This
article was published in Orient, Vol. 45, No. 2 (June 2004), pp. 239-256
The
death of Hafiz al-Asad on
Hafiz
al-Asad’s role as president of
Still, the transfer of power from father to son, smooth and free of turbulence as it was, evoked ripples of derision and criticism within and outside the country, especially regarding the suitability of the young son to lead the country at that time. The point was widely raised in this context that Bashar’s journey to the top had begun only on January 21, 1994, following the death of his older brother Basil in a car accident. Basil had been his father’s choice as heir, and was the focus of great expectations, while the selection of Bashar stemmed from a lack of alternative and was essentially accidental. It was also accidental in terms of Bashar’s personal career, which had been devoted until then to medicine rather than politics. Ultimately, the accident brought Bashar to the seat of the presidency.
Bashar’s rise to power came at a time when
So
long as Asad retained his grip on power in
The
answer is not self-evident, for today, four years after assuming power, Bashar
remains, in the view of many both inside and outside
Nevertheless,
ever since Bashar took control of
The
Syrian Ba‘th regime inherited by Bashar al-Asad from his father was a personality-based
regime revolving around the figure of Hafiz al-Asad, its founder and longtime
leader. The central pillar of the regime, Asad Sr. served as the force that
unified its varied, and sometimes rival, components. His character and
especially his image both within
At
the same time, the regime was also family-run, or even tribal, in view of the
central role played in it by Hafiz al-Asad’s family and tribe – the Kalbiyya tribe. Moreover, it was also an
communal regime in its reliance on the support of the Alawite community. This
group constituted an important element in the regime – in effect the element
that held the other components of the regime together. In this respect, the
regime reflected the ascendance of the Alawite community in the second half of the
twentieth century from a minority of inferior status to an elite sector.1
Ultimately,
the regime established by Hafiz al-Asad might be described as multi-faceted.
Sometimes it displayed its personality-based character, and at other times its
family-, tribal- or community-based character, depending on circumstances or,
more accurately, the challenges faced by its leader. Moreover, the regime also
had a party coloration as a Ba‘th regime, as well as a
military character in that it relied on the support of the army and the
security forces.
Historically,
the regime was the product of a social and political revolution that took place
in
Bashar
al-Asad thus inherited a functioning, if aging, governmental system, which
granted him a certain grace period which he would need at the start of his rule. Relying on the
system, he nevertheless attempted to introduce certain changes aimed at
integrating additional sectors of society into mainstream life, with an
emphasis on reinforcing
Bashar and his Regime
During
his first years in power, Bashar was anxious to maintain the political system
his father had established in Syria and not make substantive changes in it. In
as much as the transfer of power to him was smooth, with no evidence of
significant opposition to him or to the regime, he did not feel the need to
take drastic measures to entrench his personal and public status or to build up
power bases loyal to him in order to face down a rival camp.
Bashar’s confidants. In the perception of many
Syrians, Bashar was an unknown quantity, i.e., he was not a product, as was his
father, of the military or party system, from which Asad Sr. drew support and
recruited a close circle of like-minded associates to help him rule the
country. With this, Bashar appeared to have consolidated a personal staff to
assist him in promoting his goals and lead Syria toward change, however
limited. This staff consisted of young men his age who shared his world view, some of whom, like him, were previously
unidentified politically. Three in this group, whom Bashar brought with him
from the Syrian Computer Society where they had been involved in disseminating
computer and Internet awareness, were appointed to the cabinet, heading the
tourism, communications and higher education portfolios (see below). Another
member in the society, `Imad Zuhayr Mustafa,
computers professor in Damascus University, was appointed in January 2004 as
Ambassador to Washington. Other friends and associates brought into this circle
were Iyad Ghzzal, appointed
head of the Syrian Railway Authority, whom Bashar had gotten to know when he
served as an aide in the Presidential Palace; Dhu al-Himma Shalish and Rami Makhluf, both businessmen
and a relatives of Bashar’s. This group, however, was
unlikely to be able to assist Bashar in ruling the country, as they lacked
power bases of their own and were not influential in governmental circles.4
The
lack of background of these close associates in managing the affairs of state,
and especially in guaranteeing the security of the regime, stood out in marked
contrast to the powerful pillars who had supported the regime under Hafiz
al-Asad: the Asad and Makhluf clans, the Kalbiyya tribe, numerous, highly placed Alawite army
officers, and a close circle of politically experienced associates mostly from
the majority Sunni community.
Clan, tribe
and religious community. Ostensibly, the element of clan, tribe and community continued to play
an important role in Bashar’s regime. Evidence of this
was the presence in his inner circle of his brother, Mahir,
and even more importantly, his brother-in-law, ‘Asaf Shawkat. Additionally, a large number of
high-ranking army officers, headed by Bashar’s
tribesman, Deputy Chief of Staff ‘Ali Habib, were
considered personally loyal to him. However, neither his brother nor his
brother-in-law appeared to be involved in managing the affairs of state or in
decision making at the highest level. Moreover, the Alawite officers said to be
close to Bashar were not depicted as a consolidated group molded by him, or as
viewing him as their true leader. Apparently, Bashar had difficulty, or perhaps
did not attach sufficient importance to, entrenching his regime on firm clan,
tribal and communal foundations, as did his late father.
This
difficulty was apparent.
