy Graham to President Lyndon Johnson, 1965

Does the “Yellow Peril” continue to shape American views of Asia? Or have the Civil Rights Movement and racial integration since the 1960s eliminated race as an influence on American views of Asia? And after 35 years of “reform and opening,” China today is communist in name only. Do liberal and conservative feelings about “Red China” nonetheless continue to shape their China policy preferences?

To best answer these questions, we decided to measure how the American people feel about the Chinese people and government separately. In addition to our 0°-100° cold to warm feeling thermometer item on “China,” therefore, we included “the Chinese people” and “the Chinese government.” And to reduce measurement error and increase the internal reliability of these two measures, we also added a pair of more cognitive items that we reverse coded on our standard seven point “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” scale:

- *The Chinese GOVERNMENT is trustworthy.* (reverse coded)
- *The Chinese GOVERNMENT is devious.*
- *The Chinese PEOPLE are trustworthy.* (reverse coded)
- *The Chinese PEOPLE are devious.*

After reverse coding the feeling thermometer and “trustworthy” items, we standardized and averaged them together to form three item “prejudice against the Chinese people” and “negative attitudes towards the Chinese government” scales, both of good internal reliability.

On average, Americans felt a whopping 34° cooler towards the Chinese government (21°) than towards the Chinese people (55°), an extremely large difference statistically. Just as conservatives felt 18° cooler than liberals towards “China,” they felt 11° cooler towards “the Chinese people” and 15° cooler towards “the Chinese government,” medium and large differences statistically. Our survey also included thermometer items measuring feelings towards “Asians” and “Communist countries.” On average, conservatives scored 5° and 19° cooler than liberals on these two items, small and large differences statistically.

[figure 3 here]

Would cooler conservative than liberal feelings towards the Chinese people and their government, and Asians and Communist countries more broadly help account for their preference...
for a tougher China policy? Figure 3 reveals that they did: the inclusion of these four mediators accounts for a full three-quarters of the direct relationship between ideology and China policy preferences.\textsuperscript{11}

Figure 3 also reveals that there are two largely distinct pathways to China policy preferences. Liberals and conservatives can differ over China policy because of differences in their average warmth towards Asians in general and the Chinese people in particular (the top path in the model). As the consistently thicker lines along the bottom path in the model reveal, however, on average liberals and conservatives differ on China policy in larger part because of their greater differences in warmth towards Communist countries in general and the Chinese government in particular.\textsuperscript{12}

Prejudice against “Orientals,” we have seen, has been a persistent theme in American history, and, as James Wales reminded us in 1880 (see figure 1), has often been a source of bipartisan agreement. But our 2011 data is consistent with work in social psychology demonstrating that on average conservatives are slightly more prejudiced against Asians ($\beta = -0.09$, see the top left of figure 3) than liberals are (e.g. Sidaneus and Pratto 1999). For instance, missionaries from liberal and mainline Protestant denominations have frequently opposed discrimination against Asians. “The status of inferiority thus far imposed upon these people by the West must come to an end,” the ecumenical Foreign Missions Conference of North America declared in November 1949, one month after the establishment of the People’s Republic. “Asiatics, no less than ourselves, are children of the Heavenly Father and, as such, are entitled to be dealt with on the basis of racial equality” (Preston 2012: 488).

But it is greater conservative (13°) than liberal (32°) coolness towards communist countries ($\beta = -0.34$, see the bottom left of figure 3), that plays the larger role in accounting for overall liberal–conservative differences over China policy. The ideological sources of American feelings about communism therefore merit closer examination.

Not all liberals and conservatives are alike. While the unidimensional liberal–conservative self-placement scale used for decades is extremely useful, political scientists have increasingly recognized its limits. Stanley Feldman and Chris Johnson (2009: 25) argue that “Parsimony is a desirable goal in science,” they argue. “However, this must be balanced against the need for an accurate description of social phenomena. A unidimensional model of ideology… does not do justice to the ways in which people actually organize their political beliefs.” Shawn Treier and Sunshine Hillygus (2009: 680) similarly argue that “the belief systems of the mass public are multidimensional.”

