This project will conclude with a brief look at our observations,
some limitations of our research, and identify some areas for
future research. The impact of interservice cultural differences
on JIBs cannot be understated. We have found that different service
interpretations of Joint Publication 3-61 have led to the creation
of individual service doctrines which can often lead to miscommunication
in the joint environment. In addition, these doctrines when combined
with interservice cultural differences, can impede the flow of
accurate and timely information to the various publics the JIB
is designed to interact with. Specifically, our examination of
actual case studies revealed that media pools in particular can
be negatively impacted.
Observations
It is a testament to the professionalism of public affairs members
across all branches of the armed services that our military has
the public credibility it enjoys today. Even when faced in situations
where competing instructions, doctrines and cultures have tied
their hands behind their backs, the men and women assigned to
DoD’s various Joint Information Bureaus have, more often
than not, found a way to live up to the military public affairs
credo “Maximum Disclosure, Minimum Delay.”
While obviously each service has placed great emphasis in their
role in joint operations, the fact that each service feels the
need to document their individual doctrine is systemic of the
problem described in this paper. If there is to be a joint doctrine,
then it should be truly joint in scope. Individual services in
their published doctrine, formal, and informal cultures have superceded
any perceived authority Joint Publication 3-61 may have had at
its creation.
In both their creation and formal publication, individual service
doctrines have created situations where officers, enlisted and
civilian public affairs professionals are faced with competing
sets of guidelines and instructions. In addition, cultural differences
in the five services have created an even larger dilemma in the
handling of information to both internal and external publics.
On the basis of this study, senior leadership of the armed forces
would be well advised to review their services need for individual
instructions in regards to joint operations. In addition, Joint
Publication 3-61 should be reexamined to see if it addresses the
needs of specific services which led to their individual published
doctrines and instructions. In short, while several publications
title themselves as dealing with joint operations, none of them
can truly claim to do so, unless they’re codified into one
single instruction, with the weight of law, that is recognized
by all the individual services.
More importantly, operational direction should be provided from
the Department of Defense to unify the basic rules throughout
all its branches of service for public affairs operations, to
include release of information, media support, and accessibility
of its members.
There is no reason an Army private should have to refer to Navy
doctrine for guidance in proper release of information, nor should
a Marine captain have to consult Air Force instructions for direction
in escorting and transporting media pools (see Atch. 2) in the
field. Consolidated instructions and concrete guidance would improve
both the efficiency and accuracy of information flow to the various
publics served by the JIBs.
Limitations
In the process of compiling the information used in this study,
we encountered numerous limitations. Chief among these limitations
was time. In the constraints of this course, we have only begun
to measure the problems inherent in joint operations. Were more
time available for allotment in pursuit of this study, we may
have been better able to address some of the issues facing the
men and women assigned to our JIBs today, and alleviate the problems
sure to be encountered by future JIBs.
Another limitation of this study was in gaining access to materials
relevant to investigating this phenomenon. Several meaningful
documents are unavailable due to either classification, access
privileges, or were never gathered or compiled in the first place.
While the classifications of sensitive documents is understandable,
some publications (like the Army’s case studies of JIB operations)
are unavailable due to technical issues (in this case, individuals
not accessing the publication site with a .mil address) that are
easily remedied by other methods (password access, like the Air
Force uses, for example). Also service historians would be well
charged to collect case studies from different perspectives of
the JIB operational spectrum. Most case studies are written from
a top-down leadership perspective, and it is quite possible that
as much can be learned at both the middle and lower tiers of service
member participation.
Our last major limitation was most likely a subset of the time
constraints described above. Additional methods of data collection,
most notably, surveys, interviews and field observations would
have greatly enhanced the information upon which this study was
based.
Further Research
Our knowledge of this phenomenon would be greatly enhanced by
a simple study of the events and issues surrounding the original
publication of the various service’s doctrines and publications.
Why were these documents created in the first place? What issues
were raised by the individual services that could only be answered
in their own separate publications?
Another issue worthy of further study would be a strict systems
analysis of JIB operations. How were individual members assigned
to their roles, which sections were manned more heavily, what
was the chain of command? More importantly, why were these choices
made, and did those choices help or hinder JIB operations?
Finally, what is the media’s perspectives and expectations
of JIB operations? How much do they know and understand about
how we manage JIBs? What do media members expect from a JIB, are
those needs realistic, and if so, how well do JIBs meet those
needs?