The Asad clan avoided taking a firm stance on behalf of the young
president. Two
of his father’s brothers, Rif‘at and Jamil, voiced
reservations about Bashar’s designation as successor
to his father, and Rif‘at went so far as to challenge
the legitimacy of the choice of Bashar as president. While Rif‘at
was somewhat removed, in exile in Spain, Jamil was close at hand in Syria,
elected in March 2003 as a delegate to the People’s Assembly from the Ladhiqiyya province Bashar’s
problems in his immediate family were also public knowledge. Confrontations
between the impulsive Mahir and the family’s “royal
couple,” his sister Bushra and her husband Asaf
Shawkat, were widely reported. Following Bashar’s
marriage to Asma, rumors were spread in Damascus
about the tensed relations between her and Anisa, Bashar’s mother and Bushra, his
sister.5 And finally, in mid- 2003 Israeli media reported that the
head of bureau of Mahir, Bashar’s
young brother, initiated contacts with Israeli businessmen in Amman, in an
effort to bring to the resumption of peace negotiations between Syria and
Israel. Although, Syrians sources were quick to deny these reports, it seemed
that Bashar had troubles in ruling his own family members6 Clearly,
neither the clan nor the immediate family constituted a power base or a source
of support for him, as they had for Asad Sr. at the start of his rise to power.
The trusted leadership
nucleus (the jama’a). Asad Sr. had relied on a
governing elite consisting of close associates with a shared viewpoint who
helped him maintain his regime and thereby rule the country. This coterie was linked to him through
four types of ties: (1) Family ties, exemplified by Asad’s co-option of his
brother Rif‘at and a decade later of his sons Basil
and later Bashar. (2) Tribal or communal ties, i.e., through his reliance on
his tribe, the Kalbiyya, and his community, the
Alawites. (3) Personal friendships, i.e., colleagues who shared his world view and life experiences, and associates and
supporters dating back to the 1950s and ‘60s – the formative years of his
ascent to power. (4) Work ties, i.e., a team of aides and advisors who had
worked with him for a long time, or members of the military, the governmental and the semi-governmental elites with whom he
had come in contact over time. The majority of this stratum
were of Asad’s generation, i.e., men in their early 70s. A large
proportion, especially those who held high political posts, were Sunnis,
including both vice presidents, ‘Abd al-Halim al-Khaddam and Zuhayr Mashariqa;
Minister of Defense Mustafa Talas (till May 2004);
and Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar’.7
The
elite of Asad’s era essentially remained in place during the first years of Bashar’s rule. In contrast to Jordan, where King `Abdallah
shook the foundations of the kingdom’s military and political elite and within
a short time replaced them almost entirely, including those who had
orchestrated his succession as king, Bashar avoided introducing dramatic
changes in the Syrian leadership and especially in the military/security elite.
The
only changes that did occur in the political and military leadership involved
promotions of subordinates to leading posts, such as the promotion of Deputy
Chief of Staff Hasan Turkmani to the top position,
replacing ‘Ali Aslan, who reached retirement age in
January 2002. In May 2004 Turkmani was appointed
minister of Defense replacing Mustafa Talas who
retired in the age of 72. Turkmani was replaced as
Chief of Staff by his deputy, `Ali Habib. Notably, Bashar avoided leapfrogging young officers
who were close to him, as well into key posts so as to build up power bases in
the military and security forces personally loyal to him (see below). Similarly, changes
he made in the governmental area – bringing in new faces in the cabinet in
December 2001 and September 2003 and replacing officials in local government,
party bodies and the media – were essentially insignificant, as they generally
involved the retirement of veteran bureaucrats, to be replaced by younger ones
with the same outlook, devoted to retaining the status quo in the state.
Bashar’s father had “anesthetized” the Syrian political, and especially the
military/security leadership, allowing them to reach retirement age in the
expectation of continuing on in their posts. He then implemented their legal
retirement, a step he viewed as necessary to make room for a younger leadership
that would identify with
his successor - Bashar. Bashar retained this tactic, legally
eliminating the old guard over a period of several years. While this measure was likely to
benefit him in the short run, it could not, in itself, build power bases to
help him promote needed reforms in the social and economic areas, or assure the
long-term survival of his regime.
Bashar
thus lacked a loyal circle of supporters with power and status on whom he could
rely at critical moments or whom he could involve in the decision-making
process. The
extant Syrian leadership elite – both the remaining old guard and their
successors in government and the military – did not owe any personal allegiance
to Bashar beyond the formal loyalty obliged by his office. This
absence of a close bond with a leadership circle, combined with the absence in
the new president of the kind of defined world view that stems from a coherent
personality and formative life experiences, appeared at times to be critical in
light of his youth and inexperience. Abroad he was sometimes perceived as
being led or managed by others rather than taking charge himself. The
decision-making process in Syria in the early years of his rule lacked the
balance that could have emanated from the leader’s historical memory (i.e.,
formative life experiences) or, alternatively, from a governmental inner circle
that could help him make the difficult decisions that were required. Indeed, in
some cases it was the remnants of the old-guard leadership that appeared to
function as a needed moderating influence, for example in their reservations
over Bashar’s encouragement of Hizballah activity in
Interesting in this regard was an interview,
which was given in June 2003 by Bashar to al-`Arabiyya TV Channel where he
answered the question to what degree the old guard restrict his activities:
“the term old guard is a journalist term, but when they say old do they mean
the age, the position of these people or simply the fact that these people
belonging to the old guard simply protecting their interests. I think that they
mean that the old guard protect its interests but
young guard confronts them and what is more important is that the two groups
are not important. What is important is the general order in the state. We made
many personal changes and we determine to replace anyone who lost his value whether
he belongs to the old or the young guard.9 .