We decided to explore whether American ideology could be usefully understood across not just two dimensions but four: cultural, socio-racial, economic, and political. This analytic approach is consistent with commonsense understandings of the main issues that divide liberals and conservatives in America today. For instance, in a review of scholarship on conservatism, Kim Phillips-Fein (2011: 727) argues that most historians believe that “its central concerns included anti-communism, a laissez-faire approach to economics, opposition to the civil rights movement, and commitment to traditional sexual norms.” In our terms, these refer precisely to the political, economic, socio-racial, and cultural dimensions of American ideology respectively.
Cultural ideology was measured using three items ($\alpha = .77$) from the “conventionalism” (Altemeyer 1996) or “traditionalism” (Duckitt et al. 2010) facet of Bob Altemeyer’s right wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale:

1. *There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.* (reverse coded)
2. *This country will flourish if young people stop experimenting with drugs, alcohol, and sex, and focus on family values.*
3. *There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.* (reverse coded)

Socio-racial ideology was measured using three items ($\alpha = .61$) from the *group dominance* facet of Jim Sidanius and Felicia Platto’s (1999) social dominance orientation (SDO) scale:

1. *Inferior groups should stay in their place.*
2. *It’s probably a BAD thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.* (reverse coded)
3. *Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.*

Economic ideology was measured with three items ($\alpha = .81$) we created exploring attitudes towards income inequality:

1. *Differences between high and low incomes should remain as they are.*
2. *The government should decrease income differences.* (reverse coded)
3. *Class differences should be smaller than they are today.* (reverse coded)

Finally, political ideology was measured with four items ($\alpha = .68$) we created assessing communitarian–libertarian beliefs:

1. *American society has swung too far towards individual rights at the expense of social responsibilities.* (reverse coded)
2. *Individual rights are more important than the good of the group.*
3. *Individuals should be free to follow their own dreams in their own ways, without interference from government.*
4. *Government must limit our individual freedoms so as to prevent unchecked selfishness, greed, and immorality.* (reverse coded)

In a simultaneous multiple regression controlling for seven standard demographic variables—age, gender, education, income, race, ethnicity, and region—cultural ($\beta = .41$), socio-racial ($\beta = .12$), economic ($\beta = .37$), and political ($\beta = .12$) ideologies each contributed *unique variance* to the standard unidimensional measure of liberal-conservative ideology, together accounting for about half of its variation ($R^2 = .49$).

A multiple mediation analysis revealed that three of these four dimensions of American ideology contributed to the 19° gap between liberal and conservative feelings towards communist countries. As shown in figure 4, only social dominance orientation did not mediate the relationship, which makes sense, as communism is not a racial issue. Together, the mediators accounted for over 90% of the direct relationship between liberal-conservative ideology and warmth towards Communist countries.\(^{14}\)

Cultural traditionalism, the top path in figure 4, was the most powerful mediator of the relationship between ideology and feelings towards communist countries. Christian conservatives have long viewed communism as an atheistic threat to God and Christian values. “Communism is
not only an economic interpretation of life,” Reverend Billy Graham declared in 1949. “Communism is a religion that is inspired, directed and motivated by the Devil himself who has declared war against Almighty God.” In his famous 1983 “Evil Empire” speech given to the National Association of Evangelicals, President Ronald Reagan similarly equated the fight against communism with the fight against “evil.” “Fighting communism was a religious duty, and the American government was engaged in the work of the Lord when it opposed the Soviet Union,” historian Daniel Williams (2010: 21, 23) writes in God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right. “The ‘American way of life’ was therefore the Christian way of life, and a threat to one was a threat to the other.”

As Billy Graham notes, communism is primarily an “economic interpretation of life.” Marx was an economic historian, and Marxism is largely an economic theory. It is not surprising, therefore, that differences between American liberals and conservatives over income redistribution would also help account for their overall differences over communism. “Fundamentally there are only two ways of coordinating the economic activity of millions,” Milton Friedman (2002 [1962]: 13) wrote in Capitalism and Freedom. “One is central direction involving the use of coercion—the technique of the army and of the modern totalitarian state. The other is voluntary co-operation of individuals—the technique of the marketplace.” The same disagreements that liberals and conservatives have about taxes, social welfare spending, and income redistribution at home, our survey data suggests, also influence their feelings towards “communist countries” abroad.

