The combination of several communication theories shows how the Gulf War

syndrome situation was handled. The Gulf War veterans used the cognitive

dissonance theory, the media used agenda-setting theory and the government

used deception theory. While the government employed deception, their strategy

was eventually uncovered by the veterans and the media. The veterans were not

able to belief the government’s argument and so they spurred the media

involvement. Once the media started their coverage, it became evident to the public

how the government had tried to quell the whole incident. All of these theories led

to the negative media coverage about the incident.

Cognitive dissonance theory

Once the Gulf War veterans started to complain about their unexplained

symptoms and the government dismissed any truth to the claims, the veterans had a

dilemma. "Cognitive dissonance theory states that holding two contradictory or

inconsistent beliefs leads to psychological discomfort" (Infante, Rancer & Womack,

1997). This dissonance is a negative drive state because the individual

simultaneously holds two cognition's (ideas, beliefs, opinions) which are psycho-

logically inconsistent (Abelson et al., 1968). The veterans knew what was

manifesting in their lives was real even if the government denied it and this caused

them concern and discomfort. Festinger (1957) said people have a psychological

drive to reduce dissonance (as cited by Infante et al., 1997).

Just why did the veterans not believe the government's stance? It has to do

with their personal commitments to themselves and to their families. Brehm and

Cohen (1962), each person arrives at a state of dissonance, not just because of the

existence of inconsistency, but because of a prior commitment that has

consequences for for satisfaction of important needs. This made it particularly hard

for the Gulf War veterans because being soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines, they

are bound by duty to abide by orders. Implicitly, their government was giving them

and order: "Do not worry about your sickness because it is not real and will soon

go away." And that is exactly what caused the predicament. They had been ordered

to Saudi Arabia and now they were ordered to ignore their unexplained health

issues. Some probably tried to reason with themselves saying it was their age

creeping up on them, but they continued to have health problems or their families

started to exhibit symptoms. This ultimately led many to disbelieve what the

government was telling them: they knew they had health problems that they could

not rationally explain - except that the illnesses had started to appear in their lives

after Desert Storm.

Therefore, each veteran had to decide which one to believe: themselves or

their government. "Once the dissonance exists there is now enough drive to

motivate a person to try to reduce it" (Abelson et al., 1968, p. 321). A person can

choose to reduce the dissonance in several ways. Abelson et al. (1968) says the

options are,

1. he can change his opinion to make it coincide with the communicator's;

2. he can attempt to change the communicator's opinion;

3. he can seek social support from other members of the audience;

4. he can derogate the communicator. (p. 15)

This is exactly what the Gulf War veterans faced. Knowing that people will

choose different strategies to reduce their dissonance, the veterans eventually

banned together and used a combination of all of the options in order to change the

governments stance on the subject.

Agenda-setting theory

The veterans dealing with their cognitive dissonance did not do it alone. Soon,

the media picked up on their story. Once enough people started saying the same

thing, it became interesting for the media and the public.

One of the great pulls of this story was the media wanting to report to the

people about the government. McCombs, Einsiedel and Wearver (1991) said that

democracy is founded on numerous citizens and groups knowing and participating

in government affairs. However, it is hard for people to be directly involved with

the government so they must rely on other sources of information for their ideas

which issue is more important than another and that is where the media comes into

play.

"People are not passive receivers of the news media or other messages.

People actively construct their pictures of reality, but they are constrained by the

information available to them from the mass media and other sources" (McCombs

et al., 1991, p. 12). The media used the agenda-setting theory when they covered the

reactions of the public in this instance. Since the government was not talking or

assuring the public that they would look into the matter immediately, the media

became more interested in the story. Shoemaker (1987) said news is a report

primarily of the odd and unusual and of people or institutions in conflict (as cited

by McCombs et al., 1991). That is why this story was so appealing to the media and

really the government should have known it would be.

Therefore, the media set a stage where the American public started to learn

more about the dubbed "Gulf War syndrome." As people became informed, their

curiosity grew. "Even though the media may not be very successful at telling us

what opinions to hold, they are often quite influential in telling us what to have

opinions about" (McCombs et al., 1991, p. 12).

"And this agenda-setting effect seemed to override selective exposure,

perception, and retention - forces that contribute to reinforcement rather than

change of attitudes and opinions in earlier studies of media effects" (McCombs et

al., 1991, p. 14). This implies that the media did not change the veterans' beliefs

about their illnesses, but rather it helped solidify those beliefs. Plus, once the media

was involved, more veterans learned of their counterparts who had been exposed to

the same conditions and who were now dealing with issues similar to their own.