The Alawite Officer Class. The Syrian regime which Hafiz al-Asad bequeathed to
his son relied on the senior Alawite officer class, i.e., the heads of the
security organs and the commanders of the army units, for stability in the
state and, by extension, for the very existence of the regime. These officers
were partners – some of them visible, most hidden – in the Syrian system of
government. Their status and power not only stemmed from the letter and even
the spirit of the Syrian constitution, but also reflected the prevailing
balance of power in the coalition forces that supported the regime. Notably, although
the Alawites constituted a minority of 12% of the Syrian population, the
overwhelming majority of army commanders and heads of the security bodies –
nearly 90% – were Alawites.
Several
military leaders had a close relationship with Bashar, primarily within the
context of their roles, especially former Chief of Staff ‘Ali ‘Aslan and Deputy Chief of Staff ‘Ali Habib.
Yet, whether the military leadership regarded Bashar as one of their own, as
they did his father, is doubtful. Bashar avoided
forming close ties or promoting people personally loyal to him, thereby
remaining dependent on the formal hierarchical command and perhaps on the
tribal and communal solidarity fostered in his father’s time, which was sustained
by force of inertia. The
problem was that a power-based, strong-arm governmental system of the Syrian
kind did not tolerate a vacuum or any sign of weakness in the ruling apparatus.
A perception of Bashar as weak, therefore, could invite aggressive intervention
by any of the power bases in the state. Conceivably, such a threat could come
from one of the Alawite generals, or from one of the lower-ranking officers
who, unimpressed by Bashar and his conduct of the state, might come to the conclusion
that he could do a better job. At a given signal, such an officer might try to
establish a new ruling elite based on the existing governmental coalition
(Alawite generals and their colleagues from the other minorities, the rural population and the Syrian periphery).
Notably,
the Syrian military leadership had been in a somnolent state during Hafiz
al-Asad’s long rule. Prolonged political stability, signifying the durability
of the regime, made the military leadership irrelevant to the ongoing conduct
of the state (with the exception of such specific events as the suppression of
the Islamic revolt of 1976-82 and Rif‘at’s revolt
against his brother during 1983-84). Presumably, however, the instincts that
had led the military to intervene systematically in the affairs of state during
the 1950s and ‘60s and foment military coups could reawaken.
The Civil Governmental
Structure
Formally,
the Syrian governmental structure is made up of a series of legislative and
executive bodies tasked to conduct the affairs of state – primarily the daily
life of its citizens – on an ongoing basis. It is a well-organized hierarchical
system based on both the Syrian and the Ba’th Party constitutions. It is made up of
the cabinet, the People’s Assembly, the presidency of the republic and the
Ba’th Party bodies. The importance of the system lies in its availability to
the regime for rallying public or legal legitimation
for its moves. It
also provides the regime with a means of rewarding its supporters. By co-opting them
into the system, the regime fulfills their aspirations for accessibility to
political power and for economic and social leadership roles. Moreover, the system plays an
influential role in the daily life of the people, as reflected in Bashar’s attempt to promote social and economic reforms
under the aegis of the civic government. Evidently, he attached more importance
to fostering a group of colleagues in governmental bodies who would support him
in advancing Syria’s scientific and technological development than to mold such
a support group by his father’s time-honored means focusing on army officers
and party activists.
The Syrian government (the
cabinet). Bashar’s influence was evident in
the formation of the new government in March 2000, three months before the
death of his father, the late Hafiz al-asad. A government reshuffle – the first
in a decade – included the replacement of the prime minister, Muhammad al-Zu‘bi, who had held the poet since 1987, by Mustafa Miru, a veteran Ba’th activist who had served as governor
of the provinces of Dar‘a, Hasaka
and Aleppo, successively, over the preceding twenty years. A group of senior
ministers were also replaced, generally by younger ministers described as close
to Bashar and his outlook.