The division between libertarians and communitarians at home also shapes feelings towards communist countries abroad, as the bottom path in figure 4 reveals. In his The Broken Covenant, sociologist Robert Bellah (1992 [1975]: 124) argued that although many Americans dislike communism for economic and religious reasons, it is communism’s perceived threat to cherished American liberties the stings the most. “Though ‘revolutionary’ and ‘atheistic’ would continue to be negative terms used to characterize socialism, it was the attribute of collectivism or statism, in contrast to allegedly American individualism, that would be the central negative image.” Remarkably, our 2011 survey data exactly confirms Bellah’s argument that there are three (economic, religio-cultural, and libertarian) distinct ideological ways that Americans think about communism. Historian Andrew Preston (2012: 101) has more recently but similarly argued that a libertarian ethic rooted in Protestantism “made Americans suspicious about other nations that relied too heavily upon concentrations of power, be they religious (the Catholic Church) or political and economic (the Communist Party).” Libertarians don’t like democratic governments, let alone communist party-states.

**Liberal Panda-huggers and Conservative Dragon-slayers**

“A Bible-believing Christian Conservative, by definition, is anti-Communist, and therefore anti-Red China.”

– Billy James Hargis, Christian evangelist, 1972 (Preston 2012: 553)

Broad feelings about “Asians” and “communist countries” thus help account for more specific feelings towards the Chinese people and their government respectively, contributing to ideological
differences in China policy preferences (see figure 3). When confronted with difficult specific questions like “How much do you agree or disagree with the statement, ‘The U.S. government should pursue a tougher China policy?’,” we frequently resort to “affect heuristics,” substituting easier and broader questions about our gut feelings like, “How do I feel about Asians?” or “How do I feel about communists?” Such heuristic devices, social psychologist Daniel Kahneman (2011: 97) has argued, help us “generate intuitive opinions on complex matters.” This helps explain how Americans, in the absence of much knowledge about China, can nonetheless form consistent—if consistently different—opinions about it.

So why do American liberals and conservatives differ so systematically in their intuitive opinions about China? The path model in figure 5 reveals that all four of the dimensions of American ideology that we measured shaped China policy preferences, and in the same direction. In other words, conservatives of different stripes may disagree over why they desire a tougher China policy than liberals do, but they agree on a tougher policy. Conversely, different kinds of liberals may differ over why they want a friendlier China policy than conservatives do, but they can agree on a friendlier policy. The intensity of the American ideological divide over China policy is due in part to this synergy of ideologies.

Figure 5 also reveals that negative attitudes towards the Chinese people (prejudice) and government act as distinct pathways for American ideologies to shape China policy preferences. First, the top path in figure 5 reveals that the same socio-racial politics that divide Americans today on domestic issues like affirmative action also shapes their feelings towards the Chinese people ($\beta = .26$), and policy preferences towards China ($\beta = .12$). But social dominance orientation—the belief that “Inferior groups should stay in their place”—has no impact on attitudes towards the Chinese government.

Thomas Nast captures the competing socio-racial ideologies shaping American feelings towards Chinese immigrants in a pair of editorial cartoons for Harper’s Weekly (see figure 6). The 1870 cartoon to the left depicts a group of Caucasians atop a Great Wall labeled “The ‘Chinese Wall’ around the United States of America.” They throw down a ladder labeled “emigration” as Chinese workers sporting long Manchu queues look up helplessly from below. The Caucasians above celebrate having kept the inferior Chinese in their subordinate place. Nast objects. A flag on the wall refers to the 1870 “Know-Nothings,” “Pres. Patrick, Vice Pres. Hans,” a clear reference to the Irish and German immigrants who had been persecuted by WASP nativists just a decade earlier. Nast makes his moral stance explicit with his caption, “Throwing Down the Ladder by Which They Rose.” He wants his reader to feel compassion for the Chinese victims of the hypocrisy of earlier Irish and German immigrants.

