This study will focus on three methods to determine answers for the proposed research questions: Analysis of service doctrines, analysis of service culture, and case study analysis of actual military operations.

Analysis of Doctrine

A content analysis of military joint public affairs doctrines using organizational systems theory which Fisher (1982) defines as “the ‘all’ of a thing.” This theory is interested in the dynamic properties of wholes and parts, relationships and hierarchies. We also utilize networks within the organization (Joint Information Bureaus) “to define and explain the patterns of information flow within the organization” (Heath & Bryant, 2000). Using a systematic approach to identify basic problems with how Joint Information Bureaus operate and interact with the media in a Department of Defense joint combat operation, a comparative study was conducted using each of the military services’ joint public affairs doctrines. This required using the Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-61 as a starting point, since this publication is what each branch of the military base its unique version upon, to perform the analysis.

The units of analysis were:

· Joint Publication 3-61 Doctrine for Public Affairs Operations in Joint Operations

· U. S. Army Field Manual 46-1 Public Affairs Operations

· Department of the Navy SECNAVINST 5720.44A Department of the Navy Public Affairs Policy and Regulations

· Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5720.72 Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations

· U. S. Air Force Document Doctrine (AFDD) 2-5.4 Public Affairs Operations

The major issues are defined as those items each of the services adopted from the Joint Publication regarding interaction with the media in joint combat operations. For the purposes of analysis, we determined that guidelines and policy should be the units of measurement, because they directly relate to how the military services handle media pools in a combat/exercise area. (See Attachment)

Analysis of Service Culture

To analyze differences in the various service’s cultures, content analysis of the respective service’s public affairs guidance was used. Content analysis integrates data collection and analytical techniques measuring the occurrence of identifiable elements in a text or message (Keyton, 2001).

How this study chose its criteria. Culture is defined as a system of shared values that definine what is important and norms that define appropriate attitudes and behaviors for organizational members telling them how to feel and behave (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1996). Each of the chosen criteria guide and define how public affairs members in their respective services formally and informally accomplish their assigned tasks.

The materials used. In defining the individual criteria from the services we used the operating manuals, directives, regulations and instructions used by each of the service's public affairs organizations. To define public affairs in the individual services we used:

· Army Field Manual 46-1, Public Affairs Operations

· Air Force Instruction 35-101, Air Force Public Affairs Policies and Procedures

· Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.97, Assignment of Public Affairs Responsibilities in the Department of the Navy (, 2002)

Note: The Marines are a subsystem of the Navy and use the same instruction. Additionally, during wartime operations the Coast Guard also falls under the Navy and is held to their directives. Normally, the Coast Guard falls under the Department of Transportation. The Coast Guard is not an element of the United States Armed Forces unless Congress ratifies an act of war. In addition, respective members of each of the military branches themselves defined other criteria, such as values and vision.

The Criteria. O’Reilly and Chatman (1996) define culture as “a system of shared values that define what is important and norms that define appropriate attitudes and behaviors for organizational members -- how to feel and behave” (p. 121). This study defined culture in JIBs by four criteria: values, focus (or vision, as defined by the military services), mission and network. These four criteria were chosen as they meet the definition of culture. (See Attachment)

Case Study Examination

Researcher Robert K. Yin defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1984, p. 23). The case study method was used in this research because its findings often resonate experientially or phenomenologically with a broad cross section of readers and thus facilitate greater understanding of the phenomenon in question (Feagin et al., 1991).

Intense reporting by the international news media has become one of the realities of modern military operations. The deployment of U.S. forces usually attracts large numbers of print and broadcast journalists dedicated to providing their audiences with “near real-time information” of varying accurateness and comprehensiveness.
Much work has been done to trace the origins of the continuing tension between the military and the news media. This is because the military and the news media often hold very different values and pursue very different objectives. The following three case studies illustrate the varying problems that can and have occurred when JIBs do not facilitate the flow of information to the media. The three cases were chosen for their military basis, the varying problem areas that they demonstrate, and the chronological time frame that they occurred.