Prominent among these was `Isam al-Za’im (b. 1940), of Aleppo, who, as minister of planning in
the new government attracted attention by advocating economic reform, albeit
limited and under official supervision. Meanwhile, however, Bashar had to
accept two key holdover ministers – Muhammad al-`Imadi
(Finance) and Muhammad Khalid al-Mahyani (Economics)
– as a compromise with the regime’s old guard, who opposed making overly
dramatic changes in the composition of the government.10
The
trend of promoting relatively younger technocrats close to Bashar and sharing
his outlook was particularly evident in a further cabinet reshuffle on December
13, 2001. The new minister of interior, ‘Ali Hamud
(b. 1944), from Hums, who took over from Muhammad Harba,
had headed the General Security Administration in the past and had taken part
in suppressing the Islamic revolt during 1976-82. Another significant shift was
the replacement of the veteran ministers of finance and economics, `Imadi and Mahyani. The finance
portfolio was given to Muhammad al-Atrash (b. 1934), from Tartus, who held a
doctorate in economics from the University of London and had served in the past
as an advisor to the World Bank. Atrash had been minister of economics in the
early 1980s, but had resigned over differences of opinion with then-prime
minister Ra‘uf al-Kasm. The
ministry of economics and foreign trade was turned over to Ghassan
al-Rifa`i (b. 1942), of Hums. Like Atrash, Rifa`i, too, had a Ph.D. (University of Sussex) and had
been associated with the World Bank as a deputy to the director-general of
economic policy. The reshuffle also included the promotion of `Isam al-Za‘im from minister of
planning to minister of industry.11
The
most significant of Bashar’s moves was the co-option
into the cabinet of three of his past assistants in the Syrian Computer
Society. In contrast to his father, who brought army colleagues and party
comrades into the government, Bashar co-opted partners in the shared vision of
the computer and the Internet revolution. Sa’adallah
Awa al-Kalah (b. 1950), of Aleppo, appointed minister
of tourism, held a doctorate in computer science from the University of Paris
and had been in charge of information at the Computer Society. Hasan Risha (b. 1945), from Misyaf,
appointed minister for higher education, held a doctorate in engineering from
the Leningrad Polytechnic and had headed the scientific committee of the
Computer Society. Muhammad Bashir al-Munjayad (1947), of Damascus, who held a doctorate in
electronics from the University of Paris, had served as Bashar’s
deputy in the Computer Society. As mentioned before, the newly appointed Syrian
ambassador to Washington, `Imad Zuhayr Mustafa, was also an active member in the computer society.
Mustafa, a professor of computer engineering in the university
of Damascus, where he met Bashar who came to hear one his lectures.12
In
September 2003, three years after Miro was appointed
as prime minister in order to lead Syria into the 21st century, his government
was defined as “total failure”13 and reached its end. Miru was replaced by Naji
al-`Atari, born in 1944 in Aleppo. `Atari was a Ba`th activist who has a BA in
Construction Engineering from the university of Aleppo
and an MA in Urban Planning from a Dutch university. He served as the mayor of
Aleppo, the head of the engineering union in that city,
and later -- in Syria. He then became the governor of Hums. In the first Miru government he had served as deputy prime minister for
services and in March 2003 he was elected as the speaker of the people
Assembly. His appointment as prime minister should be seen as another
compromise made by Bashar. After all, reports from Damascus suggested that not
`Atari but a man who has no political background will be appointed as prime
minister that time14.
Alongside the replacement of Miru by `Atari there was a wide reshuffle. First the number of ministers was decreased from 35 to 30 and half were new faces. Thus the former ambassador to Tehran, Ahmad al-Hasan, replaced the information minister `Adnan` Unmran. The spokesperson of the foreign minister and the personal translator of Bashar Butahyna Sh`uban was appointed to the Minster for the expatriates. Sha`ban was born in 1953 in Hums. She got her PhD in English literature in York university and served as lecturer for poetry and comparative literature at the Department of English Language and Literature in the University of Damascus. Other new faces was Hani Murtada the president of the Damascus University who was appointed as the minister for higher education `Adnan `Ali Sa`d, who had been Dean of the Faculty of Education in Damascus university, was appointed minister of education.15
Among
those removed from the government Isam al-Za`im had
been known till that time as close to Bashar. A few weeks later a decree
confiscating all his money was announced. It became clear that he was accused
of corruption and bribery for his involvement in the allocation of 19.5 m
dollars for the building of textile factory in Ladhaqqiyya.
The Factory was never established but the money disappeared16.
The
task of government in Arab countries is not necessarily to run the country’s
affairs but to ease pressures on the president or the monarch and protect them
public criticism. This is why many rulers tend to make often reshuffles. It
seems that Bashar is no exception.
The People’s Assembly. The primary legislative body in Syria, the People’s
Assembly (majlis al-shab)
was made up of 250 delegates elected regionally every four years. Approximately 60%
of its members represented the Progressive National Front, an umbrella
organization of all the political parties officially permitted to operate in
Syria, foremost of them the Ba‘th Party. The remaining
40% of its members were independents. Essentially, the Assembly was a symbolic
body lacking decision-making power or influence regarding regime policy.
The
first elections to the Assembly during Bashar’s term
of office, held on
Although
the elections resulted in many new faces in the Assembly (178 of the 250
delegates), most of them young, ultimately, no change was made in the status of
the body within the Syrian political system. Significantly, the elected
chairman of the Assembly was Muhammad Naji al-`Atari,
a veteran Ba‘th politician who had served as deputy prime minister in charge of
the service sector. He replaced the outgoing chairman of the Assembly, ‘Abd al-Adir Qadura, himself a veteran
Ba‘th activist. In October 2003 `Atari became prime minister and was replaced
by another Ba`th activist, Mhmud al-Abrash.19
The Ba‘th
Party. The
Syrian constitution grants the Ba‘th Party a
preferential status in the country’s political life. Article 8 of the
constitution states: “The Ba‘th Party is the leading party in society and the
state and heads the Progressive National Front, which works toward
consolidating the power of the masses and harnessing it to serve the aims of
the Arab nation.”20 Extensions of the Ba‘th
Party are to be found throughout the state. These extensions – branches,
departments and cells – facilitate the spread of the party’s message to all
parts of the country. Every
four years, the party branches elect delegates to the party congress, which in
turn elects the members of the party’s two bodies: the Central Committee (al-Lajna al-Markaziyya), consisting of 90 members; and the Regional
command (al-Qiyada
al-Qutriyya), with 21 members. The Regional
Command is the party’s supreme body and thus the most powerful institution in
Syria. This
status is reflected in the method by which the president of Syria is
elected: the National Leadership
recommends the presidential candidate, the candidate is then brought to the
People’s Assembly for approval, and, with the granting of approval, a national
referendum is held. The party is headed by a secretary-general, a post held
today by Bashar al-Asad.