Nast made a similar point a dozen years later (see figure 6, right). A castle flying an American flag and labeled “The Temple of Liberty” is surrounded by a deep moat. A guard scrutinizes a Chinese immigrant’s passport, blocking his entry. Nast’s caption again makes his objection explicit: “E Pluribus Unum (Except the Chinese).” White racism is not just harming vulnerable Chinese, it is doing violence to American democratic values as well.
A similar clash of socio-racial ideologies was on display in a 2011 controversy over Rush Limbaugh’s derogatory parody of Chinese President Hu Jintao speaking Chinese. On his January 19, 2011 radio show, Limbaugh spoke of watching an Obama-Hu press conference: “Hu Jintao, he was speaking, and they weren’t translating… Hu Jintao was just going… ‘chin chang chin chan chong chang chi bababba chi chike zhing zha zhe zhike rroooor ji kedi ba baba’.” Limbaugh’s racist jibberish immediately produced a liberal outcry. “Calling the Chinese names and imitating the Chinese language was a childish and offensive tactic,” said Democratic Congresswoman Judy Chu of California, the first Chinese-American woman elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. “It is one thing to disagree with a nation and criticize its policies, but it is another thing to demonize an entire people. Over the last 150 years, Chinese in America have faced severe racial discrimination. It wasn’t that long ago that the Chinese in America were… called racial slurs, were spat upon in the streets, derided in the halls of Congress and even brutally murdered” (Khan 2011). Our survey data suggest that Limbaugh and Chu were not elites divorced from Main Street: differing beliefs about proper racial and social hierarchies continue to divide American liberals and conservatives today in their feelings towards the Chinese people.

Second, figure 5 reveals that cultural liberals and conservatives also differ in their views of both the Chinese people and U.S. China policy. For cultural conservatives, Chinese immigrants may be viewed as a threat to traditional WASP values, contributing to anti-Chinese prejudice ($\beta = .15$) and subsequent desires for tougher China policies ($\beta = .21$). The stronger direct path ($\beta = .25$) from cultural conservativism to preferences for tougher China policies may reflect a fear-driven response to a rising China seen as different and dangerous. Social psychologists have demonstrated that when confronted by perceived threats to shared cultural beliefs, values, or norms, cultural conservatives are more likely than cultural liberals to respond with aggression (e.g. Duckitt and Sibley 2007; Jost 2006).

Many cultural conservatives advocate tougher China policies. As noted in the introduction, Republican Congressman Christopher Smith deplores the persecution of Christians in China. Smith serves as Co-chair of the House Pro-Life Caucus and as a member of its Taiwan Caucus, which generally promotes tougher China policies. Smith is not unusual in linking these seemingly disparate issues. Our 2011 survey included the abortion question “Are you more pro-life or pro-choice?” Answers to this intensely personal question were a substantial predictor ($\beta = .22$) of China policy preferences, even after controlling for the standard demographic variables.

Third, economic ideology, by contrast, has no influence on feelings towards the Chinese people. Its effect on China policy preferences is instead mediated through feelings towards the Chinese government ($\beta = .21$, see figure 5). Not surprisingly, liberal-conservative disagreements over whether “The government should decrease income differences” also shape their attitudes towards the “communist” Chinese government. While business conservatives often support pro-China policies out of a material self-interest in profiting from trade and access to the China market, economic conservatism as an ideology is marked by an antipathy towards governments—especially socialist governments—that tax, spend, or redistribute income, all seen as violations of free market principles.

Wall Street Journal editorials on China often serve as proxy battles in domestic economic wars. In their June 1, 2011 editorial “Red Ghost over China,” the WSJ frets that free market
capitalism may be on the defensive in China. “Leftist thinkers are genuinely trying to turn the Party back toward Marxist ideology.” Worse yet, “Wu Bangguo, the Party’s No. 2 man, recently gave a speech in which he attacked private property.” Domestic American debates over economic stimulus were similarly exported to China the next year. “While it must be tempting to goose GDP once more, Mr. Wen and his colleagues should think twice about another round of stimulus,” the WSJ editorial board argued in their May 23, 2012 “China Is Stimulused Out.” “Now is not the time to try to reinflate the economy with more wasteful spending and investment.” Liberal economists, by contrast, were more inclined to praise Chinese efforts at economic stimulus during the global financial crisis in 2008-9 (e.g. Krugman 2010).