This fueled the veteran's growing need to have the government officially recognize

their plight.

The media tends to get people thinking about issues, but it is hard to predict

which way the people's opinions will go. However, the direction will depend on

how the issues are presented by the media in terms of group interest and values

and how the person perceives the issue after discussing it with other people

(McCombs et al., 1991). The media was also able to show other people, who were

not part of the Gulf War, what the veterans were dealing with and in turn showed

that the American government had turned away from the veterans. Since the

government was still denying the situation, the public started to believe the media

more. The media linked the current situation to the last time veterans had medical

claims and the government denied it - Vietnam and Agent Orange. The logical

question many people asked was, why didn't the government learn from their past

mistake?

"There is also evidence that the media's emphasis on certain issues may

influence not only public opinion, but also government officials' agendas and

opinions" (McCombs et al., 1991, p.20). This is why the governement finally had to

respond and change their public relations strategy. Government officials do

understand that the media is not always a valid indicator of public opinion, but

they agree that the media provides a much quicker indication of the most salient

issues than if they conducted an opinion poll or analyzed letters and phone calls

(McCombs et al., 1991). Therefore, after all the media coverage of the Gulf War

syndrome, it would have been almost impossible for the government to continue

its stance. Now, the government really had no choice but to change its tactic and so

it set up an investigation team to look into the Gulf War syndrome.

Deception theory

The way the American government decided to handle the Gulf War illness

led them to a reactive and catch-up public relations mode. Deception is a

strategically formed style of communication to act as a control device in relations by

creating false impressions and erroneous assumptions (O'Hair &Cody, 1994).

When the first illness signs started appearing and gulf war veterans vocalized their

medical problems, the government's party line was one of denial. A better way to

classify the deceit was lying because at first the government denied the whole idea

of an illness existing and they tried to brush the veterans aside.

O'Hair and Cody (1994) have classified deceptive acts into collusion,

concealment, overstatement, evasion and lies. Lies represent false statements

intending to create an impression in the receiver contrary to the truth or facts.

Evasion behavior intends to redirect or sidestep sensitive topics (O'Hair & Cody,

1994). At first, the government outright lied about the possibility of the veterans

having any illness. Later, they used evasion to try to cover some of their acts.

Communication is essential at home, school hospitals, organizations,

communities, businesses, government or anyplace where people interact with one

another (Haney, 1979). Communication within society is based on the assumption

that the information is truthful and planned by the sender (Buller & Burgoon, 1994).

Since we live in a democracy, Americans feel it is their right to have communication

between them and their government. Americans are usually outraged when they

find out this communication contains deception. In the end, the truth comes out

with the help of the investigative nature of media.

Deception messages are strategically or non-strategically formed to act as a

control device in relationships by creating false impressions and erroneous

assumptions (O'Hair & Cody, 1994). O'Hair and Cody (1994) said once deceptive

acts are revealed, the relationship between the two parties incurs great harm. This

happened with the American public and the government. After the video tape of the

explosion at Khamisiyah became public, the public was able to see the possibility of

a basis for the Gulf War illness.

Consequences for deception can result in either positive or negative outcome

(O'Hair & Cody, 1994). In this instance, the outcome was negative. The government

was not able to continue the denial for two reasons: the veterans and the media.

Both turned the public's acceptance of the government's stance into question. The

coverage grew until the government was forced to call for an investigation into the

matter. The public wanted more information because they were inclined to believe

what they could tangibly see happening to the Gulf War veterans and the lack of

help or assistance from their government. There was a public outcry for the truth.

It was obvious then that the government had lied to the public. The

consequences of deception must be weighed by the deceiver in order to commit to

deception (O'Hair & Cody, 1987). It is unclear why the government chose this

course of action but there are many possible reasons. One could be that the

government really did not want to believe that they had placed their soldiers,

airmen, sailors and Marines in danger. Or, they did not want to incur the legal

ramifications and medical expenses by allowing anyone to claim sickness due to the

war.

No matter what the reason, the government would eventually have to deal

with the growing belief of Gulf War syndrome. The destructive powers of deception

now only effect the target, but have significant psychological effects on the deceiver

(O'Hair & Cody, 1987). At first, the government outright lied about the possibility

of the veterans having any illness. Later, they used evasion to try to cover some of

their acts. Now that the public had learned about the deception, the parties were

wary of each other. The government's response was to change their strategy.