Ever
since Hafiz al-Asad took power, and especially in the last two decades of his
rule, the Ba‘th Party expanded rapidly. According to a report published for
the sixth Ba‘th Party Congress, held immediately after Hafiz al-Asad’s death in
June 2000, the membership of the party was 1,409,580, of whom 406,047 were full
members (`Adw
`Amil) – the highest category of membership (followed by trial member [Murshshah] and
supportive member [Nasir]). Notably,
in 1971 the membership was 65,398, in 1981 374,332, and in 1992 1,008,243.21
The
2000 report cited 67,18% of the members as below age 30, and 18.75% ages 30-40. Approximately
35.70% were students, 16.50% farmers, and 20.60%civil servants. Women constituted
29.14%. The
army had 27 party branches, 212 sub-branches, and 1,656 clubs, with a total of
25,066 members. Additional data pointed to the absolute hegemony of the party
in many social sectors. For example, 998 of the 1,307 sitting judges in Syria
were members, and apparently most of the intellectuals in the country were at
the service of the party: 56% of the lecturers at the University of Damascus
were party members, as were 54% at the University of Aleppo, 79% at Tishrin University in Ladhiqiyya,
and 81% at al-Ba‘th University in Hums.22
The
immense growth of the party did not necessarily indicate the extent of its
support or popularity in the population or the attractiveness or relevance of
its ideology. Rather, it pointed to pure opportunism on the part of the new
members, for whom the party had become a favored and convenient track to
social, economic and political advancement. Notably, side by side with the party’s
vast numerical growth came a loss of its ideological vitality in light of the
collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe along with the collapse of
Syria’s economy.
Cracks
also appeared in the commitment to Arabism and Arab solidarity in the face of
the regime’s preparedness to advance the peace process with Israel and its
dialogue with the West, as well as the development of a statist tendency on the
part of the regime’s leadership. Lastly, demographic changes in Syria,
especially the country’s accelerating urbanization, posed a challenge to the
party in terms of preserving its relevance for sectors of the population
destined to play a decisive role in Syrian life, especially the populations of
the poverty-stricken neighborhoods surrounding the large cities.
Thus,
despite the impressive numerical growth of the party, fears of a loss of
vitality and relevance, and ultimately a loss of influence in
Apparently,
therefore, Bashar intended to continue using the party as a convenient, accessible and above all irreplaceable vehicle to rally
broad public support for himself and his policies throughout the state,
especially in such sectors as the farming community and among the workers. As
part of this effort, he initiated a process of replacing the leadership of the
party, a necessary step since the leadership had not been rejuvenated for
decades. He also tried to introduce a trend of limited reform within the party
by ordering genuine elections for the leadership of the party cells and
branches, with candidates to be drawn from all ranks instead of the entrenched
practice of handing down a list of approved candidates from above.
Prior
to the party congress, preliminary elections were held in May 2000 in the party
branches, sub-branches and clubs, in which 24,703 candidates contended for
approximately 650 seats in the congress. These elections, held in a spirit of
relative openness according to the new norms, witnessed surprising failures at
the polls of several prominent figures, including a number of government
ministers. Some 1,150 delegates were designated for participation in the party
congress, including 650 elected delegates, 300 delegates drawn from the party’s
higher bodies, and 200 delegates with the status of observers.24
During
the congress itself, elections were held for the party’s highest bodies, namely
the Regional Command and the Central Committee. A list of the newly elected
members of these councils showed that veteran politicians and high-ranking
military officers had lost their positions over the years, including Muhammad
al-Khuly, ‘Ali Duba, Hikmat al-Shihabi and Mahmud al-Zu‘bi. The Regional Command acquired 11 new members,
including Bashar al-Asad and Prime Minister Mustafa Miru. The Central
Committee gained 62 new members, including Mahir
al-Asad, the president’s brother; and Manaf Talas, son of former Minister of Defense Mustafa Talas and a close associate of Bashar’s.
The representation of the military in the Regional Command dropped from four to
two – Talas and the former chief of staff, ‘Ali ‘Aslan. while in the Central
Committee it remained at 20.25
In
the wake of the congress, the leadership in the party branches throughout the
country was replaced in the latter part of 2000. Younger secretaries-general
and leaders were chosen in elections described as “democratic,” at least in
comparison with the previous practice of automatic approval of dictated lists
of candidates. In early 2004 Bashar also issued a decree forcing Bath party
officials and bureaucrats ’s to retire at the age of 60.26
Nevertheless, whether these younger local leaders would become loyal supporters
of Bashar’s reformist policy was doubtful. At issue
was not their age, i.e., a generational clash, but rather the very survival of
an establishment system still regarded by the Ba’th membership as essentially a
vehicle for personal and political advancement.
In
July 2003, the national leadership of the Ba’th Party made a historic decision
regarding the “separation of authority between the party and the governmental
institutions of the state.”