Fourth, like economic ideology, communitarian–libertarian political ideology is not associated with prejudice against the Chinese people; it shapes feelings towards the Chinese government ($\beta = .16$, bottom left of figure 5). Greater libertarian agreement that “Individuals should be free to follow their own dreams in their own ways, without interference from government” is associated with suspicion and hostility towards the American government, which is democratic. It is not surprising, therefore, that libertarians would also tend to feel cooler than communitarians towards the Chinese government, which is authoritarian.

William Allen Rogers captured libertarian fears of Oriental despotism in a 1900 Harper’s Weekly (see figure 7). The Boxer Rebels had been killing Christian missionaries and their Chinese converts in North China since 1898, and foreigners sought refuge in the legation quarters in Beijing in June 1900. The Empress Dowager Cixi of the Qing Dynasty then decided to throw her support behind the Boxers by declaring war on the foreign powers in China. An Eight Nation Alliance of American, European and mostly Japanese troops soon broke the siege of Beijing. Rogers’ July 28 drawing depicts President William McKinley and Uncle Sam doing battle against crazed Boxers. Severed Western heads are held high on pitchforks, and one Chinese rebel is about to sink a dagger into a prostrate and helpless white woman. A white baby lies (dead?) under an American flag next to her. McKinley resolutely holds an American flag that is inscribed with the words, “Life, Liberty, and Pursuit of Happiness under Treaty Rights.” The image is entitled “Is This Imperialism?” Rogers quotes President McKinley to answer his own question with a resounding “no”: “No Blow Has Been Struck Except For Liberty and Humanity, And None Will Be.” Americans are not imperialist aggressors in China; they are defenders of Liberty against a tyrannical Chinese government that has unleashed its fanatical people.

Our survey reveals that libertarian fears of the Chinese government persist today, contributing to conservative desires for tougher China policies. “Remember, there are reasons why Communist China remains under an arms embargo,” Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (2009) of California said at a Congressional hearing on export controls. “The Tiananmen Square massacre, where the tyrannical and brutal Chinese government murdered thousands of peaceful reformers, changed the course of history.” Note both the reference to “Communist China” and the clear distinction drawn between the “tyrannical and brutal Chinese government” and the Chinese people, described as “peaceful reformers.” Libertarians, figure 5 reveals, do not harbor prejudices against the Chinese people. Their fears, instead, are directed against governments, especially strong authoritarian governments like “Communist China’s.”
‘Free Asia’ and the ‘Yellow Peril’

“When Japanese pilots were flying suicide missions into American battleships, it seemed impossible that six decades later Japan would be a democracy, a lynchpin of security in Asia, and one of America’s closest friends.”

– President George W. Bush, Jerusalem, Israel, May 15, 2008

“America and Taiwan are united in our shared belief in fair elections, personal liberty, and free enterprise.”

– 2012 Republican Party Platform (GOP 2012: 48)

What influence does ideology have on American feelings towards the East Asian democracies of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea? Statistical analysis revealed that of the four dimensions of American ideology that we measured in our survey, only social dominance orientation and communitarian-libertarian politics mediated the relationship between ideology and warmth towards these three East Asian democracies (see figure 8). But the two indirect effects cancelled each other out.

Greater average conservative than liberal social dominance ($\beta = .36$) contributed to their greater coolness ($\beta = -.10$) towards these three Asian lands. Chinese are thus not the only Asian objects of prejudice in America today. “It’s because of you little motherfuckers that we’re out of work!” Ronald Ebens yelled at Vincent Chin outside a nightclub in Detroit in 1982. Ebens, an autoworker, thought that Chin, a Chinese-American, was Japanese, and hence the source of Detroit’s economic woes. Ebens and his stepson, Michael Nitz, tracked Chin down later that night and bludgeoned him to death with a baseball bat. Remarkably, Ebens and Nitz were not sentenced to prison time, provoking Asian-American outrage and greater Asian-American involvement in the civil rights movement (Wu 2010). 30 years later, Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez (2012) of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division marked Chin’s death by writing, “In a diverse, democratic nation like ours, we all must be able to live and work in our communities without fear of being attacked because of how we look, what we believe, where we are from, or who we love.” Differences among Americans today about proper race relations at home, our survey reveals, shape their feelings not just towards China, but towards other Asian countries as well.