Grenada 1983. In 1983, the United States executed a short-notice military operation on Grenada, a tiny Caribbean island nation, marking the adoption of the new military doctrine. The Reagan administration sent an invasion force of 6,000 U.S. troops to storm the island to return Grenada to the fold of capitalism (Stauber & Rampton, 1995). Grenadian troops, outnumbered and outgunned, offered little resistance. “Three days after the troops landed, the fighting was essentially over” (Stauber & Rampton, 1995).

Unlike the invasion of Normandy Beach during World War II, the invasion of Grenada took place without the presence of journalists to observe the action. Reagan ordered a complete press blackout surrounding the Grenada invasion (Stauber & Rampton, 1995). “By the time reporters were allowed on the scene, soldiers were engaged in "mop-up" operations, and the American public was treated to an antiseptic military victory minus any scenes of killing, destruction or incompetence” (Stauber & Rampton, 1995). Kirby (2001) explained, “The Pentagon did not permit correspondents to join in the invasion force, because, it said, their presence would jeopardize security and "complicate the forces' logistical problems.” In fact, the military refused to grant unrestricted access to Grenada until six days after the initial invasion--by then, the operation was nearly complete.”

After reporters protested the news blackout, the government proposed creating a National Media Pool. “In future wars, a rotating group of regular Pentagon correspondents would be on call to depart at a moment's notice for U.S. surprise military operations” (Stauber & Rampton, 1995). The pool system was designed to provide them with timely, inside access to military operations all the while, keeping them safe. “In practice, it was a classic example of PR crisis management strategy- enabling the military to take the initiative in controlling media coverage by channeling reporters' movements through Pentagon designated sources” (Stauber & Rampton, 1995).

Panama, December 1989. When American forces invaded Panama to oust General Manuel Noriega in December 1989, the military called the media-assigned pool reporters too late to allow them to cover the decisive U.S. assaults. The heavy combat had ended by the time reporters arrived. (Kirby, 2001)

Once again, the invasion was carried out with blinding swiftness. The Pentagon held the National Media Pool captive on an air base in Panama for the first five hours of the fighting. Members of the media pool actually watched part of the invasion on CNN while being treated to a dissertation on the history of the Panama Canal Zone by an American diplomat (Media vs. military, 1998). Little real information reached the American public outside of the Pentagon pictures given to the journalists. At least 300 civilians died in the attack and resulting crossfire, some burned alive in their homes, in El Chorrillo, the neighborhood in Panama City where General Noriega's headquarters were located (Stauber & Rampton, 1995).

Aside from the victims and Army film crews, however, no one was allowed to observe the attack. The media dutifully reported the Pentagon's claim that only 202 civilians and 50 Panamanian soldiers died in the entire invasion, even though estimates from other sources ranged as high as 4,000 civilian deaths. (Stauber & Rampton, 1995)

Operation Restore Hope, 1992. In December 1992, a United Nations peacekeeping force led by about 2,000 United States Marines was sent to restore order, while international agencies attempted the difficult task of resuming food distribution and other humanitarian aid. It was the first time the United Nations had ever intervened without permission in the affairs of an independent nation (Operation Restore Hope). The December 9 beach scene in Somalia represented the heart of every commander’s fears over the disturbance of operational security (Ricks, 1993).

Many of the soldiers coming over the beach had these night vision goggles that magnify whatever little light is out there and all of a sudden, boom, they have these Klieg lights and it could have been a dangerous situation. (Media vs. military, 1998)
The actual public affairs plan included more than 20 journalists who spent several days with the Marines in preparation for the operation. Those journalists in the active media pool actually participated in the amphibious assault. (Ricks, 1993) “Once ashore, efforts began to include the “outsiders,” such as by arranging interviews with network anchors perched on the roof of the local airport” (Ricks, 1993). The complete media relations plan was flexible enough to include, when events permitted, those journalists who were unable or unwilling to join the Marines before coming ashore. (Ricks, 1993)

The media stressed afterwards that the military overreacted to the possibility that they could have caused harm to the troops coming ashore. The fact that none of the Marines were attacked or injured was beyond the control of both the military and the news media (Ricks, 1993). “Quite simply, the event was benign only because no gunman decided to take advantage of the illuminated target area containing both the U.S. Marines and the news media whose coverage had helped to bring them there” (Ricks, 1993).



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