The decision (No. 408) read:
The task of the “Leading Party” [the official title
of the Ba’th Party] is to plan, supervise, guide, review
and necessitate reports. The Party electors and institutions must refrain from
intervening in the daily working of the governmental institutions and allow the
comrades appointed to those institutions to discharge their duties.... Every
appointment to managerial and executive positions in the governmental offices
will be made on the basis of the suitability of the candidate to his job
regardless of his party affiliation27.
The
decision evoked a stormy public debate, in Syrian terms, between perceptions of
it as a first step in the political marginalization of the Ba’th Party in
Syria, and implacable opposition, mainly by party activists, to any thought of
weakening the party status. Side by side with proposals to dismantle the
“national Command” of the party as part of needed radical reform,28 other
opinion, e.g., in the party organ, al-Ba’th,
held that “the existing political system [the Ba’th Party] is capable of
renewal and of setting into motion processes of change and development, so that
there is no need whatsoever for changing or dismantling it so long as it does
not hinder the development of the state.”29
In
any case, it is too early to know whether the prospect of weakening the grip of
the party on the Syrian politics, which Bashar al-Asad undoubtedly favors, is
realistic. Even
if he seeks this development, so as to allow additional sectors of society to
enter into the country’s political life, his
capability of bringing it about is doubtful, as his party colleagues will be
unlikely to permit it. Indeed, the composition of the new government in Syria
in September 2003, as shown above, constituted clear proof of the retention of
the status quo.
The Progressive National
Front. Other parties officially
permitted to operate in the electoral realm were mainly leftist groups that
functioned as satellite parties to the Ba‘th. They
consisted of two factions of the Syrian Communist Party and several Nasserist
parties, mostly remnants of the political mindset that had prevailed in Syria
in the 1950s and ’60s. These parties – a total of seven – were amalgamated in
an umbrella body called the Progressive National Front (hereafter, the Front),
formed by Asad Sr. in 1972 and headed by him until his death. Aside of the
Front the regime formed a series of government-sponsored organizations
representing various sectors of the population, such as professional
associations, the workers union, the farmers union and women’s groups.
Bashar attempted to infuse the Front parties
with greater vitality, although in vain. The extant political array permitted
in Syria, i.e., the Front, reflected an outdated reality that had prevailed a
half-century previously, when the Syrian street was captive to the Ba‘th Arab
nationalist ideology or, alternatively, to that molded by its ally (and later
its confirmed enemy) President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir of Egypt. The willingness of
the regime from 2000 onward to co-opt the Syrian National Party into the Front,
and possibly other Nasserist and leftist factions as well (see below), was far
from reflecting genuine openness to the current leanings of the Syrian public,
inter alia the attraction in the urban centers to
Islamic groups. Witness to this was borne, for example, by the statement of
Daniel Nu`ayma, a member of the Central Committee of
the Bakdash Faction of the Communist Party, who remarked sadly that "The
National Progressive Front parties can be compared to horses who have been
closed up in a stable for thirty hears and are now are incapable of competing
in a race as Bashshar is asking them to do". Nu`ayma also warned against "excessive
democracy", since, according to him, "Should elections to the People
Assembly in Syria be held according to the Lebanese system, i.e. completely
free elections, the bourgeoisie and the Fundamentalists will control the People
Assembly30”
Moreover,
with the passage of time the parties of the Front, like the Ba‘th regime
itself, had become dynastic, controlled by relatives and close associates of
their leader. With
the demise of a number of these leaders, the leadership passed on, to the
consternation of the membership, to relatives. For example, when the founder and
long-time leader of the Syrian Communist Party, Khalid Bakdash, passed away in
1997, his wife, Wassal Farha,
succeeded him as chairperson, and their son `Umar, appointed to the party’s
central committee, began managing the party on his mother’s behalf. The Bakdash
family’s domination of the party evoked protest by the membership, especially
in the Damascus region.
A group of members announced their resignation and in 2001 formed
an independent Communist faction, the Qasyun Group (majamuat kasiyun).31
Older factions of the party that had split off earlier, were the Communist
Party–Yusuf Faysal Faction, founded in 1985 when Faysal, a member of the
Communist Party central committee, split away from the mother party; and the Communist
Party–Political Bureau, established in 1973 by Riyad
al-Turk (see below).