Greater average conservative libertarianism ($\beta = .26$), however, contributed to their greater warmth towards these Asian democracies ($\beta = .11$), suppressing the overall effect. For libertarians, the success of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea represents the triumph of freedom in East Asia. When promoting the democratization of the Middle East, President George W. Bush (2001, 2003) frequently extolled Japan and Germany as “great democracies” capable of “sustaining democratic values.” “Today the great powers are also increasingly united by common values, instead of divided by conflicting ideologies. The United States, Japan and our Pacific friends, and now all of
Europe, share a deep commitment to human freedom,” Bush (2002) declared in a commencement address at West Point. “And the tide of liberty is rising.”

Taiwan—“Free China”—has also long been held up by American libertarians as a beacon of liberty in the Chinese world. “Taiwan is one of the strongest democratic partners of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region and serves as a model of freedom and democracy,” Republican Senator Jim Inhofe (2008) of Oklahoma wrote. Although the State of Oklahoma has few commercial or other ties with Taiwan, Inhofe has served on the Senate Taiwan Caucus since its founding in 2003, and is currently its co-chair. Supporting Taiwan appears to be a way for some American politicians to express their antipathy towards Communist China. “I want to express my strong support for Taiwan,” Republican Congressman Michael McCaul of Texas declared in 2009. “We like our independence in Texas and I think that’s what we have in common. America stands for freedom and democracy and the fight against oppression and dictatorships. And so we stand with you” (Lowther 2009).

Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea thus appear to receive a libertarian boost for being democratic and/or capitalist that counteracts the negative influence of lingering racism. Turning to South Asia, India receives a similar democratic/capitalist boost: greater libertarian warmth ($\beta = .07$) towards India partially counteracts the negative influence of racism/social dominance ($\beta = -.14$) on American feelings towards India. The suppression effect of greater conservative libertarianism helps explain why the ideological gap between liberals and conservatives on these Asian democracies is much smaller than that between them on communist countries like China. Our survey data thus supports Michael Hunt’s contention, cited above, that American hopes for a “democratic East Asia” and “racial fears” about “oriental villains” exist in equilibrium.

**Main Street, Wall Street, and U.S. China Policy**

“America’s relations with other countries—particularly a Communist country like China—must rest on a solid foundation of public opinion. When the Chinese government resorts to the wanton violation of human rights, it will inevitably pay a price with the American public and its elected representatives.”


This article has argued that while conservatives feel somewhat cooler towards the East Asian democracies than liberals do, they feel much cooler towards China than liberals do. It further argued that the sources of these ideological differences in attitudes towards Asian countries can be found in many of the same issues that divide liberals and conservatives over domestic politics.

One source of greater overall conservative coolness towards Asian countries is their greater average prejudice. “I think one man is just as good as another so long as he’s honest and decent and not a nigger or a Chinaman,” future President Harry Truman wrote in 1911. “Negroes ought to be in Africa, yellow men in Asia and white men in Europe and America” (Leuchtenburg 1991). While such overt prejudice has clearly declined over the last century, our survey reveals that it does persist, and that greater average conservative than liberal prejudice against Asians has a small but significant influence on American attitudes towards Asian countries.
But communism was an even larger source of ideological differences over Asian countries. For cultural, social, economic, and political reasons, conservatives felt cooler than liberals towards both communist countries in general, and the Chinese government in particular. By contrast, greater libertarianism counteracted greater conservative prejudice towards the Asian democracies of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.

If ideology powerfully divides Main Street Americans over China, why is that division not more clearly reflected on Capitol Hill? Public opinion is not the sole driver of U.S. China policy. Campaign contributors and special interest groups can exert an independent influence on members of both the legislative and executive branches. It may be that the pro-China advocacy of business groups like the U.S.-China Business Council and AmCham China has been able to neutralize the anti-China leanings of Congressional Republicans and their conservative constituents. Similarly, the anti-China advocacy of Big Labor has likely counteracted the greater liberal warmth towards China within the Democratic Party as a whole.

Will this delicate balance endure? While politicians from both political parties have long sought to use China against their political opponents in their campaigns, Republican politicians today appear to have begun utilizing anti-China tactics more frequently. Republican campaign ads frequently invoke the “Red Menace” and “Yellow Horde” views of China, appealing to conservative fears of both communism and Asians.

Meanwhile, pro-China business groups, so united in the 1990s as apologists for China during the fight against President Clinton over China’s MFN status, may now be dividing over China. During the Global Financial Crisis in 2008-9, the Chinese government made the case to its people that the Chinese economic model was superior to the West’s, contributing to greater Chinese assertiveness and tougher policies towards the Western business world. “In my more than two decades in China, I have seldom seen the foreign business community more angry and disillusioned than it is today,” China business expert James McGregor (2010) wrote for Time magazine. “Anti-foreign attitudes and policies in China have been growing and hardening since the global economic crisis.”

This recent development raises an important question. If business Republicans become internally divided over China policy, and stop counterbalancing the anti-China leanings of Main Street conservatives and their elected representatives, what is to keep the Republican Party from moving towards a substantially tougher China policy? We may be poised for a significant change in the politics of China policy on Capitol Hill.
Figure 1. Bipartisan anti-Chinese prejudices.

WHERE BOTH PLATFORMS AGREE.—NO VOTE—NO USE TO EITHER PARTY.

**Figure 2.** Japanese-Americans interned at the Manzanar “War Relocation Center,” 1943 California.

*Source:* Ansel Adams photo courtesy the Library of Congress.
Figure 3. Conservatives desire a tougher China policy than liberals do in small part because of their greater prejudice against Asians in general and the Chinese people in particular, and in larger part because of their greater coolness towards Communist countries in general, and the Chinese government in particular.

Note. Arrow thickness in this and all subsequent figures reflects the weight of the standardized coefficient; all indirect paths shown were statistically significant. See indirect effect statistics online. All three China measures are three item scales. Seven demographic covariates, none of which were statistically significant, not shown. Data source: Author survey, 2011.
Figure 4. Conservatives feel cooler towards Communist countries than liberals do because of their greater cultural traditionalism, opposition to income redistribution, and libertarian politics.

Note. All three indirect paths were statistically significant. Statistics online. Seven standard demographic covariates not shown. Older people felt cooler ($\beta = -0.09$) and those with greater education ($\beta = 0.11$) felt warmer towards communist countries. Data source: Author survey, 2011.
Figure 5. Negative attitudes towards the Chinese people and government act as distinct pathways for the influence of American ideologies on China policy preferences.

Note. All three China measures are three item scales. Covariances and prediction error terms are not displayed. Model fit was excellent and all indirect paths were statistically significant. Statistics online. Data source: Author survey, 2011.
Figure 6. Chinese immigration and social dominance orientation: Conservatives value socio-racial hierarchies, while liberals advocate racial equality.

THROWING DOWN THE LADDER BY WHICH THEY ROSE

E PLURIBUS UNUM (EXCEPT THE CHINESE)

Figure 7. Libertarian fears of Oriental despotism, 1900.

IS THIS IMPERIALISM?
“No Blow Has Been Struck Except For Liberty And Humanity,
And None Will Be.”—WILLIAM MCKINLEY

Figure 8. Conflicted American feelings towards Asian democracies: Socio-racial and political ideologies counteract each other.

Note. Both indirect effects were statistically significant, but the total indirect effect was not. Statistics online. Demographic covariates not shown. Data source: Author survey, 2011.
Online Appendix: Indirect Effect Statistics for Mediation Analyses

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<tr>
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<th>Point estimate</th>
<th>95% Confidence Intervals*</th>
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<td><strong>Figure 3. Ideology to China policy (mixed)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Indirect Effects</td>
<td>.2119</td>
<td>.1655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via Asians only</td>
<td>-.0031 ns</td>
<td>-.0140</td>
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<td>.0194</td>
<td>.0074</td>
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<tr>
<td>Via prejudice against Chinese only</td>
<td>.0712</td>
<td>.0470</td>
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<td>Via Asians and Chinese government</td>
<td>.0015 ns</td>
<td>-.0002</td>
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<td>Via communism and prejudice against Chinese</td>
<td>.0065</td>
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| **Figure 4. Ideology to Communist countries (simultaneous)** |                |       |             |
| Total Indirect Effects         | -4.6317        | -6.1626 | -3.0556 |
| Via cultural traditionalism   | -2.3837        | -3.3066 | -1.3569 |
| Via economic inequality       | -1.5769        | -2.9611 | -0.3236 |
| Via libertarian politics      | -.6711         | -1.1692 | -0.2637 |