Another
party in the Front was the Arab Socialist Movement (Harkat al-Ishtrakayyin al-`Arab), whose founder
was Akram al-Hurani, a prominent leader of the Ba‘th Party in the 1950s. He was succeeded by ‘Abd al-Ghani Qanut, who led the party
for a long period until his death in 2001. His successor, Mustafa Hamdun, like the party founder, had been a Ba‘th leader but, after a falling out with his colleagues,
had fled to Iraq, where he remained in exile for over 35 years. He was
permitted to return in 1998, apparently due to the mediation of his uncle,
Walid Hamdun, a member of the Syrian Ba‘th Regional
Command. Mustafa Hamdun’s election as leader of the
Arab Socialists was enabled by a deal he made with Ahmad Qanut,
son of the late leader, who sought a leadership position in the movement and,
accordingly, was appointed to the party’s central committee. Some of the
movement’s leaders, angered by Hamdun’s election,
attempted to block the elections for the party leadership by force and later
petitioned a court in Damascus to disqualify the elections – a first move of
this type in Syria.32 A splinter party of the movement emerged in
the early 1990s when ‘Abd al-‘Aziz `Uthman split away and formed the Arab
Socialist Movement–`Uthman Faction. Upon his death in 2001,
his son Asan ‘Abd al-‘Aziz `Uthman took over as
leader of the faction. In an interview he granted in early 2004 Ghassan revealed that the party has 8,000 active supporters
in 12 branches all over the country. The most active of them were those of
Damascus, Tartus and Dar`a.33
The
Front also included the Socialist Unionist. al-wahdawiyyin al-ashtirakiyyin),
under the leadership of another former Ba‘th Party
activist, Fa’iz Isma’il. A splinter group, the Democratic Socialist Unionist
Party (al-hizb al-wahdawi al-Ishtiraki al-dimuqrati), was founded in 1974 by Ahmad `Aql al-As`ad, who broke away from
Isma’il’s party. Following Ahmad al-As`ad’s death in 2001, his son Faris al-As`ad
took over as leader.34
Lastly,
the Socialist Arab Union (al-Ittihad al-`Arabi al-Ishtiraki), led by `Imad Safwan al-Qudsi, was also part of the Front. Pro-Nasserist, the party
was founded by Ghasim `Alwan,
an aggressive rival of the Syrian Ba‘th Party in the
early years of the Ba`th regime. He had fomented the revolt in the regime in
July 1963 that ended with the death of many of the rebels, including `Alwan himself. The party was rejuvenated in 1964
under the leadership of Jamal al-Atasi. It joined the Front in the 1970s under
the leadership of Fawzi al-Kiyali and Isma’il al-Qadi, the latter serving as its secretary-general. In the
wake of this move, a group of its members split off, led by Jamal al-Atasi
himself and Yusuf al-Juwa’ydani. Elections in the Socialist Arab Union
in 1984 brought in Safwan al-Qudsi
as secretary-general, a post he retains to the present. In March 2000 his wife,
Bari’a al-Qudsi, was
appointed minister of labor and welfare, representing the party in the
government, although she was removed from the post in the cabinet reshuffle of
December 2001.35
Parties courted by the
Progressive National Front. From the 1990s onward, the regime made strenuous efforts to co-opt
into the Front various parties not officially permitted to take part in the
political process in
A
major target was the Syrian Nationalist Party, which in the 1950s had been the Ba‘th’s most formidable rival for
control of the state. In the late 1990s, however, the regime signaled its
desire to turn a new page in its relationship with this party. The state-run
press ran articles that in effect cleared the party from responsibility for the
murder in 1955 of `Adnan al-Maliki, deputy chief of
staff and a Ba‘thist. That incident had been a
watershed in Syrian political life, as it engendered the elimination of the
Syrian Nationalist Party by the rest of the political forces in Syria then,
under the leadership of the Ba‘th Party,36 As a result the party’s
headquarter was moved to Lebanon where the party is still active to day. Since
the mid 1970s when Syrian forces entered
In
2002, the Syrian Nationalist Party was permitted to hold a first-time
commemoration marking the anniversary of the execution in 1949 of the founder
of the party, Antun Sa’ada, by the Lebanese
government. Thereafter, Bashar al-Asad met with several of the party’s leaders,
including `Isam al-Mahyari,
head of its political bureau, and Jubran `Arij, secretary-general.37 Early
in 2003, the party was invited to attend the annual conference of Front
parties. Thereafter, it ran over 20 candidates in the People’s Assembly
elections of March 2003, who were incorporated in the Front’s list of
candidates. The list was headed by Josef Suwayd, head
of the Syrian Nationalist Party political bureau. In effect, the party had been
represented in the People’s Assembly for over 12 years by one of its leaders,
Basil Dakhdukh. Dakhdukh
was expelled from the party for “deviating from its principles,” but he,
together with Suwayd and two other candidates
identified with the party, run in the election and
were eventually elected to the Assembly.38
The
regime also reached out to the Democratic National Unity (al-tahaluf al-watani al-dimukrati) led by Hasan ‘Abd al-‘Azim, an umbrella organization founded in 1979 that
included five opposition parties. The affiliates were: (1) The Democratic Arab
Socialist Union, under the leadership of ‘Abd al-‘Azim
himself. It
consisted of former members of the
Socialist Arab Union who, headed by Jamal al-Atasi, broke away in the early
1970s when the Socialist Arab Union joined the Front (see above). (2) The Communist
Party–Political Bureau, led by Riyad al-Turk, which
had split off from the Syrian Communist Party in 1973 (see above). (3) The
Democratic Socialist Arab Ba‘th Party, a splinter group that had broken away
from the Ba‘th Party. The
group was made up mostly of past supporters of Salah Jadid, the strongman of
Early
in 2001, Vice President ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam met with Hasan al-‘Azim
(Democratic Arab Socialist Union) and Riyad al-Turk
(Communist Party–Political Bureau) to explore the possibility of co-opting the
Democratic National Unity into the Front, an effort, however, that proved
unproductive.40 Later that year, Turk was imprisoned for a period of
about a year for criticizing the late president, Hafiz al-Asad, thereby
bringing the dialogue between the regime and the Democratic National Unity to
an end. Nevertheless, one of the parties
in the Unity – the Democratic Arab Socialist Union – began holding a series of
public events which the authorities appeared to ignore, and in which
representatives of the Ba‘th Party participated. The
Democratic Arab Socialist Union also announced the resumption of political
activity by several of its key activists who had kept a low profile during the
preceding decade.
Another
dialogue initiated by the regime was with Karim al-Shibani,
leader of the Nasserist Socialist Arab Party (al-hizb al-Ishtraki al-`arabi al-nasiri) established in the late 1980s. Shibani, an
Alawite from Ladhiqiyya, had in the past been a
member of the Socialist Unionists (see above), and had been elected as a
delegate from it to the People’s Assembly in 1986, but had left that party in
the late 1980s.41 The regime met with greater success in an approach
to the Democratic Arab Union (hizb al-tajamu` al-arabi al-dimukrati),
led by Muhammad al-Sufi, who had served as defense minister in 1963. According to
reports in the early 1990s, the regime itself encouraged the establishment of
this party. Members of it were included in the list of Front candidates for the
People’s Assembly elections of March 2003. The regime also extended its
patronage to the newly established (January 2002) Unity for Democracy and
Solidarity led by Muhammad bin Mahmud Sawan, who had
formerly been associated with the Socialist Arab Union.42
It
should be mentioned that the fall of Saddam Husayn’s
regime, along with the presence of hundreds of thousands of American soldiers
along
Indeed,
in late 2003 the establishment of the Syrian reform party (Hizb al-Islah al-Suri) was announced in
Summary
Hafiz
al-Asad’s regime relied essentially on himself, on an inner circle of loyal
colleagues, and on the army and the Ba‘th Party. These bodies incorporated, first and
foremost, members of his family, his tribe and his community – the Alawites,
and only thereafter his coalition partners. Of all these elements, the influence
of the Alawite officer class was the greatest, for Asad himself had risen from
its ranks, while the day-to-day affairs of state were entrusted to Ba‘th Party
officials and governmental bureaucrats, most of whom were, surprisingly,
veteran associates of Asad’s from the Sunni community who shared his philosophy
and life experience.
Bashar
al-Asad avoided introducing significant change in this order, although
apparently he hoped to cultivate a coterie of bureaucrats to help him promote
what he perceived to be needed reforms in the state. The question was whether he would be
able to accomplish this. Could such a group, however unified and committed, be
instrumental in implementing a true process of change? Moreover, what would be the response
of the Alawite military elite and the Ba‘th Party
cadres whom Bashar presumably sought to force out and marginalize? Various
Meanwhile,
problems piled up at Bashar’s doorstep. Along with
regional and international challenges which required the wise and careful
conduct of Syrian foreign policy, was the domestic reality of a depressed
socioeconomic system and, even more unnerving to the Syrian regime, the Islamic
threat, however latent.
Moreover, the presence of hundreds of thousands of American
soldiers in neighboring
Still,
Bashar is a young leader with his future before him. He has refrained from
making irrevocable mistakes. He was endowed with a good grasp of events, curiosity and a readiness to learn. He appeared to
understand the need for change. Reports emanating from
*This
article is based mainly upon press and electronic monitoring services during
the period under review, including Syrian, other Arab and foreign sources;
economic and political surveys and research published in Syria and abroad; and,
of course, discussions and interviews with Syrians, other Arabs and Westerners
who are permanent residents of Syria or who lived there in the past.
1.
See
Bashar interview to Al-Sharq al-Awsat. Al-Sharq al-Awsat,
2.
For
more on the debate over Bashar’s policy and vision
see Ha’aretz,
3.
For more see Ma`ariv,
1.
See
2.
See
3.
See
4.
See for example, Le Point,
5.
Al-Watan,
6.
Ma`ariv,
7.
See
8.
Ha’aretz,
9.
Al-`Arabiyya TV Channel, 9,
10.
See
11.
12.
13.
Al-Hayat, 16,
14.
Tishrin,
15.
Tishrin,
16.
Tishrin, 25,
17.
Tishrin, 6 March 2003; al-Hayat,
13 March 2003; the Assembly’s members from within the Progressive Front were
split as followed: the Ba`th Party – 132; the `Arab Socialist Union (of Safwan al-Qudsi) – 7; the
Socialist Democratic Union (of Fa’iz Isma`il) – 7; the Communist Party (the
Bakdash Faction) – 4; The Communist Party, Yusuf Faysal Faction – 4; the `Arab
Unionists (the `Uthman Faction) – 2; the Socialist democratic union (the Fadlallah Nasir al-din Faction) – 4; the `Arab Socialist
Union (the Ahmad Ahmad Faction) – 3
18.
Syrian TV, 18 Janaury 2003; al-Sharq al-Awsat,
19.
R. Damascus, 18 March
20.
for the constitution see al-Thawra,
21.
Al-Nahar,
22.
Al-Nahar,
23.
R. Damascus,
24.
See
25.
26.
See for example
27.
Al-Hayat,
28.
Al-Ra’y al-`Amm,
29.
Al-Ba`th,
30.
Al-Ra’y al-`Amm,
31.
Al-Hayat,
32.
Al-Ra’y al-`Amm,
33.
Al-Watan,
34.
See al-Shira`,
35.
Al-Watan,
36.
See more al-Hayat,
37.
See al-Watan,
38.
See al-Hayat,
39.
See al-Hayat,
40.
Al-Hayat,
41.
Al-Zaman,
42.
See also al-Nahar,
43.
Al-Nahar,
44.
See the Muslim Brothers web site
www.shrc.org,
45.
Al-Quds al-`Arabi,
46.
See al-Hayat, 6 June,