| **Figure 5. Four ideologies to China policy (path)** |                |       |             |
| From social dominance via prejudice | .0519          | .0330 | .0751       |
| From cultural traditionalism via prejudice | .0316          | .0146 | .0522       |
| From economic inequality via negative: government | .0792          | .0557 | .1057       |
| From libertarian politics via negative: government | .0586          | .0299 | .0857       |

| **Figure 8. Ideology to Asian democracies (simultaneous)** |                |       |             |
| Total Indirect Effects         | -.0214 ns      | -.6601 | .6768       |
| Via social dominance           | -.7171         | -1.1816 | -0.2521 |
| Via libertarian politics       | .6957          | .3119 | 1.1694      |

Note. * Bias corrected with 1,000 bootstrapped samples. ns = non-significant.
References

Perez, Thomas. 2012. “Remembering Vincent Chin,” June 22 blog post @ whitehouse.gov.
Notes

1 For more on “sample matching” methodology, see Rivers 2005.
2 \( F(1, 419)= 64.97, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .13 \), controlling for seven standard demographic variables, age, gender, education, income, and being black, Hispanic, or from the U.S. South.
3 Feelings towards Taiwan: \( F(1, 420)= 6.94, p = .009, \eta^2_p = .02 \); South Korea: \( F(1, 420)= 6.00, p = .015, \eta^2_p = .01 \); Japan: \( F(1, 420)= 10.75, p = .001, \eta^2_p = .03 \), controlling for the seven standard demographics.
4 In the Chicago Council’s 2010 feeling thermometer, the average American felt coolest towards North Korea (26°), followed by China (45°), South Korea (52°), and Japan (61°), the same sequence as our 2011 survey (they did not measure feelings towards Taiwan). Conservatives (39°) in their survey felt 10° cooler towards China than liberals (49°) did, a medium sized difference statistically, \( F(1, 1002)= 41.41, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .04 \), controlling for age, gender, education, income, and being from the South. Democrats had a more favorable view of China than Republicans in Pew’s 2010 global attitudes telephone survey, \( F(1, 1869)= 36.31, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .02 \). Conservatives scored higher than liberals did on a China as ally-to-enemy question, \( F(1, 270)= 8.53, p = .004, \eta^2_p = .03 \). The smaller effect sizes in the CNN and Pew polls is likely due to the greater measurement error in telephone polls, as well as the more restricted response options, which limited the variation they captured.
5 \( F(1, 419)= 89.47, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .18 \), controlling for the seven standard demographics. Three item China policy scale, Cronbach’s \( \alpha = .68 \). Cronbach’s \(\alpha\) range from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating greater internal consistency.
6 The Chicago Council’s feeling thermometer solicits feelings towards a list of “countries and peoples,” conflating two distinct attitude objects.
7 Cronbach’s \(\alpha\) = .78 and .79 respectively. Together with the three item China policy scale introduced above, these two three item scales were used in all the mediation, path, and structural equation models in this paper.
8 \( t(999)= 34.29, p < .001 \). Cohen’s \(d= 1.05 \).
9 \( F(1, 419)= 24.02, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .05 \) and \( F(1, 419)= 59.44, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .12 \), controlling for the seven standard demographics.
10 \( F(1, 419)= 6.40, p = .012, \eta^2_p = .02 \) and \( F(1, 419)= 89.79, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .18 \), controlling for the seven standard demographics.
11 The direct effect was reduced from 10.9% (semi-partial correlation= .33) to 2.8% (semi-partial correlation= .17) with the inclusion of the four mediators.
12 The only cross over between the two paths was that warmth towards Communist countries had a small impact (\( \beta = - .12 \)) on prejudice, although it was overwhelmed by the impact of feelings towards Asians (\( \beta = - .56 \)).
13 Final item drawn from Mehrabian 1996: 490.
14 The direct effect was reduced from 8.8% (semi-partial correlation= –.296) to just 0.8% (semi-partial correlation= –.09).